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One of the aims of feminist transitional justice scholarship is to identify remedies for 
international transitional justice actors’ tendency to use support for gender justice in 
transition to advance other foreign policy goals.  A feminist transformative justice 
agenda, which emphasizes the need to address the continuum of violence, has been put 
forward as a potential antidote. This thesis examines the extent to which this agenda is 
equipped to fulfil this aim through an analysis of EU support for past and future 
focused gender justice efforts in Tunisia and Ukraine embedded in in-depth knowledge 
of the local (gender) politics that are shaping both countries transitions.   
It finds that while the EU’s engagement with gender justice in both countries 
has been shaped by ulterior political considerations, the EU has actually prioritized 
support for efforts that address ‘everyday’ Gender-Based Violence instead of politically 
motivated Sexual and Gender-Based Violence. As such, this thesis questions the merit 
of a feminist definition of transformative justice around a predetermined set of harms. 
Instead it argues for the adoption of a diversified theory of ‘the patriarchy of 
internationalized transitional justice’, and the embrace of a definition of ‘transformative’ 
that is centred around the notion of challenging vested interests of powerful elites.  
In light of recent developments in the field of transitional justice itself and 
global politics, these theoretical goals require methodological innovation. Case study 
selection needs to reflect that today a broader range of transitions falls within the remit 
of internationalized transitional justice practice than fifteen years ago. Moreover, 
reliance on analysis of policy documents as the core tool to identify international actors’ 
priorities in the realm of gender justice in transition should be reduced. This will 
safeguard reliability of data about international actors’ support for gender justice in 
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1. INTRODUCTION: The EU, ‘the patriarchy 
of internationalized transitional justice’ and 
transformative gender justice solutions 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, European Union (EU) High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, Frederica Mogherini, took the stage at the High-Level Conference: Achieving 
Gender Equality – Challenges and Opportunities in the ENP to confirm the EU’s 
commitment to the promotion of gender equality abroad, stating: 
Gender equality is not simply a moral duty, and a matter of social justice, of equal access. 
Granting the same rights to men and women – the very issue that brings us here today – makes 
our societies richer and more secure. It is a matter of development, and a matter of peace and 
security, not purely a matter of principles.1 
This statement is exemplary of the EU’s reinvigorated approach to the promotion of 
women’s rights abroad that gained steam in with the adoption of its second Gender 
Action Plan (GAP) in 2015.2 Inspired by this combination of revived enthusiasm for the 
promotion of women’s rights abroad on the EU’s behalf, and the EU’s adoption of its 
first transitional justice strategy around the same period,3 this thesis selected the EU as a 
 
1 EEAS, Speech by the HR/VP Mogherini at the International High-Level Conference: Achieving 
Gender Equality – Challenges and Opportunities in the European Neighbourhood Policy, Tiblisi 2015. 
Available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/5905/node/5905_ru, accessed 23 July 2019.  
2 European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of Girls and Women 
through EU External Relations 2016-2020, Brussels, 21.9.2015 SWD(2015) 182 final.  
3 Council of the European Union, EU’s support to transitional justice – Council Conclusions, 13576/15, 
16 November 2015. Annexed to it is: European Commission & High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Staff Working Document: The EU’s Framework on Support to 





case study to look into international engagement with transformative gender justice in 
transition.  
Through an in-depth study of EU engagement with gender justice in transition 
in Tunisia and Ukraine in the wake of the Arab Spring and the Maidan, this thesis 
examines the viability of solutions suggested in feminist transformative justice 
scholarship to act as a remedy for the flaws of what Ní Aoláin has coined  ‘the 
patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’.4 By interpreting these findings 
against recent developments in global politics and the field of transitional justice itself, 
this thesis suggests a number of methodological and theoretical innovations that could 
put feminist (transformative) transitional justice scholarship in a better position to 
address the challenges of contemporary internationalized transitional justice practice. 
This introductory chapter sets out the background to this study, specifies its focus, lists 
its aims and objectives, highlights its added value and provides an outline of the 
chapters that follow.  
 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
This thesis draws on and contributes to two bodies of literature in feminist transitional 
justice scholarship: 1) feminist critiques of internationalized transitional justice practice, 
and 2) feminist forays into transformative approaches to the promotion of gender 
justice in transition.5 The latter body of literature is based mostly on research with 
 
4 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘Women, security, and ‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’’ 
(2009) 31(4) Human Rights Quarterly 1055. 
5 Jelke Boesten and Polly Wilding, 'Transformative gender justice: Setting an agenda' (Women's Studies 
International Forum Elsevier, 2015) 75; Wendy Lambourne and Vivianna R Carreon, 'Engendering 
Transitional Justice: a Transformative Approach to Building Peace and Attaining Human Rights for 
Women' (2015) Human Rights Review 1; Niamh Reilly, ‘Seeking gender justice in post-conflict 
transitions: towards a transformative women’s human rights approach’ (2007) 3(2) International Journal 
of Law in Context 155, Ruth Rubio-Marín and International Center for Transitional Justice., The gender 
of reparations: unsettling sexual hierarchies while redressing human rights violations (Cambridge 
University Press [in association with] International Center for Transitional Justice 2009), Natalia 
Szablewska and Olga Jurasz, ‘Sexual and gender-based violence: the case for transformative justice in 




female victims and activists in societies in transition on the ground, and insights derived 
from it have been put forward as a remedy for the flaws of ‘the patriarchy of 
internationalized transitional justice’. However, little research into international support 
for gender justice in societies in transition has explored international actors’ engagement 
through the comprehensive gender justice lens suggested in transformative gender 
justice literature.   
 
1.2.1 The patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice 
 
Internationalization is a central factor in feminist transitional justice scholarship. No 
meaningful discussion of the advances that have been made in relation to the 
recognition of gendered harms in contemporary transitional justice practice is complete 
without consideration of the role that international law and the internationalization of 
transitional justice practice have played in this process.6 At the same time, 
internationalization can neither be neglected in any meaningful discussion about the 
limited contribution contemporary transitional justice practice has made to the 
accomplishment of tangible gender justice gains for women in societies in transition.7 
Over the last decade, in absence of the type of women’s rights victories that incited 
feminist optimism about internationalization in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the latter 
 
Hierarchies of Rape: Rethinking Approaches to Sexual Violence in Eastern Congo from the Ground up’ 
(2018) International Journal of Transitional Justice, Madeleine Rees and Christine Chinkin, ‘Exposing the 
Gendered Myth of Post Conflict Transition: The Transformative Power of Economic and Social Rights’ 
(2015) 48 NYU Journal of International Law & Politics 1211. 
6 Catherine O’Rourke, ‘Dealing with the Past in a Post-Conflict Society: Does the Participation of 
Women Matter-Insights from Northern Ireland’ (2012) 19 William & Mary Journal of Women & Law 35: 
38; Otto D, ‘Challenging the New World Order: International Law, Global Democracy and the 
Possibilities for Women’ (1993) 3 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 371. 
7 Sabine Hirschauer, The securitization of rape: Women, war and sexual violence (Springer 2014); Ní 
Aoláin (n4); Sarah Smith, ‘‘When “gender” started’: the United Nations in post-occupation Timor-Leste’ 
(2015) 27(1) Global Change, Peace & Security 55; Louise Chappell, ‘The role of the ICC in transitional 
gender justice: Capacity and limitations’ in Gender in Transitional Justice (Springer 2012); Rosemary 
Nagy, ‘Transitional justice as global project: Critical reflections’ (2008) 29(2) Third World Quarterly 275; 
Kiran Grewal, ‘Rape in conflict, rape in peace: Questioning the revolutionary potential of international 
criminal justice for women’s human rights’ (2010) 33(1) Australian Feminist Law Journal 57; Kiran 
Grewal, ‘International criminal law as a site for enhancing women’s rights? Challenges, possibilities, 




type of discussions has dominated feminist transitional justice scholarship.8 Moreover, 
the tenor of these discussions has shifted increasingly from being focused on the role of 
the definitional constraints of international law, to the role of political calculations in 
holding back the advancement of progressive gender justice gains.9 This sensitivity to 
the role of politics in shaping international approaches towards gender justice in 
transition is in the DNA of this thesis.  
The relation between feminists and international legal frameworks has always 
been contentious. As Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright have remarked ‘both the 
structures of international lawmaking and the content of the rules of international law 
privilege men; if women’s interests are acknowledged at all, they are marginalized’.10 
Nevertheless, international law has been one of the core vehicles to advance progressive 
gender justice goals through transnational women’s rights advocacy.11 The 1990s 
feminist scholarly approach towards international law, which is at the basis of what 
would become the subfield of feminist transitional justice studies,12 therefore was 
characterized by a spirit of ‘simultaneous engagement and critique’.13 Important gains, 
such as the recognition of various conflict-related gendered harms as crimes that should 
trigger legal and political responses, were secured in part thanks to these contributions 
to the debate.14 This provided feminist scholars with the impression that ‘the doctrine 
and institutions of international law have never been more supportive of delivering 
 
8 Lucy Fiske, 'The Rise (and Fall?) of Transitional Gender Justice: A Survey of the Field' in Rethinking 
Transitional Gender Justice (Springer 2019). 
9 Margaret E Keck, Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international 
politics (Cambridge University Press 1998). 
10 Hillary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Sally Wright, ‘Feminist approaches to international law’ 
(1991) 85(4) American Journal of International Law 613: 614-615.  
11 Sally Engle Merry, Human rights and gender violence: Translating international law into local justice 
(University of Chicago Press 2009), Radhika Coomaraswamy, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, 
Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1325 (United Nations 2015): 103.  
12 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Advancing feminist positioning in the field of transitional justice’ (2012) 6(2), 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 205. 
13 Catherine O’Rourke, Gender politics in transitional justice (Routledge 2013): 7. 




positive human rights outcomes for women from domestic processes of transitional 
justice’.15  
However, empirical research demonstrates that in spite of these definitional 
advances concrete gender justice gains for women largely failed to materialize in various 
contexts where international law and its institutions played a dominant role in attempts 
to pursue accountability for past wrongs.16 More specifically, feminist scholars have 
found that transitional justice efforts have reinforced hierarchies of harms that exclude 
a large share of the harms most commonly experienced by women.17 These hierarchies 
prioritize bodily harms resulting from civil and political rights violations inflicted on 
victims during narrowly delineated time frames of conflict and repression. These are the 
types of harms most commonly suffered by men. This approach excludes various types 
of violence that dominate many women’s experience of conflict and repression – e.g. 
socio-economic rights violations – and neither allows for consideration of the fact that 
much of the violence women encounter in their lives is not bound to exceptional 
political circumstances.18  
In view of these observations, concerns about the restraining nature of 
international law as a framework to advance tangible gender justice goals have remained 
squarely at the centre of the strand of feminist transitional justice scholarship that 
approaches the field through a legal paradigm.19 However, feminist transitional justice 
 
15 O’Rourke 2013 (n13): 7. 
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18 Monica McWilliams and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ''There is a War Going on You Know': Addressing the 
Complexity of Violence Against Women in Conflicted and Post Conflict Societies' (2013) 1(2) 
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scholarship on international support for gender justice in transition has increasingly 
situated analysis outside the realm of law into the domain of international politics. In 
this body of work, legal frameworks to advance women’s rights in transition are 
approached as relatively malleable institutions at the grace of international actors, who 
implement or neglect them according to their broader political interests.20 Besides being 
reflective of a feminist fatigue with international law,21 it seems driven by the fading of 
boundaries between feminist peacebuilding and transitional justice scholarship,22 and 
characterized by a discussion of gender justice efforts in the wider framework of 
international engagement with the Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS Agenda).23 
This thesis falls within this tradition in the sense that it recognizes the important role of 
political calculations in driving international engagement with gender justice in 
transition.24 However, it is not only interested in how these calculations are reflected in 
international actors’ prioritization of pursuing accountability for Sexual and Gender-
Based Violence (SGBV), but also how they might affect international actors’ support 
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1.2.2 Feminist transformative justice solutions 
What changes are required to put transitional justice as a field in a better position to 
pursue meaningful gender justice outcomes for women? This question is at the core of 
what this thesis refers to as feminist transformative justice scholarship.25 While 
scholarship on ‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’ focuses mostly on 
identifying the flaws in the system in its current shape, feminist transformative 
scholarship focuses on the search for solutions. This has resulted in a broad range of 
suggestions of gender justice issues and efforts that should be incorporated into 
mainstream transitional justice practice in order to make sure that 1) the wide range of 
gendered harms experienced by women during conflict and repression are addressed, 
and 2) the efforts to address these harms put female victims and women as a group in a 
better position than before conflict or repression uprooted their lives.26 
Delineating the exact scope of the feminist transformative justice lens is 
challenging as while feminist transformative justice scholarship is on the rise, a 
universally accepted definition that identifies the core components of a transformative 
justice approach has failed to materialize yet.27 Nevertheless, key aspects of a feminist 
approach towards transformative justice are identifiable in this growing body of 
literature.28 Based on a review of key contributions to feminist transformative justice 
literature – to be discussed in more depth in chapter 2 - this thesis argues that a 
transformative approach towards gender justice in transition consists of three elements: 
1) formal transitional justice efforts to pursue accountability for narrowly defined 
politically motivated sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) against women, 2) 
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27 Attempts to comprehensively define what constitutes being ‘transformative’ have been made in relation 
to individual transitional justice mechanisms such as reparations: Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Catherine 
O'Rourke and Aisling Swaine, 'Transforming reparations for conflict-related sexual violence: Principles 
and practice' (2015) 28 Harvard Human Rights Journal 97: 142. 




formal and informal efforts to pursue justice for a wider range of harms – including 
what Sankey refers to as subsistence harms - experienced directly as a result of conflict 
or repression,29 and 3) more future-focused attempts at legislative and institutional 
reform to break the continuum of violence experienced by women regardless of the 
prevalence of conflict and repression.30 This thesis uses the term support for gender 
justice in transition to refer to these three categories taken together. The term gendered 
transitional justice is used to refer to mainstream transitional justice efforts that fall 
within the first category.  
An important characteristic of feminist transformative justice scholarship is that 
it draws inspiration from the local. This is in line with a feminist research ethos which 
emphasizes the importance of including and highlighting the experiences of 
(marginalized) women in knowledge creation.31 This body of scholarship, however, has 
paid significantly less attention to what happens when these solutions meet the 
‘patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’. This is an important gap in the 
scholarship as in the current transitional justice landscape international actors play an 
important role at the financial and political level in advancing and shaping ‘local’ 
transitional justice efforts.32 Neglecting this reality comes at the risk of rendering the 
transformative gender justice agenda less equipped to contribute to real life progressive 
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gender justice outcomes, and is emblematic of what O’Rourke has referred to as a ‘de-
politicizing impulse’ consuming feminist transitional justice scholarship.33 
 
1.3 FOCUS OF THIS RESEARCH  
This thesis is interested in engagement of international transitional justice actors with 
gender justice in transition through support for both mainstream transitional justice as 
well as past and future focused transformative gender justice efforts. It employs the 
term international actor to refer to the states and international organizations (IOs) that 
have used their political weight and considerable financial resources to support the 
adoption and implementation of transitional justice measures abroad. It analyses the 
support of one such actor, the EU, for gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine through 
the conceptual transformative gender justice framework described in section 1.2.2. In 
doing so it connects feminist scholarship on ‘the patriarchy of internationalized 
transitional justice’ and feminist transformative justice scholarship. The analysis relies 
on multiple types of comparisons to provide insight in 1) the factors which determine 
the nature of the EU’s engagement with gender justice in transition, and 2) the extent to 
which feminist transformative justice scholarship is equipped to identify and provide 
solutions for the flaws of contemporary internationalized transitional justice practice.  
As will be discussed in chapter 3, the research relies on analysis of relevant EU 
documents and in-depth interviews with EU officials and other actors working on 
gender justice in transition in Brussels, Tunisia and Ukraine to provide a comprehensive 
picture of EU engagement with gender justice in transition in Tunisia and Ukraine in 
the wake of their respective revolutions. When the thesis alludes to the EU it refers to 
the EU as a supranational entity rather than its individual Member States. It therefore 
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only looks into the actions supported directly from the EU budget and/or supported 
and carried out by EU institutions such as the Council, Commission and European 
External Action Service (EEAS). The actions the thesis takes into account are 1) 
financial support for different types of efforts that aim to advance gender justice in 
transition, 2) gender mainstreaming of relevant fields of EU external action (notably 
justice and security sector reform (SSR)), and 3) the EU’s use of diplomatic tools (public 
statements, economic conditionality and in the Ukrainian case sanctions) to support 
efforts aimed at advancing gender justice goals.   
Looking into the EU’s record as a supporter of gender justice in transition is 
important. This is first of all the case simply because in general transitional justice 
scholarship has failed to provide in-depth accounts of the role transitional justice 
support plays in major international actors’ foreign policy activities. In this regard 
Arthur has noted: 
There is no shortage in the literature on transitional justice (TJ) of discussion of the role of 
international norms in shaping the practice of TJ. Researchers and observers have written 
incisively about “reconciling” global norms and local agency, how such norms are “negotiated” 
by local actors “on the ground,” the importance of TJ “from below” led by “grassroots 
activists,” “localizing” TJ, and “dilemmas of the global and local.” But what about the role of 
international assistance in TJ, and in particular, financial aid from governments? The challenges 
in addressing the issue are substantial: there is a dearth of data on such financial flows; donor 
agencies may offer little public insight into their decision-making; qualitative research among 
donors faces practical and political difficulties, simply in terms of identifying the right people 
and getting them to agree to an interview; and, finally, the sheer range of actors involved would 
be daunting to any researcher.34 
Against this background of a general dearth of information on international actors’ 
engagement with transitional justice, the EU is a particularly under-explored entity, 
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despite the fact that it has been an important player in this realm. The EU has 
historically been a core financial backer of transitional justice efforts worldwide, and 
particularly of the legal institutions erected to deal with large-scale, grave human rights 
violations.35 Nevertheless, academic literature on the EU’s activities in this realm is 
relatively scarce.36 This seems to be related to the fact that only in 2015 the EU 
published its first policy on transitional justice ‘The EU’s Framework on Support to 
Transitional Justice’ (hereafter: the Framework), publicly positioning itself as an 
international transitional justice actor.37  
As the introduction has highlighted, this publication coincided with a period in 
which the EU has started to seriously gear up its women’s rights rhetoric. While doing 
so, the EU has also embraced some transformative gender justice language. However, 
existing analyses of EU engagement with the WPS Agenda imply that the EU’s 
approach in this regard has been characterised by high levels of opportunism.38 Taken 
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together, these initial observations further strengthen the case for zooming in on the 
EU for an in-depth examination of what happens when transformative gender justice 
ideals collude with the reality of international gender justice politics.  
Beyond providing a descriptive account of EU engagement with gender justice 
in Tunisia and Ukraine, the thesis also identifies the factors that have shaped the nature 
of this engagement. To do so, it relies on a comparison between what the EU says it 
does, what it actually does, and what it could be doing in Tunisia and Ukraine. To make 
these comparisons, the thesis looks at three levels of information: 1) how the EU 
depicts its approach towards each of the above discussed gender justice activities in 
generic policy documents, 2) what opportunities exist to support each of these gender 
justice efforts in Tunisia and Ukraine and how various local actors have positioned 
themselves in relation to these opportunities (the local gender justice opportunity 
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structure), and 3) how the EU engages with each of these opportunities in reality. To 
allow for structured comparison the thesis uses the tripartite conceptualization of 
gender justice in transition discussed in section 1.2.2 as a guiding framework. This 
exercise contributes to establishing the balance between the role of global – universal - 
gender justice commitments and local gender justice opportunity structures in shaping 
EU engagement with gender justice in practice.  
By using Tunisia and Ukraine (with a focus on transitional justice initiatives 
around the conflict in the Donbas region) as case studies at the local level, this thesis 
breaks with the tendency in feminist scholarship on internationalized transitional justice 
practice, to mostly focus on international engagement with from war-to-peace 
transitions in Sub-Saharan African and South-East Asian countries whose conflicts 
where characterized by large scale occurrence of conflict-related SGBV. Tunisia’s 
experience qualifies as a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The Donbas 
conflict is a low-intensity war with relatively few instances of conflict-related SGBV. 
Both countries are situated on the borders of Europe. In adopting such a focus this 
research can provide clarity on the applicability of dominant feminist theories on the 
nature of internationalized transitional justice practice in non-typical case study 
contexts.  
To the extent that the findings demonstrate that solutions suggested by feminist 
transformative justice proponents are not addressing the gaps in the EU’s approach 
towards gender justice in transition in Tunisia and Ukraine, this thesis also uses 
comparative analysis to enhance understanding of why the findings from this thesis 
deviate from dominant insights in the literature. More specifically, it compares the 
research design – choice of case studies and methods – underlying this thesis, against 
the types of research designs that have usually been employed by feminist scholars to 




comparison serves to understand how methodological choices might explain the 
differences in findings between this thesis and the literature it builds on. It links these 
findings to broader developments in the field of transitional justice itself and global 
politics, to suggest advances at the theoretical and methodological level that could put 
feminist transitional justice scholarship in a stronger position to address the challenges 
posed by contemporary transitional justice practice.  
 
1.4 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES  
The research aims to contribute to the development of feminist theory and 
methodology in the field of transitional justice – particularly feminist transformative 
justice scholarship - through the provision of original insights about the EU’s 
engagement with gendered transitional justice in third countries in practice. As such, the 
main research question this thesis aims to answer is: How to enhance the ability of 
feminist transitional justice scholarship to respond to the political realities of the 
contemporary internationalized transitional justice environment? To answer this 
question, the thesis identified six research objectives: 
 
1. To identify and categorize EU gender justice policy priorities: What does the 
EU imply its priorities are with regard to support for gender justice in transition in 
relevant policy documents? Where are these priorities situated in the tripartite 
conceptualization of gender justice in transition at the core of this thesis?  
2. To identify and categorize local gender justice opportunity structures: What is 
the local gender justice opportunity structure for each of the three components of the 
tripartite conceptualization of the feminist transformative justice agenda in Tunisia and 




differ from what are considered to be mainstream gendered transitional justice 
priorities?  
3: To identify and categorize EU gender justice efforts in practice: What type of 
gender justice efforts does the EU support in Tunisia and Ukraine? Where should one 
locate the EU’s actions in practice on the tripartite transformative gender justice 
conceptualization?  
4. To identify the factors that drive EU engagement with gender justice in 
transition by comparing EU gender justice efforts against local gender justice 
opportunity structures and international gender justice priorities: When 
comparing the EU’s gender justice activities in Tunisia and Ukraine in practice with 
what are considered to be international actors’ gendered transitional justice priorities 
and the local gender justice opportunity structure, where should the EU’s approach be 
situated? What does this imply about the factors driving EU engagement with gender 
justice in transition?  
5. To identify how choices at the level of research design and methodology have 
affected the extent to which this thesis’ findings do not align with dominant 
insights from feminist theory: When comparing the findings of this thesis with 
common feminist insights about the nature of international gender justice support and 
the drivers behind these efforts, what are the similarities and differences? In case of 
differences how can the research design of this thesis, compared to the approaches 
feminist studies on ‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’ most 
commonly rely upon, explain these differences? 
6. To provide suggestions for theoretical and methodological innovations that 
will render feminist transitional justice better equipped to respond to the 
challenges posed by contemporary internationalized transitional justice practice. 




with gender justice in transition in view of recent developments in the field of 
transitional justice itself, global approaches towards human rights and global actors’ 
gender justice rhetoric?  
 
1.5 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
Feminist transitional justice scholarship aims to contribute to the realization of 
progressive gender justice outcomes for women in societies in transition.39 To do so, it 
needs to accurately identify problems and come up with realistic solutions for them. 
This thesis’ added value - besides providing a detailed picture of the gender justice 
activities of an under-researched transitional justice actor – therefore resides in its 
identification of theoretical and methodological innovations feminist transitional justice 
scholarship should embrace to provide more pointed solutions to the flaws of ‘the 
patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’. As discussed in the background 
section, feminist transformative justice scholarship has suggested various improvements 
to mainstream transitional justice practice to arrive at more meaningful gender justice 
outcomes. However, when it comes to addressing the flaws of ‘the patriarchy of 
internationalized transitional justice’, this thesis has found that these solutions did not 
address the gaps in the EU’s engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine. In 
fact, the EU’s political interests in, and relations with Tunisia and Ukraine make it more 
inclined to engage with forward-looking transformative gender justice efforts, than with 
the type of mainstream gendered transitional justice efforts, international actors have 
been found to prioritize in other contexts.  
 ‘The patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’ thus is a multi-headed 
beast, and solutions identified as remedies for the flaws of ‘the patriarchy of 
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internationalized transitional justice’ in feminist transformative justice scholarship are 
not addressing all of its many appearances. By looking into the methodological specifics 
of this research – case study choice and methods – this thesis finds that its reliance on 
atypical case studies and analysis of EU activities on the ground rather than policy 
documents might account for the differences between the picture painted by this 
research and dominant feminist critiques of international engagement with gender 
justice in transition. Interpreting these findings in light of recent developments in the 
field of transitional justice itself and global politics more broadly speaking, this thesis 
concludes that as this thesis’ case studies speak to these developments, its findings 
present an urgent case for diversification at the theoretical and methodological level in 
feminist scholarship on ‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’.  
 More specifically, this thesis calls for less reliance on analysis of policy 
documents to enhance understanding of the nature of and drivers behind international 
engagement with gender justice as 1) due to a shift towards more interest-based foreign 
policy at the global level, policy documents seem to become ever more remote from the 
reality on the ground, and because 2) due to an enlargement of the scope of transitions 
being of interest to internationalized transitional justice practice, generic policy language 
is decreasingly unable to provide a comprehensive and adequate picture of international 
actors’ priorities in the field of gendered transitional justice. This thesis, therefore, 
argues in favour of more contextualized analyses of the functioning of the patriarchy of 
transitional justice. This approach should cover a wider range of country contexts than 
those that have traditionally dominated feminist scholarship on international transitional 
justice support, in order to account for the inclusion of a wider range of transitions in 
the scope internationalized transitional justice practice.  
These innovations at the methodological level should go hand in hand with 




‘transformative’ should not necessarily be defined in terms of a predetermined set of 
mechanisms or harms, but rather in terms of the extent to which actions challenge 
vested interests or address under-addressed gender justice issues, when suggested as a 
remedy for the flaws of internationalized transitional justice practice. 
 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis consists of eight chapters: this introductory chapter, a theoretical framework 
chapter, methodology chapter, case study background chapter, two findings chapters, a 
discussion chapter discussing the theoretical and methodological implications of these 
findings, and a conclusion.  
Chapter 2 discusses the two strands of feminist transitional justice theory that 
constitute the theoretical backbone of this thesis. It finds that feminist scholars have 
increasingly searched for solutions to the flaws of ‘the patriarchy of internationalized 
transitional justice’ by studying female victims’ demands and (feminist) grassroots 
gender justice initiatives, because these demands and approaches acknowledge a much 
wider range of gendered harms than internationalized transitional justice practice 
traditionally has. It, however, argues that neither critiques of ‘the patriarchy of 
internationalized transitional justice’, nor feminist transformative justice scholarship, 
have taken into account how local gender politics might impact the type of gender 
justice efforts international actors will support.  
Chapter 3 elaborates on research methodology, justifying the choice for a multi-
level case study design as the vehicle for the examination of the extent to which 
transformative gender justice solutions address the flaws of ‘the patriarchy of 
internationalized transitional justice’, that is sensitive to the impact of international and 




interviews as a primary method for data collection in a feminist thesis that aims to 
critically scrutinize powerful international actors.  
Chapter 4 constitutes a more in-depth discussion of the EU’s policy 
commitments to support for gender justice in transition, and the local gender justice 
opportunity structures, including the gender politics that have shaped gender justice 
efforts and discourses in Tunisia and Ukraine in the wake of their respective 
revolutions. This chapter is crucial to allow for insight in the extent to which EU 
support for gender justice in both countries is in line with its gender justice 
commitments on paper, and the extent to which the EU acquiesces to the gender justice 
priorities of local grassroots actors and/or political elites. 
Chapter 5 is a detailed description of the EU’s support for gender justice in 
Tunisia and Ukraine that distinguishes between the EU’s support for the three different 
categories of gender justice in transition identified in section 1.2.2. This chapter covers 
both the financial support and political backing the EU has provided to gender justice 
in Tunisia and Ukraine. It finds that the EU has prioritized forward-looking gender 
justice initiatives over past-focused efforts of both a transformative and mainstream 
kind. These findings are significant as they refute some dominant insights about the 
nature of international support for gender justice in transition. They refute the notion 
that international actors are disproportionally focussed on addressing politically 
motivated instances of SGBV and have ignored the continuum of violence experienced 
by women. 
Chapter 6 uses comparative analysis to examine to what extent EU policy 
commitments and/or local gender justice opportunity structures have shaped these 
outcomes. It compares the findings of chapter 5 to the insights discussed in chapter 4 
and connects them to statements by EU representatives and other experts about the 




interviews. It argues that the similarities and differences in the nature of the EU’s 
engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine compared to information about 
local gender justice opportunity structures, imply that EU support for gender justice in 
transition is guided more by the intersection of EU foreign policy interests with those 
of local governing elites than by predefined international gender justice commitments. 
Statements by EU actors support this vision. This means that while the EU’s 
engagement with gender justice in transition is vulnerable to co-option, the nature of 
the efforts that are co-opted differs from what are generally thought to be the gender 
justice efforts most vulnerable to instrumentalization.  
Chapter 7 reflects on how choices at the level of research design might have 
influenced the type of EU engagement with gender justice in transition that this thesis 
has uncovered. It compares this thesis’ choices at the level of case study selection and 
methods, to the methodological approaches that have dominated most other feminist 
studies on international support for transitional justice. It elaborates on the theoretical 
and methodological innovations discussed in the previous section. 
Chapter 8 summarizes the findings of this thesis. It concludes that to enhance 
feminist transitional justice scholarship’s ability to provide effective solutions for the 
flaws of ‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’ it needs to maintain its 
sensitivity to the ways in which broader political agendas shape international 
engagement with gender justice in transition. However, this requires acknowledgement 
of the fact that that these agendas exist on the local level as well, and that neither 
mainstream gendered transitional justice efforts nor transformative gender justice 
efforts are immune to being instrumentalized/co-opted to advance these agendas. It 
elaborates on a future research agenda for the feminist study of international 
engagement with gender justice in transition to overcome the limitations of this thesis, 




with gender justice in transition, as well as uses these findings to create a bottom-up 














2. THEORY: Bridging the gap between 
feminist theory on international engagement 
with transitional justice and feminist 
transformative justice theory 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Critiques of ‘the global’, and insistence on the need to incorporate ‘the local’ have 
become an ‘increasingly common trope in academic and policy discourse’ on 
transitional justice,40 and feminist transitional justice scholarship is no exception to this 
trend. After section 2.2’s discussion of the flaws of ‘the patriarchy of internationalized 
transitional justice’, and feminist explanations for these flaws, section 2.3 argues that for 
locally-inspired solutions to be successful they need to address both conceptual lacunae 
as well as provide a strategy to overcome politically-motivated selective engagement 
with gender justice in transition. Section 2.4 demonstrates that feminist scholars have 
suggested a locally inspired feminist transformative justice agenda to overcome these 
flaws.  However, section 2.5’s in-depth examination of accounts of transformative 
gender justice efforts that have been pursued in local contexts demonstrates that in 
reality these efforts have failed to tackle the hurdles erected by local (gender) politics. 
Based on these observations it argues that feminist transitional justice scholarship needs 
to enhance its understanding of ‘local gender justice opportunity structures’. The 
subjugation of gender justice support to broader political goals has also been found to 
be at the root of the failure of internationalized transitional justice practice to yield 
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meaningful gender justice outcomes. Therefore, section 2.5 argues that it is important to 
examine more closely what happens when ‘the patriarchy of internationalized 
transitional justice’ meets the transformative gender justice concept. As such this 
chapter identifies the core aim of this thesis, with section 2.6 also setting out the 
conceptual framework that will facilitate this research to achieve this aim in a robust, 
structured manner.    
 
2.2 THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONALIZED TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
PRACTICE 
The internationalization of transitional justice that kicked off in the 1990s, has gone 
hand in hand with increased recognition of the need to recognize women’s experiences 
of conflict and repression when designing and implementing measures to deal with the 
past. The recognition of rape as a war crime,41 and the adoption of UNSCR 1325 are 
the most high-profile examples of this development.42 However, paradoxically feminist 
scholars have found that the internationalization that initially catapulted women’s rights 
to the centre of transitional justice debates, is nowadays one of the key factors 
prohibiting the pursuit of such an agenda.43  
When referring to transitional justice in its ‘traditional’ or ‘mainstream’ sense, 
this thesis refers to the definition put forward by the United Nations Secretary General 
in its 2004 report on the matter.44 The surge of the systematic use of activities that fall 
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within the realm of this definition date back to early 1980s when a wave of transitions 
from authoritarianism to (free market) democracy in Latin American and - later - 
Eastern European created demand for tools to address legacies of violence and 
widespread human rights violations in times of political transition.45 Since then the field 
has rapidly evolved. The most notable development in this regard has been the 
widening of the field’s scope. Three decades after the ‘third wave of democracy’ that 
gave birth to transitional justice as a field of study and practice, the field is ‘increasingly 
associated not just with narrow transitions to democracy, but with post-conflict 
peacebuilding more generally’.46 This widening of scope has gone hand in hand with the 
field’s move ‘from the periphery of international attention and policymaking to the 
centre’.47 While the early adopters of transitional justice initiatives implemented them 
without significant support of – or interference from - foreign actors, the 1990s and 
2000s witnessed an explosive growth of international interest in and support for 
transitional justice, culminating in the above-mentioned landmark UN Secretary 
General report on transitional justice, which constituted ‘an official institutional 
endorsement of transitional justice’.48  
These latter developments have coincided with the recognition that transitional 
justice efforts need to recognize and address the gendered nature of harms inflicted on 
individuals and societies during times of conflict and repression: 
[The] confluence of transitional justice expansion and the WPS agenda is motivating a dramatic 
broadening of feminist objectives in transitional justice. Whereas transitional justice activity 
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motivated little feminist concern or engagement in the paradigmatic transitions of the Latin 
American Southern Cone, it is now an area of concerted feminist analysis, policy, and activism.49 
As a result of feminist advocacy that ‘sought to extend the feminist energy and insights 
concerning violence against women (VAW) in international human rights law to the 
legal treatment of violence in international humanitarian law and ICL’ wartime rape was 
recognized as a war crime.50 The advances in the field of ICL coincided with similar 
developments in the field of international security politics. The notion that women and 
gender could no longer be neglected in this domain was picked up by those actors 
residing in ‘the highest echelons of power’ through the United Nations Security 
Council’s (UNSC) adoption of Resolution 1325.51 This resolution calls upon 
international actors to ensure women and gender are taken into account in all efforts 
related to conflict resolution and peacebuilding.52 The Resolution contains a strong 
gendered transitional justice component as it ‘[e]mphasizes the responsibility of all 
States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other 
violence against women and girls, and in this regard stresses the need to exclude these 
crimes where feasible from amnesty provisions’.53 
As, in spite of historical evidence of the recurring wide scale use of strategic 
rape in conflict settings, the harms resulting from it had historically been understood to 
just be ‘collateral damage’,54 these developments inspired a certain level of feminist 
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euphoria. However, after this initial excitement about definitional advances had ebbed 
away, feminists shifted their focus to the impact of these developments on the ground. 
This has resulted in increasing levels of disillusionment with internationalized 
transitional justice, as research demonstrates that both justice for individual female 
victims, as well as more gender equal societies in general have largely failed to 
materialize in practice.55 First of all, feminists have found a basic failure on international 
actors’ behalf to meaningfully implement their actual commitments in practice. In the 
realm of international criminal law feminists have, for instance, lamented that very few 
convictions have resulted from the above discussed definitional advances.56 In the field 
of WPS feminists have criticized the limited extent to which commitments have been 
translated into for instance increased spending on the promotion and protection of 
women’s rights in the context of international security efforts,57 and the limited extent 
to which the number of women participating in this type of effort has increased.58 
Second, feminists have since long questioned whether the approach towards 
(gendered) transitional justice that has become the norm in internationalized transitional 
justice practice actually has the potential to contribute to gender justice in transition.59 
At the level of the quest for justice for individual victims, they have questioned whether 
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approaches centred around trials and truth commissions are most optimal to bring 
about meaningful gender justice outcomes for victims of the gendered harms that now 
do fall within the scope of ‘mainstream’ transitional justice practice.60 In relation to 
prosecutions Mertus has found that the language of legal proceedings, which requires 
victims to ‘narrowly define what happened to them in line with the rules of evidence 
and the legal definition of rape’ can result in rape victims’ further alienation rather than 
them obtaining a feeling of justice.61 ‘The fragmentation of testimony’ characteristic to 
criminal procedures only deepens this feeling. Truth commissions, while initially hailed 
as a platform better positioned to allow women to share their experiences,62 have also 
been critiqued for their inability to provide a comprehensive picture of women's 
experiences of political violence.63 Instead they have been found to prioritize broader 
agendas of victimhood and nation-building at the expense of women's individual 
narratives.64 
Third, at the conceptual level, feminists have criticized transitional justice 
practice in its current shape for its inability to contribute to the mitigation of structural 
(gender) inequalities. In fact, O’Rourke has found that ‘attention to structural gender 
inequalities has emerged as the sine qua none of contemporary feminist interventions 
into transitional justice’.65 The body of feminist scholarship which explores how 
transitional justice practice needs to be adjusted to be better able to address these 
structural gender inequalities is referred to in this thesis as ‘feminist transformative 
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justice scholarship’ and will be discussed in more detail in the section 2.3. This thesis 
argues that it has three core goals: 1) to provide female victims of traditionally 
prioritized gendered harms with more meaningful justice that puts them in a better 
position than before they were subjected to these harms; 2) to recognize a broader 
range of (gendered) harms, particularly socio-economic rights violations, as worthy of 
being taken into consideration in transitional justice efforts; and 3) to use periods of 
transition as windows of opportunity to address the structural marginalization of 
women that is at the root of the more excessive types of violence inflicted on women 
during periods of conflict and repression. 
 
2.3 THE POLITICS BEHIND ‘THE PATRIARCHY OF 
INTERNATIONALIZED TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE’ 
Increasingly, transitional justice’s continuous failure to address this broader range of 
harms has been explicitly ascribed to the field’s internationalized character.66 More 
specifically, feminist and other critical transitional justice authors have argued that 
internationalization has come with a standardization of a type of transitional justice 
practice heavily rooted in Western notions of justice that does neither address the needs 
of the victims, nor square with attitudes towards justice in the societies where they are 
implemented. In line with this observation feminist authors have increasingly looked at 
the local for inspiration for solutions for the flaws of contemporary internationalized 
transitional justice practice. 
 In relation to the link between internationalization and transitional justice’s 
inability to pursue meaningful justice for those subjugated to it, scholars have argued 
that the disconnect between internationalized transitional justice’s practice 
 




conceptualization of justice and local visions on justice is at the root of this issue. In 
this regard Sharp has remarked: 
This “prosecution preference,” under which anything short of Western-style courtroom justice 
is often seen as compromised justice, is seemingly hardwired into the DNA of mainstream 
transitional justice. It has been and continues to be persistent source of debate and global-local 
frictions. Though truth commissions as a form of restorative justice are arguably an exception to 
the historic emphasis on retributive responses to mass atrocities, it has been argued that they are 
still fundamentally rooted in Western modes of truth telling and traditions of public confession 
and may not be appropriate in cultures with a different historical grounding.67 
Similarly, Gready and Robins consider the ‘top-down imposition’ of legalist justice 
measures to be closely connected to the emergence of a global ‘industry of practice […] 
supported by dedicated nongovernmental organizations and large-scale funding from 
Western donors’.68  
Feminist scholars have found, on top of that, that the dominance of traditional 
Western conceptualizations of justice in transitional justice practice is central to its 
patriarchal nature. As mentioned, to summarize this state of affairs, Ní Aoláin has 
coined the term the ‘patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’.69 She explains 
that this concept captures the continuous dominance of masculinity and masculine 
norms within societies and institutions, including those representing the liberal order. 
Patriarchal mentality is reflected in, but not restricted to, the prioritization of civil and 
political rights - which are norms that mostly speak to the male experience of and 
priorities in conflict and repression, legalist responses as outlined above, and a narrow 
definition of stability/security that prioritizes the integrity of the masculine state 
structure over the day-to-day security of its citizens. 
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The dominance of the West/Global North is not only present at the conceptual 
level, it is also reflected in the composition of the actors (institutions and individuals) 
that provide the bulk of funding and expertise for the running of transitional justice 
activities on the day-to-day level.70 Here, international actors are often credited for 
‘rescuing such societies from the worst of their own excesses’.71 However, Ní Aoláin 
points out that ‘what is little appreciated is that such men also bring with them varying 
aspects of gender norms and patriarchal behaviour that transpose into the vacuum they 
fill’.72 As such Ní Aoláin argues that ‘despite an array of cultural differences between 
locals and internationals, frequently overlooked are fundamentally similar patriarchal 
views that internal and external elites share, which operate in tandem to exclude, silence, 
or nullify women's needs from the transitional space’.73 Internationalization of 
transitional justice has thus resulted in the importation of ‘international masculinities’ to 
the local level, and the reinforcement of local patriarchies by the patriarchy of 
international oversight.74  In this light it is not surprising that transitional justice 
interventions have been called out for their neo-colonial nature by critical feminist 
international law and transitional justice scholars.75   
Moreover, an emerging body of feminist scholarship finds that broader foreign 
policy agendas of powerful international actors should be blamed for internationalized 
transitional justice practice essentialist approach towards support for women’s rights in 
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transition.76 Essentialism refers to the identification of what counts as women’s rights 
concerns worthy of international support based on deeply ingrained stereotypes about 
womanhood, women’s value to society, and female suffering.77 The paradox of the 
increased international recognition for gendered experiences of transition is thus that 
while it has finally recognized women’s rights as a matter of international security, the 
terms of inclusion have severely restricted the boundaries within in which feminists can 
advocate for women’s rights. In this regard, Otto finds that in spite of UNSCR 1325’s 
façade of comprehensiveness, significant silences have been embedded in the policy 
framework from its inception – e.g. the importance of demilitarization - whereas other 
issues –  as important as they are – have received a disproportionate amount of 
attention.78 Essentialist tendencies are particularly apparent in the international 
community’s obsession with conflict-related SGBV, and its neglect of other types of 
VAW of both physical as well as economic nature.79  
Obviously, this has raised the question why these essentialist understandings of 
what constitute gender justice concerns worthy of international attention, have not 
changed despite increasing feminist advocacy in favour of a more inclusive vision on 
gender justice in transition. Various feminist scholars have come to the conclusion that 
this is the case because international engagement with gender justice has not been 
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driven by a commitment to the feminist project, but rather opportunistic political 
calculations on behalf of international actors.80  
It has been argued that international actors have feigned commitment to the 
protection of women in conflict to advance mainstream policy interests that are 
antithetical to feminist goals.81 This understanding of the motivations behind 
international engagement with gender justice in transition has been fueled by instances 
in which international actors – from the Global North - have justified interventions in 
the Global South by invoking the need to protect local women’s rights.82 In this regard 
feminists have also found that for patriarchal actors from the Global North it is more 
convenient to call out exceptional types of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) associated 
with conflict and repression than to call out everyday VAW which is also rampant in 
societies in the Global North;83 and even less so to acknowledge the structural violence 
women experience as a result of global economic inequalities fostered and exploited by 
powerful actors in the Global North,84 or worse, to recognize the violence experienced 
by women as a result of abuse of international peacekeeping missions.85 Taken together, 
this has brought certain feminist scholars to conclude that the way in which 
international actors have delineated their gender justice goals betrays an instrumentalist 
approach towards support for women’s rights in transition: it allows them to intervene 
in third countries while it doesn’t require them to address how their own actions 
exacerbate inequality at home and abroad. This is what this thesis refers to as 
‘instrumentalization’ or ‘co-option’. 
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2.4 THE PROMISE OF LOCALLY INSPIRED SOLUTIONS FOR THE 
PROBLEMS OF ‘THE PATRIARCHY OF INTERNATIONALIZED 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE’ 
This section discusses in more detail the feminist transformative gender justice agenda 
and argues that ‘the local’ has been instrumental in shaping this agenda. It shows that 
both examples of gender justice efforts executed by grassroots gender justice actors and 
local female victims’ voices have shaped the feminist transformative gender justice 
agenda. Based on an analysis of these publications, this thesis identifies the priorities of 
the feminist transformative gender justice agenda as being: 1) to provide female victims 
of ‘traditional’ gendered harms with more meaningful justice that puts them in a better 
position than before they were subjected to these harms; 2) to recognize a broader 
range of (gendered) harms, particularly socio-economic rights violations, as worthy of 
being taken into consideration in transitional justice efforts; and 3) to use periods of 
transition as windows of opportunities to address the structural marginalization of 
women that is at the root of the more excessive types of violence inflicted on women 
during periods of conflict and repression. To address all three goals feminists have 
found, based on research in local contexts, that it is crucial to address the socio-
economic dimension of harms inflicted during conflict and repression, and to recognize 
violence inflicted on women in the private space.  
The need to recognize the socio-economic dimension of harms has been central 
to feminist transformative gender justice scholarship.86 First of all, women are suffering 
from structural economic marginalization and their dependence on men makes them 
vulnerable to being harmed in the private sphere regardless of the occurrence of 
 




conflict or repression.87 During times of conflict and repression women’s economic 
fragility increases the likelihood of them becoming victim to a range of grave human 
rights violations including politically motivated SGBV.88 Conflict-induced poverty also 
increases the risk that women are forced to participate in survival sex.89 Many feminist 
scholars therefore argue that if transitional justice processes aim to bring about 
meaningful justice outcomes for women they need to address this structural inequality.90 
Second, feminists have found that during times of conflict and repression socio-
economic rights violations constitute the bulk of violations experienced by women, and 
that women suffer disproportionately from this type of harm in their capacity as sole 
providers/care-takers of the family when husbands or other male family members are 
absent due to imprisonment, forced disappearance or war.91 Not addressing 
conflict/repression-induced socio-economic rights violations in transitional justice 
 
87 Seema Vyas and Charlotte Watts, 'How does economic empowerment affect women's risk of intimate 
partner violence in low and middle income countries? A systematic review of published evidence' (2009) 
21(5) Journal of International Development 577. 
 
However, the relation is not that straightforward as in some contexts women have been found to become 
victims of increased levels of domestic violence when provided with means that could support their 
economic independency such as micro-credits. In this regard Schuler and others have found in the 
Bangladeshi context that ‘in some cases, however, providing resources to women and encouraging them 
to maintain control over these resources may provoke violent behaviour in men, because they see their 
authority over their wives being undermined. 
 
Sidney Ruth Schule, Syed M. Hashemi and Shamsul Huda Badal, 'Men's violence against women in rural 
Bangladesh: undermined or exacerbated by microcredit programmes?' (1998) 8(2) Development in 
Practice 148. 
88 Khuloud Alsaba and Anuj Kapilashrami, 'Understanding women’s experience of violence and the 
political economy of gender in conflict: the case of Syria' (2016) 24(47) Reproductive Health Matters 5: 
10; Sara E Davies and Jacqui True, 'The pandemic of conflict-related sexual violence and the political 
economy of gender inequality' in Rape Justice (Springer 2015). 
89 Reilly (n5): 165. See also: Alice Hutchinson and others, 'Understanding early marriage and transactional 
sex in the context of armed conflict: protection at a price' (2016) 42(1) International perspectives on 
sexual and reproductive health 45. 
90 Boesten and Wilding 2015 (n5).  
91 Bell and O’Rourke 2007 (n39): 34. In this regard Nikolic-Ritanovic has found that the trauma Serbian, 
Bosniak and Croatian women experienced as a result of losing male family members was aggravated by a 
loss of resources and the need to assume sole responsibility for the care and survival of other family 
members. Vesna Nikolić-Ristanović, 'War, nationalism, and mothers in the former Yugoslavia' (1998) The 




processes, effectively means excluding a large chunk of gendered harms from the 
narrative.92  
These findings about the importance of recognizing the socio-economic 
dimension of gendered harms have been inspired and backed up by research with 
female victims. Research by scholars such as Aroussi who conducted interviews with 
survivors of conflict related SGBV in South Kivu concludes that for most victims 
‘justice primarily meant economic assistance and development-oriented remedies, 
particularly those targeted at subsistence and livelihoods, access to education and 
healthcare’.93 It also includes Simon Robin’s research with families of the disappeared in 
Nepal, which identified subsistence needs to be the priority for the wives of the 
disappeared even though this raised dilemmas ‘in having to choose among the need to 
feed themselves now, the need to know the truth before any compensation or 
reparations can be accepted and the very idea of putting a value on the life of the 
disappeared by accepting money from the authorities’.94 
In addition to and in synergy with the need to recognize socio-economic rights 
violations, feminist scholars have argued for the need for transitional justice processes 
to recognize violence inflicted on women in the private sphere.95 Injuries – both of 
psychological and physical nature – resulting from domestic violence are some of the 
most common harms experienced by women before, during and after conflicts, but 
have rarely been recognized in transitional justice processes, which focus on politically 
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motivated violence including wartime rape.96 While recognizing the gravity of wartime 
rape, several feminist scholars have historically criticized the arbitrary distinction 
between conflict related SGBV and SGBV inflicted on women outside conflict settings, 
most notably the violence women experience within the ‘safety’ of their own homes.97  
Many have argued that this distinction between conflict-related and other types 
of SGBV serves patriarchal agendas, as it only requires men to recognize the need for 
the pursuit of accountability for gendered harms when it is inflicted on women by the 
other/the enemy.98 As women are more likely to become victim to violence at the hands 
of their own family members/partners and more excessive types of SGBV that occur 
during conflict seem to build on this everyday impunity of GBV, transitional justice’s 
neglect of domestic violence denies women’s experience of conflict and repression, and 
fails to contribute to a more secure society for women in the aftermath of such 
periods.99 Therefore, proponents of a feminist transformative justice agenda have 
emphasized the importance of institutional and legislative reform in combination with 
efforts to address forgiving societal norms and attitudes towards everyday violence.100 
 Again, the importance of recognizing the need to address domestic violence in 
transitional justice trajectories has been backed up by extensive research with women in 
societies in transition. McWilliams’ work on intimate partner violence in Northern 
Ireland is a cautionary tale of how conflict both increases the levels of domestic 
violence experienced by women, as well as deflects attention from this issue because 
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there are ‘more important’ issues to address.101 In the South-African context literature 
has highlighted how domestic violence has ‘continued at levels akin to, or surpassing, 
those experienced during the conflict’.102 Based on extensive research into women’s 
experience of violence in Northern Ireland, Liberia and Timor-Leste Swaine identifies ‘a 
complex mosaic of pre and during conflict violences upon which to view the 
aftermath’.103 More specifically she finds that that while ‘armed men, as well as men who 
are not directly involved in the conflict may take the opportunity presented by conflict 
to enact both political and conflict-influenced private abuses’.104 However, she also 
finds that current responses – be they of a legal, policy or practical programming nature 
– ‘do not adequately address these multi-dimensional and multi-faceted violences nor 
the fluidity that exists between the two’.105 
How to achieve better justice outcomes for women in times of transition? Many 
feminist researchers agree that while some tools from the current transitional justice 
toolkit have the potential to deliver upon such outcomes, they do not suffice by 
themselves,106 and/or should be employed in a different way.107 Therefore, feminist 
scholars have looked at existing initiatives at the local level to answer this question. 
Lambourne and Carreon, for instance, have studied the activities of the ‘The Women’s 
Advocacy Network’ (WAN) in Uganda, and its use of participatory strategies to bring 
women together to advocate for socio-economic justice and access to land, reparations 
and bursaries for their children, inclusion in consultations regarding post-war 
reconstruction and elimination of stigmatisation.108 Crosby, Lykes and Caxaj have 
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documented an ‘emerging sense of protagonism’ amongst female Mayan survivors of 
SGBV in Guatemala in their research on a project in which these victims, with the 
support of a consortium of women’s groups have undertaken efforts to pursue justice 
and reparations.109 Meertens and Zambrano have examined Columbian indigenous 
women’s groups’ advocacy efforts aimed at agrarian reform laws in order to guarantee 
women access to land.110  
Feminist transformative justice scholarship has also studied the use of 
alternative grassroots justice mechanism as an avenue for the pursuit of transformative 
gender justice outcomes for female victims. Examples include the use of grassroots 
transitional justice toolkits,111 or the organization of popular tribunals/women’s 
courts.112 While this type of initiatives does not provide any formal justice outcomes 
they can contribute to a feeling of justice on behalf of female victims who do not have 
access to formal justice mechanisms or who do not wish to participate in formal justice 
mechanism for a variety of reasons. In this regard O’Reilly finds that ‘the increasing use 
of popular tribunals by women’s movements is indicative of evolving efforts to 
reconcile two fundamental concerns of women’s human rights advocates. The first is to 
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counter the potential threat of re-victimisation of women victims of gender crimes in 
the context of formal, top-down, legal proceedings. The second is to affirm nonetheless 
a commitment to ‘objective’ values of fairness, transparency and accountability and to 
appropriate the legitimacy and authority of the law toward the advancement of 
meaningful equality and human rights for women’.113 These grassroots transitional 
justice initiatives also function as an important agenda setting and advocacy tool for 
women’s movements, as they can generate significant levels of popular attention.  
From these studies emerges a multi-faceted feminist transformative justice 
proposition. First, they highlight the importance of relying more on underused 
traditional transitional justice mechanisms such as reparations and guarantees of non-
repetition to pursue meaningful gender justice outcomes for victims, in parallel with 
prosecutions and truth-seeking initiatives. They could also include development 
initiatives that particularly focus on historically marginalized communities. These 
publications emphasize the importance of using these initiatives to address both 
conflict-related SGBV and other conflict-related harms such as socio-economic rights 
violations inflicted on women as a direct result of the conflict. Second, many of these 
publications also emphasize the need for broader, more future-focused reform efforts 
that address broader legacies of structural violence and marginalization impacting all 
women. These efforts consist of legislative and institutional reform efforts that benefit 
the female population at large. Lastly, many of these publications highlight the 
importance of support for grassroots transitional justice initiatives that advocate for 
more inclusive gender justice approaches and provide space to women to grapple with 
the harms they experienced outside official transitional justice avenues.  
 
 




2.5 THE LIMITS OF THE LOCAL  
Despite that the local has proven to be a fruitful source for inspiration for a feminist 
transformative gender justice agenda, this section finds that a closer look at the 
‘effectiveness’ of some of these initiatives puts into question the feasibility of the 
comprehensive transformative gender justice agenda outlined in feminist literature. Not 
only have few of the above-discussed initiatives managed to provide durable gender 
justice gains due to resistance of local patriarchal forces, there has also been significant 
competition between different local gender justice proponents who prioritize different 
components of the agenda for both practical and ideological reasons. This section 
argues that this points towards the need for the consideration of specific ‘local gender 
justice opportunity structures’ before proposing universal locally inspired solutions for 
the flaws of ‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice as put forward in the 
previous section.  
 
2.5.1 The absence of distributive outcomes 
Despite that the ideals of above-discussed grassroots women’s groups nicely coincide 
with the feminist transformative justice ideal, in practice they have achieved limited 
success in terms of actualizing these ideals. While in many cases grassroots transitional 
justice activities have contributed to providing women with a sense of recognition, they 
have not advanced any redistributive claims.114 In relation to WAN’s activities in 
Uganda Lambourne and Rodriguez Carreon for instance admit that while WAN’s 
approach mirror’s the authors’ ideal of transformative justice practice ‘many challenges 







In order to engender the social transformation needed to undermine sexual and other direct and 
structural violence which women continue to experience with alarming impunity, the 
participation of men is also essential—to lead and support changes in discriminatory laws and 
attitudes in a partnership with women empowered to fully exercise their agency in relationships 
as well as in institutions.115  
Similarly, authors that have examined the contribution of ‘women’s courts’ to the 
pursuit of gender justice in post-conflict societies have also highlighted the limited 
impact this type of grassroots initiatives have on for instance the redistribution of 
resources. O’Reilly ascribes this to ‘the obstacles to the ‘trickle-up’ effect of civil society 
initiatives, particularly in deeply divided societies where political elites continue to 
propagate division and ethno-nationalist narratives’.116 In relation to the Women’s Court 
for the Former Yugoslavia she finds that: ‘as a civil society initiative, the Women’s 
Court was not backed by a reparations programme for BiH. It could not respond to 
resources disparities’, and that while ‘BiH activists did engage with representatives from 
state and entity-level ministries, as part of the preparatory process, to push for 
government endorsement of a Programme for Victims of Wartime Rape, Sexual Abuse 
and Torture and their Families in Bosnia-Herzegovina … the programme … remains 
delayed by ongoing political deadlock’.117  
As Meertens’ and Zambrano’s research in Colombia shows, local women’s 
groups advocacy has resulted in legal reform that provided women with land rights 
claims, an important distributive justice gain. However, they also found that reliance on 
legislative reform and subsequently court litigation to enforce these rights has proven to 
be a fickle strategy in Colombia due to under enforcement.118 Similarly, in the Congolese 
context Aroussi found that in spite of the allocation of reparations to women via 
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judgements of mobile courts, few female SGBV survivors ended up receiving these 
reparations due to both a lack of access to court as well as a generic failure to execute 
the judgements once the mobile courts left.119 Thus while grassroots women’s advocacy 
manages to achieve distributive justice goals via legal reform, these gains have often not 
fully translated in actual redistributive outcomes on the ground as a result of the fact 
that the culture in the institutions that are responsible for implementing these laws has 
not changed. Ní Aoláin and Rooney indeed find that in Northern Ireland competing 
institutional interests have prevented the authorities from upholding women’s rights– 
including in the area of women’s economic rights– in spite of the inclusion of 
commitments to ensuring women’s equality and social inclusion in the Good Friday 
Agreement.120  
Advocates of bottom-up approaches have consistently emphasized the way in 
which ‘participation of affected communities in shaping these processes also increases 
the likelihood of outcomes being considered legitimate, particularly in comparison to 
outcomes resulting from the imposition of an agenda by outside elites’.121 However, for 
these outcomes to materialize there is need for support from inside elites, and as the 
above discussed examples indicate, this support has often been lacking.  
 
2.5.2 Competing agendas of local gender justice actors  
Second, findings about female victims’ justice needs and grassroots female led initiatives 
to pursue (transformative) gender justice in transition indicate that ‘the local’ is not a 
uniform space, as even between local actors whose aim is to pursue/promote gender 
justice for themselves and female citizens at large, significant differences exist with 
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regard to what they consider to be transformative. This issue has received increasing 
recognition in feminist scholarship when it comes to the priorities and alliances of 
female victims vs. the priorities of feminist scholars. However, less attention has been 
paid to other types of fragmentation at the local level, such as tensions between 
different female victims’ groups and between various elements of local women’s 
movements.  
Feminist scholars have found a discrepancy between what on the one hand the 
literature and feminist activists consider to be the root causes of VAW during times of 
conflict, and how on the other hand some female victims themselves conceptualize the 
reasons for the harms they have endured.122 While feminist experts have identified a 
robust link between the persistent reality of women’s marginalization during ‘normal’ 
times and the type of aggravated harms women experience during times of conflict and 
repression, some female victims have been found to consider their suffering to be 
primarily a result of other factors such as their status as a member of a racial or religious 
minority.123 Furthermore, Rubio Marín  has suggested that female victims who feel a 
desire to return to the status quo – unequal as it might have been -  or fear to let down 
or further peril their already severely marginalized (male) community members,124 might 
not acknowledge the existence of a ‘continuum of violence’: 
This double dimension of extraordinary violence against women (as both affirmation and 
subversion of pre-existing meanings and orders) makes the project of reparations for survivors 
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one that is inevitably ridden with tensions. On the one hand the disruption of a pre-existing 
order may be the source of corrective claims of victims to have it re-established and affirmed 
(going back to “normal”). On the other, victims and women in general may also have legitimate 
expectations to push a transformative agenda when asking for reparations so as to question 
sexual hierarchies that were embedded in the “ordinary” accounting for many of the forms of 
violence they experienced in their normal lives.125  
In addition, due to deeply held religious or political beliefs some female victims might 
just genuinely adhere to a conservative worldview which prioritizes the conservation of 
the patriarchal order over transformative gender justice gains. These female victims 
might opt for the pursuit of justice – including reparations - for harms inflicted on them 
by other men, but oppose understanding the harms inflicted on them as a manifestation 
of women’s structural marginalization.  In such instances the prioritization of victims’ 
needs and perspectives, and the desire to promote a feminist transformative justice 
agenda can be at odds.  
Women’s movements in societies in transition on the other hand have in some 
cases consciously refrained from focusing their advocacy efforts on measures to deal 
with the past.  Based on a comparative study of women’s movements in Northern 
Ireland, Chile and Colombia O’Rourke has for instance found that ‘while reparations 
have been the area of most creative feminist scholarly analysis in transitional justice’, 
local women’s movements in Northern Ireland and Chile have been slower in 
embracing this issue: in Chile in particular ‘reparations have never been a key mobilizing 
issue in feminist organizing’.126 She ascribes low levels of engagement and even 
reluctance on behalf of local women’s movements to advocate for reparations to the 
broader political opportunity structure ‘that is typically hostile to acknowledging state 
liability for past harms’.127 As such ‘women’s movements seeking to build collaborative 
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relationships with the new or reformed state may not wish prioritise oppositional issues 
such as reparations for past harms’.128 Human rights organizations and female victims 
groups on the other hand have been the core voices in advocacy for reparations, which 
means that in Chile different gender justice actors have engaged selectively with the 
transformative justice agenda.  
This divergence between transformative gender justice priorities does not only 
exist between female victims and women’s/feminist groups that advocate for a more 
gender just society in a general sense. Case studies of women’s movements in societies 
in transition have found significant levels of fragmentation between different women’s 
groups. Once the uniting aim of toppling a dictator or ending war has been achieved, 
there is room for ideological divergences, different priorities and competing interests to 
manifest themselves. Some of this fragmentation takes place along ethno-nationalist 
lines. In this regard O’Reilly finds that the organizers of the Women’s Court in Bosnia 
received significant criticism from local activists for giving the impression that it only 
focused on SGBV inflicted on Bosniak women who had fallen victim to Serbian 
perpetrators: 
Second, the perception that the Women’s Court was not a neutral initiative appears to have 
impeded participation by BiH survivors. Within BiH, the lead organization, WiB, is noted for its 
work with individuals and communities who were victims of crimes committed by Serbian 
forces in ‘their name’. Perceptions that the initiative was partial in favour of ‘Bosniak’ survivors 
and against ‘Serb’ survivors in particular were reinforced by the decision by WiB to select the 
Mothers of Srebrenica association as a Regional Board member. The screening of promotional 
materials, which featured testimonies of survivors targeted by Bosnian Serb forces, to women in 
communities which are mainly Bosnian Serb, was also problematic. This issue was flagged by 
activists from organizations within the RS, but did not lead to changes in outreach.129  
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Simic has also reflected on the divides between local women’s groups in the Balkans, 
identifying a cleavage between those who wanted to foreground the gendered nature of 
wartime rape and women’s groups that predominantly approached it as a harm inflicted 
on women because of their ethnic identity.130 As Pavlovic has remarked, this severely 
limited the capacity of feminists to advance a transformative gender justice agenda for 
all as  ‘attempts to express any form of solidarity and commonality with women across 
ethnic and national identity lines could be regarded as disloyalty’.131 Simic’ recent work 
on the silences around wartime rape of tainted, Serbian victim-subjects in the context of 
the aftermath of the Balkan war is emblematic of the increase of feminist attention for 
the fault lines that divide gender justice advocacy at the local level. Reflecting on being a 
feminist academic who has strong ties with the context she is researching, she describes 
how focusing on Serbian victims of SGBV put strain on her relations with some 
feminist activists in Bosnia.132 This demonstrates that in deeply divided societies 
grassroots gender justice actors will not necessarily embrace transformative 
conceptualizations of victims and harms.  
Fragmentation along other fault lines exists as well. Alliance to diverging 
political ideologies has been a major cause for fragmentation with left-wing feminists 
having pursued more ambitious agendas at the level of socio-economic rights than 
some of their less radical counterparts in the women’s movement.133 This disaccord 
within the women’s movement in societies in transition is also caused by diverging 
visions about what is the most pragmatic/effective approach for ensuring gender justice 
concerns are taken into account in times of transition. In Chile and Northern Ireland 
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the women’s movement has been divided between those not willing to make any 
concessions to their transformative gender justice agenda, and those applying a more 
pragmatic approach that acknowledges the need for compromise for the sake of 
reaching any tangible outcomes.134 In Chile feminist activists have criticized those 
feminists who have joined the state’s women’s bureau ‘SERNAM’, as it has mostly 
advanced policies that are considered to be non-controversial. In this regard Waylen 
found that: 
Many women’s organizations (some of which are often seen as radical feminist) have been wary 
because SERNAM is regarded as an arm of the state (La Boletina nd.). Popular women’s 
movements in particular are confused as to what SERNAM does and do not feel represented by 
it. There has also been some disillusionment with what is considered to be SERNAM’s lack of a 
radical approach. The nature of the projects now being funded has shifted towards projects 
focused around narrow market orientated economic aims.135  
In Northern Ireland feminists have questioned the Northern Irish Women’s Coalition’s 
decision to not invoke reproductive rights during the peace talks in which they 
participated. Representatives of the Northern Irish Women’s Coalition, however, 
defended this choice on pragmatic grounds, by stating that it was clear from the start 
that abortion would not figure in the peace agreement.136 
This means that while feminist scholars have set out an ambitious 
transformative gender justice agenda that has been embraced by some local gender 
justice actors such as WAN in Uganda or the feminist networks working with Mayan 
victims in Guatemala, other case studies imply that not all female victims’ groups and 
women’s movements adhere to the same coherent vision of transformative justice. To 
the contrary, in some contexts different gender justice actors have endorsed ‘competing’ 
(transformative) gender justice priorities.  
 
134 O’Rourke 2013 (n13). 
135 Waylen 1994 (n133): 91.  




Needless to say that the embrace of one of the above discussed visions on what 
is transformative over the other has severe implications for the extent to which ‘the 
past’ is considered as a factor that needs to be taken into account, what harms are being 
prioritized, and the extent to which transitional justice mechanisms are relied upon. 
Female victims’ groups and other gender justice actors who focus on pursuing justice 
for victims of conflict-related SGBV operate from a strong past-focused point of view 
even if their goal is to pursue the type of justice that mitigates the consequences of 
structural violence. These groups are likely to invoke the full range of transitional justice 
mechanisms – if available – as a tool to pursue gender justice outcomes for the victims 
at hand. They might also establish informal transitional justice measures themselves in 
absence of official transitional justice mechanisms, or if the existing transitional justice 
mechanisms that exist fail to incorporate a gender perspective. The women’s 
movements that prioritize societal transformation and gender justice for society at large 
seem to have adopted a more future-focused mind-set, prioritizing for instance 
legislative and institutional reform, meaning that they have relied less on the other tools 
of the transitional justice toolbox. This implies there is some friction between the 
academic interpretation of ‘transformative justice’ and the definition of ‘transformative 
justice’ employed by some of the local actors that according to the literature are central 
to its promulgation.  
Thus, while the local has figured prominently in feminist transitional justice 
scholarship, case studies that focus on local efforts to pursue gender justice in transition 
put into question the generalized use of the term ‘the local’ in feminist transitional 
justice scholarship. While isolated examples of ambitious gender justice initiatives by 
certain local women’s groups do align well with the transformative justice ideal, they 
have not always yielded the aspired outcomes. Moreover, the women’s organizations 




promotion of gender justice in transition often constitute only one of the many gender 
justice actors operating in the same local sphere. Local gender justice actors include 
female victims’ groups and a range of local women’s groups of different ideological 
backgrounds. Research shows that in various contexts between them no consensus 
exists about what type of gender justice outcomes qualify as most transformative, and 
what approaches are best suited to pursue these goals.  
 
2.5.3 Co-option of gender justice efforts at the local level 
Few feminist publications on transformative justice have devoted much attention to the 
fragmented nature of transformative gender justice efforts at the local level, when 
championing the feminist transformative gender justice agenda. As such, it is not 
surprising that even less feminist energy has been devoted to the question why at the 
local level the implementation of the feminist transformative gender justice agenda has 
been incomplete and/or fragmented. However, some evidence implies that 
instrumentalist approaches towards gender justice also happen in local contexts. 
Interestingly, while at the international level instrumentalist tendencies have been 
associated with an exclusive focus on wartime rape, in local contexts political 
engineering has been reflected in the prioritization of addressing more mundane 
instances of GBV over politically sensitive efforts to pursue accountability for past 
politically motivated harms.  
The co-option of women’s rights issues for broader political goals is not 
restricted to international actors and contexts. Scholars who have examined state 
engagement with women’s rights in non-transitional contexts have consistently found a 
tendency to employ women’s rights language and promotion for political gains.137 In the 
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literature on state level engagement with the feminist agenda, instances in which the 
states are significantly involved in the creation and implementation of feminist policies 
are referred to with the term ‘state feminism’.138 In itself state feminism does not have 
to be a bad thing, as women’s rights in many of the most progressive countries around 
the globe – and even in some more conservative ones - have been improved as a result 
of extensive state support for gender equality policies.139 However, at the same time 
many of these examples demonstrate that state support for the feminist cause is rarely 
unconditional, and can result in the feminist cause getting exploited by those in power. 
This has resulted in selective engagement with certain feminist priorities, the protection 
of rights of certain groups of women, and the use of feminist policies as a fig leave to 
cover up less savoury policies. This in its turn has rendered the  – often already 
controversial - feminist cause and movement vulnerable to criticism from political 
opponents of the ruling elite.140 
While the prevalence of state feminism in contexts that are experiencing 
transition has been the topic of feminist research,141 few feminist scholars have explored 
the consequences of state feminism on support for gendered transitional justice 
specifically. An exception is O’Rourke whose work on the engagement of local 
women’s movements with the full range of recognized transitional justice mechanisms 
in Northern Ireland, Chile and Colombia has figured in section 2.3.3. She has found 
that certain transitional states’ tendency to shy away from pursuing justice for past 
 
and Ideas; Nelfour De Mel, Women & the nation's narrative: gender and nationalism in twentieth century 
Sri Lanka (Rowman & Littlefield 2001); Sabrina P Ramet, Gender politics in the Western Balkans: 
Women and society in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav successor states (Penn State Press 2010). 
138 Carol Pateman, The disorder of women: Democracy, feminism and political theory (John Wiley & 
Sons 2018). 
139 Anette Borchorst and Birte Siim, 'Woman-friendly policies and state feminism: Theorizing 
Scandinavian gender equality' (2008) 9(2) Feminist Theory 207. 
140 Emma C Murphy, 'Women in Tunisia: Between state feminism and economic reform' Women and 
Globalization in the Arab Middle East: Gender, Economy, and Society (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2003): 
169. 




political crimes, could result in a preference for less controversial legislative reform to 
combat VAW over the pursuit of accountability for, the unveiling of truth about, 
and/or the provision of reparations for gendered harms as a result of past political 
violence.142  
These findings have two important implications within the scope of this 
research. First of all, they raise questions about the immunity of the transformative 
gender justice agenda against co-option. In this regard O’Rourke herself has argued that 
the lack of attention for this risk in feminist transitional justice scholarship suggests that 
the field is consumed by a ‘de-politicizing impulse’.143 Making sure that feminist 
transitional justice scholarship stays politically relevant requires recognition that the 
transformative gender justice agenda is vulnerable to fragmentation and systematic 
examination of (international) engagement with all of its components. Second, by 
highlighting the competing interests of different fractions of the local women’s 
movement and the role that national political/governing elites play in shaping gender 
justice trajectories, O’Rourke’s research emphasizes the importance of recognizing local 
‘gender justice opportunity structures’ as a factor in shaping gender justice outcomes.  
Significant knowledge gaps exist both in relation to international actors’ interaction with 
the transformative justice agenda as well as the role local gender justice opportunity 
structures play in shaping international actors’ engagement with women’s rights in 
societies in transition. Both concepts will be explored in more depth in this chapter’s 
final section.  
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2.6 CONCEPTUALIZING TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE AND 
INCLUDING LOCAL GENDER JUSTICE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
IN THE EQUATION 
In view of the fact that international actors have a propensity for selectively 
understanding feminist gender justice agendas, the previous sections’ observations raise 
concerns about what happens when international actors meet a multi-faceted 
transformative gender agenda, which has been vulnerable to co-option at the local level. 
They also draw attention to the need of taking into consideration the impact of local 
actors and circumstances in shaping the drivers behind international engagement with 
gender justice in transition. This section operationalizes both the transformative justice 
concept as well as the notion of ‘local gender justice opportunity structures’ and 
explains how they inform the remainder of this thesis.  
 
2.6.1 A tri-partite conceptualization of transformative justice 
Both in the context of internationalized transitional justice practice as well as 
transitional justice efforts at the local level, elites have co-opted gender justice efforts 
for political gain. This phenomenon manifests itself at both levels through selective 
engagement with only certain components of a more comprehensive women’s rights 
agendas. Feminist scholarship on internationalized transitional justice practice has 
identified co-option predominantly at the level of support for the pursuance of 
accountability for wartime rape. However, feminist scholars studying transitional justice 
in local contexts have demonstrated that co-option can also take place via a neglect of 
politically motivated gendered harms and a prioritization of forward looking gender 
justice efforts. In order to get a complete picture of the occurrence of co-option within 
the context of internationalized transitional justice practice it is important to study 




justice agenda. To facilitate such an exercise this thesis relies on a tripartite 
conceptualization of transformative gender justice in transition, that has been developed 
along the conceptual fault lines that have separated local gender justice actors’ 
engagement with gender justice in transition. 
The idea is that while the feminist transformative gender justice ideal is 
comprehensive, and envisions all components to be implemented in synergy, experience 
shows that in reality both powerful elites as well as local gender justice actors prioritize 
and neglect certain components of this agenda based on political calculations. What 
components are and are not supported differs from context to context, but the way in 
which these components are delineated seems relatively consistent, with the key 
dividing lines being drawn between future vs. past focused efforts and between efforts 
with a focus on a narrow vs a more comprehensive set of gendered harms. As such, the 
three core components of the transformative gender justice agenda under consideration 
in this thesis are:  
 
1. Past-focused gender justice efforts that focus on a narrow set of gendered 
harms experienced by female victims of politically motivated violence: This 
component refers to the type of gender justice issues that have dominated 
international actors’ engagement with gender justice in transition. These include 
attempt to pursue accountability for a narrow set of gendered harms – conflict 
and repression-related SGBV – predominantly relying on trials and truth 
commissions.  
2. Past-focused gender justice efforts that focus on a wider set of gendered harms 
experienced by female victims and aim to effect transformative change: This 
category contains efforts to address socio-economic rights violations and 




victims as a direct result of conflict or repression. Reparations and guarantees of 
non-repetition as well as grassroots initiatives such as women’s courts play a key 
role in addressing these harms with an eye on effectuating transformative 
change. This is the component that has dominated much feminist literature on 
transformative justice, and efforts by grassroots gender justice groups and 
(certain) female victims’ groups discussed in section 2.3.1. 
3. Future-focused gender justice efforts that focus on addressing structural 
marginalization and gender inequality: This category is the furthest removed 
from traditional gender justice practice. It concerns efforts to use transitions as 
windows of opportunity to effectuate broader legislative and institutional 
reform aimed at combating structural inequality and marginalization of women.  
 
Through an examination of the EU’s engagement with each of these types of gender 
justice efforts in Tunisia and Ukraine – more details on what they entail exactly in both 
contexts in section 3.2.4 and chapter 4 – this research provides insight in the nature of 
international engagement with gender justice in transition across the full spectrum of 
transformative justice activities.  
 
2.6.2 Including local gender justice opportunity structures in the equation 
These observations raise challenging questions about the viability and desirability of the 
transformative gender justice agenda outlined in section 2.4 as a solution for the flaws 
of contemporary internationalized transitional justice practice. One of the reasons 
behind this discordance seems to be the fact that feminist scholarship focuses almost 
uniquely on ‘the global’ or ‘central’ level when it comes to understanding the drivers 
behind internationalized transitional justice practice. This constitutes an important gap 




some research on internationalized transitional justice practice, emphasizes the role of 
local elites’ political power and priorities in shaping international actors’ transitional 
justice preferences. This section argues that this mismatch between problem and hints 
at the need for better understanding of “local gender justice opportunity structures” as a 
sine qua non for the design of alternatives for contemporary internationalized transitional 
justice approaches. 
The notion that the shaping of development aid agendas is a two- rather than 
one-way process is well established in the field of development studies.144  In this regard 
Findley and others have for instance argued that ‘the provision of aid involves a 
bargaining relationship between donors and recipient governments; the balance of 
power between them depends on the situation’.145 This potential for local actors to 
shape development aid, including international support for transitional justice, is often 
more or less ignored in critical – including feminist – assessments of international 
transitional justice practice.146 However, over the last couple of years, a small but 
growing body of transitional justice publications has explored how local actors and 
circumstances shape the nature and impact of international transitional justice support. 
In a comparative study of the pursuit of gender justice in the DRC and South-Africa, 
Lake has for instance shown that if states are weak and local political elites are absent or 
highly dependent on international aid providers – as is the case in the DRC - this can 
result in more progressive gender justice outcomes than when established state 
structures do exist.147 The important role of political elites in shaping the 
 
144 Jeremy Armon ‘Aid, politics and development: a donor perspective’ (2007) 25(5) Development Policy 
Review 653. 
145 Michael G. Findley, Adam S. Harris, Helen V. Milner and Daniel L. Nielson, ‘Who Controls Foreign 
Aid? Elite versus Public Perceptions of Donor Influence in Aid-Dependent Uganda’ (2017) 71(4) 
International Organization 633: 658.  
146 Adam Kochanski, 'The “Local Turn” in Transitional Justice: Curb the Enthusiasm' (2018) 
International Studies Review 26; Soumita Basu, 'The Global South writes 1325 (too)' (2016) 37(3) 
International Political Science Review 362. 
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implementation of international actors’ transitional justice agendas has also been 
highlighted in MacDonald’s research on the transitional justice implementation gap in 
Uganda, in which she shows that meaningful transitional justice outcomes have failed to 
crystalize as a result of donors’ inability to respond to political manoeuvring by 
domestic elites.148  
These publications draw attention to the role of what has been described as 
political or legal ‘opportunity structures’ in literature on the role of social movements in 
advancing political and societal goals. Kitschelt defines opportunity structures as 
‘specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical 
precedents for social mobilization’ that allow for or constrain certain political or societal 
outcomes to materialize.149 These opportunity structures have figured prominently in 
leading feminist literature on the advancement of women’s rights goals at the national 
and international level.150 While these publications consistently emphasize the 
importance of the transnational women’s movement in pushing forward progressive 
gender justice outcomes, they also emphasize the important role of the state and other 
(patriarchal) international institutions in both restraining and advancing women’s rights 
outcomes.  
Some feminist examinations of the pursuit of gender justice outcomes in 
societies in transition have also identified political opportunity structures as both a 
facilitating and restraining factor when it comes to the advancement of (certain) gender 
justice outcomes.151 Building on this body of work, this thesis aims to look into the 
interaction between local gender justice opportunity structures and international 
 
148 Anna MacDonald, ‘“Somehow This Whole Process Became so Artificial”: Exploring the Transitional 
Justice Implementation Gap in Uganda’ (2019) 13(2) International Journal of Transitional Justice 225. 
149 Herbert P Kitschelt, ‘Political opportunity structures and political protest: Anti-nuclear movements in 
four democracies’ (1986) 16(1) British Journal of Political Science 57: 58. 
150 Keck and Sikkink 1998 (n9); Engle Merry 2009 (n11).  




transitional justice actors to get better insight in the drivers behind international 
engagement with gender justice in transition. This research distinguishes three central 
components of these opportunity structures: the various actors involved in advancing 
gender justice trajectories (both those whose stated aim is to advance women’s roles as 
well as those who act as constraining factors), the type of gender justice issues that are 
being featured in national debates, and the mechanisms (e.g. legislative reform, 
transitional justice measures, SSR) that are available to advance these goals.  
Importantly, this thesis examination of local gender justice opportunity 
structures takes into account the preferences of local political/governing elites; A 
category that, McAuliffe argues, has been chronically understudied in transformative 
justice scholarship: 
Of these actors involved in negotiating TJ, it is here argued that the most important, but least 
well understood, are domestic elites. Strategic options that are theoretically available to TJ 
implementers may not be ‘incentive compatible’ insofar as they do not accord with the other 
compelling interests of critical politically effective groups to adopt (the government, faction 
leaders and economic elites, for the most part). As discursively framed in the TJ literature, elites 
emerge as a homogenous coterie of bogeymen pursuing a clearly definable class interest whose 
position is actively perpetuated by traditionally corrective TJ at the expense of empowering the 
marginalised (Aguirre and Pietropaoli, 2008: 367). However, though identified as one of the 
main barriers to transformation, there has been no sustained analysis in the transformative TJ 
literature of who elites are, what they do, the divisions between them or the incentives they 
might have to ameliorate the conditions of those in their society.152 
In particular, this thesis is interested in the implications of local gender justice 
opportunity structures on international actors’ engagement with the tripartite 
transformative gender justice agenda as outlined in the previous section. Tunisia and 
Ukraine’s local gender justice opportunities structures will be mapped and subsequently 
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compared to the nature of EU engagement with gender justice in transition to examine 
whether and how international gender justice support is connected to local 
circumstances. Based on the answers to questions about the nature and drivers behind 
EU engagement with gender justice in transition in Tunisia and Ukraine, this thesis will 
eventually answer the broader research question: How to enhance the ability of feminist 
transitional justice scholarship to respond to the political realities of the contemporary 
internationalized transitional justice environment? 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter aimed to identify the gaps that exist between feminist scholarship on 
international engagement with transitional justice and feminist transformative justice 
scholarship, and to create a clear conceptual framework that would allow for systematic 
analysis of international engagement with transformative gender justice in transition.  
While feminist scholars have developed transformative conceptualizations of 
gender justice in transition out of discontent with the direction that ‘the patriarchy of 
internationalized transitional justice’ practice has taken, few feminist scholars have 
systematically examined international engagement with these efforts. This is 
problematic; a critical look at the literature on local efforts to promote transformative 
justice, suggests that the transformative gender justice agenda can be susceptible to co-
option by actors in power as mainstream gendered transitional justice efforts are. While 
O’Rourke has previously pointed out the possibility of local political elites 
instrumentalizing more forward-looking gender justice efforts for political gain, this 
chapter is original in the sense that it asks readers to consider that this mentality could 
also affect international actors’ engagement with gender justice in transition. In 
particular, this chapter identified the need to develop a politically informed 




taking into consideration local gender justice opportunity structures when examining 
the drivers behind international engagement with gender justice in transition.  
The remainder of this thesis sets out the local gender justice opportunity 
structures in Tunisia and Ukraine and studies EU’s interaction with them to address this 
gap in the literature and contribute to the development of more robust feminist theory 
on solutions that can contribute to mitigating the flaws of ‘the patriarchy of 



















3. METHODOLOGY: Researching EU support 
for gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine 
3.1 INTRODUCTION: 
Powerful actors, such as the EU, constitute a challenging type of research subject. The 
methodological challenges posed by focusing on the powerful, however, have remained 
relatively under-explored in feminist methodological scholarship. This is remarkable as 
while challenging traditional power structures is a core feminist research goal, the 
strategies suggested in mainstream methodological contributions to get robust data on 
the actions of these actors do not always sync well with a feminist research ethos. 
Nevertheless, through careful choices at the level of research design (section 3.2), data 
collection (section 3.3) data analysis (section 3.4) and research ethics (section 3.5), and 
the consistent application of reflexivity, this thesis mitigated the risk of reinforcing 
traditional power dynamics in knowledge production, while staying in line with a 
feminist research ethos, and also collecting reliable, high quality data.  
At the level of research design, this chapter argues that as the starting point of 
this thesis is that politics shape powerful actors’ engagement with (gendered) 
transitional justice, it is a prerequisite to go beyond analysis of policy documents. 
Instead it requires looking at the actual engagement of international actors with gender 
justice in specific countries to understand how broader foreign policy interests shape 
what components of the transformative gender justice agenda international actors do 
and do not engage with. Reliance on a multi-level case study design allowed for the 
consideration of contextual circumstances while simultaneously facilitating the inclusion 
of the voices of local gender justice actors. These voices from the periphery were 




gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine with in-depth interviews with a range of 
stakeholders working on these issues in both countries.  
Nevertheless, despite that the research allowed for the inclusion of perspectives 
from not only Brussels, but also Carthage and Kyiv, all interviewees for this research 
qualified as experts and some as ‘elites’. Most feminist methodological literature 
presumes an opposite power dynamic between the interviewer and interviewee and 
therefore offers limited guidance for the specific challenges posed by elite interviews. It 
is, however, clear that the simultaneously deferential and manipulative approach 
towards creating rapport suggested in some mainstream methodological literature on 
elite interviewing, does not sync well with a feminist research ethos even when the 
power balance is in favour of the interviewee. This research therefore adopted a critical 
dialogue format towards interviews with elite actors, and used a reflexive approach both 
in relation to the data collection as well as analysis process to grasp how the dynamic 
between the researcher’s own positionality as well as the interviewees’ institutional 
affiliations impacted the type of data collected.153  
 
 
153 Reflexivity is one of the key strategies used by feminist academics to identify, acknowledge, and – 
ideally – remedy power differentials. It requires researchers’ to be aware of how ‘our subjectivity becomes 
entangled in the lives of others’. Reflexivity can be used to map and address power differentials when 
doing research with vulnerable or powerful participants. According to Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber, it 
entails taking into consideration questions such as: ‘How does your own biography affect the research 
process; what shapes the questions you chose to study and your approach to studying them? How does 
the specific social, economic, and political context in which you reside affect the research process at all 
levels?’ Feminist researchers in the social sciences consistently reflect on how social background affects 
the knowledge created by their research. The use of reflexivity is a common thread throughout this 
chapter as well. See: Karen V England, 'Getting personal: Reflexivity, positionality, and feminist research 
(1994) 46(1) The Professional Geographer 80; Mary Margaret Fonow and Judith A Cook, Beyond 
methodology: Feminist scholarship as lived research (Indiana University Press 1991); Brooke Ackerly and 
Jacqui True, 'Reflexivity in practice: Power and ethics in feminist research on international relations' 
(2008) 10(4) International Studies Review 693; Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber, 'The practice of feminist in-
depth interviewing' in Feminist research practice: A primer (2007): 130; Andrea Doucet and Natasha S 
Mauthner, 'Feminist methodologies and epistemology' in Handbook of 21st Century Sociology (Sage 
2006) 36: 41; Wanda Pillow, 'Confession, catharsis, or cure? Rethinking the uses of reflexivity as 





3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research seeks to understand how following the popularization of transformative 
conceptualizations of gender justice in transition the EU has supported gender justice 
efforts in Tunisia and Ukraine in practice. To capture the interaction between the global 
and the local, this thesis employs a qualitative multi-level case study design that 
combines elements from a single case study with a comparative case study design. It is a 
single case study in the sense that it constitutes an investigation of the gender justice 
activities of one international actor, the EU.154 It is multi-level and comparative in the 
sense that it examines EU activities in two local contexts.155  
Many feminist publications in the field of transitional justice and WPS more 
generally have studied international actors’ support for gender justice in transition in 
isolation from the local. Feminist research into international actors’ support for 
transitional justice has often relied on textual analysis of generic policy documents,156 
while research into the local has employed more often an empirical case study 
approach.157 This chapter, however, argues that to get an in-depth understanding of 
international support for gender justice in transition one needs to embrace an empirical 
lens to study the activities of international actors in specific local contexts, because this 
facilitates consideration of how ‘politics’ shape international engagement with gender 
justice in transition.  Such an approach also better serves the feminist goal of 
challenging existing power relations, as it facilitates the inclusion of local perspectives.  
 
 
154 John Gerring, 'The case study: what it is and what it does' in The Oxford handbook of comparative 
politics (Oxford University Press 2007). 
155 William Zartman, 'Comparative case studies' (2005) 10(1) International Negotiation 3. 
156 Muehlenhoff 2017 (n38); Martin de Almagro 2017 (n36); O'Rourke 2011 (n50); Nadine Puechguirbal, 
'Discourses on gender, patriarchy and Resolution 1325: A textual analysis of UN documents' (2010) 17(2) 
International Peacekeeping 172. 




3.2.1 A qualitative case study approach  
To understand how the promotion and popularization of transformative 
conceptualizations of gender justice in transition are likely to influence international 
engagement with women’s rights in transition it is crucial to get insight in the values and 
belief systems of the individuals who represent the EU and are responsible for the 
execution of its activities. This complex web of motivational factors cannot be 
measured in numbers, and therefore does not lend itself to quantitative interrogation. A 
qualitative research approach, which is usually defined by its aim to understand certain 
aspects of social life in its natural context, and relies on methods that generate words 
instead of numbers as data for analysis, is best suited for this task.158  
Qualitative studies can be conducted in different ways.159 At the basis, this thesis 
has utilized a case study design. A case study design consists of the ‘empirical 
 
158 Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln, The SAGE handbook of qualitative research (Sage 2011).  
Qualitative approaches have also been the subject of a large range of objections. These concern the 
inability to produce generalizable outcomes through qualitative studies. In the field of transitional justice 
specifically, researchers have criticized the lack of research that aims to establish generalizable claims 
about the contribution of transitional justice mechanisms to their stated goals. However, even if one 
accepts that qualitative research has an important place in transitional justice scholarship pressing 
challenges still exist in relation to rigour, bias, and trustworthiness. These include the creation of 
opportunities for third parties – e.g. research participants, supervisors, other students, reviewers for 
academic journals, examiners, etc. – to review the data collection and analysis process. This happened 
throughout this thesis thanks to 1) supervision of Professor Louise Mallinder, Professor Rory O’Connell 
and Eilish Rooney, 2) annual progress reviews by Ulster University, and 3) participation in numerous 
conferences, and 4) submission of case study findings for review to academic journals. To facilitate such 
reviews, the researcher is best advised to provide thick descriptions of his findings, and leave a ‘decision 
trail’ when doing data analysis. Data analysis is discussed in more depth in section 3.4, and supported by 
Appendix I which contains the code book. See: Kirsti Malterud, 'Qualitative research: standards, 
challenges, and guidelines' (2001) 358(9280) The Lancet 483; Todd Landman, 'Social Science, Methods 
and Human Rights' (2014) The SAGE Handbook of Human Rights: Two Volume Set 181; Phuong Pham 
and Patrick Vinck, 'Empirical research and the development and assessment of transitional justice 
mechanisms' (2007) 1(2) The International Journal of Transitional Justice 231; Oskar Thoms, James Ron 
and Roland Paris, 'State-level effects of transitional justice: what do we know?' (2010) 4(3) International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 329; Tina Koch, 'Establishing rigour in qualitative research: the decision 
trail' (2006) 53(1) Journal of Advanced Nursing 91; Lynn Weber Cannon, Elizabeth Higginbotham and 
Marianne L Leung, 'Race and class bias in qualitative research on women' (1988) 2(4) Gender Society 449; 
Yvonna S Lincoln and Egon G Guba, 'But is it rigorous? Trustworthiness and authenticity in naturalistic 
evaluation' (1986) 1986(30) New directions for evaluation 73; Donna Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges: 
The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective' in Turning Points in 
Qualitative Research: Tying Knots in a Handkerchief (2004) 21.  
159 Creswell and others, for example, distinguish five types of research design in qualitative studies, 
namely, ethnography, narrative, phenomenological, grounded theory, and case study. John W Creswell 
and others, 'Qualitative research designs: Selection and implementation' (2007) 35(2) The Counselling 
Psychologist 236. Yin distinguishes between experiments, surveys, archival analysis, histories and case 




examination of a real-world phenomenon within its naturally occurring context, without 
directly manipulating either the phenomenon or the context’.160 In this sense, the case 
study differs from an experimental design in which external factors, except for the one 
under study, are eliminated. Qualitative case study research facilitates the intimate 
analysis of a ‘spatially and temporally delimited phenomenon observed at a single point 
in time or over some period of time’, 161 and can be descriptive, exploratory or 
explanatory.162 As the assumption at the core of this thesis is that contextual factors 
shape the type of support international actors provide to gender justice in societies in 
transition, the case study method is well-suited to provide answers to the research 
questions at the core of this thesis.  
 
3.2.2 Justifying the use of a multi-level case study design.  
This research uses what it refers to as ‘a multi-level case study design’, as the specific 
features of such a design aligned with the feminist ethos of this research as well as 
facilitated the fulfilment of the research objectives it aimed to achieve. A multi-level 
case study design reunites a single case study design and a comparative case study 
design in one study. This is possible, because the research is conducted at two levels. 
The research’ focuses on the EU in its capacity as an international actor to contribute to 
development of theory on ‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’. As 
the EU is only one international actor, this choice qualifies the research design as a 
single case study design. However, by studying the EU’s activities in two different 
contexts, Tunisia and Ukraine, it is at the same time a comparative case study design. 
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This combination allows the research to provide a more robust picture of the activities 
the EU supports in the realm of gender justice and the factors that drive these choices.  
This approach also is in line with the feminist ethos of this thesis even though it 
differs from the most common approaches towards studying international actors in 
feminist transitional justice scholarship. Except for those authors’ whose work 
specifically focuses on ad hoc international tribunals or the activities of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) in certain countries,163 few feminist transitional justice scholars 
have conducted empirical research on transitional justice support provided by individual 
international actors in well-defined local contexts.164 Critiques of ‘the international’ in 
feminist transitional justice scholarship usually do not identify one specific international 
actor,165 and often rely on analyses of generic policy documents written in headquarters 
in New York, Brussels, Geneva or other capitals in the Global North. Therefore, little 
in-depth feminist knowledge of the day-to-day practices of specific global actors 
engaged in transitional justice efforts at the local level is available.166 This is odd, as 
 
163 Chappell 2017 (n56); Kateřina Uhlířová, 'Contribution of the International Criminal Court to the 
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the ICC at Its Twentieth Anniversary (Brill Nijhoff 2018); Valerie Oosterveld, 'The Special Court for 
Sierra Leone's Consideration of Gender-based Violence: Contributing to Transitional Justice?' (2009) 
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164 Barbara Miller, Milad Pournik and Aisling Swaine, 'Women in peace and security through United 
Nations Security resolution 1325: Literature review, content analysis of national action plans, and 
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of international actors through analysis of National Action Plans on WPS, but the data on 
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Annie Bird, US Foreign Policy on Transitional Justice (LSE Theses online 2012); Paige Arthur and 
Christalla Yakinthou, Transitional Justice, International Assistance, and Civil Society: Missed 
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dynamics of international engagement with transitional justice processes in societies in transition. Most of 
these publications also fail to identify specific international actors. see for example:  
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Jelena Subotić, 'The transformation of international transitional justice advocacy' (2012) 6(1) International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 106; Gerhard Thallinger, 'The UN Peacebuilding Commission and 
Transitional Justice' (2007) 8 German Law Journal 681; Olga Martin-Ortega, 'Building peace and 
delivering justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The limits of externally driven processes' (2013) 




feminist research is based on the premise that knowledge production should be 
democratized both when it comes to those who produce knowledge as well as those 
topics that are the subject of knowledge production.167 Focusing on what international 
actors say in policy documents in isolation from examining what they do in local 
contexts does not allow for the inclusion of specific local voices. A multi-level case 
study design facilitates the examination of powerful actors outside the confines of their 
own bureaucratic epicentres, and facilitates the inclusion of local voices, including those 
of grassroots women’s rights actors.168 As such, the multi-level case study design 
facilitates the feminist premise of democratizing knowledge creation.  
The multi-level case study design also facilitates theory development. Some 
authors believe that a qualitative case study design’s capacity to deliver intimate 
knowledge about a phenomenon comes at the expense of generalisability of the data 
acquired through it.169 However, this thesis adheres to the notion that case study 
research can contribute to the production and further development of knowledge that is 
relevant outside the confines of the specific case,170 provided that the research is 
 
'Bridging the Gap: The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission and the Challenges of Integrating 
DDR and Transitional Justice' (2013) Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and 
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provision in complex conflicts: The Democratic Republic of Congo' (2015) 24(1) European Security 101.  
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purposefully designed to illustrate specific theoretical propositions.171  In this regard 
Zartman has stated that though social scientists ‘can never be caught inescapably in 
theories, mechanisms and regularities’, case studies can provide presumptive 
explanations for events when data fit with theory, or can be a source for the 
development of alternative explanations for certain phenomena.172  
In relation to what constitutes a suitable design for case study research to 
contribute to theory development, opinions also differ with regard to the question 
whether only comparative case study designs or also single case study designs can 
contribute to theory development. Yin, for instance, posits that that the consideration 
of multiple cases is likely to contribute to a stronger research design.173 Nevertheless, 
others have argued that also the single case study design, can contribute to the 
development and refining of theory.174 Flyvbjerg is a defender of the latter vision 
arguing that a single case study design can contribute to the building of ‘soft theory’  
through amongst other things the ‘force of example’.175 He particularly recommends the 
use of case studies as a means of falsification. If a case study does not deliver the 
outcomes predicted by the theoretical framework one adheres to, this is a strong 
indication that the theory is flawed.  
Therefore, this thesis’ reliance on an examination of only one international 
actor’s activities in the realm of international transitional justice support, can still 
contribute to theory development, as feminist theory on international engagement with 
transitional justice already exists, but has not been tested through the use of the EU as 
an example. In this research the EU is approached in its quality as a unitary 
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international actor,176 comparable to how the UN or US foreign policy have been the 
subject of research on international actor engagement with transitional justice.177 The 
choice for the EU as a case study in this context is based on the observation that most 
theories on international engagement with gender justice in transition have been based 
on examinations of the activities of international courts and UN documents – most 
notably UNSCRs on WPS - which less directly represent the political interests of one or 
more specific international actors. The EU is an international actor with a more clearly 
interest-based foreign policy agenda which has the primary goal of protecting its own 
and its Member States’ political, economic and security interests. This allows this thesis 
to interrogate and refine feminist theory on how foreign policy interests shape 
international engagement with various types of gender justice in transition, by what 
Flyvbjerg calls the ‘force of example’.178  
The use of two case studies at the local level serves to get a more diversified 
picture of EU engagement with gender justice in different contexts in line with the 
notion that in practice international engagement with gender justice in transition 
depends on local circumstances. The core assumption that underlies this research, is 
that transitional justice actors’ choices for engagement with certain types of gender 
justice efforts are – at least partly - driven by political calculations. Therefore, one 
cannot make generic statements about the nature of international support for gender 
justice in transition based on an actor’s engagement with such efforts in just one 
context, as the nature of this engagement could be completely dependent on the 
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177 Bird 2012 (n164); Sharp 2013 (n166).  
178 The EU is a severely under researched transitional justice actor, particularly when it comes to its use of 
transitional justice mechanisms to support gender justice in countries in transition. This observation 
provided further incentive to have a closer look into the EU’s activities in the field. In addition, 
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specific circumstances of the recipient country. However, if actors demonstrate similar 
or dissimilar tendencies in certain contexts, that can be linked to comparable or 
different local circumstances, this can suggest the existence of patterns in the drivers 
behind international engagement with gender justice in transition.  
 Notwithstanding the clear benefits of a (comparative) case study design, 
challenges exist as well. In this regard comparative case study research is at risk to suffer 
from sloppy formalization, and deference to case idiosyncrasy. This results in the 
collection of data that are outside the scope of the research to answer the research 
question, and conclusions that are non-representative.179 However, a balance of 
strengths and weaknesses is inherent to any type of research design, and both an 
intentional, well-argued choice for cases, as well as a clear delineation of the research 
subject contribute to the robustness of the outcomes. Choosing three comparable 
instances of gender justice reform in two countries to examine the motivations behind 
EU engagement with gender justice in transition allowed for structured comparison. 
According to George and others, structured comparison entails the careful development 
of a standardized set of questions based on the objectives and theoretical propositions 
guiding the research, which are asked of each case under study.180 This results in 
standardized data collection, which allows for systematic comparison and accumulation 
of the findings of the cases, reducing the risk of loose formalization and deference to 
case idiosyncrasy.  
Through in-depth examination and thick description of EU engagement with 
each instance of gender justice in both countries, the research subsequently aimed to 
gather various instances of evidence of the operation of causal mechanisms envisioned 
by the theories at hand, which allowed for the drawing of conclusions about the 
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appropriateness or inadequacy of an explanation.181 Systematically comparing the EU’s 
actual engagement with different gender justice mechanisms in multiple countries can 
provide insight in 1) the actual nature of international – in this case the EU’s – 
engagement with different types of gender justice in transition, and 2) the extent to 
which this engagement is shaped by universal gender justice commitments and/or 
political calculations.  
The idea here is that the nature of the EU’s engagement with gender justice in 
transition falls somewhere on a two-point scale with pre-determined universal EU 
gender justice priorities presenting one end of the scale and gender justice opportunity 
structures constituting the other point of this scale. Local gender justice opportunities 
differ according to the types of issues that are pursued by local women’s movements 
and the priorities of local political elites. These can be pursuing accountability for 
politically motivated instances of SGBV, but also effectuating legislative or institutional 
reform to combat VAW, or to pursue justice for a broader set of politically motivated 
gendered harms than just SGBV. By providing a detailed map of what these local 
opportunity structures are in Tunisia and Ukraine and which local actors are the 
proponents and opponents of each of these actions, one can subsequently identify 
whether EU support for gender justice activities is mostly in line with its own policy 
priorities or with (certain) local gender justice agendas. 
 The multi-level case study design thus compares the strengths of a single case 
study with those of a comparative case study design contributing to feminist theory 
development in relation to international support for transitional justice by creating 
robust insight in the factors that drive EU engagement with gender justice in transition 
based on a comparison of its activities in two countries, examined against the gender 
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justice opportunity structures that exist in each country. The success of such an 
approach, however, depends on deliberate case study selection. Therefore, the following 
sub-section will explain why Tunisia and Ukraine are two suitable countries to study in 
this framework.  
 
3.2.3 Case study selection  
This thesis identified a number of criteria the case studies at the local level would have 
to meet based on presence of gender justice efforts under scrutiny in this thesis and 
presumptions about factors that could potentially shape EU engagement with gender 
justice in transition.182 Specifically, the following selection criteria were used for 
inclusion in this research: 
• This research only took into account countries that embarked on their process 
of transition after 2011. The rationale behind this is, that as the idea of 
transformative (gender) justice only acquired traction rather recently outside the 
specialist confines of transitional justice scholarship/practice,183 it would not 
make sense to research the EU’s engagement with this concept before it reached 
prominence in academic circles, and subsequently reached a broader audience. 
The cut-off point has been set at the onset of the Arab Spring, as it has been 
argued in the literature that this development significantly contributed to the 
popularization of transformative justice outside the realm of transitional justice 
experts.184 The preference to study more recent transitional justice efforts also 
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more mainstream debates about transitional justice at the practical level. See for instance: Kirsten J Fisher 
and Robert Stewart, 'After the Arab Spring: a new wave of transitional justice?' (2015) Transitional Justice 
and the Arab Spring. Other seminal publications on transformative justice include: Gready and Robins 
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seemed more appropriate as the EU only adopted its first official guidelines on 
transitional justice in 2015.185 While the EU supported transitional justice 
around the globe before that time,186 the 2015 document contains tangible self-
imposed standards that can be analysed from a gender lens and be used as a 
yardstick to assess the EU’s subsequent efforts in the field.  
• The research only focused on countries which had put some form of 
transitional justice mechanisms in place to pursue justice for past (or ongoing) 
politically motivated crimes in order to explore EU support for politically 
sensitive past-focused transitional justice efforts.  
• The research only focused on countries which were simultaneously engaged in 
broader state-level reform efforts to ensure a better position for women in 
society in line with the idea that transformative justice connects traditional 
transitional justice efforts with generic reform. Examples of such efforts include 
the adoption of legislation to combat VAW and increase women’s political 
participation,187 as well as comprehensive efforts to reform the security sector in 
the spirit of the WPS Agenda.188 In practice, this meant that only countries that 
were experiencing a certain level of stability were taken into consideration, as 
this type of comprehensive reform efforts usually do not take place during 
phases of severe insecurity.  
• This research only took into account countries where local gender justice 
politics have resulted in the authorities disproportionately supporting certain 
types of gender justice measures while neglecting or even obstructing others. 
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This means that countries where authorities have been generally dismissive of 
women’s rights support were not taken into consideration.  
• This research only focused on countries in which the EU had strong political, 
economic, and security interests, as this would make it easier to trace how these 
interests impact an international actor’s engagement with different types of 
gender justice in transition. The thesis relied on EU foreign policy strategies to 
identify which regions/countries the EU considers to be most central to its own 
prosperity and stability.189 These documents indicate that the EU considers 
safeguarding stability in the countries it refers to as the ‘European 
Neighbourhood’ one of its most vital foreign policy interests. 
Focusing on the European Neighbourhood a range of countries have experienced 
transitions or attempts at transitions since 2011. These include: Libya, Egypt, Syria, 
Tunisia, Ukraine. Some of these countries, Libya and Syria most notably, got eliminated 
from the list of possible case study sites as they were too insecure to conduct fieldwork. 
Initially, the researcher therefore decided to look into Egypt and Tunisia, as in 2015 
transitional justice and gender justice more broadly still were on the agenda in both 
countries. However, as the repressive climate (for transitional justice actors and 
researchers) in Egypt worsened,190 and Egypt’s attempts to pursue accountability for 
past harms and implement women’s rights reforms halted under President el-Sisi’s rule, 
this option seemed increasingly unsuitable.  
 Ukraine had not dominated recent debates in academic literature and 
practitioner communities the way Tunisia and Egypt had. However, various transitional 
justice measures had been implemented since the Maidan Revolution had resulted in the 
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overthrow of the Yanukovych government in 2014.191 Amongst other things the ICC 
had opened preliminary investigation into alleged Rome Statute crimes after Ukraine 
made two special ad hoc article declarations under article 12(3) of the ICC Rome 
Statute. This move by the Ukrainian authorities provided the ICC with jurisdiction to 
examine events related to the Maidan, the annexation of the Crimea, and the conflict in 
Eastern Ukraine from November 2013 onward.192 As the conflict in the Donbas region 
deepened,193 publications by the Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
highlighted the occurrence of grave human rights abuses, including conflict-related 
SGBV in the context of the Donbas conflict.194 Moreover, desk research into the 
broader gender justice landscape in Ukraine revealed that like Tunisia,195 Ukraine was in 
the midst of several important gender justice reforms, including an attempt to ratify the 
Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention, the Council of Europe’s Convention aimed 
at combating GBV,196 and efforts aimed at integrating more women in security 
institutions in line with commitments set out in the WPS Agenda.197 In both countries 
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Ukraine and the International Criminal Court (2016). Available at: 
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August 2018. 
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http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/news/tf2017581.pdf, accessed 15 August 2018. 
195 Council of Europe, The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence 
against Women and Domestic Violence (November 2014). Available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/548165c94.html, accessed 3 August 2019. 
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political elites have been supportive of at least some of these measures (to be discussed 
in more depth in chapter 4). In view of these observations, it appeared that Ukraine 
would be an appropriate alternative for Egypt in the context of this research.  
The combination of Tunisia and Ukraine as case studies in a research project on 
international support on gender justice in transition, also allowed for the examination of 
international engagement with gender justice in transition in the type of transitional 
contexts that have received relatively little attention in feminist transitional justice 
scholarship; most feminist research on international engagement with gender justice in 
transition has focused on ‘war-to-peace’ transitions in the Global South, where conflict 
related SGBV and wartime rape have been highly prevalent.198 By including a case study 
with a (potential) war-to-peace transition but with a low rate of conflict-related SGBV, 
and a case study of a transition from authoritarianism to democracy, this thesis could 
test whether insights about the nature of and drivers behind internationalized 
transitional justice support derived from examinations of ‘war-to-peace’ transitions in 
contexts that experienced high levels of conflict-related SGBV also apply in other types 
of transitional contexts.199  
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For the purpose of this study it is also important that while Tunisia and Ukraine 
have both been the stage to the full range of types of gender justice initiatives of interest 
to this research, the actual local gender justice opportunity structures in relation to these 
various gender justice efforts differ significantly. These differences – which will be 
discussed in extensive detail in chapter 4 – exist at the level of robustness of (state-
sanctioned) transitional justice measures, the prominence of gender justice concerns in 
debates about nationhood and the type of gender justice issues that have and have not 
received government buy-in. Thus, while in principle the EU could engage with each of 
the three types of gender justice efforts identified in this thesis in both countries, 
context-specific circumstances make that whether it is politically opportune for the EU 
to engage with a certain gender justice issue varies between the two contexts.  
 
3.2.4 Operationalizing the case study design 
To operationalize the research this section identifies three specific avenues for gender 
justice support in each context and three types of EU modi operandi to support these 
gender justice issues. The avenues are the local examples of the three components of 
the tripartite conceptualization of the feminist transformative gender justice agenda 
identified in the previous chapter.  
In the Tunisian context, the three avenues include: 1) the Specialized Chambers’ 
efforts to pursue accountability for politically motivated SGBV, 2) the Truth and 
Dignity Commission’s (TDC) efforts to pursue justice for indirect victims, and female 
victims of socio-economic rights violations, including its design of a comprehensive 
strategy for reparations, and/or grassroots initiatives to pursue transformative gender 
justice outcomes such as women’s courts put in place by feminist actors who have 
remained mostly at the side-lines of Tunisia’s official transitional justice efforts, and 3) 




gender equal society. In the Ukrainian context, these include 1) efforts to document and 
prosecute the instances of conflict-related SGBV committed within the context of the 
Donbas conflict, 2) grassroots transformative gender justice efforts aimed at the 
pursuance of justice for socio-economic harms inflicted on internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) and citizens of the Donbas in the framework of the conflict, and 3) attempts to 
ratify the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention and/or gender mainstreaming in 
SSR efforts to combat VAW. The type of activities that would be interesting to consider 
in the scope of this research were selected based on what has been identified in feminist 
transitional justice literature discussed in chapter 2 as possible areas for traditional and 
transformative gender justice support. The specific instances that would be relevant to 
consider in each country context were identified during desk research.200 More details 
 
200 For Tunisia: Doris H Gray, 'Tunisia after the Uprising: Islamist and secular Quests for women's rights' 
(2012) 17(3) Mediterranean politics 285; Doris H Gray and Terry Coonan T, 'Notes from the field silence 
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Rights and the Politics of Victimhood in Transitional Justice Discourses Since 2011' (2016) 38(2) Human 
Rights Quarterly 261; Christopher K Lamont and Helena Pannwitz, 'Transitional Justice as Elite Justice? 
Compromise Justice and Transition in Tunisia' (2016) 7(2) Global Policy 278) and the gendered 
implications of this state of affairs; ATFD, La repression des soulevements populaires de 2010–2011 
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about each of these efforts and how various local actors (female victims’ groups, 
feminist activists, political elites) relate to them, follow in chapter 4.  
EU support for each of these gender justice efforts in practice is measured 
along three axes in line with the EU’s own conceptualization of gender justice support 
being a three-pronged approach which ‘combines gender mainstreaming, gender-
specific actions with political and policy dialogue to maximise outcomes’.201 Thus when 
examining EU support for the three different types of gender justice efforts it looks at 
1) how the EU has mainstreamed gender in its transitional justice support (which can 
constitute of financial and diplomatic support) and other relevant activities such as 
judicial reform and SSR, 2) how it has supported gender justice efforts directly through 
targeted action such as support for specific gendered transitional justice initiatives or 
feminist advocacy in the realm of legislative reform, and 3) how it has used diplomatic 
tools including political/economic pressure to support traditional and transformative 
gender justice efforts.  
 
3.2.5 Conclusion 
Much research on international support for gender justice in transition only focuses at 
the central level. This does not allow for consideration of how local context specific 
factors affect international support for gender justice in transition. As the starting point 
of this thesis is that local gender politics are likely to shape how universal gender justice 
norms are implemented by international actors in third country contexts, such an 
approach is not likely to provide the required information to enhance understanding of 
the dynamics behind international support for gender justice in transition. Moreover, a 
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Brussels/New York/Geneva focused case study design is not in line with the feminist 
ideal to decentralize the narrative from those in power. This section argues that a multi-
level case study design which maps the EU’s activities through engagement with both 
EU officials and gender justice experts at the central level and on the ground is a more 
suitable approach for enhancing insight in the factors that drive EU engagement with 
gender justice in transition. It subsequently showed that through a careful research 
design and case study choice it is possible to identify which factors weigh heaviest in 
shaping the EU’s approach towards gender justice in transition abroad. The next 
section will discuss how careful choice of data collection methods further reinforced the 
feminist ethos of the research and provided the required information to make the above 
discussed comparisons.  
 
3.3 DATA COLLECTION 
A case study design facilitates various data collection methods that rely on different 
types of sources.202 In the case of this research these sources need to give insight in ‘the 
what’ and ‘the why’ of EU engagement with gender justice in transition. A combination 
of analysis of EU documentary data and in-depth interviews was identified as the most 
appropriate strategy for data collection within the existing practical constraints. 
However, both the overall choice for these methods as well as the specifics execution 
could potentially refute the (feminist) methodological principles at the basis of this 
thesis. This section therefore justifies the choice for these methods (3.3.1) and explains 
how through purposive selection of documents (3.3.2) and careful execution of the in-
depth interviews (3.3.3), and the application of reflexivity (3.3.4) the researcher managed 
 




to collect the required, high-quality data while staying true to the feminist ethos of this 
thesis.  
 
3.3.1 Methods to understand ‘the what’ and ‘the why’ of EU engagement with 
gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine 
A combination of documentary analysis and in-depth interviews with EU officials and 
gender justice actors in Brussels, Tunisia and Ukraine was identified as the best 
approach for getting insight in the nature of EU engagement with gender justice in 
Tunisia and Ukraine, broader local opportunity structures for gender justice support 
and the factors that determined EU engagement with certain gender justice efforts at 
the expense of others. Each of the data collection tools has limits both in relation to the 
overall nature and quality of the data this method can yield and the appropriateness of 
the use of this method within the feminist spirit of this research. This section justifies 
the overall approach while identifying the limits of these methods and introducing the 
measures that were taken to mitigate them.  
 
3.3.1.1 Documentary analysis 
At first sight reliance on analysis of EU documents to get insight in the nature of EU 
engagement with gender justice seems to contradict this thesis’ critical stance towards 
feminist scholars’ reliance on textual analysis to understand international support for 
gender justice in transition. This is not the case. Official documents can provide useful 
insight in international engagement with gender justice in transition provided that the 
type of documents that are included in the analysis and the type of information that is 
extracted from them is clearly delineated. More concretely, in order to get a meaningful 
picture of an international actor’s support for gender justice in transition in a certain 




These documents should only contain factual information about the interventions that 
the international actors will or has already carried out there.  
Other documents, such as thematic policy strategies were included in the 
analysis as well, but only to draw conclusions about the nature of EU policy priorities 
and thus not about the nature of its support an sich or the factors that motivate EU 
engagement with gender justice in transition. Documentary analysis was also used to get 
insight in the avenues for gender justice support in Tunisia and Ukraine. In this context 
the researcher relied on existing academic literature and reports by IOs and NGOs 
about gender justice issues and initiatives to address them. Taken together they were 
used to create an overview of avenues for change and the local actors associated with 
each of these avenues. The findings from the first stage of the research about the nature 
of EU engagement with gender justice in transition informed the second stage which 
relied on in-depth interviews with EU officials and gender justice actors in Brussels, 
Tunisia and Ukraine to get more insight in the motivations behind EU support for 
gender justice in transition.  
 
3.3.1.2 In-depth elite-interviews 
In-depth interviews are generally acknowledged as a suitable tool to get access to the 
views and interpretations of the organizations and actors under scrutiny,203 and are 
regularly used in feminist research.204 However, in the context of this research reliance 
on in-depth interviews could also raises some methodological challenges. First, as 
almost all interviewees were interviewed in their capacity as professionals or civil society 
organization (CSO) representatives about topics that fall within the remit of their 
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expertise, they qualified as experts. Some interviewees, due to their high-level positions 
in the EU bureaucracy itself, other IOs, or powerful international non-governmental 
organizations (iNGOs) qualified as elites,205 particularly compared to the researcher’s 
own status as a junior academic. This choice for prioritizing engagement with experts 
on EU foreign policy, gender and transitional justice is a natural fit for this thesis, as the 
aim of this research is to establish what the EU is doing in this realm, and why it is 
doing so, rather than to examine how EU foreign policy impacts women’s lives in the 
countries where it is active. However, it seems at odd with the key premise of feminist 
research which is to democratize knowledge making and shift narratives away from 
those in power. The researcher tried to mitigate this issue by including the voices of 
expert actors of different categories, including those representing women’s interests, in 
order to avoid lifting the voices of one category of elite actors.  
A second issue concerned the fact that as elite interviews are not considered a 
mainstay of feminist scholarship, feminist methodological literature contains relatively 
little guidance on how to approach these interviews. It is believed that extracting quality 
data from elites is particularly challenging. Therefore, mainstream experts on elite-
interviewing have elaborated strategies to facilitate data collection. However, at the 
same time it is clear that some of these strategies do not sit well with a feminist research 
ethos as they to some extent rely on ‘manipulation’ to optimize data collection. This 
means that a feminist researcher who relies on elite interviews needs to find a way to 
successfully balance her commitment to a feminist research ethos with the need to 
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extract quality data with relatively little guidance from feminist methodological 
literature.  
The acquisition of good interview data depends on the acquisition of access to 
and the creation of a positive relationship – rapport - with interviewees. In relation to 
the notion of rapport DiCicco‐Bloom and Crabtree have found that: 
Essentially, rapport involves trust and a respect for the interviewee and the information he or 
she shares. It is also the means of establishing a safe and comfortable environment for sharing 
the interviewee’s personal experiences and attitudes as they actually occurred.206 
In general, experts have emphasized that in order to create rapport researchers should 
adjust their message and communication style to their target audience in order to create 
a favourable expression. 207 If the interviewer manages to create a favourable impression, 
he/she can significantly improve the richness and quality of that data gathered. Experts 
on elite interviewing have set out various strategies for the actual conduct of the 
interview to facilitate the creation of report. One of the most common advices concerns 
the build-up of the interview from relatively generic, ‘unthreatening’ questions to more 
specific and critical questions.208  
However, following such a schedule is no guarantee for the creation of rapport 
and/or a successful interview. Experts acknowledge that even when interviewers adhere 
to this type of strategies, one conversation might not be sufficient to – if necessary – 
change the interviewee’s first impressions, or generic willingness to talk to the 
researcher about the topic under scrutiny.209 Individuals, and particularly individuals 
with a duty to or stake in protecting their organizations against scrutiny/criticism, might 
not be fully open about what factors motivate their organizations’ activities. In this 
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regard, it has been observed that elite interviewees in particular are shrewd interpreters 
of the intentions of (critical) academic researchers.210 Institutional affiliations, project 
description, or even choice of research topic in itself can raise certain expectations – 
and misinterpretations – on behalf of the interviewee about the interviewer’s intentions 
and point of view.211 Moreover, experts on elite interviewing have observed that with 
elite interviewees in particular there always exists a risk that interviewees will be 
dishonest.212 In this regard Stephen Ball has argued that elite interviewees only agree to 
participate in an interview to ‘present themselves in a good light, not be indiscreet, to 
convey a particular version of events, to get arguments and points of view across, to 
deride or displace other interpretations and points of view’.213 If they get access, 
researchers might have a hard time distilling truth from lies, as elite actors are often 
excellent communicators who are trained in setting the terms of a conversation. The 
researcher was aware that EU officials in particular might display this type of behaviour.  
However, there is little advice for feminist researchers how to deal with these 
challenges in a fashion that is in line with a feminist research ethos. Mainstream 
scholars, to the contrary, have come up with a range of tactics to tilt the power 
dynamics that guide the interview more in favour of the researcher to ensure optimal 
data collection. These vary from being professional and well-prepared,214 to participating 
in outward deceit.215 In the latter category Lilleker, for instance, advises those 
researching political elites to discuss controversial topics in generic terms, and while 
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doing so to try to ‘flatter’ the respondent by highlighting their influential role in the 
matter.216 Others have advised researchers to appear relatively ‘unknowing’ – even 
though they actually are well-informed - as this will create a ‘unthreatening’ atmosphere 
in which the elite interviewee will feel more at ease to share his/her real points of 
view.217 At the more extreme side of the spectre, researchers such as Spencer and 
Routledge have gone as far as to actively betray their powerful research objects by 
hiding they were academic researchers.218 They justify such approaches by arguing that 
‘under certain conditions, when dealing with powerful bureaucracies, to mask one’s true 
purpose of seeking facts rather than the perpetuation of myths, in order to obtain the 
information essential to sustain a free society’.219 However, while on the surface, such an 
argument speaks to the essence of the feminist research agenda which is to challenge 
the patriarchy, various feminist researchers have criticized such an approach.  
At the core of these critiques sits the question: how, as an ethical researcher, can 
you justify engaging in the same type of behaviour for which you criticize your 
interviewee? In this regard, Morris concludes in relation to the suggestion to use more 
manipulative techniques to create rapport that:  
In practice these are probably very effective … but they are also duplicitous; a point not 
acknowledged by those offering the advice. They involve the researcher doing precisely what 
they criticise elites for doing – being selective in what they present in order to elicit a particular 
response in others.220 
 
216 Darren G Lilleker, 'Interviewing the political elite: Navigating a potential minefield' (2003) 23(3) 
Politics 207: 209.  
217 Margaret Desmond, 'Methodological challenges posed in studying an elite in the field' (2004) 36(3) 
Area 262: 265. 
218 Gary Spencer, 'Methodological issues in the study of bureaucratic elites: A case study of West Point' 
(1973) 21(1) Social Problems 90: 102.  
219 Ibid; Paul Routledge, ‘Travelling east as Walter Kurtz: identity, performance, and collaboration in Goa, 
India. Environment and Planning D’ (2002) 20 Society and Space 477.  




Bradshaw agrees, noting that as academics ‘we cannot work with two codes, one for 
researching up and one for researching down’.221 Kezar finds that the notion that ‘it is 
the interviewer’s responsibility to be open to transforming the lives of all people they 
interview, not just those who need empowerment or ones that we identify with as 
similar to ourselves’, is inherent to a feminist research ethic.222 According to Smith these 
concerns are deepened by the fact that those who are powerful in daily life are not 
necessarily also powerful – or do not necessarily display the characteristics and 
behaviours of a powerful actor – during an interview: ‘it is not always the case that 
"elites” exert the power associated with their professional position in the research space. 
Perhaps we need to make room to consider the possibility of “vulnerable elites”’.223 
Moreover, she also finds that actors who are normally not considered as ‘powerful’ can 
display the characteristics associated with powerful actors: ‘there is little evidence to 
support the idea that any areas of concern relate specifically to interviewing “elites”. 
Instead, there seems to be an assortment of potential problems which all interviewers 
may encounter’.224 This means that those who think it is acceptable to use ‘manipulative 
techniques’ with elite actors, might actually be using them with vulnerable subjects, 
further increasing the unethicalness of such an approach.  
Nevertheless, the imperative to collect quality data is also of concern to feminist 
researchers. This raises questions about how to reunite this objective with a feminist 
research methodology. Feminist scholars do not provide an unequivocal answer to this 
question.225 Smith’s advice to researchers, for instance, is to admit that ‘the goal of 
 
221 Matt Bradshaw, ‘Contracts and member checks in qualitative research in human geography: Reason 
for caution?’ (2001) 33 (2) Area 202: 204.  
222 Adrianna Kezar, 'Transformational elite interviews: Principles and problems' (2003) 9(3) Qualitative 
Inquiry 395: 403.  
223 Katherine E Smith, 'Problematising power relations in ‘elite’ interviews' (2006) 37(4) Geoforum 643: 
650. 
224 Ibid: 652. 
225 Shelley Pacholok, 'Interviewing elite men: Feminist reflections on studying “up” and selling out' (2016) 




perfection is actually unobtainable’,226 and to reflect in more depth and openness how 
power relations actually worked out during the interviewing process. Kezar provides 
more elaborate and concrete advice about steps one should take when interviewing 
elites with the aim to transform certain types of oppressive behaviour in which the 
interviewee takes part. She suggests that ‘decisions about challenging elites must be 
made very judiciously and perhaps toward the later part of the study’ when data have 
been collected.227 This, however, seems to refute her insistence on authenticity 
throughout the interviewing process. Campbell, who interviewed senior police officers - 
‘a group of powerful, authoritative and uniformed men’ - sought to extend the inter-
subjectivity of a brokered understanding, or to gain reflexive distance from ‘self-evident' 
beliefs and values’.228  However, as she found that not all senior police officers were 
equally open to such an exercise, she identified successful rhetoric devices to address 
sensitive topics and voice critiques, while not providing a hostile impression. These 
include reliance on ‘a devil’s advocate approach’, the use of hypothetical questions 
rather than direct questions about the handling of certain cases by the police officers 
who participated in the interviews, and the use of ‘ideal world’ comparisons.229  
The interviewer can thus use certain rhetoric devices to broach critiques in a 
more diplomatic fashion while not betraying the critical feminist ethos of the research. 
Nevertheless, most publications on feminist elite interviewing seem to suggest it is 
inevitable that the feminist researcher will have to deal with hard – if not impossible – 
to reconcile goals. Reflecting on these findings the researcher decided that most of the 
measures to mitigate power imbalances that tilt in favour of the interviewee, would have 
 
226 Smith 2006 (n223): 652.  
227 Kezar 2003 (n222): 411. 
228 Campbell 2005 (n210): 290. 
229 Ibid: 294. These seem acceptable, as they allow the interviewer to express his or her critiques in a more 
constructive fashion. This seems less ‘deceitful’ than Lilleker’s advise to broach controversial topics in 






to be taken outside the scope of the interview itself. More specifically the researcher 
identified that 1) careful, inclusive selection of interviewees and contrasting of the 
perspectives they shared,230 2) the application of reflexivity to identify how the level 
rapport between the interviewer and interviewee might have influenced the quality of 
the data, and 3) triangulation of the interviews with other sources would be the most 
efficient way to ensure the reliability of the data.  
 
3.3.2 The sources for documentary analysis 
This thesis relied on a range of documents to provide a comprehensive picture of the 
EU’s policy priorities, and the nature of EU engagement with gender justice in 
transition in Tunisia and Ukraine as well as of the local gender justice climate in Tunisia 
and Ukraine. This section provides an overview of the types of documents that were 
taken into consideration within the framework of this exercise.  
 
EU documents relied upon to understand the nature of EU engagement with gender justice in transition 
As discussed, this thesis distinguishes between EU policy documents and other 
documents which contain information about actual activities that the EU has 
undertaken in Tunisia and Ukraine. This section lists the key policy documents that 
were studied to inform the fieldwork and the Tunisia and Ukraine specific documents 
that were analysed to understand the actual activities the EU has undertaken in both 
countries. With regard to these activities the thesis distinguishes between different 
foreign policy tools the EU has at its disposal to support gender justice in transition 
(targeted action, gender mainstreaming, political measures). Different types of EU 
 
230 Asking multiple actors about their interpretation of the same types of events or action on behalf of the 
EU facilitates the identification of points of consensus and contestation. In this regard it is has been 
remarked that ‘it is through the connection of many ‘truths’ that interview research contributes to our 




documents were relied upon to identify to what extent the EU has used each of these 
approaches to advance gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine.  
 To understand the EU’s policy priorities in the realm of gender and transitional 
justice in advance of the fieldwork the thesis relied upon analysis of core policy 
documents in the realm of gender and transitional justice. The starting point for this 
analysis were the 2015 Council Conclusions on transitional justice and the EU’s Policy 
Framework on Support to Transitional Justice annexed to the conclusions.231 This 
document contains several references to other policy frameworks relevant to the EU’s 
support for gender justice in transition such as the EU’s 2008 Comprehensive approach 
to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security,232 the Guidelines on Violence against 
Women and Girls,233 and the Gender Action Plan.234 These documents were analysed to 
get insight in the EU’s policy priorities in the realm of gender justice in transition in 
general and in the European Neighbourhood in specific. After the fieldwork the EU 
published an updated strategy on Women Peace and Security (December 2018).235 The 
findings about the nature of EU engagement with gender justice in transition were 
compared against the previous 2008 EU policy framework on WPS and this updated 
version to check whether today’s policy framework better reflects the EU’s actual 
approach than the previous one.  
 
231 Council of the European Union 2015 (n3) 
232 Council of the European Union, Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security, Brussels, 1.12.2008, 
15671/1/08. See also: Council of the European Union, Revised indicators. Comprehensive approach to 
the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, 
peace and security, 12525/16, 22 September 2016. 
233 European Union, The EU Guidelines on violence against women and girls and combatting all forms 
of discrimination against them. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/eu_guidelines_on_violence_against_women_and_girls_1.pdf, 
accessed 31 July 2018. 
234 European Commission and High Representative 2015 (n2).  
235 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on Women, Peace and Security, 15086/18, 




 To get insight in targeted spending on gender justice activities in Tunisia and 
Ukraine the thesis relied in first instance on Annual Action Programmes, i.e. ‘financing 
decisions adopted by the European Commission, to reserve funds for regional and 
country-based external cooperation programmes’,236 In the Ukrainian context the 
research also relied on Special Measures the EU has published, outlining ad hoc 
spending on issues of imminent importance. All Annual Action Programmes and 
Special Measures are available via the country pages for Tunisia and Ukraine at the 
website of the European Commission.237 The Ukrainian Annual Action Programmes are 
available in English, while the Tunisian ones can be consulted in French. Annual Action 
Programmes contain annexes related to specific fields of intervention such as justice 
sector reform, SSR and support for gender equality. The table below lists which Annual 
Action Programme annexes were considered in the context of this thesis: 
 
Table 3.1: EU Annual Action Programmes and Special Measures analysed in the context of this 
thesis 
 
 Tunisia Ukraine 
2011 https://bit.ly/31bj6qZ (Special Measure 
Marginalized Regions)238 
NA 
2012 https://bit.ly/2KhkT6Z (Justice 
PARJ2)239  
NA 
2013 No relevant documents NA 
 
236 European Commission, Annual Action Programmes, Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/ap/index_en.htm_en. Accessed 20 July 2019.  
237 European Commission Tunisia page: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/tunisia_en. Accessed 20 July 2019; European Commission 
Ukraine page https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/ukraine_en. 
Accessed 20 July 2019. 
238 Commission Europe ́enne, Fiche action du Programme d'Appui au Développement des Zones 
De ́favorise ́es pour la Tunisie (2011). Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/c20116826_sm_tunisie_2011_ad1.pdf, accessed 2 August 2018. 
239 Commission Europe ́enne, DÉCISION D'EXÉCUTION DE LA COMMISSION du 28.9.2012 
Approuvant le programme d'appui à la re ́forme de la justice en faveur de la Tunisie sous le programme 













(Special Measure CS)243 
2015 https://bit.ly/2Mxbf32 (SSR)244 No relevant documents 
2016 No relevant documents https://bit.ly/2KfcSiZ (Special 
Measure Rule of Law PRAVO)245 




No relevant documents 
2018 No relevant documents https://bit.ly/2LRpPCI (AAP - 
HR)248 
 
In addition, the research also looked at specific projects the EU has funded through the 
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)/European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument contribution to Stability and Peace (IcSP), and 
Development Cooperation Instrument in Tunisia and Ukraine.249 Information about 
 
240 Commission Europe ́enne, Annexe 2 de la décision d’exécution de la Commission approuvant le 
programme d’action annuel 2014 en faveur de la Tunisie: Document relatif à l'action « Programme 
d’Appui à la Réforme de la Justice 2 ». 
241 Commission Europe ́enne, Annexe 4 de la de ́cision d’exe ́cution de la Commission approuvant le 
programme d’action annuel 2014 en faveur de la Tunisie, Document relatif a l’action “Programme de 
promotion de l’egalite homme-femme en Tunisie”.  
242 European Commission, Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Special measure 
2014 in favour of Ukraine Action Document for the State Building Contract for Ukraine.  
243 European Commission, Annex 2 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Special measure 
2014 in favour of Ukraine Action Document for Ukraine Civil Society Support Programme. 
244 Commission Europe ́enne, Annexe 2 de la de ́cision d’exe ́cution de la Commission relative au 
programme d’action annuel 2015 en faveur de la Tunisie partie I à financer sur le budget géne ́ral de 
l'Union europe ́enne, Document initial relatif à l’action pour le programme d’appui à la re ́forme et 
modernisation du secteur de la sécurité de la Re ́publique tunisienne  
245 European Commission, Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Special Measure 
III 2016 on Support to Rule of Law Reforms in Ukraine (PRAVO) Action Document for Support to 
Rule of Law Reforms in Ukraine (PRAVO)  
246 Commission Europe ́enne, De ́cision d’exe ́cution de la Commission du 17.11.2017 relative au 
programme d’action annuel 2017 partie I en faveur de la Tunisie à financer sur le budget géne ́ral de 
l'Union, Bruxelles, le 17.11.2017 C(2017) 7759 final.  
247 Commission Europe ́enne, De ́cision d’exe ́cution de la Commission du 29.11.2017 relative au 
programme d’action annuel 2017 partie 2 en faveur de la Tunisie à financer sur le budget géne ́ral de 
l'Union, Bruxelles, le 29.11.2017 C(2017) 8046 final.  
248 European Commission, Annex 2 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action 
Programme 2018 (part 1) in favour of Ukraine Action Document for Technical Cooperation Facility 
2018. 
249 It looked at the ENI, because it is the core instrument for funding of EU actions in the 




projects supported through these grants was accessed via the Financial Transparency 
System (FTS),250 which is a publicly accessible online EU managed database of EU 
funded projects. In this database results can be filtered per country, instrument and 
year. This thesis identified a total of 384 commitments in Tunisia between 2011 and 
2018 and 317 commitments in Ukraine between 2014 and 2018 under these 
instruments.251 Each of these commitments was studied to examine if it was relevant to 
EU support for gender justice in transition according to this thesis’ definition of gender 
justice in transition.  
Table 3.2: Total number of EU budgetary commitments under ENPI/ENI per year 
 
 Tunisia Ukraine 
2011 47 NA 
2012 37 NA 
2013 35 NA 
2014 30 52 
2015 36 (10 ENI, 26 ENPI) 52 (10 ENI, 42 ENPI) 
2016 33 (22 ENI, 11 ENPI) 43 (15 ENI, 28 ENPI) 
2017 35 35 
2018 40 30 




Table 3.3: Total number of EU budgetary commitments under EIDHR per year 
 
 Tunisia Ukraine 
2011 18  NA 
2012 7  NA 
2013 1  NA 
2014 24  25  
2015 5  6  
2016 1  6  
2017 5  5  
2018 3  3  





interest to this thesis. In her analysis of EU funding for transitional justice Laura Davis also focused on 
these three thematic instruments. Davis 2014 (n36): 81.  
250 European Commission, Financial Transparancy System. Available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/fts/index_en.htm, accessed 3 August 2019.  




Table 3.4: Total number of EU budgetary commitments under IcSP per year  
 
 Tunisia Ukraine 
2014 0  0  
2015 0  6  
2016 2  7  
2017 5  2  
2018 No data available via 
FTS 
4  




Table 3.5: Total number of EU Budgetary commitments under the Instrument for Development 
Cooperation per year 
 
 Tunisia Ukraine 
2011 0 NA 
2012 5 NA 
2013 0 NA 
2014 6 24 
2015 4 2 
2016 0 4 
2017 2 8 
2018 1 3 




Above discussed documents and commitments provide straightforward insight in the 
EU’s support for different types of gender justice efforts through targeted action. They 
can also contribute to increasing understanding of the extent to which the EU uses 
gender mainstreaming of relevant programmes to contribute to gender justice in 
transition. To get enhanced insight in the EU’s use of gender mainstreaming, the 
researcher looked for references to women/girls/gender/gender mainstreaming in the 
annexes describing the EU’s Annual Action Programmes in the area of human rights, 
justice and SSR. While these references are no guarantee that the EU has actually 
applied gender mainstreaming in practice, they provide insight in the extent to which 
the role of gender in EU programmes in Tunisia and Ukraine has evolved over time and 




The in-depth interviews were subsequently used to get insight in the extent to which the 
EU has actually lived up to these commitments in practice.  
 As diplomacy often takes place behind closed doors, in a sense analysis of EU 
documents in itself was not sufficient to get a comprehensive picture of the ways in 
which EU has used political tools to support gender justice initiatives in Tunisia and 
Ukraine. Still, the annual country reports the EU has publishes every year to reflect on 
the state of democracy and human rights around the world provide some insight in 
what the EU considers to be priority issues in the realm of human rights and 
democratization in Tunisia and Ukraine.252 The same is true with regard to the 
statements the EU releases after annual human rights dialogues and other major events 
such as association councils, as do EU statements released in response to important 
developments in Tunisia and Ukraine.253 The research analysed all EU human rights 
reports on Tunisia and Ukraine and relevant public statements (23 statements on 
Ukraine and 18 statements on Tunisia) published between the Arab Spring – in the 
 
252 European External Action Service, Human rights and democracy in the world: Report on EU Action 
in 2011. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2011_human-rights-annual_report_en.pdf, 
accessed 20 July 2019; Council of the European Union, EU Annual Report on Human Rights and 
Democracy in the World in 2012 (Thematic Reports). Available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2012_human-rights-annual_report_thematic_en_0.pdf, accessed 
20 July 2019. [the country reports are not available online]; Council of the European Union, EU Annual 
Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World in 2013. Available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2013_human-rights-annual_report_en.pdf, accessed 20 July 2019; 
Council of the European Union, EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World in 
2014, Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2014-human-rights-annual_report_en.pdf, 
accessed 20 July 2019; Council of the European Union, EU Annual Report on Human Rights and 
Democracy in the World in 2015 - Country and Regional Issues, Available at: 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12299-2016-INIT/en/pdf, accessed 20 July 2019; 
Council of the European Union, Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World in 2016. 
Available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/annual_report_on_human_rights_and_democracy_in_the_world
_2016_.pdf, accessed 20 July 2019; Council of the European Union, Annual Report on Human Rights 
and Democracy in the World in 2017 - Country Updates on Human Rights and Democracy. Available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/compiled_country_updates_annual_report_on_human_rights_an
d_democracy_2017_clean_0.pdf, accessed 20 July 2019; Council of the European Union, Annual Report 
on Human Rights and Democracy in the World in 2018 - Country Updates on Human Rights and 
Democracy. Available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/complete_eu_country_updates_on_human_rights_and_democra
cy_in_the_world_2018-29.05.pdf, accessed 20 July 2019.  




Ukrainian case the Maidan – and 2018.  The statements were identified through the 
press communications databases of the European Commission and the websites of the 
European Delegations in Tunisia and Ukraine. In addition, in the Ukrainian context the 
research also looked into the sanctions the EU has imposed in response to the events 
that are taking place in the Donbas.254 
 
Academic literature and other publications to enhance understanding of gender justice environment in 
Tunisia and Ukraine 
To understand the gender justice environment in which the EU is operating in Tunisia 
and Ukraine in advance to the interviews the research relied on English language 
academic publications reflecting on the different type of transitional justice and gender 
justice activities implemented in Tunisia and Ukraine in the wake of their respective 
revolutions and the gender politics that have shaped these gender justice trajectories. In 
relation to the Tunisian context this includes the work of authors such as Gray and 
Coonan, Debuysere, Charrad, Lamont, and Andrieu. In the Ukrainian context this 
includes publications by Martsenyuk, Phillips, Channell-Justice, Hankivsky and Skoryk, 
Lyubashenko and Lachowski. These publications were identified through searches in 
Google Scholar, HeinOnline, JSTOR, Muse, SAGE, Wiley and Taylor and Francis 
through the use of search terms such as [country] AND ‘transitional justice’ OR gender, 
[country] AND gender, [country] AND ‘women’s rights’, and through references in 
these articles to other sources. In addition, the research has relied on reports by NGOs 
and IOs on gender justice issues in Tunisia and Ukraine. These were identified through 
references in academic literature and google searches in French and English for Tunisia 
and in English for Ukraine.  
 
254 A timeline of sanctions imposed by the European Union in response to the Ukraine Crisis is available 
at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/history-ukraine-crisis/, 




While findings from this desk research informed the interview guide, during the 
interviews the researcher gained a much more detailed picture of EU activities in the 
realm of gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine and the local gender justice landscape. 
Thanks to the interviews she also identified additional documents to include in the 
documentary analysis that she had not yet identified during the first phase. Insights 
from these new documents were used to further refine descriptions of the local gender 
justice opportunity structure discussed in chapter 4 and to draw conclusions on the 
nature of EU engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine.  
 
3.3.3 The interviewing sample 
Purposive sampling was used to create a diverse sample of interviewees in accordance 
with the notion that it is through the connection of many ‘truths’ that interview 
research contributes to our knowledge of the meaning of the human experience’.255 The 
multi-sited case study design was chosen as the backbone for this study to facilitate the 
inclusion of expert voices from the periphery while researching a powerful international 
actor based in the Global North. However, the case study design in itself does not 
guarantee that all relevant voices are taken into account. Within each case study site, the 
researcher also had to ensure that she engaged with the (from a feminist perspective) 
relevant individuals. This required purposive sampling.256 As the sampling stage is a 
phase of the research during which the researcher is still in relative control over the 
direction in which the fieldwork is heading, the composition of a balanced sample was 
one of the core measures the researcher took to mitigate the risk of acquiring unreliable 
 
255 DiCicco‐Bloom and Crabtree 2006 (n206). 
256 Ma. Dolores C Tongco, 'Purposive sampling as a tool for informant selection' (2007) 5 Ethnobotany 




data as result of reluctance on behalf of (EU) elites to freely share their perspectives on 
certain issues 
In the context of research on EU development support in third countries, Petra 
Debusscher has argued for the inclusion of voices of local feminist organizations rather 
than a focus on those who are active on the Brussels level in order to avoid 
‘stereotypical, paternalist and Eurocentric ideas about the meaning of gender equality 
abroad’, as: 
An approach grounded in the lived realities of people seems more appropriate to detect possible 
‘silences’ (what is not said) in EU development discourse and practice (Debusscher, 2011), and 
allows to question policy-makers’ labels and predetermined solutions, as well as the implications 
they have.257 
However, the inclusion of feminist voices as an antidote to the dominance of the voice 
of powerful institutions, also presents some challenges as the feminist narrative itself 
can be considered oppressing, regardless of the fact that feminists have traditionally 
presented themselves as a marginalized societal force.258 As the previous chapter 
discussed, in feminist transitional justice scholarship increasing recognition of the 
differences that exist between women as a result of their positionality has emerged. 
Intersectional and postcolonial feminist scholars have pointed out the power 
discrepancy between powerful and less powerful feminist/female voices.259  
This acknowledgement of the existence of power differentials between not only 
‘powerful’ international actors on the one hand and women or feminists on the other, 
but also amongst actors who have the female cause at heart, shaped the identification of 
interviewees for this research. More specifically the selection process of interviewees 
 
257 Debusscher 2016 (n168): 13.  
258 Halley 2008 (n51). 
259 Natalie J Sokoloff and Ida Dupont, 'Domestic violence at the intersections of race, class, and gender: 
challenges and contributions to understanding violence against marginalized women in diverse 




took into account 1) the global/local divide, 2) the division between international actors 
and (feminist) CSO representatives, 3) differences between ‘hegemonic’ feminist and 
marginalized feminist narratives, and 4) differences between feminist priorities at large 
and the experiences of (non-feminist) women with a focus on female victims.260  
For the identification of actual interviewees, the researcher used a combination 
of purposive sampling, snowball sampling, and opportunistic sampling techniques. 
Purposive sampling entails the identification of interviewees based on the researcher’s 
awareness of the contribution that this individual can make to the research.261 This 
requires knowledge of the composition of the previously identified stakeholder groups. 
Researchers with intimate knowledge of certain populations e.g. because they previously 
conducted research with this group or used to be part of the group themselves, can 
identify interviewees based on their familiarity with the population. A study of existing 
 
260 In the Tunisian context, the researcher was familiar with a range of academic publications on the 
volatile/politicized nature of Tunisia’s transitional justice process (e.g. Andrieu K, 'Confronting the 
Dictatorial Past in Tunisia: Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood in Transitional Justice 
Discourses Since 2011' (2016) 38(2) Human Rights Quarterly 261; Lamont CK and Pannwitz H, 
'Transitional Justice as Elite Justice? Compromise Justice and Transition in Tunisia' (2016) 7(2) Global 
Policy 278) and the gendered implications of this state of affairs (e.g. Gray and Coonan 2014 (n200)). 
These publications paid particular attention to the rift between prominent feminist organizations and the 
Islamist female victims, who constitute the core female constituency participating in Tunisia’s transitional 
justice process. Based on a combination of these insights and those from postcolonial and intersectional 
feminist literature, this thesis’s aim was to include voices representing both groups from throughout the 
country. In Ukraine the thesis aimed to include a similar variety of interviewees including representatives 
of the country’s core feminist organizations that emerged with Western donor support after the collapse 
of the USSR, more radical post-Maidan feminist activists, and representatives of women’s groups who are 
engaged in peacebuilding activities related to the conflict in the Donbas. Alexandra Hrycak, 'Foundation 
feminism and the articulation of hybrid feminisms in post-socialist Ukraine' (2006) 20(1) East European 
Politics & Societies 69; Emily S Channell-Justice, '“We’re Not Just Sandwiches”: Europe, Nation, and 
Feminist (Im)Possibilities on Ukraine’s Maidan' (2017) 42(3) Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and 
Society 717; Olga Onuch and Tamara Martsenyuk T, 'Mothers and Daughters of the Maidan: Gender, 
repertoires of violence, and the division of labour in Ukrainian protests' (2014) 1(1) Social, Health, and 
Communication Studies Journal 105; Sarah D Phillips, 'The Women's Squad in Ukraine's protests: 
Feminism, nationalism, and militarism on the Maidan' (2014) 41(3) American Ethnologist 414; Marian J 
Rubchak, 'A Fiery EuroMaidan Ignites a Feminist Voice' (2014) 44(2) Perspectives on Europe 82.  
 
Importantly, the researcher did not aim to include activist voices from the Femen movement due to the 
controversies surrounding this movement, and the lack of Femen activities that relate directly to the 
Maidan protests or the developments in the field of women’s rights that followed these. See: Heather 
McRobie, ‘Bikinis and babas: the gender subtext of clichés about Ukraine’, Open Democracy, January 
2015. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/heather-mcrobie/bikinis-and-babas-gender-
subtext-of-clichés-about-ukraine, accessed 22-5-2018. 
261 Oisin Tansey, 'Process tracing and elite interviewing: a case for non-probability sampling' (2007) 40(4) 




literature or organograms of organizations can also provide the researcher with 
potential names of interviewees. For those with fewer connections, as was the case for 
this researcher, snowball sampling is a particularly useful tool to identify and reach more 
potential interviewees.262 When using snowball sampling, a researcher identifies one or 
more individuals with insider knowledge and asks them to name others who would be 
useful informants for the research.263 After identification of potentially useful 
interviewees based on a review of academic literature, a mapping of relevant NGOs 
active in Brussels and the case study countries, and a study of the EU organogram, the 
researcher reached out to other academics who had done research on the EU’s support 
for transitional justice and/or the WPS Agenda to suggest to her other relevant 
interviewees.  
 No matter how big the efforts invested in the careful selection of interviewees, 
the successful collection of data from a varied sample always depends on chance. Elite 
or expert actors are not only notoriously challenging to interview, but also difficult to 
reach,264 and when it comes to the existence of strategies to overcome these barriers 
Kenneth Goldstein has found that ‘[t]he bottom line is that there are no silver bullet 
solutions, and scheduling and completing elite interviews takes a fair bit of luck’.265 
While the researcher used snowball sampling to identify relevant interviewees, and 
 
262 Kenneth Goldstein, 'Getting in the door: Sampling and completing elite interviews' (2002) 35(4) PS: 
Political Science & Politics 669. 
263 Nissim Cohen and Tamar Arieli, 'Field research in conflict environments: Methodological challenges 
and snowball sampling' (2011) 48(4) Journal of Peace Research 423. 
264 Goldstein 2002 (n262); Lilleker 2003 (n216). Smith, however, does not agree that what most 
researchers consider to be elite actors are necessarily harder to reach. She argues that ‘whilst gaining 
access to powerful groups may indeed be extremely difficult, this is no more true of ‘elites’ than it is for 
some other groups’. The examples she cites include the experiences of a white, male researcher trying to 
get access to a Puerto Rican neighbourhood where inhabitants engaged in illegal drug dealing (subjects 
not only threatened to withdraw participation, but also to kill the researcher if he would not exceed his 
activities) and the obstacles faced by a white, female researcher in identifying working-class lesbians, her 
topic of interest. Smith (n223): 648. She refers to:  
Philippe Bourgois, In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio (Cambridge University Press 1995); 
Yvette Taylor, ‘Hidden in the small ads: Researching working-class lesbians’ (2004) 1(2) Graduate Journal 
of Social Science 253. 




asked existing contacts to introduce her to other relevant interviewees, this approach 
only covered part of the sample. Therefore, the researcher still had to rely on ‘cold-
calling’ to reach certain interviewees who had been identified as potential core 
informants.  
Eventually 89 individuals participated in interviews for this thesis.266 About 25 
individuals who were invited to take part in an interview never responded to the 
invitation or turned it down The researcher took a number of steps to increase the 
response rate. These measures include the use of personalized invitations,267 which were 
sent predominantly to individual work email accounts identified through EU address 
books and NGO websites. In Brussels and Ukraine, where the fieldwork only lasted for 
a month,268 the researcher tried to plan interviews as much as possible in advance of the 
fieldwork.269 In Brussels the researcher interviewed a total of 28 individuals and in Kyiv 
27.270 In Tunisia the researcher organized a two-months internship with the Tunisia 
country office of the ICTJ to get access to a network of interviewees.271 Thanks to the 
 
266 For an anonymized list of interviewees, indicating location and generic descriptor of professional 
affiliation see Appendix V. 
267 Most authors emphasize the importance of providing a biography with credentials of the researcher, 
fully explaining the research project to the target population, and being clear about the parameters of the 
interview.267 In line with these insights, this research employed a standard invitation letter, which 
introduced the researcher and the research, including a reference to her affiliation to Ulster University’s 
Transitional Justice Institute. These letters were subsequently individualized for each interviewee with a 
tailored explanation of what would be the expected contribution of this interviewee to this research. The 
invitation included TJI’s official letterhead and were dispatched by email with a subject information sheet 
attached. Goldstein 2002 (n262); Richards 1996 (n207). 
268 The researcher stayed in Brussels in June 2017 and came back for a week in July. The researcher stayed 
in Tunisia from mid-July 2017 till the beginning of October 2017. The researcher was in Ukraine from 
the very end of October till the very beginning of December 2017.  
269 The first component of the fieldwork started in Brussels in the beginning of June 2017, and lasted a 
month. Interview invitations were sent well in advance in view of the relatively short duration of the stay. 
The aim was to make optimal use of this period of time, and this required conscientious planning. 
Initially, the response rate to the invitations was low. In hindsight, this was probably related to the fact 
that they were sent just before the 2017 Easter weekend. After a polite reminder, a reasonable number of 
responses materialized, and the researcher was able to schedule 15 interviews from diverse stakeholder 
groups before arriving in Brussels. Snowball sampling resulted in the identification of another 13 
interviewees in Brussels, and a reasonable number of contacts in Tunisia and Ukraine particularly within 
EU institutions.  
270 The thesis uses Ukrainian spelling in accordance with the spelling used by the UN in reporting on the 
situation in Ukraine, unless it cites source material that uses the Russian spelling. This means for instance 
that the thesis uses the Ukrainian Kyiv, Odesa Donbas and Luhansk rather than the Russian Kiev, 
Odessa, Donbass and Lugansk.  




internship, the researcher got in touch with various representatives of female victims’ 
groups throughout Tunisia, who would have been very difficult to reach if she would 
not have been affiliated with this organization due to language barriers and the relatively 
unorganized nature of some of these groups. During a three-months stay, 34 individuals 
belonging to the different stakeholder groups identified in the previous sub-section 
agreed to participate in an interview. Two interviewees the researcher spoke to in Kyiv 
withdrew after reading the transcript, which means that the researcher relied on insights 
from 87 interviews.272  
 However, gaining access to the interviewees required considerable effort, and as 
said not all of these efforts eventually turned out to be successful on the short and the 
long-term. This had implications for the representativeness of the data, particularly at 
the level of saturation. Saturation concerns the question whether the researcher 
interviewed a sufficient number of individuals to get a complete picture of the topic 
under examination. It can be described as the point ‘at which the data collection process 
no longer offers any new or relevant data’,273 or ‘when gathering fresh data no longer 
sparks new theoretical insights, nor reveals new properties of your core theoretical 
categories’.274 In view of the large number of individuals the researcher spoke with, 
problems at the level of saturation might not seem obvious. Goldstein, however, argues 
that when a researcher engages in elite interviewing it is more appropriate to tackle the 
issue of saturation from a sampling theory perspective.275 He argues that when assessing 
the quality of the sample it is most important for the researcher to compare the 
characteristics of the respondents and non-respondents in order to avoid what 
 
272 The implications of these withdrawals are discussed in section 3.3.4. 
273 Shari L Dworkin, Sample size policy for qualitative studies using in-depth interviews (2012) 1319.  
274 Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative Analysis 
(Sage Publications 2006) 113.  




quantitative researchers call ‘systematic error’.276 If all non-respondents share the same 
profile, which is significantly different from the profile of the respondents, the absence 
of their perspective from the collected data will likely bias the outcomes of the 
research.277 
Saturation is thus easier to reach with a relatively homogenous interviewee 
sample. As this research identified a rather diverse sample of interviewees, it had to get 
access not only to more interviewees, but also make sure all of the sub-groups in all of 
the three locations would be represented sufficiently. This was a struggle in all case 
study sites. In Tunisia and Ukraine, this was related to the fragmented nature of the 
countries’ women’s movements, and some of these actors’ either aversion to or lack of 
interest in transitional justice. In Tunisia relevant gender justice actors’ perspectives on 
the concept of (transformative) gender justice in transition and the best ways to pursue 
it differed significantly between the local gender justice actors, and certain amongst 
them were very sceptical about the transitional justice process and some of the IOs 
engaging with it.278 Thanks to the affiliation with ICTJ, the researcher got relatively 
easily in touch with representatives of the female victims’ groups with which ICTJ had 
established strong connections.279 However, due to this same affiliation the researcher 
experienced severe obstacles in reaching other stakeholders, and particularly 
representatives of Tunisia’s leading feminist organizations. When the researcher finally 
managed to speak to representatives of these organizations the researcher did not ask 
directly why they had ignored her invitations during a period of two months. However, 
the interviewees did indicate that they thought the TDC’s Women’s Committee had 
 
276 Ibid.  
277 Ibid.  
278 Interview 29 Tunisia, Tunis, 29 September 2017, Representative Tunisian feminist NGO. 
279 The ICTJ has established the female victims’ network ‘Transitional Justice is also for Women’. This 
network consists predominantly of female victims’ groups/CSOs closely affiliated to the Islamist 





failed to pursue inclusive gender justice outcomes, and that the ICTJ (Tunis country 
office) was partly to blame for the approach the TDC had taken in this regard.280 
In Ukraine, the researcher spoke predominantly to Ukrainians – all of them in 
favour of Ukraine’s independence from Russia – working for international 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, and local NGOs. This sample 
differed from the ideal sample, which would have included more interviewees from 
Ukraine’s grassroots women’s movement, radical feminist activists, and also some 
perspectives from representatives of non-feminist women’s groups. That the researcher 
did not speak to all these categories of interviewees was a result of language obstacles 
and a lack of time and resources for extensive travel.281  Nevertheless, the interviewees 
the researcher talked with were the ones who were most engaged in the activities that 
are of interest to this thesis – gendered transitional justice and legislative reform in the 
field of women’s rights – and could therefore provide relevant insights about the 
developments in this field, and the EU’s engagement with it. Therefore, as the 
researcher was aware of these gaps and the overall sample was sufficiently divers to 
compare competing truths, they did not result in biased or incomplete findings. If local 
NGOs for instance declined to participate, the researcher would look up their 
publications – provided that they were available in English - to understand what gender 
justice issues they prioritized.  
A second issue in relation to saturation that affected the overall sample of 
interviewees, but particularly the sample of Brussels interviewees, relates to this 
research’s focus on transitional justice, and more specifically transformative gender 
justice in transition. In Brussels very few interviewees – be it in the EU institutions itself 
or NGO offices in Brussels - were working on or had specific expertise on this topic. 
 
280 Interview 29 Tunisia (n278). 
281 The researcher relied on a Ukrainian interpreter for one interview. Interview 5 Ukraine, Kyiv, 31 




Therefore, the researcher had to talk to persons working on related issues. As a result, 
interviewees approached the topic from a range of different angles, which raised 
definitional concerns and questions about interviewees working on how many different 
topics should be included in the sample. However, as the issue at the core of this thesis 
is the EU’s approach towards gender justice in transition, it was possible to overcome 
this issue by using more generic terminology when necessary, and to focus specifically 
on the interviewees’ attitudes to gender mainstreaming/women’s rights in their 
activities. This approach greatly facilitated the identification of common threads even if 
the interviewees were working on a wide range of different issues, which they 
themselves would not always necessarily describe as ‘transitional justice’, but which 
could qualify as such according to the broad conceptualization of gender justice in 
transition of this thesis.  
 
3.3.4 A reflexive account of the interviews 
A reflexive comparison between the more and less successful interviews conducted in 
the course of the fieldwork in Brussels, Tunisia and Ukraine, implies that often factors 
outside the researcher’s control largely determine the unfolding of the interview; a 
finding in line with experiences of other feminist researchers who did elite 
interviewing.282 Nevertheless, being well-prepared and critical in a ‘smart’, factual way, 
can help mitigating initial distrust or at least provide the researcher with a feeling of 
dignity and control when the conversation does not unfold as planned. Importantly, 
applying reflexivity contributes to understanding what are the deeper implications of the 
spirit in which an interview took place on the meaning of the data. In this regard the 
researcher found that while interviews in which rapport did not crystalize were more 
 




challenging in the moment itself, they sometimes provided a more genuine picture of 
the interviewee’s views on the matters under discussion than some of the experiences in 
which the interviewees were very facilitating.   
 The strategy for this fieldwork was to be open about the feminist nature of the 
research, not to engage in manipulative techniques, and to be prepared to engage in 
what Campbell describes as critical dialogue: 
In other words, to achieve something resembling `interpretive rapport' in this context, I adopted 
an interviewing style which inhibited as much as it facilitated an `empathic' interviewee-
interviewer relationship. At the same time, this somewhat schizophrenic approach was capable 
of producing a hermeneutical understanding of these officers' decision- making world. If I was 
pressed to describe this style I would say that it was based on `critical dialogue'. By this I mean 
that rather than `empathy', the concept of `dialogue' seems more appropriate. `Dialogue' 
suggests connection without requiring empathy and acceptance of all that is said, and when 
qualified by `critical', which allows for challenge, it becomes a working construct which 
adequately conveys the key elements of such an interviewing style.283  
Against this background, it was decided that good preparation and the demonstration of 
a certain level of expertise would be key to 1) being capable to ask well-informed critical 
questions, and 2) not alienating interviewees when posing these questions. This included 
the drafting of comprehensive interview guides before the fieldwork commenced, 
research on the background of the interviewees before each meeting, and additional 
skimming through relevant policy documents/publications just before the meeting to 
have important information readily available. 
In most instances, interviewees demonstrated willingness to engage with 
critical/sensitive questions in relation to their own activities aimed at supporting gender 
justice in transition or those of other relevant actors. However, the time and efforts it 
took to create the type of rapport required for this type of conversations differed. In 
 




some cases, interviewees seemed eager – almost relieved - to share critical perspectives; 
they emphasized the importance of this type of research and expressed interest in 
reading the findings.284 In others, interviewees who seemed nervous/reluctant in the 
beginning were put at ease relatively quickly through a question that triggered their 
interest or a small joke. In many cases, interviewees were willing to engage with critical 
questions, but stayed on the defensive side. Within this category some provided the 
impression that they were not willing to share openly. In the EU’s case, some of the 
interviewees in this category seemed to genuinely believe in the EU’s status as a 
women’s rights ‘pioneer’.285 In a small number of cases, despite preparations and the use 
of strategies to put the interviewee at ease, interviewees did not overcome their 
antagonism/distrust towards the researcher, resulting in rather unpleasant 
conversations. In others, however, the researcher did manage to overcome scepticism 
and build rapport. These interviews were some of the most rewarding experiences of 
the fieldwork, and often also yielded the most interesting data.  
A good example of an interview in which the researcher managed to gradually 
create rapport was an encounter she had with a Brussels-based EU diplomat who was 
working on security related matters in the European Neighbourhood.286 This diplomat 
started the interview by criticizing the focus of the research as irrelevant as the EU did 
not prioritize transitional justice in the European Neighbourhood. However, during the 
 
284 Interview 15 Ukraine, Kyiv, 15 November 2017, Representative EU Delegation. In relation to my 
reflection that in absence of effective gender mainstreaming in Ukraine, it might be more effective to rely 
more on targeted action the interviewee mentioned: 
I: But also coming back to the recommendation related to the other question you were asking 
before, the recommendation that you gave before about perhaps leaving this cross-cutting…  
E: Well not leaving it, but at least…  
I: Leaving it aside for a moment, and then taking a more targeted approach. I surely would be 
very happy to read this in the end results.  
285 Interview 6 Brussels, 8 June 2017, Representative EEAS (gender expert). This interviewee literally used 
the term ‘pioneer’ to describe the EU’s activities in the field of women’s rights. In another interview with 
two EEAS representatives, one interviewee stated in relation to the importance of gender mainstreaming 
in Ukraine that it is important, because it is ‘part of our way of life in the EU to treat men and women 
equally’. Interview 20, Brussels, 19 June 2017, Representative EEAS.  




conversation the interviewee came to understand that 1) the researcher was well aware 
of the developments in the realm of EU security policy in the European 
Neighbourhood, 2) that transitional justice efforts in Tunisia and Ukraine were relevant 
to her work on the European Neighbourhood, and 3) that the researcher was eager to 
learn more about these activities. This diplomat seemed to appreciate the researcher’s 
preparation and the interest she displayed in the interviewee’s activities. Over the course 
of the conversation, the interviewee became ready to fill in gaps in the researcher’s 
knowledge, rather than to consider these gaps a reason to disqualify the researcher’s 
capability. Towards the end of the interview, she allowed the researcher to have a look 
at various relevant documents that were not publicly available, and provided her with 
the contact details of a number of other potentially relevant interviewees.  
Overall, critical dialogues predominantly took place with EU officials who were 
working on issues in the field of justice and security without having specific expertise in 
the field of gender. An important goal of the research was to learn their visions on the 
role of gender mainstreaming, and the WPS Agenda in EU support for justice and 
security in the European Neighbourhood. In order to trigger such discussions, the 
researcher shared her own (feminist) perspectives on these matters. This served the goal 
of creating a democratic interviewing process and promoting the feminist narrative 
amongst actors who might not be completely familiar with for example the rationale 
behind the WPS Agenda, or the concept of gender mainstreaming.  
 However, despite many positive experiences, rapport did not always crystalize. 
Problems arose in relation to two categories of interviewees specifically. The first 
category consisted of EU officials who were working on gender-related issues, but who 
did not agree with the feminist critiques of the EU’s activities in this field in the 
academic literature. The second category was composed of interviewees who 




assault on the EU’s activities in Ukraine in particular. In two of the three case study 
sites – Brussels and Ukraine - the researcher encountered gender advisers/experts/focal 
points within EU institutions who were openly sceptical of the research and in some 
cases even outwardly hostile towards the researcher. Though the researcher was aware 
of critiques on governance feminism - which problematizes the role of career feminists 
and their ‘complicity’ in the propagation of otherwise harmful policies of major IOs - 
the attitude of these interviewees was still surprising and difficult to digest. This was 
particularly the case as the sample also included various EU gender experts who easily 
sympathized with the researcher and the research topic, who were not afraid to voice 
critiques in relation to EU support for gender justice in neighbouring countries,287 and 
even emphasized the importance of this research and the need to share the outcomes 
with them.  
Upon reflection the researcher identified two reasons for reluctance on behalf 
of gender advisors and focal points to engage with this researcher. Some had little 
affinity with the topic and seemed to have ended up as gender focal points and advisors 
rather randomly. In this regard one hostile gender focal point indicated that he fulfilled 
his role on a voluntary basis in addition to his core activities that related to a completely 
different field of EU activities in the European Neighbourhood. During the interview, 
he repeatedly criticized the introduction of the concept of gender in a women’s rights 
context, while at the same time implying that he did not understand exactly what it 
 
287 The researcher interviewed nine gender experts/advisors/focal points active in various EU institutions 
in the three case study contexts. Conducting 89 interviews and establishing rapport with 89 interviewees 
in three different countries in three different languages (English, French and Dutch) in a period of six 
months is a tiresome process in itself. Failures to establish rapport and especially encounters with hostile 
interviewees take their toll. However, due to good preparation it was possible to take distance, evaluate 
the process, learn from it, and rationalize these experiences. This contributed to enhanced interviewing 
skills and a better understanding of the reality of the reliance on in-depth interviews as a tool for data 
collection. In spite of the many strategies set out in academic literature on in-depth interviewing, the 
creation of the rapport required for critical dialogue to crystalize in the end very much depends on a 
certain level of chemistry between researcher and interviewee that neither good preparation nor 




entailed.288 The researcher, however, also experienced difficulties establishing rapport 
with a gender advisor who was relatively high ranking in the EU hierarchy, and had 
much knowledge and experience in relation to the topic. In her case it seemed that she 
was sceptical about certain tendencies in the academic feminist literature that inspired 
this research: 
That is a problem, … that people who explain how things are don’t really know enough of how 
are things are done, and also how long things take. So the perceptions in those ivory towers are 
sometimes that things are not happening, because people are ignorant or they don’t care, or they 
are not serious, but I would argue that that is many times not the case. So I would also say that 
this criticism is sometimes driven by external actors who don’t fully understand. And that said, 
of course at the same time there are situations where also criticism is very, very relevant. So I am 
not arguing that it shouldn’t be in place, but I think there are two types of criticism.289  
However, the researcher got the impression it could also be the case that her reluctance 
to engage with the critiques inspiring this research was caused by the stakes she had in 
portraying the EU as a progressive gender justice actor, or at least a gender justice actor 
that had made big strides over the recent years.290 This type identification with the 
institution by gender advisors working for big IOs has been documented by others 
before.291 
 The fact that the researcher only experienced difficulties with gender advisors in 
Brussels and Ukraine seemed to reflect the fact that the EU – and its staff – felt much 
more confident about its gender justice activities in Tunisia. In Tunisia the EU has 
 
288 Interview 19 Ukraine, Kyiv, 21 November 2017, Representative EU Delegation. 
289 Interview 29, Brussels, 27 July 2017, Representative EEAS.  
290 Similarly, the director of the Brussels office of an IO working on women’s rights was very reluctant to 
engage with the researcher, and like the EU gender expert was not willing to have the conversation 
recorded. While she was not as hostile as the EU gender advisor, the conversation never touched upon 
issues beyond the surface level, and the interviewee’s answers occurred scripted. Again, as this 
organization very much cherished its cooperation with the EU the interviewee seemed to have high 
stakes in constructing a mutually beneficial picture of the EU’s role as a supporter of women’s rights 
around the world. Interview 22 Brussels, 12 July 2017, Representative IO.  
291 Uma Kothari, 'Authority and expertise: The professionalisation of international development and the 
ordering of dissent' (2005) 37(3) Antipode 425; Lucy Ferguson, '“This Is Our Gender Person” THE 
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invested significantly in women’s rights support, and many civil society interviewees 
acknowledged the important role the EU has played in this regard over the last five 
years.292 In Ukraine the EU’s presence has been much more limited and representatives 
of IOs, iNGOs, local NGOs and even actors within EU institutions expressed 
themselves very critically about the EU’s activities in this area.293 For those committed 
to defending the EU’s reputation as a ‘gender justice pioneer’ Ukraine definitely seemed 
to presented a more sensitive case than Tunisia. The researcher considered some of the 
tensions that arose when discussing EU support for gender justice in Ukraine, but also 
other sensitive gender justice topics broached with officials in Brussels to be strong 
indicators of the EU’s uneasiness in relation to its gender justice presence in this 
country, and the EU’s uneasiness in relation to its gender justice record in certain areas 
of foreign policy.  
Some of these experiences were emotionally challenging; it is never pleasant to 
have a 30-60 minutes’ conversation in which the atmosphere is fraught and one feels as 
if one needs to defend both his/her capability as a researcher as well as the research 
itself.294 All these interviewees were middle-aged, had significantly more working 
experience and authority than the researcher, and sometimes seemed to intentionally 
want to make the researcher feel incompetent. So while one could argue that their 
stakes into the matter made them belong to the category of ‘vulnerable elites’ identified 
by Smith, the actual interviews made the researcher feel vulnerable in her capacity as a 
 
292 Interview 25 Tunisia, Tunis, 12 September 2017, Representative international development NGO; 
Interview 8 Tunisia, Tunis, 21 August 2017, Representative regional women’s rights NGO.  
293 Interview 2 Ukraine, Kyiv, 27 October 2017, Representative EUAM, Interview 7 Ukraine, Kyiv, 4 
November 2017, Representative IO, Interview 9 Ukraine, Kyiv, 8 November 2017, Representative 
Ukrainian women’s rights NGO, Interview 12 Ukraine, 10 November 2017, Kyiv, Representative EU 
Delegation. 
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Research into European Union Politics' (2003) 10(4) European Journal of Women's Studies 423. While 
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junior academic. The clearest example of this was the senior gender advisor who 
requested to see the questions in advance, and then started the interview by stating that 
she had never seen such questions before, and that academics would normally not get 
away with asking such questions.295 While she did answer some of the questions, it is 
probably easy to imagine how embarrassed the researcher felt throughout the interview 
and that the atmosphere during the interview was not really conducive to the creation 
of a constructive conversation. A similar attack directed at her intellectual/academic 
capacities was launched by the gender focal point, who did not like the notion of 
 
295 The questions for this specific interviewee included (the researcher removed the questions which 
would reveal the identity of this interviewee):  
 
1. How do you experience your cooperation with security experts in the EU institutions and third 
countries that do not have a specific gender background? 
2. The adoption of the 2015 review of the ENP and the Global Strategy seem to indicate a shift towards a 
stronger role for security related efforts in EU foreign policy. What is your perspective on this 
development from a gender perspective? 
3. In the European Neighbourhood various countries are involved in a process of transition (including 
my case studies Ukraine and Tunisia), to what extent is [your office] promoting the incorporation of a 
gender perspective in transitional justice processes? Does the EU framework on support to transitional 
justice play a role in your work?  
4. Feminist academics as well as women's rights NGOs have expressed the concern that the adoption of 
the WPS has mostly resulted in the inclusion of women in existing security structures rather than more 
transformative approaches towards international security. To what extent do you think this also applies to 
the EU's approach towards the WPS agenda? Is gender mainstreaming sufficient or should the EU focus 
more on targeted support for gender equality (e.g. through transitional justice processes/legislative 
reform)?  
5. CT & P/CVE are priorities in the EU's external action in the (Southern) Neighbourhood, UNSCR 
2242 requires the implementation of a gender perspective in such activities. Many feminist scholars, 
however, have expressed concern about the 'instrumentalization' of women's groups/women individually 
for purposes countering violent extremism. What is your perspective on the EU's approach towards 
gender mainstreaming in CT and P/CVE activities?  
6. The adoption of the GAP requires all EU institutions to more structurally mainstream gender in their 
foreign policy activities, which has been welcomed by women's rights advocates as a positive 
development. However, experts and previous interviewees have also identified various obstacles to a 
successful implementation of the GAP such as a lack of targeted funding and human resources to 
support successful implementation. What is your perspective on the potential of the GAP to enforce 
gender mainstreaming in EU foreign policy? 
7. What are the biggest obstacles the EU is facing in Ukraine in relation to the promotion of a gender 
perspective in the EU's security efforts?  
8. What is your perspective on the functioning of the gender focal point system in EUAM 
9. Ukraine has rejected adoption of the Istanbul Convention, how could the EU best proceed in 
supporting the struggle against VAW in Ukraine? 
10. The EU is no part of the conflict in the East of Ukraine. However, there have been reports of sexual 
violence, is the EU involved in any type of support for victims of wartime rape in Ukraine or efforts to 
collect evidence for potential future efforts to achieve accountability?  
11. Do you think the EU has a different approach towards the promotion of gender equality in 
Neighbourhood East and Neighbourhood South?  




gender, after the interview. He withdrew his participation after he read the transcript of 
the interview, noting that he had never encountered a researcher who shared verbatim 
transcripts, and that the use of verbatim transcripts seriously put in doubt the 
researcher’s professionalism.296  
Reflecting on these experiences, it seems that these interviewees simply did not 
like the content of the conversation either from the start of the conversation itself or in 
hindsight when reading the transcript. For instance, the informed consent sheet 
informed interviewees about the fact that they would receive verbatim transcripts if they 
expressed interest in receiving the transcript. The interviewee who eventually withdrew 
his participation, initially expressed interest in receiving the transcript. The researcher 
could only have changed these attitudes by asking questions that would not have 
challenged their own and the EU’s attitudes towards support for gender justice in 
transition. This, however, would have yielded far less interesting data, and also refuted 
the notion that one should speak truth to power. Therefore, in these cases creating 
rapport would have come at the expense of both the quality of the data as well as the 
ideological principles behind this thesis.  
 Both positive and negative experiences were a valuable indicator about the 
actual ‘trustworthiness’ of the data. Interestingly, hostile answers often seemed to be 
some of the most ‘truthful’ responses. In the literature on elite interviewing, it has 
indeed been posited that while the creation of rapport is considered a core condition for 
critical dialogue, its establishment is by no means a guarantee that real critical dialogue 
will take place.297 First, there is the risk that researchers in their desire to establish 
rapport forego being critical.298 Second, even if researchers are critical, and there seems 
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to be rapport, (elite) interviewees might not wholeheartedly participate in this process, 
withholding certain truths or trying to sabotage the interview.299 Campbell has remarked 
in relation to her interviews with police officers that she sometimes had the impression 
that ‘if democratic relations “broke out”, they did so on the terms and conditions of the 
interviewees rather than those of the interviewer’.300 Similarly, during the fieldwork 
sometimes situations occurred during which even though the atmosphere was very 
friendly and positive, the researcher was not in control of the interview.301 In one such 
conversation, the interviewee for instance jokingly admitted that he was using his skills 
as a diplomat to bend the conversation to his will.302 And indeed, the researcher was 
aware during the conversation that this interviewee was talking a lot while revealing very 
little and not allowing the interviewer to insert many questions. He embodied the type 
of shrewd communicator invoked by Ball.303 
As discussed, one of the key concerns in the literature on elite interviewing is 
the potential dishonesty of elite interviewees. The establishment of a positive 
interviewing relationship can make the researcher to some extent oblivious to the 
‘hidden agenda’ of his/her interviewee. In this regard, the researcher’s core concern was 
the EU’s self-representation as a ‘normative power’.304 It seemed that the desire to 
defend the image of the EU as a ‘force for good’ coloured the answers of some of the 
interviewees.305 This was not always necessarily a matter of ‘dishonesty’ born out of 
loyalty to the institution in which they worked. To the contrary, in some cases it seemed 
to reflect the interviewees’ actual impressions of the nature of the EU’s role in the 
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world, inspired by the abundance of EU policy documents that have been published on 
its commitments to human rights, equality, and democracy. 
 Thus while advice on the best approaches towards elite interviewing in 
mainstream literature often emphasizes the need for ‘manipulative’ techniques, a more 
straightforward approach towards interviews, rooted in a feminist research ethos, can 
also yield quality data. The reflections on the fieldwork show that while such an 
approach can be emotionally challenging, these experiences can still be valuable if one 
approaches them through a reflexive lens. This entails using them as a way to improve 
interviewing skills and/or data analysis. As such, one of the most important insights 
derived from this exercise in reflexivity concerns the fact that willingness/enthusiasm 
on behalf of EU officials to speak about gender and gender mainstreaming does not 
always correlate with the extent to which gender actually plays a role in the day-to-day 
activities of the interviewees. To the contrary, in some cases those most invested in the 
issue are most reluctant discussing it critically as the stakes for them are obviously 
higher. On the other hand, those chatting about gender most optimistically often 
seemed to be those EU officials for whom gender was just an afterthought. Both 
observations were kept into mind during the data analysis stage.  
 
3.3.5 Conclusion 
While feminist methodological insights have been developed with a marginalized 
research subject in mind, feminist methodological principles can be applied to data 
collection centred around powerful subjects. This thesis relied on a combination of 
textual analysis and in-depth interviews to enhance insight in EU engagement with 
gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine. Both activities were executed according to this 
research’s feminist ethos which sought to shift the narrative from the centre to the 




core of this research. This created dilemmas particularly during the interviewing stage. 
However, through the combination of adherence to feminist values in each encounter, 
and the subsequent application of the feminist methodological tool of reflexivity the 
researcher managed to balance these seemingly competing goals. This impacted both 
the selection of interviewees, as well as the actual conduct of interviews with those who 
accept to participate. With regard to the latter this thesis acquiesces with Campbell’s 
assessment that the approach towards power differentials in some circles of feminist 
academia has been too narrow to capture the complex reality of elite interviewing. In 
relation to her own research, she observed that while she had to ‘admit’ that her efforts 
to create rapport were predominantly driven by a purely instrumental motive to solicit 
information; this did not necessarily result in an undemocratic interviewing process.  
The potentially biggest contribution of the embrace of a feminist approach 
towards elite interviewing could be a more honest reflection on the challenges and 
pitfalls inherent in this exercise. Many methodological elaborations on elite 
interviewing, or publications that are based on information derived from elite 
interviews, do not explicitly recognize the difficulties and failures encountered during 
the interviews. Based on this lack of transparency one might get the impression that if 
one applies the right strategies rapport, and as a result, interesting, truthful 
conversations will follow. The key take away from this research’ fieldwork, however, 
was that the establishment of rapport is a much more arbitrary process, than what is 
depicted in the literature. Moreover, the creation of rapport, or a positive interviewing 
relationship, is no golden bullet for critical dialogues in which both parties share their 
honest views on sensitive topics. This type of observation might by some be interpreted 
as an admission of failure or defeat.306 This section, however, argued that the awareness 
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of these ‘deficits’ is inherent of being reflexive and will eventually improve interviewing 
praxis and interpretation of data. The subsequent section on data analysis strategies will 
outline how these insights impacted the transformation of raw interview data into 
findings.  
 
3.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
The data analysis phase is the phase during which the researcher can take back control, 
as the researcher can decide which issues will be foregrounded and whose voices will be 
acknowledged. This section discusses what interpretative decisions lay underneath this 
research’ analysis of ‘the what’ and ‘the why’ of EU engagement with gender justice in 
transition.  
 
3.4.1 Qualifying the nature of EU engagement with gender justice in transition 
One of the core objectives of this research is to get objective insight in the nature of 
EU engagement with gender justice in transition, by creating a list of gender justice 
activities supported in Tunisia and Ukraine. This was challenging because support for 
gender justice is carried out through different foreign policy tools and under different 
funding instruments. The researcher relied on a combination of clues from interviews, 
documentary analysis, and analysis of EU financial transparency data to get a complete 
picture. In terms of analysis the core challenge subsided in how to determine whether a 
certain activity qualified as a type of support for gender justice in transition according to 
the conceptual framework outlined in section 2.7. This section outlines the steps the 
researcher took to identify and classify EU gender justice support – both of a financial 
as well as political nature. 
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As a first step in the process, the researcher used key word searches to identify 
references to gender, gender justice, transitional justice, and women in EU documents, 
public statements, and the list of projects yielded by searches in the EU’s FTS.307 These 
key word searches provided a selection of statements made and projects supported by 
the EU that had varying levels of relevance to the type of ‘gender justice in transition’ 
support that is under question in this research. It was thus necessary to determine 
whether these statements and activities 1) qualified as EU support for ‘gender justice in 
transition’, and if so 2) where they would fall exactly on the tripartite conceptual 
framework of different types of gender justice activities set out in section 2.7. The 
researcher used the criteria outlined in chapter 2.7 to make these decisions: 
- To qualify as gender justice support, only those projects and statements 
which embraced a strong women’s rights angle, focused on addressing 
GBV, and/or aimed to address women’s rights abuses caused by conflict or 
repression were taken into account. This means that projects focusing on 
amongst other things women’s economic development an sich were not 
considered in the scope of this research’ analysis.  
- To qualify as support for ‘past-focused gender justice efforts that focus on a 
narrow set of gendered harms experienced by female victims of politically 
motivated violence’ statements and/or activities had to concern EU efforts 
to support pursuance of accountability for victims of politically motivated 
bodily harms via official transitional justice mechanisms such as the TDC 
and Specialized Chambers in Tunisia and UN-sanctioned human rights 
violations documentation missions and the ICC or domestic courts in 
 




Ukraine. This does only cover direct EU support to these entities; it can also 
include EU support for CSOs supporting these efforts and institutes.  
- To qualify as ‘past-focused gender justice efforts that focus on a wider set of 
gendered harms experienced by female victims and aim to effect 
transformative change’, efforts still had to focus on harms inflicted on 
female victims during periods of conflict or repression, but could cover a 
wider range of human rights violations including those of a socio-economic 
nature. This category could cover support for efforts by official transitional 
justice mechanisms such as the TDC in Tunisia, but mostly covered civil 
society initiatives. 
- To qualify as support for future-focused gender justice efforts, EU efforts 
had to focus on women’s rights promotion via legislative reform or the 
inclusion of women in SSR efforts.  
Descriptions of EU activities in the FTS did not always provide a complete picture of 
the scope of the activity, making it hard to distinguish whether an activity qualified as 
any to the types of support for gender justice in transition described above. In some 
cases interviews with EU officials or representatives of implementer organizations 
provided more detailed information of some of these programmes.308 These insights 
helped in establishing whether certain projects qualified as one of the three components 
of EU support for ‘gender justice in transition’. These insights were triangulated with 
descriptions of the projects provided by project implementers on their websites and social media 
platforms. Online sources were also used to get insight in the exact nature of potentially relevant projects 
in case interview data did not provide more clarity on certain projects – because interviewees were not 
familiar with them. In general, in-depth knowledge of the local context and local gender 
 




justice trajectories was of key importance for establishing whether a certain activity did 
or did not qualify as transitional justice support.  
   
3.4.2 Qualifying the drivers behind EU engagement with gender justice in 
transition 
Interview data alongside structured comparisons between EU policy commitments, 
local gender justice opportunity structures and the actual nature of EU gender justice 
support, were used to identify the drivers behind EU engagement with gender justice in 
transition. This section reflects on the process put in place to identify motivations 
behind EU gender justice support based on interview data. As the spoken word often is 
less unequivocal than textual data and ‘the drivers behind’ are more difficult to pin 
down than ‘the nature of’ gender justice support efforts, this exercise required a careful 
approach which relied on guidance from feminist methodological literature on data 
analysis and used NVivo to facilitate the process.  
 In her reflective account of research with senior police officers, Campbell found 
that even though she sometimes did not feel in control during the data collection 
process, the data analysis process allowed to her to reset power imbalances.309 The 
notion that the data analysis stage puts the (feminist) researcher in – disproportionate - 
control over actual research outcomes based on his/her epistemological and ontological 
choices has been discussed by other feminist researchers such as Mauthner and Doucet 
as well.310 They have found that while data collection efforts are usually documented in 
minutiae, the activities resulting in the translation of raw interview data in final analysis 
are rarely the topic of in-depth discussion, let alone rendered visible to a publicly 
available decision-trail. This failure to provide evidence which shows how raw interview 
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data translated into research findings is not unique to feminist research.311 In the field of 
transitional justice, it has been found that it is not uncommon to read rather ‘grandiose’ 
claims about the effectiveness of certain mechanisms presumably based on findings 
from interviews without any documentation of how these findings could be derived 
from the data.312 This section aims to break this pattern by providing a transparent 
account of the decisions made during the data analysis stage.  
At the practical level, qualitative data analysis usually entails coding. Coding 
constitutes the allocation of units of meaning to fragments of the data and 
categorization of fragments to which the same unit of meaning has been allocated in 
groups. This facilitates the identification of relevant patterns in large quantities of data. 
The identification of relevant units of meaning can be guided by the data themselves (a 
grounded theory approach),313 or by a pre-existing theoretical framework.314 As this 
thesis had already identified a rather well-defined set of motivations of international 
actors to engage with gender justice in transition based on existing feminist theory on 
‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’ and feminist literature on EU 
foreign policy, this research relied upon what Crabtree and Miller refer to as template 
approach: a deductive data analysis strategy, which uses a pre-defined code book to 
organize the interview data. 315  It differs from inductive ‘editing styles’ in which ‘the 
researcher makes interpretations (observations) of segments of text, and these 
interpretations then are used to make further abstractions’.316 A researcher who uses 
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code books turns this process around, as he or she defines the template or codes – 
which already present a certain level of abstraction – a priori to the coding process. The 
template approach is considered to be particularly useful for researchers who already 
have a rather well-defined hypothesis or set of hypotheses to explain expected 
outcomes, as was the case for this research. The template approach requires less coding 
cycles than editing styles, which makes the template approach less time-consuming.317 
The downside to this approach is that it requires ‘a trade-off with respect to the 
potential of new discovery’.318  
The creation of a code book which syncs with the theoretical framework is 
central to the template approach. This thesis relied on Miles and Huberman’s structured 
approach for this task.319 This approach relies predominantly on insights of the 
theoretical framework, rather than the more inductive approach for code book creation 
– i.e. first reading over large swaths of the text – as propagated by Willms and others.320 
The initial code book consisted of descriptive codes that could capture the actual 
gender justice activities the EU supports in Tunisia and Ukraine for both countries 
separately.321 ‘EU gender in Tunisia/Ukraine’, ‘EU TJ in Tunisia/Ukraine’, ‘EU security 
in Tunisia/Ukraine’. In ‘EU gender’ the codes distinguished between the type of gender 
justice activities supported according to the categorization of section 2.7- ‘EU past 
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centred gendered transformative justice’, ‘EU gendered traditional TJ’, ‘EU support for 
future focused transformative justice’ – and the tools the EU has at its disposal to 
support each of these activities – ‘EU gender & diplomacy’, ‘EU targeted support’, and 
‘EU gender mainstreaming’. Each code contained fragments in which EU officials or 
third actors familiar with EU support for gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine 
discussed activities actually taking place. Triangulated with information from the EU 
FTS and EU documents summarizing annual activities these codes allowed 
understanding of what categories of gender justice the EU actually supports in practice, 
as discussed in the previous section. This information constitutes the backbone of the 
findings presented in chapter 5.  
In addition to the descriptive codes, explanatory codes were created based on 
the theoretical insights about motivations driving international engagement with gender 
justice in transition as identified in feminist scholarship discussed in chapter 2. The 
overarching codes in this regard were ‘EU essentialization’, ‘EU instrumentalization’, 
‘EU de-politicization’. Statements implying that the EU considers women as 
victims/passive actors and/or prioritizes responding to politically motivated SGBV 
were included in the first category, statements implying that the EU supports gender 
justice because it is useful or serves other foreign policy goals were included in the 
‘instrumentalization category’. Statements implying that the EU does not engage with 
politically sensitive gender justice topics were included in the third category. For these 
categories, the researcher made a distinction between statements by EU officials and 
statements by local gender justice actors and transitional justice experts about how EU 
support for gender justice in transition is linked to external factors. This was deemed 
important as the researcher could not be sure of the ‘truthfulness’ of statements made 




In addition, local actors’ descriptions of their own activities and gender justice 
priorities were categorized according to the same principles set out in section 3.2.2. This 
allowed the researcher to get a better picture of the activities that the EU could support 
in both countries. They were captured in the category called ‘local gender justice 
efforts’. Thanks to these codes it was possible to compare to what extent EU gender 
justice support synced with the different gender justice avenues available in Tunisia and 
Ukraine. The implications of the comparison between what the EU does, and what the 
EU could be doing are discussed in chapter 6.  
The previous section discussed how the application of reflexivity provided the 
researcher with a better understanding of the significance of certain behaviours and 
attitudes by interviewees during the interviews. These attitudes towards the research are 
expected to affect the meaning of the insights shared by interviewees. Thus, if the 
researcher thought that an interviewee’s mentality during the interview was particularly 
remarkable or if certain questions triggered particularly strong reactions the researcher 
noted this during the interview. Later, during the coding process the researcher took 
these interpretations in mind and wrote – if necessary – short analytical notes about the 
ways in which to interpret these statements.  
Thus, a structured approach towards data analysis allowed the researcher to 
demonstrate how the EU’s approach towards gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine 
breaks with certain insights about international engagement with gender justice in 
feminist literature. This is quite significant as the researcher started coding with a code 
book based on aforementioned insights. In order to demonstrate that these insights are 
rooted in the data, the researcher has attached the code book and a diagram showing 






Traditionally the definition of ethics relates to the imperatives of doing good while 
avoiding harm.322 In qualitative research, this notion has been translated in a number of 
guidelines and principles that should be followed by researchers in their pursuit of 
knowledge in order to protect participants and researchers, minimize harm, increase the 
sum of good, assure trust, and ensure research integrity.323 The safeguarding of these 
principles has increasingly been formalized through the instalment of formal ethics 
boards and committees in universities and grant funding authorities. This section 
reflects on the implications of adhering to safety and ethical standards when doing 
research with those who are in power. It argues that while adherence to research ethics 
is important to create trust between researcher and elite interviewees, this practice – 
especially the right to review transcripts and withdraw from participation – in research 
with powerful actors can reinforce existing power dynamics. This means that measures 
originally devised to protect ‘vulnerable groups’ can inadvertently become a tool for 
those in power to control knowledge creation.  
Protecting those who participate in research against harm resulting from this 
participation is the core aim of the use of ethical standards as a framework for academic 
research. The measures which need to be taken to guarantee the participants’ safety 
depend on a combination of factors including the context in which research is 
performed and the extent to which the participant qualifies as potentially vulnerable. 
Standard procedures for ethical research under all circumstances include the 
acquiescence of informed consent, the safeguarding of confidentiality, and the right for 
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participants to review their contributions and withdraw from the research.324 
Researchers who do research in high-risk settings should take extra precautions to 
ensure that the fieldwork and the products resulting from it will cause harm to neither 
the researcher nor the participants.325 The provision of information sheets and informed 
consent forms in advance of interviews, the anonymization of participants in interview 
transcripts and other outputs resulting from the research, the secure storage of data, and 
the provision of transcripts to interviewees are examples of the basic steps the 
researcher should take to put these commitments into practice. 
As the fieldwork took place in Tunisia at a time that the Foreign and Common 
Wealth Office still advised against all but necessary travel, the researcher took additional 
precautions to guarantee her own and her participants safety. The researcher did not 
identify any of the interviewees as members of vulnerable groups in the traditional 
sense, because the interviewees were approached in their professional capacity, be it as 
officials working for the European Union or civil society advocates in the field of 
women’s rights and transitional justice. Engagement in this type of jobs or activism 
implies a certain extent of interaction with the public including researchers. 
Nevertheless, the researcher was aware of the fact that even though the participants did 
not qualify as vulnerable in their capacity as professionals, this did not abolish the 
possibility that they could be vulnerable in other capacities. Both in Tunisia and Ukraine 
some of the women’s rights and transitional justice activists interviewed in the context 
of this research had at some point in their lives been victimized for political reasons. 
While this could have been a source of retraumatization, these interviewees emphasized 
that they considered themselves activists in the first place, and that - if ever they had 
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looked at themselves as victims - the embrace of this role had been crucial in 
overcoming a sense of victimization.326 During the interviews, the researcher was careful 
to never bring up personal experiences of victimization. However, some interviewees 
referred to these experiences themselves. If this occurred, the were not cut off, because 
it was considered important to respect their choice to transform their past experiences 
of victimhood into a source of strength.327  
As this chapter has highlighted, most of the interviewees actually qualified as 
‘powerful’. Ethical standards also apply in this type of situations. However, the type of 
harms that could be experienced by powerful actors as a result of participation in 
research are different than those that might be experienced by marginalized 
interviewees. Here, one could think about the risk of reputational damage and/or 
professional repercussions.328 In this light, especially when the research concerns a 
sensitive topic confidentiality is paramount to many elite interviewees.329 Therefore, in 
many instances having such standards in place will be a sine qua non to get access to 
elite interviewees. Moreover, the researcher provided interviewees with the opportunity 
to review transcripts in the wake of the interview, make amendments, or withdraw.  
As discussed, two interviewees made use of the right to withdraw. Another 
interviewee used the opportunity to revise the transcript to make significant 
amendments to the transcript which changed the meaning of her initial responses. 
Besides that these withdrawals caused some distress to the researcher due to manner in 
which they were announced to her, they also reduced the amount of data the researcher 
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could rely on. The amendments described above reduced the trustworthiness of the 
account provided by the interviewee. Respect for this type of interventions by elite 
interviewees, while being central to an ethical research practice, reduces the researcher’s 
ability to scrutinize powerful actors. As exposing how existing power structures are 
disadvantaging women is a central premise of feminist research adherence to ethics 
poses feminist researchers with serious dilemmas:  
On the other hand, managing these sensitivities and participants’ control over ‘their’ data is a 
balancing act. Researchers conducting research in policy networks have described the ‘trade off’ 
involved in guaranteeing confidentiality to participants and how this shapes both data collection 
and the way that research findings can be reported. By guaranteeing confidentiality to 
participants, participants are protected and may more confidently offer rich description and 
detailed accounts … Researchers must be aware that the decision not to disclose particular 
information is a political choice which may have implications for maintaining or perpetuating 
troubling power dynamics.330  
While the researcher respects the importance of research ethics, the fact that this trade-
off influenced the type of data collected in the framework of this thesis should be 
acknowledged. Moreover, while through their withdrawal these participants aimed to 
withhold information from the outside world, they provided a potentially more 
meaningful insight in the extent to which gendered transitional justice support is 
considered a difficult or sensitive topic for the EU in the European Neighbourhood.  
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
This thesis does aims to not only provide a descriptive account of EU engagement with 
gender justice in transition, but also to use insights about EU activities in this realm to 
draw conclusions about 1) what drives EU engagement with gender justice in transition 
and 2) what these findings tell about the capacity of feminist transformative justice 
 




theory in its current state to address the flaws of ‘the patriarchy of internationalized 
transitional justice’. To derive this type of more generic insights from case study 
research one needs a robust research design. This chapter explained how this thesis 
multi-level comparative research design allowed this thesis to contribute to both goals. 
It also detailed the methods this thesis has employed to get a comprehensive picture of 
EU engagement with gender justice in transition in Tunisia and Ukraine, and sets out 
the measures the Researcher has taken to guarantee that data collection and analysis 
lived up to the feminist research ethos that guides this thesis.  
 The researcher identified the multi-level qualitative case study design as best 
suited to enhance insight in the factors that drive EU engagement with gender justice in 
transition. One of the key hypotheses underlying this thesis is that gender politics and 
gender justice opportunity structures in the countries receiving EU support for gender 
justice in transition, shape – and perhaps determine – the nature of EU engagement 
with gender justice in transition. In order to account for these factors, it is necessary to 
examine EU engagement with transitional justice in at least one specific country 
context. The thesis opted to look into two country contexts in order to allow for a 
structured comparative exercise that could enhance insight in whether EU choices in 
this regard provide the impression of a pattern or are rather random. By relying on a 
multi-level case study design this research deviates from the more common feminist 
practice of researching the nature of international engagement with transitional justice 
through analysis of generic policy documents and statements about WPS and other 
relevant issues produced by these actors. This thesis argues that the multi-level case 
study design not only allows for taking into account local gender justice opportunity 
structures, but also is more appropriate from a feminist perspective as it allows for the 




 These voices, however, still all constituted experts or elites. As feminist 
methodology is constructed around the notion of providing a platform to marginalized 
groups there is relatively little guidance on how to engage with elites in a feminist 
fashion. This provided the researcher with a challenge, as common knowledge has it 
that elites/experts are notoriously difficult subjects to interview, but the tactics to 
overcome these challenges suggested in mainstream scholarship on elite interviewing 
seem to be antithetical to some core premises of a feminist research ethic. This 
researcher therefore decided in favour of an approach towards interviewing that did not 
rely on any ‘questionable’ tactics to elicit data, and to rely on reflexivity during the 
interviewing process itself and the data collection stage to compensate for any 
difficulties she might have encountered during data collection. Reflecting on the 
researcher’s experiences during the fieldwork this chapter argues that in doing so it is 
possible to elicit high quality data while living up to a feminist research ethic. Moreover, 
it found that while this approach might sometimes result in the occurrence of less 
pleasant encounters, these encounters can turn out to be some of the most valuable 
sources for insight into the reality of EU support for gender justice in transition when 
approached through a reflexive lens.  
 The comparative multi-level case study design discussed in this chapter guides 
the structure of the chapters that follow with chapter 4 providing insight in EU policy 
commitments in the realm of gender justice in transition on the one hand and local 
gender justice opportunity structures in Tunisia and Ukraine on the other, chapter 5 
giving a detailed picture of EU engagement with gender justice efforts in Tunisia and 
Ukraine in practice and chapter 6 comparing between what the EU does (as discussed 
in chapter 5) with what it could be doing (as discussed in chapter 4) to enhance insight 
of the factors that drive EU engagement with gender justice in transition. This chapter 




that of other publications on internationalized transitional justice practice in order to 
understand why – to the extent that this thesis’ findings differ from commonly held 
knowledge about the nature of ‘‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’ – 






4. CASE STUDY BACKGROUND: The EU’s 
policy commitments, and gender justice 
opportunity structures in Tunisia and Ukraine 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Intimate knowledge of EU policy commitments and the transitional justice 
environment in the two local case study countries is vital to understanding which 
factors shape EU engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine. The core 
function of this chapter is to set the parameters against which the EU’s actual 
engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine will be compared. As discussed 
in the introduction and the previous chapter, this thesis compares what the EU says it is 
doing and what the EU is actually doing in terms of gender justice support in Tunisia 
and Ukraine against the 1) the avenues for gender justice support that it could be taking 
in both countries, and 2) global gender justice priorities as identified in feminist 
literature.  
 To make any of these comparisons it is necessary to know what are the EU’s 
stated gender justice priorities in policy, and what is the nature of the gender justice 
opportunity structures in Tunisia and Ukraine. As such section 4.2 of this chapter 
provides an analysis of the EU policy documents – allegedly – guiding its engagement 
with gender justice abroad, and section 4.3 and 4.4 on their turn constitute detailed 
overviews of the gender justice opportunity structures in Tunisia and Ukraine. In doing 
so this chapter fulfils objectives 1 and 2 of this thesis, which are to identify and 






4.2 GENDER JUSTICE PRIORITIES IN THE EU POLICY FRAMEWORK 
ON SUPPORT FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
In theory policy commitments are the guiding framework for international actors’ 
engagement with gender justice in transition. In practice, evidence shows this is not 
always the case. Knowing the extent to which policy and practice are removed from 
each other in the case of EU engagement with gender justice in transition in Tunisia and 
Ukraine is necessary to enhance insight in the factors that drive its activities in this 
regard. Through an analysis of the EU’s Policy Framework on Support to Transitional 
Justice and associated documents, this section argues that while the Framework hints at 
more transformative conceptualizations of transitional justice and support for gender 
justice in transition – e.g. by acknowledging that women suffer from ‘socio-economic 
violations and gender-differentiated impacts of forced disappearances, torture, loss of 
family members and other violations or abuses’ - traditional notions of gendered 
transitional justice still dominate in the Framework.331 As such, analysis of EU policy 
documents partly confirms feminist concerns about international actors’ engagement 
with gendered transitional justice, while also demonstrating a nascent commitment on 
the EU’s behalf towards a more transformative approach towards gender justice in 
transition.  
 
4.2.1 The Framework: A prioritization of mainstream gendered transitional 
justice goals over a transformative approach towards transitional justice  
In November 2015, the EU Council adopted Council Conclusions on the EU 
Framework on Support to Transitional Justice.332 As mentioned, this is the first EU 
policy document specifically devoted to EU engagement with transitional justice in its 
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foreign policy. In doing so the Council acknowledged the Framework as the official 
guiding framework for EU engagement with transitional justice.333 The goals of EU 
transitional justice support are twofold according to the Framework: ‘to strengthen the 
EU’s position on transitional justice’ and ‘to promote a comprehensive approach to 
transitional justice’ in order to achieve ‘peaceful, just and democratic societies’.334 The 
document also emphasizes the need to integrate a gender dimension in all EU 
transitional justice activities. As such, it recognizes that ‘pre-existing gender inequalities 
inform both the nature of the crimes committed and the consequences of those 
violations’,335 and acknowledges that during times of war and repression, women suffer 
from a wider range of violations than just sexual violence, including the wide scale 
violation of socio-economic rights. In its endorsement of the Framework, the Council 
remarked that the EU:  
Prioritises gender sensitive transitional justice which addresses the full range of violations and 
abuses suffered by women, girls, men and boys and responds to their differentiated 
vulnerabilities and needs. In this respect, gender must be mainstreamed throughout transitional 
justice mechanisms and processes, from their design through to implementation of 
recommendations.336  
Does this commitment to the consideration of a gender perspective in transitional 
justice support entail adherence to a transformative vision on gendered transitional 
justice that covers all three aspects of the transformative justice agenda described in 
section 2.7? For answers to this question, this section looks both at the gender 
paragraph of the Framework - in synergy with the documents this paragraph refers to - 
and the Framework as a whole.  
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The Framework indicates that the EU has a broad understanding of the 
gendered harms that should be covered by transitional justice processes. After 
recognizing that pre-existing inequalities inform women’s experience of conflict and 
repression, it specifies the type of violations typically experienced by women. These 
examples imply a broad understanding of gendered harms, as it acknowledges that 
victims also go through ‘socio-economic violations and gender-differentiated impacts of 
forced disappearances, torture, loss of family members and other violations or 
abuses’.337 The recognition of socio-economic rights violations as a cause worthy of 
consideration in transitional justice efforts, and acknowledgement of indirect 
victimhood are integral to a transformative justice agenda generally speaking, of which 
feminist transformative justice scholarship is one strand.   
However, despite these promising statements, some characteristics of the 
Framework’s language on gender put into question the depth of the EU’s commitment 
to a transformative feminist gender justice agenda. Some phrases imply that pursuing 
accountability for SGBV still is the EU’s key gender justice priority in transition. In 
relation to the first point, the gender paragraph of the Framework states that: 
Ending sexual violence and gender-based violence in conflict and post conflict situations is a 
priority area for the EU, in which transitional justice has a strong role to play in bringing 
perpetuators to account, preventing further violence and supporting survivors to overcome 
violations.338  
The need to provide justice to victims of socio-economic rights violations and other 
types of GBV is not explicitly identified as a priority area. Moreover, while the EU does 
mention transitional justice’s role in ‘bringing perpetrators to account, preventing 
further violence and supporting survivors to overcome violations’, the gender paragraph 
of only 24 lines does not contain detailed guidance on how the EU will implement EU 
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commitments to more transformative gender justice goals in terms of which actors and 
mechanisms it will support to realize them.  
An analysis of the Framework as a whole, that looks beyond the gender 
paragraph, paints a similar picture of hesitant commitment to a more transformative 
approach towards transitional justice, without clear guidance on how to implement 
these commitments. While the Framework does not usher the term ‘transformative 
justice’ as such, it does include a number of references that indicate that the EU is 
inclined to support transitional justice efforts that contribute societal transformation: 
The EU […] supports transitional justice processes that are forward-looking, with the aim to 
transform the society by identifying and dealing with root causes of conflict and violence that 
may reside in discrimination, marginalisation or violation of social, economic and cultural rights. 
EU support to transitional justice mechanisms and processes are based on Articles 208 and 212 
TFEU. Transitional justice is therefore considered as an integral part of EU external 
assistance.339  
However, at the level of implementation, the EU’s language betrays hesitance with 
regard to committing to the approaches generally associated with transformative justice. 
Firstly, the language on ‘transformation’ is linked to a need to integrate support for 
transitional justice in a ‘security-development nexus paradigm’: 
As transitional justice mechanisms can significantly contribute to initiating post-conflict 
recovery and in preventing the emergence of new cycles of violence, the EU recognises the links 
between rule of law, peacebuilding, development and transitional justice. In this context, the 
main EU objective is to assist partner governments to provide effective, legitimate and 
accountable justice and security services to their citizens, in a manner that is consistent with 
democratic norms, rule of law values, good governance principles and respect for human 
rights.340  
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As such it is not clear whether this statement refers to supporting transitional justice 
that is transformative for individual victims, or supporting the type of transitional 
justice mechanisms – guarantees of non-repetition – most commonly associated with 
transformation at the institutional level.  
Second, the Framework’s language on reparations is not entirely in line with the 
vision on reparations espoused by transformative justice advocates. While the 
Framework indicates the EU believes that ‘the potential to access reparations should be 
as inclusive as possible in order to avoid any marginalisation of victims and to support 
their reintegration and empowerment in society’,341 it also mentions that reparations 
should only be provided to provide redress for ‘serious crimes’.342 While the term 
‘serious crimes’ has a broader scope than ‘grave human rights violations’, without a 
specifier of what ‘serious crimes’ entails, one cannot be certain about the scope of 
crimes the EU is willing to pursue reparations for. Does the EU believe that reparations 
have a role in dealing with root causes of conflict and violence that may reside in 
discrimination, marginalisation or violation of social, economic and cultural rights? 
While one could argue that this lack of detail should be expected in a generic 
policy document, the resources the Framework refers to for more detail – when it 
comes to the EU’s approach to gendered transitional justice – do not provide much 
more transitional justice specific detail, and to some extent seem to employ more 
conservative notions of what a gender sensitive approach towards transitional justice 
entails. The Framework refers to the 2008 European Council’s Comprehensive 
approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council 
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Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security,343 and The EU Guidelines 
on violence against women and girls and combatting all forms of discrimination against 
them for further guidance.344 The term transitional justice does not figure prominently 
in either of these documents.345 Moreover, to the extent that they invoke the term 
transitional justice, both documents espouse a more narrow understanding of gendered 
harms than the Framework.346 
The Comprehensive Approach mentions transitional justice only in relation to 
the need to pursue accountability and redress for ‘war crimes affecting women’: 
In its support to the strengthening and reform of the justice sector the EU will seek to enhance 
the involvement of women and their access to justice, including transitional justice mechanisms. 
The EU will pay specific attention to building capacity for the prosecution of crimes against 
women and the protection of witnesses. The provision of reparations and other forms of 
redress for survivors will be considered wherever possible. Ending impunity for war crimes 
affecting women is the objective of these efforts, as is providing justice and redress to victims.347 
This phrasing is slightly unclear, as all war crimes could potentially affect women. 
However, it is likely that the Comprehensive Approach referred to the types of sexual 
violence listed as war crimes in the Rome Statute, being: ‘Rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual 
violence of comparable gravity’.348 Moreover, when mentioning the continuum of 
violence affecting women in societies in transition it implies that this continuum only 
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applies to rape and sexual violence: ‘women around the world continue to suffer 
systematic sexual violence and rape before, during and after conflict’.349 
 Both the Comprehensive Approach’ and the Guidelines’ understanding of 
which gendered harms are most common and least addressed during times of conflict 
and repression also conflict with insights from feminist scholarship. The 
Comprehensive approach, for instance, states that ‘the weakest pillar of the 
implementation of Resolution 1325 is prevention and response to Sexual and Gender-
based Violence’.350 This goes against the broadly held feminist observation that 
international actors have prioritized protecting women against and addressing the 
consequences of SGBV, to the detriment of addressing other gendered harms.351 In a 
similar vein, the Guidelines mention that ‘in situations of crisis or armed conflict, the 
use of rape, slavery, sexual abuse and exploitation are the most systematic and 
widespread manifestations of violence against women’.352 This statement contradicts the 
notion that women’s experiences of conflict and repression are much broader, and that 
socio-economic rights violations and the type of GBV that is indirectly spurred by 
conflict are some of the most common gendered harms experienced by women during 
conflict and repression.353  
When it comes to mechanisms, the EU’s commitment to reparations seems 
weaker than its commitment to the pursuit of legal accountability. In the above-cited 
quote from the Comprehensive Approach, the EU for example states that ‘the 
provision of reparations and other forms of redress for survivors will be considered 
wherever possible’. This is less robust language than the statement it makes on 
combatting impunity for violence against women and girls in the Guidelines, in which it 
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states that ‘it is essential for States to ensure that violence against women and girls is 
punished by the law and to see that perpetrators of violence against women and girls are 
held responsible for their actions before the courts.354 One could argue that this 
phrasing on reparations leaves space for greater state discretion in how to fulfil these 
obligations. Nevertheless, the adoption of strong language on reparations by the EU 
could signal to states that reparations should be a priority and not an afterthought.  
However, since recently, thanks to the adoption of the 2018 ‘EU Strategic 
Approach to Women, Peace and Security’,355 the EU has brought its language on WPS 
more in line with the gendered transitional justice commitments outlined in the 
Framework. This new document specifies that the EU is committed to promoting 
‘efforts that aim to end impunity for crimes of sexual and gender-based violence, 
including conflict-related sexual violence’.356 This phrasing differs from the phrasing 
used in the 2008 Comprehensive Approach. It identifies conflict-related sexual violence 
as one of the crimes of SGBV for which accountability should be pursued, instead of 
narrowing down the range of gendered harms that should be addressed down to ‘war 
crimes’ affecting women’. Moreover, the 2018 Strategy very clearly mentions that during 
times of conflict ‘women are at risk of violence in both the public and the private 
sphere’ and that the EU should: 
Address conflict-related sexual violence as part of a continuum of gender-based violence closely 
intertwined with persistent inequalities and broader attacks on gender equality and women’s 
human rights, including, but not limited to, digital and cyber violence.357 
This is a stronger acknowledgement of the existence of a continuum of violence than 
the Comprehensive Approach’ observation that ‘women around the world continue to 
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suffer systematic sexual violence and rape before, during and after conflict’.358 In 
relation to transitional justice mechanisms the 2018 document uses much stronger 
rhetoric on victims’ rights to reparations, stating that one of the EU’s objectives is to: 
‘ensure that every person who has suffered from sexual or gender-based violence has 
the right and access to comprehensive healthcare information and services, justice and 
reparations’.359 
 Taken together, this implies that while the EU has quite significantly developed 
its rhetoric support for gender justice in transition from a transformative point of view, 
lack of detail on how to implement these commitments raises questions about their 
depth. As mentioned, this might be partly related to the purpose of policy documents, 
which is to set out broad commitments with the expectation that implementation steps 
will be outlined in other documents adapted to specific contexts. However, the 
ambiguity in relation to transformative justice is also reflected in the overall tone of the 
Framework, including the gender paragraph, which suggests that while the EU is aware 
of the developments in transitional justice literature and practice, it still prioritizes its 
traditional goals of pursuing accountability for grave human rights violations.  
 
4.2.2 The EU’s support for forward-looking gender justice initiatives in 
transition  
What about the role of forward-looking gender justice initiatives that aim to address 
structural inequalities? While the Framework acknowledges that gendered harms 
inflicted on women during times of conflict and repression are rooted in structural 
marginalization, it does not discuss support for concrete initiatives to address structural 
gender inequalities in any depth. However, the documents it refers to do. The 
 
358 Council of the European Union 2008 (n232): 6.  




Comprehensive Approach and Guidelines include references towards the need for 
support for women’s socio-economic empowerment and support for (legislative) efforts 
to address VAW. The Comprehensive Approach, for instance, suggests that the EU 
should support: 
The development of enabling legal systems […] so that land and asset ownership will be 
guaranteed for women, particularly in contexts where female-headed households risk losing land 
and other productive assets because of gender-biased inheritance systems. Credit and other 
enterprise support systems designed to catalyze economic recovery particularly in agrarian 
economies must be tailored to serve women producers.360 
As discussed in chapter 2, land ownership has been a central theme in both mainstream 
as well as feminist transformative justice literature. When it comes to addressing 
everyday physical VAW, the Comprehensive Approach and the Guidelines emphasize 
the importance of legislative reform. In this regard the Comprehensive Approach states 
that periods of transition ‘offer windows of opportunity to review and redraft 
constitutions and laws and to create new systems of governance, including reform of 
both customary and formal judicial systems’, and that in these contexts the EU will be 
specifically focused on ‘advancing the protection of women’s rights in conformity with 
International Law: elimination of discrimination in the letter and application of all 
relevant laws’.361 Thus, historically the EU has acknowledged the need for broader 
legislative and institutional reform to advance women’s position in societies in 
transition.  
 In the 2018 WPS strategy the EU has very much ‘upped’ its language on the 
need for structural reforms. It even explicitly acknowledges support for women’s 
empowerment and gender equality as an essential step towards conflict prevention.  
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• Promote gender equality and women’s empowerment systematically and in the long term in 
stages of fragility, conflict, relief and recovery. Furthermore, the EU will maintain its focus on 
gender-related root causes throughout its implementation of the WPS Agenda, and will continue 
to address prevention in parallel to response.  
• Support efforts that address the root causes of violence, such as exclusion, discrimination, 
structural inequalities and sexual and gender-based violence including violence against women 
and girls.  
• Support inclusive civil society initiatives at the community, national, regional and global levels to 
build sustainable peace and to transform gender-based inequalities. Also support initiatives that 
aim to challenge and transform socialised gender norms and stereotypes.362  
This type of explicit recognition of the fact that gender inequality is at the root of 
conflicts, and that therefore it is important to promote gender equality as a conflict 
prevention and resolution strategy is an example of the progress the EU has made from 
recognizing women as useful resources in their capacity of grassroots peacebuilders to 
recognizing the need for promotion of gender equality as such to safeguard stable 
societies.  
As such, the findings from Martin de Almagro’s 2017 analysis of the 
Transitional Justice Framework – when the updated EU strategy on 1325 had not been 
published yet – seem therefore slightly outdated. She found that: 
If the EU directs its normative potential and high levels of expenditure on retributive and 
restorative transitional justice that limits the understanding of what is a “gendered sensitive 
approach” to crimes concerning (only) sexual violence, it also perpetuates the idea that the WPS 
agenda is directed at protecting women from (sexual) violence and at empowering women as 
participants and democracy promoters as key to security, development and international 
stability.363 
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It shows that over the last ten years the EU has acknowledged the need for support for 
forward looking gender justice measures in societies transitioning from conflict to 
security. The new WPS Strategy seems to make this link more clearly than the 2008 
Comprehensive Approach by emphasizing the need for support for gender equality as 
an essential component of conflict prevention as well as resolution. However, these 
documents do not clearly indicate whether the EU considers these activities as an 
intrinsic component of the EU’s transitional justice activities – e.g. as part of EU 
support to guarantees of non-repetition.  Regardless, the policy documents imply that in 
contexts in transition the EU will combine support for efforts to pursue accountability 
for politically motivated SGBV with efforts to support (legislative and institutional) 
reform to create more gender equal societies. Support for past-focused transformative 
gender justice initiatives, that provide transformative justice solutions to individual 
victims and/or provide justice to victims of politically motivated socio-economic harms 
seems less of an EU priority.  
 
4.2.3 Conclusion 
Based on analysis of policy documents the EU seems to endorse a more diversified 
approach towards support for gender justice in transition, than one would expect based 
on feminist critiques of international transitional justice actors. While combating 
impunity for conflict-related SGBV is at the core of the EU’s gendered transitional 
justice strategy, the Framework itself displays some recognition on the EU’s behalf to 
adopt a more transformative approach towards gender justice transition. It does so, 
amongst other things, through recognizing that conflict-related SGBV is rooted in 
women’s structural marginalization, and only one of the many types of gendered harms 
experienced by women during conflict and repression. Nevertheless, when it comes to 




seems more inclined to supporting forward-looking initiatives to combat women’s 
marginalization, than to embrace transformative justice initiatives with a clear past-
focused link.  
However, identifying this willingness on the EU’s behalf to support potentially 
transformative gender justice efforts requires: 1) embracing the broad definition of 
transformative gender justice at the root of this thesis, and 2) looking beyond the 
Framework itself for a more comprehensive description of EU engagement with gender 
justice in countries in transition. If one does not do this, the EU’s Framework on 
Support to Transitional Justice paints the image of and international actors whose half-
hearted embrace of some vague transformative justice rhetoric, does not come close of 
hiding the fact that in its support for gendered transitional justice per se the EU is still 
heavily skewed towards support for the pursuit of accountability for conflict-related 
SGBV. The significance of this finding – i.e. what this means for the role and 
functionality of documentary analysis as a tool to understand international support for 
gender justice in transition - will be discussed in more depth in chapter 7.  
 
4.3 TUNISIA’S GENDER JUSTICE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE 
To understand what factors drive EU engagement with gender justice in transition, it is 
important to understand the local gender justice circumstances in which the EU 
operates. This section provides such an overview for the Tunisian context, while the 
next one will focus on Ukraine. Both will set out the gendered harms that have been on 
the agenda during both countries’ transitions, the avenues that exist to address these 
harms, and the perspectives of different local gender justice actors – broadly 
understood as those actors who directly engage with and have influence over gender 
justice efforts – on each of these harms and avenues for change. They conclude looking 




neglect of other gender justice issues on the EU’s behalf likely demonstrates about the 
factors driving EU engagement with gender justice abroad.  
In the Tunisian context this section finds that while the country is grappling 
with a wide range of gendered harms and has erected various state-sanctioned and 
grassroots initiatives to address them, questions around transitional justice and women’s 
position in society have become highly politicized post-Arab Spring across 
religious/secular lines, and powerful political elites have used this polarisation to 
sabotage gender justice efforts focused on addressing the past in particular. As the EU 
is heavily invested in safeguarding good ties with Tunisian political elites, engagement 
with certain gender justice issues at the expense of others could provide insight in 
whether EU policy commitments or local priorities determine the nature of its 
engagement with gender justice in Tunisia.  
 
4.3.1 Gendered Harms in Tunisia 
During almost six decades of dictatorship, Tunisia has been the stage for a wide array of 
gendered harms. The following paragraphs provide an overview of these harms to 
provide the reader with insight in the range of gender justice issues that are on the 
agenda in Tunisia and the identity of the women who have suffered these harms. The 
latter is important to better understand the next section’s discussion of how gender 
justice issues were instrumentalized for political gain.  
The different categories of harms inflicted on women because of their – real or 
perceived – political affiliations are multi-fold. This includes politically-motivated SGBV 
including rape at the hands of representatives of the Tunisian security forces inflicted 
on women associated with the Islamist movement.364 A more common type of harm 
 




inflicted on women who the regime considered to be associated with political 
opposition was the exclusion from educational and professional opportunities. For 
example, Circular 108 banned women who wore headscarves from enjoying university 
education or becoming a civil servant.365 Islamist women are widely believed to have 
been on the receiving end of the most widespread, systematic politically motivated 
gendered harms.366 However, some leftist female activists experienced similar 
treatment.367 Women associated with oppositional activities were subjected to intense 
surveillance, requiring them to report multiple times a day with the authorities and 
leaving them vulnerable to intrusions into their private lives by security forces day and 
night.368 Wives and other female relatives of male political prisoners also suffered in 
their capacity as indirect victims. Besides psychological trauma, this included socio-
economic marginalization as a result of the loss of male breadwinners and social 
exclusion.369  
Working class women in Tunisia in particular have borne the brunt of Ben Ali’s 
exclusionary economic policies.370 In Tunisia’s marginalized regions, particularly the 
phosphate mines in the South, women played a central role in the organization of large-
scale protests against the corruption and bad economic governance that was at the core 
of the marginalization of these female workers themselves and their regions as a 
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whole.371 These protests sowed the seeds for what would become the Arab Spring. 
These initial efforts, however, were met with violent crackdowns by the Ben Ali regime 
resulting in physical harms being inflicted on these women in addition to the socio-
economic harms they already experienced as a result of their marginal status as workers 
in the phosphate mines, as well as the overall marginalization of their regions.  
Tunisia has been heralded as an example in the field of women’s rights in the 
Arab World for its relatively progressive 1956 Personal Status Code. Amongst other 
things, this law abolished polygamy and provided Tunisian women with equal divorce 
rights. Nevertheless, female Tunisians as a group have continued to be the subject of 
sustained marginalization since the country’s independence from France. This includes 
inequality in the domain of inheritance,372 and vulnerability to violence in the private 
sphere due to the absence of an adequate legislative framework and institutional 
capacities to protect women against GBV. The gravity of this issue is reflected in 
statistics on the prevalence of domestic violence, which indicate that one in two 
Tunisian women have experienced violence by a partner or relative.373  
Thus, Tunisia has witnessed all types of gendered harms that have been of 
interest to feminist transformative justice scholars. The following sub-sections discusses 
how these harms have been embroiled in a broader struggle for Tunisia’s identity in the 
wake of the Arab Spring, and how this has impacted the implementation of each of 
these efforts.  
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4.3.2 Gender politics in Tunisia374 
After the Revolution the above-discussed gender harms have become central to a 
struggle between competing political elites, as part of the Islamist and secular political 
classes’ attempts to determine Tunisia’s post-revolutionary national identity. While 
Islamists have prioritized the pursuit of gender justice via transitional justice 
mechanisms, secular actors have promoted gender justice through legislative reform in 
line with their aversion against transitional justice. This section discusses the history 
behind this struggle, how different political groups have used support for – or 
denunciation of – certain gender justice causes for political gain, and how different 
components of Tunisia’s women’s movement have responded to the politicization of 
the struggle to pursue transformative gender justice goals. This background is necessary 
to allow this thesis to disentangle if and how the EU’s support for certain types of 
gender justice issues in Tunisia aligned it with the interests of certain local actors and in 
particular local political elites.   
Since Tunisia’s independence from France, women’s rights have been used as a 
tool to define and solidify the country’s identity as a modern nation in the Arab World. 
Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia’s first president, considered the emancipation of Tunisia’s 
female population a key condition for Tunisia’s successful transition to ‘modernity.’375 
This progressive attitude towards women’s rights – albeit less sincerely and effectively – 
was preserved by Bourguiba’s successor Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. This explains 
Tunisia’s relatively progressive record in the field of women’s rights compared to other 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa.376 However, not all segments of 
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Tunisian society shared this desire for a shift towards modernity and more liberal 
gender norms, most notably conservative Islamist actors who after independence from 
France aimed to establish a Tunisian state governed according to the principles set out 
in the Sharia.377 This sentiment, however, largely stayed under the surface, as progressive 
women’s rights policies went hand in hand with severe political oppression of those 
who opposed Tunisia’s subsequent dictatorial regimes.378  
The overthrow of Ben Ali revealed the discontent of large parts of society with 
the direction the ‘modern’ Tunisian state had taken. While this discontent 
predominantly concerned the ruling class’s corrupt economic policy,379 the victory of 
the socially conservative Islamist Ennahda party in Tunisia’s first democratic elections 
also put the question of Tunisia’s national identity at the forefront of the debates 
concerning Tunisia’s path towards democracy.380 Since liberal gender norms had 
traditionally been presented as a core signifier of Tunisia’s nature as a modern Arab 
state, these became the centre of the post-2011 debates on national identity.381 Liberal 
opponents pointed at Ennahda’s intention to restore the Tunisian woman in her 
traditional role as caretaker of the family as the most vivid symbol of its dangerous and 
oppressive politics.382 The struggle for the determination of the identity of ‘the Tunisian 
woman’ – and in her trail the Tunisian state - in the wake of the 2011 revolution 
reached a boiling point when Ennahda attempted to introduce ‘complementarity’ 
 
377 Currently Ennahda states that it is in favour of democratically governed state: Rached Ghannouchi, 
'Islam and Democracy in Tunisia' (2018) 29(3) Journal of Democracy 5. 
378 Lamont and Pannwitz 2016 (n200). 
379 Fabio Merone, ‘Enduring class struggle in Tunisia: the fight for identity beyond political Islam’ (2015) 
42(1) British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 74. 
380 Teije Hidde Donker, ‘Re-emerging Islamism in Tunisia: repositioning religion in politics and society’ 
(2013) 18(2) Mediterranean Politics 207. 
381 Debuysere 2016 (n200); Maaike Voorhoeve, ‘Women’s Rights in Tunisia and the Democratic 
Renegotiation of an Authoritarian Legacy’ (2015) 5 New Middle Eastern Studies. 
382 Mounira M Charrad and Amina Zarrugh, ‘Equal or complementary? Women in the new Tunisian 
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instead of ‘equality’ in the new constitution to describe spousal relations. Many 
Tunisians considered this to be an unacceptable breach of the spirit of Tunisia’s 
‘popularly valorised Code of Personal Status.’383  
However, while being socially conservative in terms of women’s rights during 
the initial period of its ascendancy to power, the Ennahda party presented itself as an 
ardent supporter of transitional justice.384 This was directly related to the fact that the 
party represents the part of Tunisia’s electorate that was subject to the harshest and 
most intense repression under the Ben Ali regime. The party played a pivotal role in the 
design of Tunisia’s transitional justice trajectory and particularly in the creation of the 
Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC) which is at the centre of it.385 Interestingly, when 
the TDC was created, leading party figures of the otherwise conservative Ennahda 
movement emphasized the importance of including women and their experiences in 
this effort to come to terms with the country’s past.386 The chair of the TDC’s Women’s 
Commission, Ibtihel Abdellatif, is the former director of an Islamist women’s group, 
Nisa Tounsiat.387 Moreover, newly active Ennahda-affiliated women’s groups have 
become pivotal forces in popular outreach and advocacy in the field of transitional 
justice,388 while simultaneously carving out their own conservative niche in Tunisia’s 
 
383 Ibid: 230. Large-scale protests headed by Tunisia’s well-organized feminist movement followed, and 
eventually the constitutional guarantee of men and women’s equality in every aspect of life was retained.  
384 Andrieu 2016 (n200). 
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Wiebelhaus-Brahm, ‘The Ministerialization of Transitional Justice’ (2019) 20(1) Human Rights Review 
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traditionally feminist women’s movement.389 This means that Islamist actors have 
become some of the core drivers of the pursuit of gender justice in transition via 
Tunisia’s official transitional justice institutions, albeit with a different vision of gender 
justice to their secular counterparts.  
The country’s transitional justice efforts were dealt a severe blow when the 
secular Nidaa Tounes party – which has strong ties to the former ruling elite – won the 
majority of the votes in the country’s 2014 election. While it needed to enter into a 
coalition government with the at that point still pro-transitional justice party, Ennahda, 
Nidaa Tounes has become the most powerful political opponent of Tunisia’s 
transitional justice process.390 This is unsurprising in view of the strong ties of some of 
its members – including Tunisia’s recently deceased President Beji Caid Essebsi – 
have/had with one or both of Tunisia’s preceding regimes.391 This obtrusion includes 
attempts to push through an amnesty for businesspeople and officials who engaged in 
corrupt practices under the previous regime through an Administrative Reconciliation 
Law,392 the refusal to prolong the TDC’s mandate in spite of the fact that the 
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accessed 9 August 2019.  
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commission had not yet finished its work,393 and consistent attacks on the legitimacy of 
the Specialized Chambers.394 Interestingly, over the course of time the Islamist Ennahda 
party has increasingly turned its back on transitional justice as well, copying its coalition 
partner’s rhetoric on the need for reconciliation.395 This means that at the highest 
echelons of power, little support for past-focused gendered transitional justice efforts 
remains.  
On the other hand, however, Nidaa Tounes, and particular President Essebsi, 
have been very vocal about the need to defend and expand Tunisia’s progressive record 
in the field of women’s rights.396 Amongst other things, this has been translated in 
staunch support for the adoption of legislation to combat VAW - and a presidential 
push for a revision of Tunisia’s current inheritance legislation to guarantee equal 
inheritance between men and women.397 Commentators have suggested that while 
 
The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission judged that it would ‘not permit the achievement of one of 
the objectives of transitional justice, namely reform of the institutions’. CDL-AD(2015)032-e Interim 
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Session (Venice, 23-24 October 2015). Available at: 
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President Essebsi might believe genuinely in equal inheritance rights, it is also a political 
ploy to bolster Nidaa Tounes’ reputation as the party defending secular statehood, and 
representing women’s interests, despite it having entered a coalition with the 
Islamists.398 The Islamist party and its base have expressed strong opposition against 
attempts to introduce equal inheritance rights, as it goes against the spirit of the 
principles of Islamic family law.399 
Somewhere in the middle of these political intrigues operates Tunisia’s 
historically well-organized and relatively powerful feminist movement, spearheaded by 
the ATFD, its sister organization AFTURD and feminist lawyers/intellectuals/activists 
such as Sana Ben Achour, Monia Ben Jemia, and Bochra Belhaj Hmida. For these 
actors, the pursuit of accountability and redress for politically motivated gendered 
harms that occurred in the past – both in the sense of trials as well as more broadly 
speaking - is an important goal, and after the Revolution they indeed were some of the 
first to travel to the marginalized regions of Tunisia to collect testimonials from women 
who had experienced oppression by the hands of the dictatorial regime. They, however, 
have been much more reluctant to participate in or utilize Tunisia’s official transitional 
justice mechanisms as an avenue to pursue gender justice goals, due to the perceived 
dominance of Islamist actors and narratives in the process as a whole, and particularly 
the Women’s Commission. In this regard, a Tunisian feminist activist interviewed 
during the fieldwork for this thesis remarked:  
We tried to work a bit with the Women’s Commission, but I think that for various reasons be it 
for the TDC itself, or even for some of international NGOs that support the TDC’s work, there 
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has been an orientation towards Islamist victims. They were the principal victims, but there has 
been a marginalization of all other women and struggles, and with this approach we are not 
satisfied. There is a need for more objectivity for all victims.400 
Instead, the feminist movement has used the opportunities created by the ascendance to 
power of the secular Nidaa Tounes party to push through aforementioned legislation to 
combat VAW, and reforms in the area of equal inheritance. Bochra Belhaj Hmida has 
for instance presided the COLIBE Commission which was established by President 
Essebsi to explore the actions Tunisia should take to guarantee its citizens’ equality and 
individual liberties. At the same time, feminist organizations have protested the regime’s 
attempts to crackdown on the transitional justice process, as they consider the pursuit 
of accountability for politically-motivated human rights violations – including those 
inflicted on ATFD activists themselves – and the structural marginalization of Tunisia’s 
hinterlands as a core condition for a successful democratic transition.401  
 As the support for past and future focused gender justice efforts is this starkly 
divided across political lines, EU engagement with one or the other could be a strong 
indication of the factors that determine the contours of EU activities in this regard. The 
next paragraph will provide a more detailed description of the gender justice efforts that 
have been pursued in Tunisia and the actors that have dominated these efforts 
according to this thesis’ conceptual framework in order to allow for structured 
comparison.   
 
4.3.3 Avenues for gender justice in Tunisia 
This section categorizes the different types of avenues for gender justice support that 
have been established in the wake of the 2011 revolution according to the conceptual 
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framework identified in chapter 2. In combination with the previous sub-section’s 
reflections on the politicization of gender justice in Tunisia, this allows for in-depth 
insight in how each type of avenue for the pursuit of gender justice goals is related to 
broader political interests and specific gender justice actors. It finds that past-focused 
mainstream transitional justice efforts on the one hand, and future-focused 
transformative gender justice efforts (i.e. legislative reform) are each very strongly 
associated with one of the competing political fractions discussed above. The efforts of 
the TDC are central as an avenue for the which the pursuit of both mainstream gender 
justice goals and more transformative gender justice outcomes. However, other 
activities designed by grassroots justice actors provide another avenue for the pursuit of 
transformative gender justice efforts that have a strong link with the past. All in all, 
weighing political support for, and opposition against each of the three types of gender 
justice efforts, it seems that legislative reform has been the most effective avenue for 
change, while past-focused gender justice efforts have increasingly lost their momentum 
due to political opposition (the TDC and Specialized Chambers) or their marginality 
(grassroots transformative justice efforts).  
 
4.3.2.1 Past-focused mainstream gendered transitional justice efforts in Tunisia 
In the wake of the Arab Spring a transitional justice trajectory has been put in place in 
Tunisia to deal with legacies of political violence including the gendered harms 
discussed above. As such the TDC and the Specialized Chambers are the main avenues 
for the pursuit of mainstream gendered transitional justice goals in the Tunisian context. 
Both institutions were state-sanctioned transitional justice mechanisms. However, as 
discussed, they were the target of consistent attacks by the Nidaa Tounes party, and 




past-focused gender justice goals has become one of the most challenging, politically 
sensitive gender justice endeavours in the Tunisian context.  
The contours of Tunisia’s transitional justice trajectory are laid out in Tunisia’s 
2013 Transitional Justice Law, which ‘set out a comprehensive approach to addressing 
past human rights abuses’.402 The Law foresees the invocation of all tools of the 
mainstream transitional justice toolbox: truth seeking, reparations, accountability, 
institutional reform, vetting, and national reconciliation.403 Article 39 of Tunisia’s 
Transitional Justice Law calls for the creation of a Truth and Dignity Commission 
(TDC) to be at the centre of and streamline the different components of Tunisia’s 
transitional justice process. The TDC’s mandate covers the period between 1955 and 
2013, and includes the following tasks: to investigate violations committed since June 
1955; to collect testimonies to create a list of victims and a database of violations; to 
identify responsibility and root causes; to recommend reparations and take immediate 
action to compensate victims; and to preserve the national memory.  
When it comes to addressing politically motivated grave human rights violations 
inflicted on Tunisian women during the dictatorial rule, Article 4 of the Transitional 
Justice Law specifies that efforts to reveal the truth should address the particularity of 
the violations experienced by a range of vulnerable groups, including women. Violations 
are defined in Article 3 as: 
Any gross or systematic infringement of any human right committed by the State’s apparatuses 
or by groups or individuals who acted in State’s name or under its protection, even if they do 
not have the capacity or authority to do so. Violation shall also cover any gross or systematic 
infringement of any human right committed by organized groups.404  
 
402 International Center for Transitional Justice, ‘ICTJ Welcomes Tunisia’s Historic Transitional Justice 
Law’ (16 December 2013). Available at: https://www.ictj.org/news/ictj-welcomes-tunisia’s-historic-
transitional-justice-law, accessed 14 August 2018.  
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This means that documenting instances of politically motivated SGBV inflicted on 
women is a central task of the TDC. In addition, the Law also stipulates that rape and 
other forms of sexual violence amongst the violations which should be addressed by 
Specialized Judicial Chambers which will be entrusted with ‘adjudicating cases related to 
gross violations of human rights as specified in international agreements ratified by 
Tunisia and in this law’.405  
In practice, identifying, documenting and highlighting politically motivated 
SGBV has been a central component of the activities of the TDC’s Women’s 
Commission. The Women’s Commission’s mandate is to deal specifically with 
violations inflicted on female victims and support the integration of a gender dimension 
in the activities of the other Truth Commissioners.  This Commission has developed a 
methodology for testimony-taking that would facilitate testimonies by female victims of 
SGBV, who either due to a reluctance to relive the trauma, the social stigma that rests 
on survivors of SGBV, or due to pressure of family members to remain silent would be 
reluctant to come forward with this experiences.406 The methodology introduced special 
measures that would allow these victims to testify without having to go public with their 
stories, by introducing the possibility of secret hearings for female victims of rape and 
 
405 Ibid, Article 8.  
406 In this regard Ibtihel Abdellatif, the president of the Women’s Commission, has remarked: 
 
‘During the initial period of the TDC’s work receiving victims’ cases, i.e. from 15 December 2014 to 15 
June 2016, we noticed that no more than 5% of the total number of cases pertained to women victims of 
violations. This alerted us to the role played by the barrier of silence, a barrier that was chosen voluntarily 
by some victims and forced upon others by the family or family environment. We discerned, via the direct 
relationship with the women victims, that the voluntary silence was due to the impact of grave violations 
and psychological traumas, the desire to suppress and forget them, and the fear of recalling those incidents 
and events that left psychological and social effects of varying degrees of gravity. It was also due to fear of 
society’s reaction and the lack of psychological rehabilitation available throughout the period of living with 
the violations and their legacy. As for the forced silence, it is due to refusal by family members, especially 
many of the children who blame their guardians for their marginalization and are still haunted by a memory 
burdened by the legacy of the violations that involved the entire family, not least the removal and 
imprisonment of a father or mother.’ 
The Legal Agenda, ‘Ibtihel Abdellatif of Tunisia’s Truth and Dignity Commission: The Women Victims 
Who Chose to Testify’ 2019 The Legal Agenda. Available at: http://legal-




other types of SGBV.407 To inform the Tunisian public about the occurrence of these 
harms the TDC’s second public hearing was devoted to women’s experiences of 
repression, and figured the testimonies of female victims of politically motivated SGBV 
who were willing to discuss their experiences publicly. One of these women was Basma 
Balai,408 a female political activist who experienced sexual harassment and rape threats 
and witnessed the rape of other women by members of security forces during a two-
month period of imprisonment in the early 1990s. The TDC’s final report, while 
published online in Arabic, is not yet available in French or English. However, third 
sources have noted that the part of the report that discusses the characteristics of the 
repressive system, is divided in three parts with one part being violations against women 
and children.409  
Basma Balai’s case was one of the first cases to be referred to the Specialized 
Chambers once they became functional.410 The role of the Specialized Chambers is to 
prosecute the perpetrators of grave human rights violations such as deliberate killing, 
rape and any form of sexual violence, torture, enforced disappearance, and execution 
without fair trial guarantees. The TDC is responsible for selection of cases that should 
 
407 Ibid.   
408 Henda Chennaoui, ‘IVD: Les femmes victimes de la dictature brisent le silence’ 2017 Nawaat. 
Available at: https://nawaat.org/portail/2017/03/10/ivd-les-femmes-victimes-de-dictature-brise-le-
silence/, accessed 10 May 2018.  
409 The report consists of multiple components. The first part discusses the mandate of the TDC. 
Subsequently, four parts are consecrated to ‘the dismantling of the despotic system’, one of these parts 
discusses violations inflicted on women and children. The sixth part sets out a comprehensive approach 
towards reparations, and the final component contains recommendations for guarantees of non-
repetition.  
 
Olfa Belhassine, a Tunisian journalist who has closely documented the activities of the TDC since its 
inception, however, remarks that the part dedicated to violations inflicted on women and children is 
relatively underdeveloped: ‘On peut regretter, par exemple, que le volume consacré aux violations contre 
les femmes et les enfants soit plutôt maigre, malgré les très nombreux témoignages recueillis’.  
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be transferred to the Specialized Chambers. However, the TDC has struggled to send 
cases concerning politically motivated SGBV to the Specialized Chambers, because 
most victims who provided a testimony to the TDC did so on the condition of 
anonymity. In this regard Ibtihel Abdellatif, the President of the TDC’s Women’s 
Commission, has remarked that:  
Per the TDC’s procedure manuals, a violation case is only referred to the Specialized Chambers 
for Transitional Justice if the victim agrees. In reality, many women victims did not want to 
enter the accountability process because they refused to publicize the violations they suffered. 
Unfortunately, the judicial process does not guarantee the secrecy that we succeeded in 
providing to the victims in the secret hearings. Hence, the women abstained from putting their 
right to accountability into effect. 
She, however, also identified the TDC’s failure to effectively investigate all cases that 
could potentially be transferred to the Specialized Chambers, because of internal 
struggles in the TDC and particularly the hostility between the President of the TDC 
and the Commissioner responsible for investigations as a reason for the low number of 
cases concerning female victims having been transferred to the Specialized Chambers. 
411 
 Nevertheless, it is clear that in Tunisia the TDC and Specialized Chambers have 
acted as an important platform for addressing the types of gendered harms that have 
traditionally been at the core of efforts to introduce a gender dimension in transitional 
justice efforts. This means that in Tunisia, while these harms might not have been the 
most common ones experienced by female victims of repression by the dictatorial 
regime, did figure quite prominently in the country’s state sanctioned transitional justice 
efforts. As such, by supporting the work of the TDC’s Women’s Commission or the 
Specialized Chambers the EU could contribute to addressing the gendered harms it 
 
411 The Legal Agenda, ‘Ibtihel Abdellatif of Tunisia’s Truth and Dignity Commission: The Women 
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identifies in its Framework on Support for Transitional Justice as priority harms to be 
addressed in transitional justice efforts.  However, in view of section 4.3.2’s discussion 
of the political opposition that hampered the activities of the TDC and Specialized 
Chambers, it could be argued that these mechanisms have become the most challenging 
avenues through which to pursue gender justice outcomes, as they have become the 
subject of Nidaa Tounes’ political ire while having lost significant levels of support 
from their Islamist backers.  
 
4.3.2.2 Past-focused transformative gender justice efforts in Tunisia  
Tunisia has also witnessed both state-sanctioned and grassroots efforts to pursue more 
transformative gender justice outcomes through widening the type of gendered harms 
beyond those harms that have traditionally dominated efforts to introduce a gender 
dimension in transitional justice efforts, and attempts to provide the types of redress 
that could potentially transform the lives of female victims. This section discusses both 
categories of efforts, as they could provide the EU with an opportunity to demonstrate 
a commitment to supporting transformative gender justice efforts.  
  At the state-sanctioned level, Tunisia’s Transitional Justice Law foresees a role 
for transitional justice mechanisms to bring about more transformative justice 
outcomes. Article 10 provides a broad definition of the concept of victim stipulating 
that: 
In this law, a victim shall mean any individual, group or legal entity having suffered harm as  
a result of a violation. Under the Public Law, shall also be considered as victims’ family 
members who were harmed as a result of their kinship to the victim as well as any person who 
was harmed while intervening to help the victim or to prevent the violation. This definition shall 
include every region which was marginalized or which suffered systematic exclusion. 412   
 




By explicitly acknowledging the concept of ‘indirect victimhood’, Tunisia’s Transitional 
Justice Law facilitates the participation of a broader category of women in the 
transitional justice process, as the majority of female victims consisted of family 
members of men, who were persecuted by the Ben Ali regime.413  
Moreover, while the Transitional Justice Law does not explicitly refer to the 
socio-economic dimensions of indirect victimhood, thanks to activities of the Women’s 
Commission over the course of its investigations, the TDC has acknowledged that an 
adequate response to the gendered dimensions of repression requires the formal 
recognition of harms of a socio-economic nature.414 In the Tunisian case, this includes 
the harms resulting from exclusion from educational and employment opportunities, 
and the economic insecurity women experienced as a result of the loss of a male 
breadwinner.415 Guaranteeing recognition for the harms experienced by women who 
were expelled from school/university and their (public sector) jobs for wearing the veil 
has been a signature issue for the Women’s Commission throughout its tenure.416 This 
was facilitated by the submission of a collective file of 140 testimonies to the TDC by 
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inclusion of socio-economic harms within the IVD process was reinforced by the broad mandate of the 
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Instance Ve ́rité et Dignité, 2015 Rapport Annuel (Résumé). Available at : http://www.ivd.tn/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/Resume-Rapport-Annuel-IVD-2015.pdf, accessed 1 August 2018. 
416 Seif Soudani, ‘Tunisie. Port du voile sous Ben Ali : la "circulaire 108" devant la justice transitionnelle’ 
(16 May 2016) Le Courrier d’Atlas. Available at: https://www.lecourrierdelatlas.com/tunisie-port-du-
voile-sous-ben-ali-la-circulaire-devant-la-justice-transitionnelle--5012, accessed 20 July 2019.  
 
In this article Ibtihel Abdellatif, the president of the TDC’s Women’s Commission, is cited stating that 
responding to this violation against a woman’s right to participate equally in public life is as serious as 
responding to accusations of corruption levelled at the family in law of former President Ben Ali.  
 
‘Pour Ibtihel Abdellatif, présidente de la commission Femme au sein de l’Instance, “la réconciliation dans 
ce domaine n’est pas moins importante que celle avait récemment été illustrée par une poignée de main 
historique” entre l’Etat tunisien et Slim Chiboub en tant que demandeur d’arbitrage en matière de 
corruption.’   
 
‘For Ibtihel Abdellatif, president of the women's commission, "reconciliation in this area is no less 
important than the reconciliation that was recently illustrated by a historic handshake" between the 




the ‘Transitional Justice is Also for Women Network’ on Circular 108.417 This network 
consists of eleven women’s organizations with most of them representing Islamist 
victims. Their submission constituted the first time a women’s advocacy group 
presented a collective file to the TDC.418 
The TDC has also worked on the issue of marginalized regions and the 
violations inflicted on the individuals who protested against corruption in the 
management of Tunisia’s phosphate mines before the 2011 Revolution emerged. Files 
concerning these violations – e.g. torture inflicted on protesters during the 2008 
uprisings in the mines of Gafsa – have been referred to the Specialized Chambers.419 
The Women’s Commission, however, has not been particularly active on this issue, 
regardless of the obvious gendered dimensions of regional marginalization. Some 
grassroots gender justice actors have therefore questioned the Women’s Commission’s 
priorities. More specifically, they have criticized the Commission’s focus on Circular 
108 and indirect victimhood experienced by female family members of political activists 
at the expense of for instance more focus on developing gendered analyses of the 
notion of marginalized regions and efforts to highlight the stories of female victims of 
the crackdowns of the protests in the phosphate mines.420  
Therefore, Tunisian grassroots gender justice actors have developed parallel 
efforts to pursue past-focused transformative gender justice outcomes with a different 
thematic focus. Just after the ousting of Ben Ali, representatives of the ATFD, Tunisia’s 
leading feminist organization, travelled to Tunisia’s marginalized regions to take the 
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testimonies of female activists and victims who had been engaged in the popular 
uprisings against the Ben Ali regime that preceded the 2011 revolution. This resulted in 
the publication of a report highlighting the role of female activists in these uprisings, 
and the harms they suffered as a result of their participation.421 Subsequently, in 2013, 
the ATFD, with the support of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, organized a popular 
tribunal which provided a stage to a range of women who were victimized by the 
oppressive regime. This tribunal highlighted the various forms of gendered oppression 
that have been inflicted on Tunisian women. It included female victims whose rights 
had been violated during the era of Bourguiba, under Ben Ali, during the revolution and 
in the period following Ben Ali’s ousting.422 The testimonies alluded to a large variety of 
harms, ranging from the imprisonment and torture of a female political activist in the 
1970s, to the harassment, economic exploitation and eventual imprisonment of a 
housekeeper by members of Ben Ali’s family. The tribunal also highlighted the 
contemporary suffering of the mothers of the Martyrs of the Revolution, who after two 
years had still not received the promised and much-needed state support.423  
This means that in Tunisia the EU had different options at its disposal to 
engage with transformative gender justice efforts. Here again, the activities of the 
TDC’s Women’s Commission, or the TDC as such, have become a difficult to navigate 
avenue for pursuing gender justice outcomes. Therefore, the grassroots efforts could act 
as a less politically sensitive area for engagement with transformative gender justice 
efforts if the EU indeed is interested in exploring such opportunities. However, due to 
their ‘unofficial character’ and the overall lack of interest in these activities on behalf of 
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those in power, puts into question the utility of this mechanisms as an avenue for the 
pursuit of transformative gender justice goals.  
 
4.3.2.3 Legislative reform to pursue progressive gender justice outcomes in Tunisia 
Last, but not least this thesis identified support for legislative and institutional reform as 
a way for the pursuit of more forward-focused transformative gender justice outcomes. 
This section discusses how gender justice actors have employed this avenue for change 
to effect transformative gender justice outcomes since 2011. It distinguishes between 
legislative reform to combat VAW and to safeguard/achieve gender equality before the 
law and efforts to integrate more women in the security services in particular, with an 
eye on improving this institution’s ability to address cases of GBV.  
In the direct aftermath of the Arab Spring, most feminist advocacy efforts at the 
legislative level were aimed at safeguarding the women’s rights standards that already 
existed against the potential whims of a conservative Islamist parliamentary majority.424 
This included – successful - advocacy against the proposition to include the notion that 
spouses are complementary rather than equal in Tunisia’s new constitution.425 However, 
since the 2014 elections, which tilted the power balance back in the direction of more 
secular political parties, feminist advocacy has focused on expanding the legislative 
framework to provide better protection to women against GBV and to guarantee equal 
rights between women and men.426 The key achievement in this regard has been the 
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adoption of the Integral Law on VAW.427 VAW, as mentioned in section 4.3.1, is a 
persistent problem in Tunisia, and Article 46 of Tunisia’s 2014 Constitution obliged the 
State to take measures to combat this phenomenon. This was in line with 
recommendations addressed at the Tunisian State by CEDAW in 2010.428  
Before the adoption of the Integral Law on VAW, grave acts of VAW including 
rape could go unpunished. Article 227bis of the Criminal Code,429 for instance, provided 
rapists with the opportunity to escape prison time if they marry their victims. Tunisia’s 
legislative framework neither obliged the state to take the necessary steps to prevent 
VAW, nor to protect victims of VAW against further harms. The onus for taking care 
of victims and rehabilitating them was mostly put on feminist CSOs such as the 
ATFD.430 The new law includes a comprehensive definition of VAW which recognizes 
the physical, sexual, moral, economic and political dimensions of VAW (Article 3), and 
sets out a clear, multi-sectoral approach for preventing, adjudicating and supporting the 
victims of this type of violations. This includes the creation of a National Observatory 
to monitor the implementation of the law (Article 39).431 While not being perfect –the 
law for instance does not criminalize marital rape – it has been welcomed as a major 
achievement in the struggle for women’s rights by both Tunisian as well as international 
women’s rights activists.432 
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relation to the establishment of the observatory that ‘No initiative has been taken to include independent 
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Women’s rights have also been advanced via legal reforms, and attempts to 
pursue legal reforms, in the realm of family law. While the Tunisian Constitution and 
the Integral Law on VAW call for the prohibition of all forms of discrimination against 
women, Tunisia’s contemporary legislative acquis still contained and contains a number 
of discriminatory laws and by-laws. In this regard, the abolition of Decree 1973,433 
which prohibited Tunisian women from marrying non-Muslim men, has been the first 
step in the direction of further equality in this regard.434 The core objective of Tunisia’s 
feminist movement is to revise the country’s Personal Status Code in order to abolish 
all discriminatory articles it contains including the ones relating to inheritance.435 
Currently, Tunisian women have the right to only half of what their brothers inherit in 
line with the inheritance system outlined in the Sharia. Since the adoption of the 
Integral Law on VAW, equal inheritance rights have dominated feminist advocacy. This 
cause has been picked up by the Tunisian President, who has created a Commission to 
examine the extent to which Tunisia’s legislative framework lives up to international 
human rights standards aimed at protection equality and civil liberties. The report that 
was issued by this Commission in July 2018 recommends amongst other things the 
revision of the legislative framework to guarantee equality in inheritance.436 In 
December 2018 the Cabinet approved the referral of a Bill that would enshrine equal 
inheritance rights into law to the Tunisian Parliament.437 
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Legislative reform has so far proven to be the most effective avenue for gender 
justice change. Thanks to buy in from both secular and Islamist parties the parliament 
could pass legislation to combat VAW. Equal inheritance rights are more politically 
controversial and the subject of significant Islamist opposition. However, this thesis 
would argue that even this avenue for transformative gender justice change is more 
viable than for instance the transformative gender justice efforts discussed in the 
previous paragraph, because at least they are relevant and can count on the support of 
one powerful political fraction.  
 
4.3.4 The EU’s relations with and foreign policy priorities in Tunisia 
In order to understand what factors drive EU engagement with gender justice in 
Tunisia based on a comparison between what avenues for gender justice support are 
available and what the EU actually does engage with, it is important to know the overall 
nature of the relations between the EU and Tunisia. After all, if the EU’s broader 
foreign policy interests in a certain country are rather narrow, it is likely that its 
engagement with gender justice issues will be less determined by political factors. In 
Tunisia the EU has strong foreign policy interests. As such this section argues that if the 
EU’s priorities in the realm of gender justice in transition coincide with those of the 
authorities, this is a strong indication that local political interests shape EU engagement 
with gender justice in transition.  
In the EU’s own terms, Tunisia is ‘a key partner country’ in the Mediterranean 
region.438 Relations between the bloc and Tunisia gained significant momentum when 
Tunisia and the EU signed an Association Agreement in 1995.439 However, cooperation 
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only really kicked off after the 2011 Revolution. With the ratification of a privileged 
partnership in 2012, EU-Tunisia relations have entered a new phase of ‘intense political 
contacts, higher levels of financial assistance and significant progress in many areas 
including trade relations, security sector reforms, education, research and innovation’.440 
These commitments are more than just rhetoric. Through a combination of grants, 
macro-financial assistance and loans, the EU has supported Tunisia’s democratic 
transition with over 3.5 billion euro between 2011 and 2016.441 In an 2019 interview 
with Le Monde Afrique Patrice Bergamini, the EU Ambassador to Tunisia, remarked 
that between 2016 and 2020 Tunisia has received, and will continue to receive 300 
million euro per year, which makes it the country that has received the highest amount 
of EU support per inhabitant.442 
This level of support is not just a sign of benevolence on the EU’s behalf. The 
EU has a real interest in keeping Tunisia on track. Tunisia is the only country that is 
moving towards democracy in the wake of the Arab Spring,443 a process in which the 
EU is heavily invested for several reasons. First, the credibility of the EU as a value-
centred foreign policy actor, and generally the credibility of the EU’s value-centred 
foreign policy approach are largely dependent on Tunisia’s successful democratic 
transition. Moreover, one could argue that in view of the hostile conditions for support 
for democracy and the rule of law in other countries in the region, Tunisia is the only 
country where the EU has room to spend significant resources on the country’s 
development.444 Second, faced with socio-economic decline and political unrest in the 
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region, the country has become one of the main exporters of both jihadist fighters 
aspiring to join Daesh in the Middle East, as well as terrorists involved in attacks on the 
EU’s soil.445 In 2015 Tunisia was the scene of two major terrorist attacks – in the 
Museum of Bardo in Tunis and at the beach of the popular holiday destination Sousse. 
In the Bardo attack twenty-two individuals lost their lives, of whom 17 tourists.446 The 
Sousse attack resulted in the deaths of 38 individuals (including the perpetrator) out of 
whom thirty were British tourists.447 The EU perceives these developments as an 
existential threat to its own security.448 Therefore, providing Tunisia with the capacity to 
counter terrorism – both through support for its faltering economy and the 
development of its security apparatus – has become a key foreign policy priority for the 
EU in Tunisia as of 2015.449  
 
 
‘The Commission acknowledges that the Tunisian authorities may have encountered difficulties in 
managing all the assistance, due to the post-revolution context and frequent changes of governments and 
within the administration. However, it must also be emphasised that the absorption rate for EU projects 
is higher than that of other donors.’  
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What does this mean for the EU’s relations with Tunisia’s political elites? One 
could argue that in light of the EU’s commitment to promoting a successful democratic 
transition the EU should be willing to be highly critical of undemocratic behaviours 
displayed by Tunisia’s political elites. However, in light of the pressing security issues, 
many experts agree that the EU has prioritized the goal of safeguarding stability. 
Stability in this sense includes both political stability and security more narrowly. As 
such the EU has abstained from behaviour that could put the country’s delicate political 
balance at peril. It has also identified SSR as a priority area for EU engagement. In order 
to conduct SSR successfully one needs buy in from local political elites even if they do 
not always take all principles of good governance at heart.  
The nature of the EU’s engagement with gender justice in Tunisia is interpreted 
against this background. High levels of EU engagement with more controversial gender 
justice issues – most notably the TDC - would refute the idea that interests of local 
political elites rather than EU policy commitments determine the EU’s approach 
towards gender justice in transition. The opposite of course also is the case; if the EU 
only engages with issues that can count on buy in from these elites, this thesis will 
interpret this as an indication that the EU’s support for gender justice in transition is 
shaped by the priorities of those in power.   
 
 
In relation to Tunisia specifically the EU 2017-2020 Single Support Framework states that SSR and 
actions aimed at combatting terrorism remain priorities for the EU in Tunisia.  
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4.3.5 Conclusion - Gender Justice in Tunisia: Gendered Harms, Avenues for 
Change, And (Gender) Politics 
In the wake of the Arab Spring, the position of women in Tunisia’s new democratic 
system has been at the core of discussions about national identity. This has drawn 
significant attention to the gendered harms that women have experienced under past 
dictatorial regimes. It, however, has also resulted in the further politicization of 
women’s rights issues. This section argues that at the national level past-focused gender 
justice initiatives – both of a mainstream and transformative nature – have particularly 
borne the brunt of this development. Future focused transformative gender justice 
efforts such as legislative reform to combat GBV have suffered less from political 
backlash. In theory the EU could either feel triggered to put all its political weight 
behind supporting mainstream gendered transitional justice goals, in line with its 
commitment to combating impunity for politically motivated SGBV, or decide to 
support the type of gender justice efforts that already have buy in from the authorities. 
There could be multiple reasons behind either choice. This section, however, argues 
that as the EU is heavily invested in safeguarding strong ties with Tunisia, a choice on 
the EU’s behalf to prioritize future focused gender justice efforts at the expense of past-
focused ones, is a strong indication that priorities of local political elites determined the 
EU’s engagement with gender justice in transition.   
 
4.4 UKRAINE’S GENDER JUSTICE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE 
While less prominently so than in Tunisia, in Ukraine the success of post-Maidan 
gender justice efforts has been impacted quite heavily by political calculations. As is the 
case in Tunisia both before Euromaidan as well as during the conflict that erupted in its 
wake, women have been subjected to a wide range of harms of a political and private 




opposition or - in case of grassroots efforts past-focused transformative justice efforts - 
of an overall lack of political interest. As is the case in Tunisia, forward-looking 
transformative gender justice efforts have received most support from political elites. 
However, in Ukraine’s case this support was not granted to attempts to ratify the 
Istanbul Convention to address more structural types of violence, but rather to 
integration of women in the country’s army and security forces. This focus on women’s 
participation fits in with Ukraine’s historical, Soviet era women’s rights priorities and 
also is convenient in the current political climate in which influential religious actors 
have been pushing for a rejection of the recognition of the Istanbul Convention. Again, 
this section concludes that as safeguarding close ties with Ukraine is a core EU foreign 
policy priority, EU support for certain types of gender justice efforts and/or neglect of 
others could be a clear indication of the factors that drive EU engagement with gender 
justice in transition.  
 
4.4.1 Gendered harms in Ukraine 
The relative invisibility of gender justice concerns in the narratives surrounding the 
contemporary transition and crisis in Ukraine does not mean that gender inequality 
generally speaking, and VAW specifically are not major issues in Ukraine. To the 
contrary, local and international women’s rights organizations have drawn attention to 
the occurrence of conflict-related SGBV in Donbas,450 increased levels of ‘everyday’ 
GBV in the conflict-affected areas,451 the high rates of GBV in Ukraine generally 
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speaking,452 the economic cost of this type of violence,453 and the huge lacunae in 
Ukraine’s legislation when it comes to protecting women against the consequences of 
GBV.454 The following paragraphs introduce these harms for the reader to have a global 
picture of what type of gender justice issues the EU could engage with in Ukraine.  
The type of harm that has gotten most international attention is conflict-related 
SGBV inflicted on women in the context of the Donbas war. In 2017, the OHCHR 
reported that between March 2014 and January 2017 Government forces and armed 
groups on both sides had inflicted conflict-related sexual violence on both men and 
women.455 Most of this happened to individuals who were in detention, and the scope 
of harms ranged from rape to threats to rape one’s children: 
Beatings and electrocution on the genitals, rape, threats of rape, and forced nudity were used as 
a method of torture and ill-treatment to punish, humiliate, or extract confessions ... Perpetrators 
threatened to also detain, abduct, rape, injure or kill victims’ relatives, especially their children, to 
increase the pressure.456 
Constituting the first comprehensive overview of the gendered dimension of conflict in 
the Donbas by a major IO active in Ukraine, this report finally drew some mainstream 
attention to the gendered consequences of the Ukraine crisis.457  
However, while shedding light on an important aspect of women’s experience 
of conflict, the report prioritized the extraordinary over the more ‘everyday’ type of 
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women’s rights violations. Nevertheless, as was the case in Tunisia, Ukrainian women 
have been subjected to a much broader range of harms. In the Donbas region and 
around the contact line, i.e. the area in government-controlled Ukraine that borders 
with the Donbas region, economic deprivation is rampant. This is partly a result of the 
‘normal’ economic fall-out of war, but it is exacerbated by the refusal of the Ukrainian 
government to pay social security allowances to inhabitants of the Donbas who have 
not registered as IDPs.458 For women, the absence or death of male breadwinners has 
put the onus of taking care of the family uniquely on their shoulders. The OHCHR 
estimates that up to 13.000 people have been killed as a result of the conflict in Donbas 
between 2014 and 2019.459 Economic despair has resulted in increased levels of 
trafficking and reliance on ‘survival sex’ to make ends meet in the Donbas region in 
particular, but also in other parts of Ukraine.460  
Ukraine also has persistent and pervasive problems in the realm of women’s 
rights and GBV. UNFPA data for instance, show that while in 2016 174 women died as 
a direct result of the conflict, 601 were killed as a result of non-conflict related GBV.461 
As is the case in most countries in conflict, the occurrence of conflict has further 
increased the prevalence of this phenomenon in both the Donbas as well as the country 
itself. Women’s rights organizations have reported spikes in violence as a result of 
traumatized husbands and fathers returning to their homes without sufficient psycho-
social support.462 Moreover, historically domestic violence has largely gone unpunished 
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as a result of an inadequate legislative framework and institutional obstacles that 
prohibit the prosecution of GBV.463  
Lastly, discriminatory legislative frameworks have prohibited Ukrainian women 
from fully participating in the labour force.464 This includes exclusion from jobs 
included in a list which was created when Ukraine was still under Soviet rule. The 
rationale behind this practice was the perceived need to protect women’s reproductive 
health.465 This exclusion caused problems when in 2014 many women decided to join 
the army and take up combat roles in response to the eruption of the conflict in the 
Donbas. Once they entered the armed forces, women did not receive the same 
treatment as men. Some did not receive any payment, because they could not officially 
register as a soldier. Others could register but not under the combat roles, they had 
taken up, but rather as support staff. These women were excluded from the benefits 
allocated to male combatants such as the right to social guarantees afforded to 
veterans.466 
Thus, also in Ukraine the EU could potentially interact with the full range of 
harms that has been identified in feminist transitional justice scholarship as relevant to 
post-conflict and post-repression efforts to pursue gender justice in transition. The 
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following sections discuss how local political elites have engaged with each of these 
harms, and how this has affected the pursuit of gender justice via the three types of 
avenues for gender justice reform under scrutiny in this thesis.  
 
4.4.2 Gender politics in Ukraine 
In Ukraine political elites have also engaged selectively with the gender justice issues 
described above. This section argues that the extent to which the different categories of 
gendered harms have been addressed depends on the extent to which the pursuit of 
gender justice for these harms interferes with narratives of nationhood and male 
heroism in times of crisis. Such efforts are not popular in Ukraine at the moment, and 
therefore political elites have shied away from them. Again, understanding which efforts 
can and cannot count on this type of support is important to know, if one wants to 
establish whether and to what extent EU engagement with gender justice in Ukraine is 
adjusted to the priorities and preferences of powerful local actors.  
Powerful domestic actors, most notably the Council of Churches, have been at 
the centre of advocacy against ratification of the Istanbul Convention.467 The All-
Ukrainian Council of Churches, which is an inter-confessional advisory body which 
aims to unite the efforts of religious organizations in service of the national and spiritual 
revival of Ukraine, has argued that its invocation of the term gender and its questioning 
of gender stereotypes puts at risk Ukraine’s traditional family values.468 The Istanbul 
Convention considers VAW to be GBV. Understanding VAW as GBV implies that one 
considers women to become victim of this type of violence because they are women. 
 
467 The Council of Churches is the representative organ of all Ukraine’s Christian institutions. Ketelaars 
2018 (n196). 
468 Institute for Religious Freedom, ‘Council of Churches stands for the European integration of Ukraine 
without the gender ideology’ (8 January 2019). Available at: 
https://www.irf.in.ua/eng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=461:1&catid=34:ua&Item




Article 3 of the Istanbul Convention defines gender as ‘the socially constructed roles, 
behaviours, activities and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for 
women and men’, and calls upon Parties ‘where appropriate’, to take ‘the necessary 
steps to include teaching material on issues such as equality between women and men, 
non-stereotyped gender roles […] in formal curricula and at all levels of education’ (Art. 
14). This rejection of gender stereotypes and traditional gender roles is at the core of the 
Council of Churches resistance against the document, as it believes that recognition of 
the notion that traditional gender roles are problematic, constitutes a threat for 
Ukraine’s social stability. In this regard, representatives of the Council of Churches have 
remarked that ‘such a twisted approach […] can make the Istanbul Convention an 
instrument for popularizing new “gender roles” and same-sex relations in Ukrainian 
schools and universities, which would be a disastrous way for Ukraine’.469  
The fact that a parliamentary majority gave in to this advocacy for the 
protection of traditional values by the Council of Churches is remarkable, as it is type of 
rhetoric that has been associated with Russia’s recent promotion of ‘Russian values’.470 
Since the Maidan and Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s sovereignty, Ukraine has preached a 
shift to more European values.471 Ratification of the Istanbul Convention, being a 
Council of Europe Convention, would be a clear signifier of such a shift. However, 
despite their desire for closer integration with the EU, the majority of the Ukrainian 
 
469 Union of Orthodox Journalists, ‘No to gender: Council of Churches speaks out against ratification of 
Istanbul Convention’ (2017). Available at: http://spzh.news/en/news/40019-no-to-gender-council-of-
churches-speaks-out-against-ratification-of-istanbul-convention accessed 27 January 2019.  
470 Valentina Feklyunina, 'Soft power and identity: Russia, Ukraine and the ‘Russian world(s)’' (2016) 22(4) 
European Journal of International Relations 773. 
471 ‘Nothing can stand between Ukraine and its European Ambitions’, UNIAN (10 July 2018). Available 
at:  https://www.unian.info/politics/10182074-nothing-can-stand-between-ukraine-and-its-european-
ambitions-poroshenko.html, accessed 27 January 2019.  
471 Kostiantyn Yelisieiev, ‘Ukraine to EU: Tell us what we're fighting for’ (15 November 2017) 
EUobserver. Available at: https://euobserver.com/opinion/139873, accessed 27 January 2019. 
Matthes Buhbe, How Ukrainians Perceive European Values Main Results of an Empirical Survey, 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2017). Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/13731.pdf, accessed 




population is religious,472 and Ukrainian religious institutions including the Council of 
Churches and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine enjoy wide popularity amongst 
Ukrainian citizens. This is partly due to the Church’ strong stance against the 
interference of Russia and the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine’s domestic and religious 
affairs. The European Parliamentary Research Service has found in this regard that 
‘religion is seen as a key aspect of Ukraine's evolving national identity, which includes 
the struggle for hearts and minds amid Moscow's hybrid war against the country’.473 The 
Kyiv Patriarchate’s autocephaly from Moscow in January 2019 has been embraced as an 
important step for Ukraine in the direction of independence from Russia.474 The 
popularity of these religious institutions has been recognized by Ukrainian politicians all 
the way up to the presidency. During the 2019 Presidential elections, President 
Poroshenko ran – albeit unsuccessfully - under the slogan: ‘Army, language, faith’.475  
The reluctance to pursue accountability for conflict-related SGBV inflicted on 
women in Donbas also is an example of how ‘country’ is being prioritized over 
women’s security. While it is true that Ukrainian authorities cannot prosecute separatist 
forces who have committed such crimes, these are not the only individuals who have 
been found to engage in these acts. The OHCHR report has found that members of the 
 
472 Pew Research Center, Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe (2017). 
Available at: https://www.pewforum.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/05/CEUP-FULL-
REPORT.pdf, accessed 3 August 2019.  
473 Naja Bentzen, Ukraine: Religion and (geo-)politics - Orthodox split weakens Russia's influence (2019) 
European Parliamentary Research Service. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635525/EPRS_BRI(2019)635525_EN.pd
f, accessed 3 August 2019.  
474 President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko Official Website, ‘Head of State: Church autocephaly is the 
most important event similar to the Ukrainian aspiration to join the European Union and NATO’ (14 
October 2018), Available at: https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/glava-derzhavi-avtokefaliya-cerkvi-
ce-najvagomisha-podiya-po-50450, accessed 27 January 2019.  
475 Volodymyr Yermolenko, ‘Does Poroshenko Have a Chance at a Second Term?’ (1 October 2018) 
Atlantic Council. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/does-poroshenko-
have-a-shot-at-a-second-term, accessed 23 May 2019. 
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Ukrainian army and affiliated armed groups have also engaged in this type of violence.476 
In principle the Ukrainian authorities could prosecute these men. They, however, have 
largely failed to do so.477 Ukrainian – and international – women’s rights defenders 
believe that the reluctance to prosecute conflict related SGBV is related to the fact that 
soldiers are considered to be ‘heroes’ of the nation.478 Even when it comes to cases of 
sexual violence inflicted on female Ukrainian soldiers, it has been found that ‘though 
sexual abuse in the army is widespread, it is typically overlooked in a society reluctant to 
criticize soldiers during a war’.479 Similarly, when it comes to the violent behaviour of 
returning soldiers directed towards their own family members, experts have found that 
‘Women who suffer abuse from partners in military service are further discouraged 
from reporting the crime, as Ukrainian police and society view servicemen as heroes 
and patriots’.480  If even the cases of the women fighting for Ukraine themselves, or the 
wives of those soldiers who do cannot count on support, the hopes for female victims 
considered as members of the ‘enemy’ are virtually zero.  
However, the Maidan and conflict in the Donbas have not only contributed to 
political and societal resistance against gender equality and women’s rights. Women’s 
participation in the Maidan protests and subsequently the war has bolstered public 
support in favour of women’s participation in the security sector. Paradoxically, while 
Soviet era rules were at the root of women’s exclusion from military service, this 
attitude seems to build on the Soviet mentality towards gender equality which considers 
 
476 OHCHR 2017 (n194): 15-19.  
477 Ibid. 
478 Ilione Schultz and Marie-Alix Detrie, ‘Ukraine: The Intimate War’ (28 March 2017) Zero Impunity. 
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women’s participation in the labour force to be the core indicator of a country’s track 
record in the field of women’s rights.481 Moreover, somehow attempts to integrate 
women in and highlight their contribution to security operations has gone hand in hand 
with the objectification of female combatants and supporting staff in service of both 
nationalist narratives,482 as well as everyday sexism.483 Ukrainian and international media 
have for instance reported about beauty contests figuring women military medics.484 
With regard to the use of the female soldier to incite nationalist sentiments, various 
authors have reflected on the use of imagery of beautiful female Ukrainian soldiers to 
incite nationalist sentiments.485  
This broader political reality naturally greatly impacts the pursuit of gender 
justice via each of the three conceptual avenues for gender justice support identified in 
this thesis albeit in different ways. The following section will discuss in more depth the 
efforts that have been undertaken in each category and how these political calculations 
impact each of them.  
 
4.4.3 Avenues for gender justice in Ukraine 
While the pursuit of transitional justice and gender justice in Ukraine has followed a less 
structured approach than in Tunisia – not in the least because Ukraine is engaged in an 
ongoing conflict - gender justice actors have used mainstream transitional justice 
mechanisms, grassroots transformative gender justice efforts, and legislative and 
institutional reform to advance women’s rights at this critical juncture in Ukraine. This 
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section discusses these efforts according to the conceptual framework at the backbone 
of this thesis in order to facilitate systematic tracking and comparison of whether and 
how EU support for gender justice issues in Ukraine aligns with the agendas of local 
actors, and how this compares to Tunisia.  This section demonstrates that, as is the case 
in Tunisia, in Ukraine forward-looking gender justice efforts seem most viable due to 
the political calculations described above. However, in Ukraine, as a result of the 
opposition against the Istanbul Convention, these forward-looking efforts mostly 
concern integration of women in the security services rather than legislative reform. 
This section will reflect on the relevance of this finding in light of the comparative 
exercise that will be conducted in the following chapters.  
 
4.4.2.1 Past-focused mainstream gendered transitional justice efforts in Ukraine 
In Ukraine official transitional justice efforts have been less systematic and coherent 
than in Tunisia. After the Maidan Uprisings and the 2014 ousting of President Viktor 
Yanukovych, Ukraine has embarked on a process of political transition aimed at further 
distancing the country from its Soviet past and while doing so aligning itself more 
closely to the EU and its values.486 However, this process of transition has been 
disrupted by Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, and a Russia backed separatist war in 
the Eastern Donbas region.487 In theory, transitional justice related considerations play a 
significant role in both contexts.488 However, for various reasons, including the ongoing 
 
486 Channell-Justice 2017 (n200); Elias Kuhn von Burgsdorff, ‘The Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine: 
Stages of the Maidan Movement and Why They Constitute a Revolution’ (2015) 7(02) Inquiries Journal. 
487 For a comprehensive discussion of the developments that resulted in the annexation of Crimea and 
the separatist war in Donbas, see: Richard Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: crisis in the borderlands (IB Tauris 
2014). 
488 For theoretical reflections on the role of and possibilities for transitional justice in Ukraine see: Post-
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conflict,489 and political reluctance,490 Ukraine has not embarked on a comprehensive 
transitional justice trajectory. Within the framework of its political transition, the 
Ukrainian Parliament has passed a number of home-grown transitional justice measures. 
Some of these are aimed at purging Ukraine’s bureaucracy of its corrupt elements,491 
others at the decommunization of the country from its Soviet past,492 and again others 
at pursuing accountability for the grave human rights violations inflicted on protesters 
during the Maidan.493 However, observers have noted that, except for the 
decommunization efforts, so far the state has implemented most of these laws only to a 
marginal extent.494   
When it comes to the pursuit of accountability for grave human rights violations 
committed during the Maidan protests and in the context of the Donbas war, the 
Ukrainian government has initially tried to outsource efforts to international 
institutions. Ukraine, which has signed but not ratified the Rome Statute, has made two 
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special ad hoc article declarations under article 12(3) of the ICC Rome Statute, in order 
to give the ICC jurisdiction to examine crimes committed on Ukrainian territory or by 
its nationals.495 The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor is currently engaged in a preliminary 
examination into the situation in Ukraine, ‘which focuses on the Maidan events, as well 
as on the alleged crimes occurring after 20 February 2014 in Crimea and eastern 
Ukraine’.496 This examination consists of four stages. In relation to the alleged crimes 
committed in Ukraine since 21 November 2013 (during Maidan), the preliminary 
examination reached phase 2. As such, the Prosecutor is now in the process of 
determining the ICC’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Based on a review of all relevant 
information the Prosecutor will decide ‘whether there is a reasonable basis to believe 
that the alleged crimes fall within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court’.497 
However, the Ukrainian Prosecutor’s Office has picked up some cases relating 
to the killings of protesters by members of the security service during Maidan and later 
on the killing of 48 individuals during violence between pro-Ukrainian and ‘pro-
federalist’ groups in Odesa in May 2014 (Kulikov Field Killings). Four years after these 
killings took place the OHCHR concludes in relation to both of them that ‘Due to the 
complexity of cases and failure to preserve evidence shortly after the events or to 
prevent key suspects from fleeing the country, little progress has been achieved in 
prosecuting those responsible’.498 In relation to prosecution of those responsible for the 
violence in Odesa in particular the OHCHR has concluded that ‘investigations and legal 
proceedings related to the violence continued to be one-sided, focusing on prosecution 
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of ‘pro-federalists’ involved in the clashes. Moreover, the failure to prevent several 
senior police and emergency service officials from fleeing the country results in inability 
to bring them to account’.499  
When it comes to prosecution of Ukrainian perpetrators of grave human rights 
violations in the context of the Donbas war as of the end of 2017 Ukrainian law 
enforcement agencies have engaged in efforts to prosecute human rights violations 
committed by Ukrainian soldiers, members of the Ukrainian security service (SBU) and 
members of Ukrainian armed groups fighting next to the military in the Donbas 
conflict.500 Before, attempts by Ukrainian authorities to pursue accountability for human 
rights violations and abuses only targeted members of separatist armed groups.501 
Despite these positive developments the OHCHR cautioned that ‘yet, a large number 
of investigations remain to be undertaken into human rights violations allegedly 
perpetrated by military and security forces’.502 Moreover, it also ‘observed that some 
cases that occurred in the earlier stages of the conflict have still not been investigated or 
adequately investigated’.503 Moreover, in 2019 the OHCHR reported that most of the 
cases that had been taken up in 2017 had stalled, that few new cases had been taken up, 
and that in cases that were still on track prosecutors had failed to enforce defendants’ 
presence as a general practice.504 
 
499 Ibid: 18.  
500 Ibid: 9. Under endnote 53 the report lists the following examples: ‘The Military Prosecutor’s offices of 
Kharkiv and Mariupol garrisons are conducting investigations into allegations of illegal arrest and 
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trial before Druzkivskyi town court of Donetsk region; the trial against 2 SBU officers, accused of 
causing a death of a civilian arrested at a checkpoint by torturing him and failing to enable his immediate 
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region’.  
501 Ibid: 13. 
502 Ibid. 
503 Ibid: 9.  




In parallel to these efforts Ukraine has been negotiating a peace agreement with 
Russia in the framework of the Normandy Format,505 which also includes France and 
Germany. These negotiations resulted in the adoption of the Minsk II agreement. 
Minsk II – as did the Minsk Protocol which proceeded it – does not make any reference 
to gender or women. Moreover, if abided to, the document could have significant 
consequences for the pursuit of accountability for crimes committed within the context 
of the Donbas conflict. Minsk II calls upon the parties to: 
Ensure pardon and amnesty by enacting the law prohibiting the prosecution and punishment of 
persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and 
Lugansk regions of Ukraine.506  
This provision concerns all parties to the conflict, including separatist fighters. In view 
of the 13.000 citizens who have died in Donbas, and the economic havoc the conflict 
has wrecked on the country as a whole, it is not surprising that this provision is highly 
unpopular in (government-controlled areas of) Ukraine.507 Therefore, in 2017 the 
Ukrainian President signed into law an amnesty law which only exempts from 
prosecution Ukrainian soldiers who ‘defended the independence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Ukraine’ while directly taking part in the antiterrorist operations 
and who committed a crime ‘that is not a particularly grave crime against the life and 
health of a person’.508 This excludes separatist fighters from the amnesty.  
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Overall, this phrasing seems in line with the notion that amnesties should not be 
rewarded for grave human rights violations. As such it seems that the Ukrainian 
authorities’ inactiveness on prosecuting offenders of grave human rights violations in 
the context of the Donbas conflict is not a result of the Amnesty Law, but rather 
general unwillingness to hold soldiers, members of armed groups of members of the 
Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) to account. In this regard it is interesting to notice that 
while the OHCHR has found widespread violations of fair trial rights of individuals 
charged with affiliation or links with armed groups or crimes against the national 
security of Ukraine, SBU officers and members of pro-Ukrainian armed groups accused 
of grave human rights violations against civilians have often be released of custody 
during trial.509  
Faced with this lack of serious efforts on behalf of the Ukrainian authorities to 
prosecute offenders of grave human rights violations, national CSOs and IOs have 
engaged in documentation of and reporting on human rights violations in the context 
of the conflict. The most significant efforts to monitor the occurrence of SGBV in the 
Donbas have been conducted by the Coalition “Justice for Peace in Donbass”,510 and 
the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission Ukraine (HRMMU).511 While their reports 
disagree about the prevalence, and nature of SGBV inflicted on civilians by Ukrainian 
security forces and separatist armed groups,512 they have been the ones to identify the 
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members of Parliament motioned to release them under their personal guarantees. In another case, three 
members of the Right Sector on trial for a number of incidents of extortion, ill-treatment and arbitrary 
detention of civilians were released during trial’. 
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occurrence of this type of violence in the context of the Donbas war. These reports 
have also drawn attention to the fact that impunity for this type of violation prevailed, 
with the HRMMU report noting that by the end of 2016 the Chief Military Prosecutor’s 
Office ‘had launched only three criminal proceedings that included allegations of sexual 
violence committed by Ukrainian forces and/or members of armed groups against 
civilians in Donetsk and Luhansk regions’.513 This of course is in line with the overall 
reluctance of the judicial authorities to prosecute Ukrainian soldiers and affiliated 
groups for any type of grave human rights violations. 
In addition, Ukrainian human rights NGOs have found that the fact that 
Ukraine’s current legislative framework is not in accordance with the core norms of 
international humanitarian law and international criminal law further facilitates 
impunity. In this regard a Global Rights Compliance report has found: 
Although crimes against humanity are crimes under customary international law and the Rome 
Statute, the Criminal Code of Ukraine does not criminalise crimes against humanity. Concerning 
war crimes, and as previously discussed, the Criminal Code of Ukraine does not contain a 
comprehensive list of war crimes. […] The introduction of such a list of war crimes would 
enable better compliance with international standards and also assist with providing the 
necessary specificity and certainty that would guide domestic investigators and prosecutors in 
framing investigations and prosecutions that respect the principle of legality and culpability and 
form the basis for effective criminal sanction.514  
Therefore, NGOs have pushed – so far unsuccessfully - the national authorities to bring 
the Criminal Code and Code on Criminal Procedure of Ukraine into accordance with 
 
violence has been used consciously and deliberately with military purposes in mind. However, these 
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range of violations. 
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the provisions of international humanitarian law and international criminal law.515 
Moreover, when it comes to pursuit of accountability for conflict related SGBV in 
particular, the OHCHR and women’s rights NGOs have drawn attention to additional 
obstacles hampering the pursuit of justice. In this regard, the Ukrainian Criminal Code’s 
previous definition of rape, and the evidentiary standards required by courts, were 
identified as key obstacles to the pursuit of accountability for SGBV. Article 152 of the 
Criminal Code defined rape as ‘sexual intercourse combined with violence, threats of 
violence, or committed by taking advantage of the victim’s helpless condition’.516 
According to OHCHR, the notion of ‘helpless condition’ was problematic as it was 
‘interpreted by investigators and courts in a restrictive matter, lacking any notion of 
coercive circumstances or inability to give genuine consent, which is of particular 
importance in contexts of armed conflict‘.517 This combined with the fact that courts 
only accept forensic evidence which 1) demonstrates the fact of penetration, and 2) 
proves the involuntary nature of the act, including a physical struggle with the 
perpetrator,518 is the reason why sexual violence cases almost never reached trial, and if 
they did rarely result in guilty verdicts.519 However, the 2017 law which recognized 
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domestic violence as a crime, also recognized sex without consent as rape.520 The law 
went into effect in January 2019.521 
In view of this combination of structural obstacles and unfavourable politics, it 
seems safe to conclude that the pursuit of accountability for SGBV in Ukraine currently 
is a very challenging avenue for the pursuit of gender justice outcomes despite the 
significant levels of attention that the OHCHR report has raised for this issue. This 
mirrors the Tunisian situation where the authorities’ overall opposition against measures 
to deal with the past has significantly hampered attempts to pursue accountability for 
politically motivated gendered harms under the repressive regime.  
 
4.4.3.2 Past-focused transformative gender justice efforts in Ukraine 
In view of the fact that more traditional gender justice concerns have only recently 
gained more traction, it is not surprising that discussions about the need for 
transformative conceptualizations of gender justice have not figured prominently in 
more mainstream debates about gender justice in Ukraine. Nevertheless, various 
representatives of CSOs interviewed during the fieldwork for this thesis indicated that 
both in the government-controlled as well as in the non-government-controlled areas 
socio-economic rights concerns are on the top of the agenda of a large share of 
Ukrainian women.522 One interviewee working as a mediator in conflicted communities 
in the East remarked that he estimated that 85 per cent of Ukraine’s population – this 
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includes both the government controlled and separatist areas - was currently living ‘the 
values of survival’.523 As such, he argued, most people are not very much concerned 
about questions surrounding justice and accountability for crimes of which they have 
not been direct or indirect victims themselves.524  
Those who are living in the non-government controlled territories have been hit 
hardest by economic deprivations as a result of the conflict. HRMMU reports describe 
‘increased levels of poverty and unemployment coupled with record-high food prices’.525 
As a result of these dire living conditions, even in the conflict affected areas, traditional 
transitional justice concerns are not high on the agenda. This has been confirmed by a 
number of surveys, which indicate that the desire for peace and restoration of minimal 
living standards trumps the justice demands of Ukrainian citizens.526  
When it comes to gender specific demands for transformative justice, a number 
of feminist interviewees working with (internally displaced) women on both sides also 
emphasized that the women they worked with were mostly concerned about their and 
their family’s subsistence needs.527 The shadow report submitted jointly by a range of 
women’s rights NGOs to CEDAW for Ukraine’s eighth periodic review emphasizes the 
economic dimension of the harms inflicted on Ukrainian women as a result of the 
conflict, with a focus on the way these harms are exacerbated by intervention of 
international financial institutions.528 Similarly, input by women’s rights organizations to 
the 2014 UN Human Rights Council attests that socio-economic concerns were at the 
core of the Maidan protests, and the subsequent emergence of conflict in the East, 
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before right-wing extremists hijacked the protests for the promotion of their nationalist 
agenda:  
In our view, it is important not to forget about the analysis of origins of street confrontation 
during Maidan and further confrontation in south-eastern regions. Maidan partly canalised 
dissatisfaction of social and economic situation of those who strongly opposed Yanukovych, 
while supporters of anti-Maidan and federalisation were unhappy with the new government in 
Kyiv. Throughout, Ukraine people’s main problems were low standard of living, lack of social 
security and corruption in almost all spheres of life, ranging from healthcare and education to 
business and courts. In connection with situation in the East, requirements to reduce social 
programs, inflation and rise in tariffs.529  
Some of these developments have hit women hardest.530 When men are fighting women 
often need to carry responsibility for the care of multiple family members. In this regard 
the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission found that: 
Reports from the field indicate that deterioration of the economic conditions, necessity to 
support a parent or a child and/or addiction to alcohol are major causes driving a number of 
women into harmful coping mechanisms. The SMM, for instance, met with a registered IDP 
who had fled her home town due to shelling and subsequently could not find a job in Mariupol. 
She shared that having to take care of her daughter and a grandmother with health issues, 
without sufficient funds, eventually led to her entering into sex work. She noted that the 
majority of her clients are soldiers.531 
In view of these observations, women’s rights defenders ask for more attention for 
women’s socio-economic marginalization in the context of Ukraine’s political transition 
and peacebuilding efforts in the East. Similarly, a number of feminist activists 
interviewed for this research, who were active in conflict-affected regions, remarked 
that, while they welcomed attempts to monitor conflict related SGBV in the East, more 
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attention for the deprivation of women’s basic needs in conflict-affected areas was 
necessary.532 In this regard, one interviewee even alluded that while instances of 
politically motivated SGBV had indeed occurred, a significantly larger share of women 
were vulnerable to become victims of SGBV as a result of their ‘voluntary’ engagement 
in the above described types of ‘survival sex’ with combatants on both sides.533 Another 
interviewee also criticized the tendency (of international actors) to only focus on IDP 
women when providing aid, as many women who lived on the Ukrainian side of the 
contact line, and who had not fled war, lived in equally dire circumstances as IDPs.534  
 However, for multiple reasons the need to address socio-economic rights 
violations through a transitional justice paradigm has gained little traction. First of all, 
because the war is still raging and Ukrainians are suffering across the board, there is 
little popular support for measures to address the socio-economic rights violations 
inflicted on citizens of the Donbas. Second, as Ukraine lacks the type of comprehensive 
transitional justice trajectory as was put in place in Tunisia, there is not really a platform 
around which to argue for more transformative gender justice approaches. Third, when 
it comes to the gender-specific dimensions of these harms and particularly the increased 
rates of survival sex, the willingness to recognize these issues is even lower as sex work 
is stigmatized in Ukraine – as in most places – and sexual exchanges that take place 
between soldiers and women around the conflict line are even harder to discuss openly, 
as addressing it comes at the risk of muddling the reputation of soldier heroes. In this 
regard a journalist reporting on the occurrence of survival sex in Donbas noticed: 
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Many people refuse to speak about sex work taking place near the conflict zone. They say the 
topic is sensitive, and that talking might displease soldiers or put sex workers at risk from the 
police. Doors are closed, organisations never return calls. I’m told people are probably 
concerned I will use the information obtained against the Ukrainian side.535 
Eventually a psychologist working for an NGO providing assistance to people living 
around the contact line told this journalist:  
We go to places where life was very hard before the conflict and has gotten even worse since … 
Alcoholism is much worse. Women have sex with soldiers to feed their kids or even their 
parents. Everything around them appears feels like a nightmare and soldiers appear to be a 
potential protection. These girls can be 13 or 15. They tell you about what happens in 
confidence, but they are scared of any kind of institution — schools, hospitals, social services — 
finding out because they could suffer the consequences. Victims of sexual violence are 
stigmatised. It’s very hard to talk about that violence. If you speak up, people see it as an assault 
on patriotism.536 
As such, pursuing and supporting the pursuit of transformative gender justice goals for 
women in Ukraine seems to be an even bigger challenge than it was in Tunisia, because 
there is no existing structure that can be used as a vehicle for advocacy efforts and some 
of the core issues that need to be addressed in attempts to pursue transformative gender 
justice outcomes in the context of the Donbas war are heavily stigmatized.  
 
4.4.3.3 Forward-looking gender justice efforts in Ukraine 
In Ukraine attempts to pursue forward-looking gender justice goals have in some sense 
also be the most viable ones. However, due to the opposition of more conservative 
elements in society against the Istanbul Convention, the biggest advances have been 
made in relation to the integration of women in the security sector.  
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Demands for legislative reform aimed at improving the response to cases of 
SGBV in the Donbas, fit into a broader push for reform aimed at improving Ukraine’s 
response to GBV. These advocacy efforts have centred on the ratification of the 
Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention.537 The Istanbul Convention is ‘the first pan-
European and legally-binding instrument aimed at tackling all types of VAW, including 
DV, and is unique in its approach’.538 The document is centred on the axes of 
prevention, protection and prosecution, and obliges states parties to improve their de 
jure and de facto responses to GBV. Its guiding principle is ‘due diligence’,539 which 
means that states parties are held accountable for VAW perpetrated by both state and 
non-state actors. Ukraine signed the Convention in 2011, and has embarked on a 
trajectory that should result in ratification.  
As mentioned before, Ukraine’s current legislation is not well equipped to deal 
with the issue of GBV in Ukraine. Legislative change would therefore be one of the 
first reforms triggered by the ratification of the Istanbul Convention. Since 2002 
domestic violence had been charged in Ukraine as an administrative offence.540 The 
criminalization would have been a first step in fighting back against a climate of 
impunity and would also have facilitated the adoption of a series of restrictive measures 
to protect victims, and prevent escalation, for example through the issuing of 
restraining orders. The parliament, however, voted against the ratification of the 
Istanbul Convention in 2016, preventing the adoption of a comprehensive legislative 
framework to combat VAW. Instead, it opted to ensure the criminalization of domestic 
violence through the adoption of an isolated Statute in December 2017.541 The 
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ratification and incorporation into domestic law of the Istanbul Convention would have 
provided more robust protection to Ukrainian women, as it goes beyond just 
criminalizing domestic violence, by also calling upon states to take preventive measures 
and put mechanisms in place to deal with the consequences of domestic violence at all 
levels. Therefore, advocacy efforts for its ratification continue.  
However, adopting new legislation, even ratification of the Istanbul Convention, 
would not have been sufficient to ensure an effective response to GBV in Ukraine 
anyway. Ukraine also needed to develop capacities at the operational level, both when it 
comes to the response of law enforcement agencies, as well as service providers.542 
Recognizing the difficult current political reality, local and international women’s rights 
organizations have started investing in the operational infrastructure necessary to 
respond to VAW.543 Most of these efforts focus on training police and judiciary and 
providing healthcare and psycho-social services to victims. The Ukrainian government 
has noticed these efforts, and the Ministry of Interior has for instance decided to 
support an existing UNFPA project which has established mobile police brigades which 
are specialized in dealing with cases of domestic violence.544 
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 Legislative reform has also been pursued to remove discriminatory provisions 
that prohibited Ukrainian women from entering the security forces.545 The first step in 
this direction constituted of feminist advocacy efforts aimed at providing visibility to 
female combatants and their experiences of marginalization, e.g. through the 
publication of the study and production of the documentary ‘The Invisible Battalion’. 
These efforts were picked up by the Ukrainian government who in December 2017 
abolished the Soviet-era list of 450 professions deemed too dangerous for women to 
take up. In addition, the Ukrainian government has taken steps to facilitate the 
integration of women in its security forces. This includes the publication of a National 
Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.546 This willingness on behalf of the 
Ukrainian authorities to integrate women in the security sector seems in line with the 
growing positive attitude towards female participation in the armed forces. This attitude 
is reflected also in the appointment of Ukraine’s first female military general in 2018,547 
and the presentation of awards to women representatives of law enforcement agencies 
who participated in deterring Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine by President 
Poroshenko in the beginning of 2019.548 
 Thus, while in Tunisia and Ukraine forward-focused gender justice efforts have 
received most political backing, different types of approaches have been prioritized in 
each country. This is relevant to the comparative exercise that will be conducted to 
enhance understanding of the factors that drive EU engagement with gender justice in 
Tunisia and Ukraine. If the data show that the EU for instance prioritizes the pursuit of 
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legislative reform to combat VAW in both countries, even though in Ukraine the 
Istanbul Convention has proven to be a divisive topic, this would suggest that policy 
commitments to support legislative reform in the field of VAW drive EU engagement 
with forward-focused gender justice issues. However, if in Ukraine the EU would be 
relatively silent on the Istanbul Convention and instead focus on mostly on integrating 
women in the security sector, this would be a strong indication of the fact that gender 
justice priorities of local political elites are shaping the nature of the EU’s engagement 
with gender justice in transition abroad.  
 
4.4.4 The EU’s relations with and foreign policy priorities in Ukraine 
Also in the Ukrainian context it is important to establish the overall nature of the EU’s 
relationships with this country, in line with the notion that one can only understand the 
significance of gender justice choices on the EU’s behalf if one understands its broader 
political agenda. 
After the Maidan uprisings, which erupted in response to the refusal of the 
Yanukovych regime to sign an Association Agreement with the EU after pressure from 
Russia, the rhetoric on Ukraine’s political transition has centred on the need for 
rapprochement with the EU and its values.549 Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and its 
support for the separatists in the Donbas has intensified this desire to look westwards. 
The EU has embraced this attitude on behalf of Ukraine and emerged as its core 
financial and political alley as the stability of the country was put in peril due to the 
annexation of Crimea and the emergence of the conflict in Donbas.  
Central to these efforts has been the signing of the Association Agreement that 
ignited the Maidan Revolution in the first place. This Agreement aims to spur political 
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association and economic integration through a comprehensive set of reforms.550 EU 
has provided Ukraine with approximately 15 billion euro to support these efforts.551 In 
order to successfully implement EU support and monitor Ukraine’s progress the 
Delegation in Kyiv is the second largest EU Delegation in the world.552 Furthermore, in 
Brussels, a special Support Group for Ukraine (SGUA) was created to assist with the 
implementation of the Association Agreement,553 and on the invitation of the Ukrainian 
authorities, the EU has also deployed an advisory mission, EUAM to: 
Assist the Ukrainian authorities towards a sustainable reform of the civilian security sector 
through strategic advice and practical support for specific reform measures based on EU 
standards and international principles of good governance and human rights.554  
The EU’s commitment to Ukraine’s reform process has most recently been confirmed 
by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, at the 2019 EU-
Ukraine summit, where he stated: 
The European Union's partnership with Ukraine is one of mutual solidarity and friendship. It is 
also one that is flourishing: we have achieved more progress together in the last five years than 
we did in the two decades before. Ukraine has taken up ambitious reform commitments. The 
EU, in turn, has provided Ukraine with unprecedented support, from financial and expert 
support, to autonomous trade measures, and almost 3 million visa-free visits to the EU for 
Ukrainian citizens to date. This, alongside continued unity on sanctions, shows the EU's 
commitment to Ukraine – one that remains unwavering.555 
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However, EU backed reforms have met with serious obstacles as a result of deeply 
ingrained corruption and the further strains put on the country as a result of the 
conflict.556 One of the more worrying aspects of Ukraine’s post-Maidan reform track 
record include Ukraine’s failure to reform the Prosecutor General’s Office. While a new 
legislative framework has been put in place to govern to Prosecutor General’s Office,557 
the office remains highly politicized due to the nomination of political allies in the 
higher ranks of the office.558 As a result, the Prosecutor General has remained closely 
tied to the Presidency, making his office a tool to advance the interests of the President 
and his associates. This politicization of the Prosecutor General’s Office in Ukraine is 
perhaps most clearly exemplified in the fact that the Prosecutor General who was 
appointed by Poroshenko in 2016 is not a lawyer, but a politician.559 In order to approve 
this appointment, the Ukrainian Parliament had to change the Law on the Prosecutor’s 
Office removing the requirement that the head of the office should have a legal 
education. This change to the law was adopted in one day.560 Needless to say that this 
arrangement has severely limited Ukraine’s ability to effectively address its struggles 
with corruption.  
Nevertheless, the EU is keen on safeguarding good relations with Ukraine and 
has been careful to direct serious criticism in the direction of the Ukrainian authorities. 
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What explains this commitment on the EU’s behalf to support for Ukraine despite the 
fact that it has not implemented many of the reforms required from it? Many experts 
believe that also in Ukraine the EU’s security interests trump other considerations.561 
Indeed, the EU itself identified Russia’s interference in Ukraine as one of the biggest 
threats to the EU’s stability: 
Peace and stability in Europe are no longer a given. Russia’s violation of international law and 
the destabilisation of Ukraine, on top of protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea region, have 
challenged the European security order at its core. The EU will stand united in upholding 
international law, democracy, human rights, cooperation and each country’s right to choose its 
future freely.562 
In this context the EU’s goal is not only to protect Ukraine against the negative 
consequences of Russian interference, but also to make sure that Ukraine continues to 
envision its future as a nation in terms of a shift towards Europe rather than a return 
towards Russia.563 This means that the EU needs to balance support for reforms – 
which it considers to be essential to Ukraine’s stability on the longer term – with the 
safeguarding of close ties with Ukraine’s political elites that might not be as invested in 
these reforms as the EU itself.564   
Against this background it seems likely that also when it comes to Ukraine’s 
failed attempts to support women’s rights, the EU will take a relatively restrained 
approach. Therefore, also in Ukraine the nature of the EU’s engagement with gender 
justice is interpreted against this background. A willingness on behalf of the EU to push 
for controversial gender justice issues such as the Istanbul Convention or the obligation 
to prosecute conflict-related SGBV would be understood as a confirmation of the EU’s 
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approach towards gender justice in transition being shaped by the policy commitments 
discussed in section 4.2, rather than gender justice preferences of local counterparts. 
But also here, it should be noted that the opposite of course also is the case; if the EU 
only supports the integration of women in Ukraine’s security sector, this thesis will 
interpret this as an indication that the EU’s support for gender justice in transition is 
shaped by the priorities of those in power at the local level. As mentioned, the fact that 
forward-focused gender justice priorities of local political elites differ in Ukraine and 
Tunisia makes it possible to double check whether this is the case.  
 However, Ukrainian interests are not the only ones that count in the EU’s 
approach towards Ukraine. In the end, for the EU, and its individual Member States, 
the ultimate goal is stability in the Eastern Neighbourhood, which requires some type of 
working relations with Russia.565 This desire goes beyond the simple absence of war. 
For many EU Member States, Russia, in its capacity as a global power and energy 
hub,566 is an important partner to have on their side, despite the fact that Russia’s 
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behaviour in many regards is in disaccord with core European values, including core 
principles of international law.567 In this regard it should be noted that energy security 
has been acknowledged as a core EU security concern in the Global Strategy.568 
 While this reality might have less direct impact on the EU’s engagement with 
gender justice goals in Ukraine than the consternation about ‘gender-ideology’, it will 
likely affect its approach towards transitional justice in Ukraine and therefore the EU’s 
support for mainstream gendered transitional justice goals. This influence is particularly 
likely to detected in the framework of the Minsk Peace Process. While the EU is no part 
of these talks – not in the least because it is such a sensitive exercise – its two leading 
Member States, France and Germany, are. In view of the fact that stability is the 
overarching goal of these talks, and Russia in the end has more leverage in these talks 
than Ukraine due to its military might and geo-economic importance to Europe, this 
might shape the type of transitional justice measures France and Germany will insist on 
or allow to be neglected. This could subsequently impact the EU’s stance on the fight 
against impunity in Ukraine.   
 
4.4.5 Conclusion - Gender Justice in Ukraine: Gendered Harms, Avenues for 
Change, And Gender Politics 
In Ukraine, women’s rights and transitional justice have occupied much less prominent 
spots in the discourse on national identity post-Maidan. Nevertheless, national and 
international women’s rights actors have tried to use this window of transition to 
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advance important women’s rights causes such as the ratification of the Istanbul 
Convention. The conflict in the Donbas has resulted in the occurrence of conflict-
related SGBV inflicted by both those fighting on the Ukrainian as well as the 
separatists’ sides. Ukraine’s political elites have largely failed to advance forward-
focused gender justice issues, or to pursue accountability for the conflict-related SGBV 
currently taking place in the Donbas. A range of factors including the fact that the war 
is still ongoing, and the existence of relatively powerful nationalist and religious actors 
who are hostile to certain women’s rights advances are at the root of this neglect of 
women’s rights issues. However, integration of women in security services has emerged 
as a cause that can count on relatively high levels of support by Ukraine’s political elites. 
This means that while legislative reform to combat VAW has been a highly polarizing 
gender justice issue, forward-focused gender justice efforts nevertheless could count on 
most buy in from local political elites. As the EU also has high stakes in safeguarding 
strong relations with Ukraine, the assumption underlying this thesis is that if the EU 
focuses mostly on forward-focused gender justice efforts in Ukraine, this is an 
indication of the fact that local interests rather than EU policy commitments shape its 
engagement with women’s rights in transition.   
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter worked towards objectives 1 and 2 of this research which are to provide 
insight in the EU’s policy commitments in the realm of gender justice in transition and 
the local gender justice opportunity structures. Having a clear picture of both is 
necessary to enhance understanding of the factors that drive EU engagement with 
gender justice in transition.  
This chapter found that the EU has adopted a transitional justice policy 




the promotion of gender justice in transition which contains mainstream past-focused 
and transformative past and future focused elements. Moreover, over the last couple of 
years the EU seems to have evolved gradually in the direction of a more comprehensive 
vision of support for gender justice in transition. Nevertheless, the commitment to 
support for efforts to pursue accountability for politically motivated SGBV still seems 
to be the strongest feature of the EU’s gender justice in transition philosophy.  
An in-depth analysis of the gender justice landscapes in Tunisia and Ukraine 
through the conceptual framework of this thesis shows that for each three categories of 
gender justice support avenues for engagement do exist. However, in both contexts 
some gender justice efforts have been sacrificed by local political elites in favour of 
broader ‘nation-building’ efforts.  While this state of affairs has been discussed 
exhaustively in academic literature on the role of gender issues in the context of 
Tunisia’s transition, these issues have received relatively little attention in the context of 
Ukraine.  
Discussions of the EU’s overarching foreign policy interests in and relationships 
with Tunisia and Ukraine indicate that safeguarding strong relations with both countries 
is a key EU foreign policy priority. This puts into doubt the EU’s willingness to 
implement its comprehensive gender justice agenda in both countries. Therefore, this 
chapter argues that engagement with and/or abstention of support for certain gender 
justice initiatives in both countries can function as a strong indication of whether 
universal gender justice commitments or local gender justice opportunity structures 
determine the nature of EU engagement with gender justice in transition in third 
countries. Chapter 6 is going to answer this question based on a comparison between 
this chapter’s insights and chapter 5’s findings regarding the types of gender justice 
































5. FINDINGS I: The EU’s support for gender 
justice in transition in Tunisia and Ukraine in 
practice 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
What is the exact nature and scope of the EU’s engagement with the different gender 
justice activities identified in the previous chapter in Tunisia and Ukraine? Based on 
analysis of the range of EU documents and budgetary commitments identified in 
chapter 3, and interviews with actors who have insight in the EU’s activities in Tunisia 
and Ukraine, this chapter provides an overview of EU engagement with 1) past-focused 
mainstream gendered transitional justice efforts, 2) past-focused transformative gender 
justice efforts, and 3) future-focused gender justice efforts. In doing so, it fulfils 
objective 3 of this thesis: To identify and categorize EU gender justice efforts in 
practice. 
The analysis shows that while policy commitments have to some extent been 
translated into financial support for both mainstream and more transformative 
transitional justice efforts (5.2), the EU has largely failed to back up this financial 
support with the type of political support which seems required to advance these goals 
(5.3). This puts into question the extent to which the EU is committed to transitional 
justice at all. This chapter finds, instead, that the EU has prioritized forward-looking 
gender justice initiatives (5.4). Comparing these insights to feminist critiques of ‘the 
patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’ this chapter argues that significant 
discrepancies exist between what the EU has been doing and what international actors 




This chapter provides the raw material – the facts - for the analyses of the two 
following chapters which aim to 1) provide insight in the drivers behind EU 
engagement with gender justice in transition based on a comparison between this 
chapter’s and the previous chapter’s findings, and 2) suggest theoretical and 
methodological innovations that will put feminist transitional justice scholars in a better 
position to understand current day international engagement with gender justice in 
transition.  
 
5.2 FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE PAST IN 
TUNISIA AND ONGOING CONFLICT IN UKRAINE 
Following the money is an effective approach to enhance understanding of the types of 
issues the EU has prioritized in its engagement with gender justice in transition in 
Tunisia and Ukraine. Based on the documents and overview of projects discussed in 
chapter 3, this section provides insight in the nature of EU financial support for past-
focused (gendered) transitional justice initiatives in order to identify whether the EU has 
prioritized support for mainstream (gendered) transitional justice efforts or also lived up 
to its commitment to engage more with past-focused transformative (gender) justice 
initiatives. This section finds that The EU’s financial support for activities that qualify 
as transitional justice efforts in practice still prioritizes efforts that contribute to the 
pursuit of mainstream transitional justice goals. However, in Tunisia the EU has 
supported some projects constructed around a more transformative notion of dealing 
with the past, and in Ukraine EU implementing partners have ensured to not uniquely 
focus on a narrow set of civil and political rights violations. As such the EU’s financial 
support for efforts to deal with the past – or the ongoing conflict in Ukraine – is a bit 
more diverse than one would expect based on the way in which international 




As discussed in chapter 3, this thesis relied on analysis of EU AAPs and projects 
funded under ENI/ENPI, EIDHR, IcSP and the Instrument for Development 
Cooperation to get a comprehensive picture of EU support for gender justice in 
transition in Tunisia and Ukraine. When it comes to EU engagement with past-focused 
gender justice efforts – of a mainstream and transformative nature – the analysis 
identified six projects in Tunisia and six projects in Ukraine that contributed to the 
pursuit of justice for past crimes. In Tunisia the majority of these commitments was 
funded under the EIDHR, whereas in Ukraine most of these commitments were 
funded under the IcSP. The projects this thesis identified as relevant in relation to effort 
to pursue justice for past crimes in the Tunisian context are:  
 
Table 5.1: EU budgetary commitments supporting efforts to deal with the past in Tunisia 
Year Amount Topic Instrument Implementer(s) 
2011 8,423 €  Support for a workshop on 
transitional justice 569 







Active peripheries: support to 
participation and freedom of 
expression for civil society and 
vulnerable groups in the Sidi 
Bouzid governorate570 
EIDHR GVC (Italian 
NGO) 
2012 438,593 € The struggle against torture and 
ill-treatment in Tunisia571 
EIDHR OMCT (Swiss 
NGO) 
2014 700,000 € Support to the transitional 
justice process in the processing 
of cases by the judicial 
authorities, with the creation of 
a mechanism for the protection 






569 In French: Soutien de la Délégation au séminaire ''Assises de la Justice transitionnelle en Tunisie'' à la 
cité des Sciences de Tunis les 9-10/12/2011). A description of the event can be found at: Marsad Tunisie, 
Démarrage du congrès international sur « les assises de la justice transitionnelle en Tunisie » (2011). 
Description of the event available at: 
 https://www.observatoire-securite.tn/fr/2011/12/09/demarrage-du-congres-international-sur-les-
assises-de-la-justice-transitionnelle-en-tunisie/, accessed 5 August 2019.  
570 In French: Périphéries actives: Appui à la participation et libre expression de la société civile et des 
groupes vulnérables du Gouvernorat de Sidi Bouzid)  
571 In French: La lutte contre la torture et les mauvais traitements en Tunisie 
572 In French: L’appui au processus de justice transitionnelle dans le traitement des dossiers par les 
autorités judiciaires, avec la création d’un mécanisme de protection des victimes et des témoins. This 
project did not appear on the list of projects in Appendix II, because it is funded under PARJ II. This 





The projects this thesis identified as relevant in the same category in the Ukrainian 
context are: 
Table 5.2: EU budgetary commitments supporting efforts to deal with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine 
Year Amount Topic Instrument Implementer 
2014 140,583 € 
119,417 €
  
Civic campaign against torture 
and ill-treatment in Ukraine  









7,000,000 €  
6,000,000 €  
5,000,000 €573 
Support to OSCE Special 
Monitoring Mission in Ukraine 
  




3,000,000 €  
Support to the UN Human 




2017  1,000,000 € Combatting Torture and Ill-






Victims Of Wars 
And Totalitarian 
Regimes (IRC)  
2017 1,120,000 € Parliamentary Campaign for the 
Effectiveness and Universality 
of the Rome Statute (RS) of the 
International Criminal Court 
(ICC) System (PGA ICC 
Campaign) 





2018 275,000 € Fight Against Torture, Ill-
Treatment and Impunity in 
Ukraine 




Two initial observations that can be made in relation to these overviews of projects are: 
1) that the EU itself only considers few of them as direct support for transitional justice, 
and 2) none of them support efforts specifically focused at pursuing justice for 
 
2014 AAP that describes the EU’s commitments under PARJ II contains an extensive description of the 
project: Commission Européenne 2014 (n240). 
573 In 2019 the EU provided another 10,000,000 € under IcSP to the OSCE SMM. 
574 For more information about this project: European Commisison, Annex Instrument contributing to 
Stability and Peace Exceptional Assistance Measure "Support to conflict-affected populations in Ukraine" 
(2015). See also: https://icspmap.eu/pdf/?format=single&contract_number=379842 
575 Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, Kharkiv Institute for Social Researches, Odessa Regional 
Organization of All Ukrainian Non Governmental Organization Committee of Voters of Ukraine Civic 




gendered harms that have been inflicted on women during times of conflict and/or 
repression. A quick look at the projects the EU has supported under IcSP globally 
shows that in other countries the EU has supported projects which the EU categorizes 
as transitional justice,576 and even projects which are purely focused on the integration 
of a gender dimension in transitional justice.577  
Nevertheless, based on the previous chapter’s analysis of the human rights 
violations that have dominated the discourse surrounding transitional/transformative 
justice in Tunisia and Ukraine, this thesis still identified six EU supported projects in 
each case study country as relevant to these efforts. Based on these twelve projects the 
following paragraphs analyse to what extent the EU’s financial support for efforts to 
deal with the past provide the impression of an actor committed to support for a more 
transformative approach towards transitional justice in general, and gender justice in 
transition in particular. For this analysis it relies on descriptions of the projects and 
 
576 Examples include the projects: Ensuring Access to Justice for Witnesses/Victims through 
Strengthening Existing and Establishing New Witness Support Networks across BiH; Tahdir: Tutoring 
Syrian Talents to Tackle Transition; Pre ́vention et réduction de la conflictualite ́ à Diffa par le dialogue 
(Niger); Supporting the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the 
Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International 
Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic; Renewed EU Support to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon  
 
See: European Commission, Instrument Contributing to Stability And Peace (IcSP) (2019). Available at: 
https://icspmap.eu/pdf/?format=, accessed 5 August 2019. 
 
The EU will likely have supported other transitional justice initiatives globally through other instruments. 
It was outside the scope of this thesis to come up with a comprehensive overview of the EU’s activities 
globally. The most recent overview of transitional justice projects the EU has supported around the 
world is included in Laura Davis’ analysis of EU transitional justice support: Davis 2014 (n36): 81.  
 
This overview demonstrates that the largest share of EU transitional justice funding has been allocated to 
support for the ICC and other tribunals.  
 
577 Examples include the projects: Empowering Women for Peace: Towards Implementation of the 
National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 and 1820 (Nepal), and Gender-Sensitive Transitional Justice 
(Colombia, Kosovo, Philippines).  
 
For a description of the latter, see: European Commission, Annex 2 of the Commission Implementing 
Decision on the 2014 Annual Action Programme for the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 
(ISP) Conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness component (Article 4) - Action 






insights about these projects shared with the researcher during interviews with EU 
officials and representatives of organizations implementing these projects. 
The research also looked into the EU’s support for transitional justice through 
its justice and security sector reform programmes in Tunisia and Ukraine. However, 
based on interviews with EU officials working in these areas in Tunisia and Ukraine the 
researcher concluded that neither in Tunisia nor in Ukraine the EU has approached it 
support for broader justice and security sector reform efforts as an avenue to deal with 
the past through for instance supporting legislative or judicial reform efforts that could 
contribute to the more effective prosecution of conflict-related and/or politically 
motivated grave human rights violations.578  
 
578 This seemed a particularly relevant avenue for transitional justice support in Ukraine where the onus 
to pursue accountability for grave human rights violations taking place in the Donbas so far rests on the 
Ukrainian authorities. Chapter 4, however, highlighted that these authorities have largely deflected their 
responsibility to prosecute grave human rights violations by either referring cases to the ICC or generally 
ignoring these violations. Therefore, besides creating political support for the fight against impunity, 
improving the capacity of the Ukrainian justice system to prosecute these violations was considered vital 
by several interviewees. The EU has played a pivotal role in justice sector reform in Ukraine through both 
the financial support it provides through the Delegation, and the expertise it has shared with Ukrainian 
institutions via EUAM. However, during interviews with EU officials in Brussels and Kyiv, the picture 
arose that the fight against impunity has not figured as an explicit goal defining the work of both 
institutions. EUAM’s work on prosecutorial reform is a potential avenue through which the EU can 
address impunity. However, an interviewee in Kyiv stipulated that none of the trainings for this 
institution has targeted the prosecution of war crimes specifically: 
 
E: But with regard to the prosecution of human rights violations, some of the main violations of 
this kind are taking place in the context of the conflict. So EUAM’s training for prosecutors 
doesn’t touch upon that kind of work, or does it?  
I: It does. This is a sensitive issue let me frame it in the most sensitive way. Let us say for 
instance, we are participating as lecturers in a human rights training for the prosecutors, the 
training was organized by the Council of Europe, and they invited trainers from the UN, and 
from our side, and from Ukrainian institutions, and it is hosted by the academy of prosecutors 
which is a completely civilian institution, and they are sending Ukrainian prosecutors there. Will 
some of those prosecutors later on be investigating and prosecuting crimes that are committed 
in the East of Ukraine? Certainly, but we don’t have that perspective. We don’t teach how to 
investigate war crimes specifically etc. There are other institutions which do that with specific 
training for instance. The EU does not target counterparts specifically that work on this kind of 
issues, and we don’t participate in projects that encompass military interlocutors, and we don’t 
like discuss issues related to Crimea or to the war in the East in Ukraine. Interview 3 Ukraine,  
Kyiv, 30 October 2019, Representative EUAM.  
 
In relation to the opportunity of supporting the Ukrainian Prosecutor’s Office with the prosecution of 
perpetrators of grave human rights violations during and just after Maidan, another EU official 
mentioned that the Ukrainian authorities had actually requested such support from EUAM, or more 
precisely that: ‘the Ukrainian prosecutor’s office is trying to drag the EU/EUAM into this effort’.578 
However, providing such support was deemed impossible as EUAM only provides advice at the strategic 





5.2.1 EU financial support for efforts to deal with the past in Tunisia 
In Tunisia only two projects qualify as direct support to transitional justice, of which 
one was a very small grant of 8,423 EUR to support a conference on transitional justice 
in 2011. The other is a relatively big 700,000 EUR grant allocated to UNDP in 2014 
under the PARJ II justice reform package (approximately 15 million EUR in total) to 
support the creation of Specialized Chambers in Tunisia.579 As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the Specialized Chambers were created with the aim of adjudicating those cases 
of which the files have been transferred to it by the TDC based on the observation that 
grave human rights violations have been committed in the context of these incidents.580 
The other projects that were identified as relevant to transitional justice were one 
project that focuses on promoting the engagement of local CSOs in transitional justice 
advocacy in the marginalized town of Sidi Bouzid, and one project that focuses on 
combatting torture and ill treatment implemented by OMCT, a global network fighting 
against torture and other human rights violations. Together these projects totalled 
1,626,040 EUR. Besides these projects the FTS search identified two projects 
implemented by the Belgian NGO ASF which focused on the promotion of socio-
economic rights in Tunisia, which were not presented as transitional justice projects, but 
did focus on advancing (socio-economic) rights protection in Tunisia’s marginalized 
regions (originally one of the central themes of Tunisia’s transitional justice 
trajectory).581 
 
579 Commission Européenne 2014 (n240). 
580 Republique Tunisienne 2013 (n385): Article 8. 
581 In French: La défense des droits économiques et sociaux des groupes vulnérables des régions de 
Monastir et du Bassin Minier (Gafsa). Description of the project available at: 
http://jamaity.org/project/droits-socio-economiques-des-groupes-vulnerables-de-monastir-et-de-gafsa/, 
accessed 5 August 2019. GesRNa: Contribuer à rendre la société civile actrice de la gouvernance locale en 
matière de gestion des ressources naturelles et dans le respect des droits humains. Description of the 
project available at: https://www.asf.be/fr/action/field-offices/archives/archives-asf-in-tunisia/, 





  While it is clear that EU support for the Specialized Chambers qualifies as 
transitional justice support, the other projects were only added to this list based on 
insights from interviews and resources and/or analysis of written sources about the 
project and consideration of the specific characteristics of Tunisia’s transitional justice 
landscape/local gender justice opportunity structure. With regard to the OMCT project, 
the organization’s 2012 annual report mentions that: 
Finally, 2012 saw the European Commission agree to a two-year project, to be managed by the 
Tunis office, whose objective is to improve access by victims of torture and ill-treatment to 
justice and to encourage the creation of a system that provides effective prevention and 
protection against these scourges. The expected results are the improvement, on the one hand, 
of the access by victims to specialised assistance through the creation of a structure for their 
rehabilitation, in particular in the regions, and, on the other hand, improvement in the ability of 
local actors to document cases of torture and defend the victims at the national and 
international levels. It is also expected that this project will lead to legal and political reforms 
that will improve the prevention of torture and ill-treatment.582  
The EU’s 2014 annual report on EU-Tunisia relations confirms that its support for 
OMCT primarily served increasing access to justice for past and recent victims of 
torture and ill-treatment, alongside supporting the adoption of a law for the creation 
of a National Authority for the Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  
 The EU’s support for three projects that focus on supporting civil society in 
Tunisia’s marginalized regions were qualified as an attempt to support transitional 




582 OMCT, 2012 Annual Report, Available at: 





‘Active peripheries: support to participation and freedom of expression for civil society 
and vulnerable groups in the Sidi Bouzid governorate’, stipulates on its website that: 
The project aims at enhancing the role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and activists in 
engaging in the process of transitional justice in Sidi Bouzid region, one of the most 
marginalized in the country. The project’s goal is to guarantee the access to information 
concerning transitional justice in the rural context in particular, in order to foster disadvantaged 
groups’ access to justice.583  
Taken together the EU has spent 1,138,593 EUR on projects contributing to the 
pursuit of accountability for and/or prevention of future grave human rights violations 
in Tunisia (the UNDP and OMCT projects), and 238,186 EUR on projects contributing 
to more transformative justice goals.  
A number of features of this short list are remarkable: 1) the fact that in 2012 
the EU did support a transitional project focusing on the marginalized town of Sidi 
Bouzid, and also two other (non-transitional justice) projects addressing (socio-
economic) rights violations in Tunisia’s peripheries, 2) the fact that the EU stopped 
allocating funding to transitional justice related projects in 2014 entirely, 3) the fact that 
the EU never provided any funding to the TDC or to projects implemented by IOs 
and/or NGOs to support the TDC despite that the TDC is central to Tunisia’s 
transitional justice efforts, and 4) the fact that the last and biggest trunk of EU funding 
to transitional justice in Tunisia has been provided to an effort aimed at supporting the 
construction of a judicial accountability mechanism aimed at dealing with grave human 
rights violations committed under the Ben Ali regime implemented by UNDP.  
 Taken together this provides the impression that in Tunisia just after the Arab 
Spring the EU started out as willing to support a more transformative vision of 
 
583 GVC, OPERA. Civil society mobilization and awareness about transitional justice. Available at: 
http://www.gvc-





transitional justice, supporting NGO projects that aimed to pursue accountability for 
the structural marginalization of Tunisia’s hinterlands. However, the logical follow-up 
to these projects, which would have been support for the TDC, being the official 
transitional justice mechanism most suited to address this broader range of violations, 
did not crystalize. Instead the EU’s only support for official transitional justice 
mechanisms in Tunisia consisted of support for the creation of the Specialized 
Chambers through UNDP. This raises three important questions that will be examined 
in more depth in the next chapter: 1) why did the EU stop providing support to 
transitional justice related projects in 2014, 2) why has the EU never provided any 
tangible support to the TDC, and 3) why has the EU channelled its largest trunk of 
funding through UNDP? 
None of these projects had as its direct objective to advance justice for female 
victims of past crimes. In order to get insight into the extent to which these projects did 
incorporate a gender perspective the researcher spoke to representatives of the EU 
Delegation in Tunis familiar with these efforts and to representatives of some of the 
implementing organizations of these projects. Based on these interviews the researcher 
learned that The UNDP project in Tunisia incorporates a small component on witness 
protection and protection of vulnerable victims including women, girls and minors.584 
However, according to interviewees this component did not materialize as a result of 
insistence on the integration of a gender dimension on the EU’s behalf. In this regard it 
is worthy to notice that the EU’s own documents pertaining to the UNDP project on 
the Specialized Chambers in Tunisia, for instance, do not mention the need for UNDP 
to integrate a gender dimension in its activities.585 Representatives of two other 
 
584 This is not mentioned in the EU description of the project, but was conferred to the researcher by the 
EU official responsible for transitional justice programming in the EU Delegation in Tunisia. Interview 
24 Tunisia, Tunis, 12 September 2017, Representative EU Delegation. 




organizations implementing the projects mentioned above indicated that these projects 
had not specifically addressed harms experienced by women under the dictatorial 
regime.586 
Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Specialized Chambers have 
contributed relatively little to the pursuit of justice for female victims of the 
dictatorship, as female victims have been reluctant to openly discuss the grave human 
rights violations – instances of SGBV in particular – inflicted on them during the era of 
oppression. Chapter 4, however, did highlight the important role the TDC has played in 
highlighting the broad range of gendered harms experienced by Tunisian women in the 
past. The lack of EU support for this body therefore signifies a rather significant gap in 
the EU’s engagement with past-focused gender justice initiatives in Tunisia. The fact 
that the overview of EU transitional justice projects in Tunisia shows that the EU has 
neither supported grassroots initiatives by Tunisian women’s NGOs (be it of a feminist 
or more conservative nature) or female victims’ groups only strengthens this 
assessment.  
 
5.2.2 EU financial support for efforts to deal with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine 
In Ukraine EU support for projects contributing to the (eventual) pursuit of justice for 
crimes committed in the context of the Donbas war amounts to 28,854,522 EUR 
allocated to various IOs and NGOs between 2014 and 2018.587 The largest share of this 
funding has been provided to the OHCHR HRMMU,588 and to the OSCE SMM in the 
 
586 Interview 31 Tunisia, Tunis, 5 October 2017, Representative international human rights NGO; 
Interview 32 Tunisia, Tunis, 6 October 2017, Representative international human rights NGO. For 
reasons of confidentiality the researcher cannot specify which are these two NGOs exactly.  
587 In 2019 the EU provided another 10,000,000 € under IcSP to the OSCE SMM. However, 2019 
funding has not been taken into account as the FTS information for Tunisia and Ukraine was not 
complete.  
588 For more information about the EU’s support for the HRMMU, see: European Commission, 
Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace – EU support to the UN Human Rights Monitoring 
Mission in Ukraine (2016-2018) Available at: 




Donbas.589 However, the EU has also supported Ukrainian and iNGOs fighting against 
torture and ill-treatment, and the Parliamentary Campaign for the Effectiveness and 
Universality of the Rome Statute (RS) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
System.590 In Ukraine the EU has not supported any projects of which the core focus is 
the advancement of transformative justice goals for victims of the conflict in Donbas. 
However, as the analysis of aforementioned activities will show, some of the human 
rights monitoring work does contribute to documenting (gendered) harms that go 
beyond the scope of the mainstream gendered transitional justice agenda.  
 Systematic documentation of human rights violations taking place in the context 
of violent conflict has been found to be essential to successful efforts to pursue 
accountability for these efforts in the wake of conflict or repression.591 The EU’s 
support for the HRMMU and SMM therefore can be understood as relevant to 
transitional justice. In this regard the HRMMU’s own  description of its role in Ukraine 
explicitly alludes to the goal of combating impunity, stating that it ‘monitors, reports 
publicly and advocates on the human rights situation in Ukraine with the aim of 
fostering access to justice and bringing perpetrators to account’.592 The EU justified its 
first support package to the HRMMU stating that: ‘given the rise of serious human 
rights violations, especially in areas held by the separatists’ it is necessary to ‘monitor 
human rights abuses with the aim of building up a well- documented caseload which 
 
 
 This is the second time the EU provides funding to the UN HRMMU. 
589 European Commission, Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace - Further support in the area 
of satellite imagery to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (2018-2020). Available at: 
https://icspmap.eu/pdf/?format=single&contract_number=398620, accessed 24 August 2018.  
590 A recent activity that has been conducted in the framework of this project is a roundtable at the 
Ukrainian Parliament on ensuring harmonization of Ukrainian criminal legislation with provisions of 
international law. See: https://www.pgaction.org/news/ukrainian-roundtable-ensuring-harmonization-
criminal-legislation.html, accessed 5 August 2019.  
591 Gerald Steinberg, Anne Herzberg and Jordan Berman, Best Practices for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian NGO Fact-Finding (Brill Nijhoff 2012). 
592 For more information, see United Nations in Ukraine. Available at: 




will then assist in the restoration of justice for affected individuals and communities’.593  
Furthermore, one of the core objectives of the project is that ‘government and civil 
society have a better understanding of accountability mechanisms and the conduct of 
effective investigations of most egregious human rights violations (such as torture).594 
There thus exists a clear link between the EU’s support for the HRMMU in Ukraine 
and the advancement of transitional justice goals.  
The OSCE SMM was deployed in Ukraine in 2014 after a request by Ukraine’s 
government and a consensus decision by all 57 OSCE participating States, including 
Russia. It is ‘an unarmed, civilian mission, of which the ‘main tasks are to observe and 
report in an impartial and objective way on the situation in Ukraine; and to facilitate 
dialogue among all parties to the crisis’.595 As such the direct link with traditional 
transitional justice goals seems less clear. However, in its description of its support for 
the SMM the EU identifies the documentation of human rights violations as a core 
activity, stating that one of the expected objectives is: 
Enhanced and more accurate reporting on the ceasefire violations, including on the protection 
of civil critical infrastructures along the line of contact; the movement of military equipment and 
troops, and the withdrawal of weapons; comprehensive documentation of human rights 
violations, including with regard to sexual and gender-based violence, domestic violence, 
prostitution and trafficking in human beings.596 
This shows that not only is the EU’s support to the OSCE SMM expected to contribute 
to mainstream transitional justice goals, but also gendered transitional goals. 
 The projects focused on combating torture also contribute to transitional justice 
goals in view of various reports on the occurrence of this practice in the context of the 
 
593 European Commission, Annex Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace Exceptional Assistance 
Measure "Support to conflict-affected populations in Ukraine" (2015): 1.  
594 Ibid: 6. 
595 For more information see: OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. Available at: 
https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine, accessed 1 December 2018.  
596 European Commission, Annex Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace Interim Responses 




Donbas conflict. Obviously, the support for the Parliamentary Campaign for the 
Effectiveness and Universality of the Rome Statute (RS) of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) System is a core example of EU support for the fight against impunity in 
Ukraine. Activities conducted within the scope of this project include advocacy for 
reform of Ukraine’s criminal code in order to bring it in line with international law. As 
discussed in chapter 4, Ukrainian human rights NGOs have found that Ukraine’s 
current legislative framework is not in accordance with the core norms of international 
humanitarian law.597 Here, it should be remarked that the EU has also indirectly 
contributed to the pursuit of accountability in Ukraine through its direct support for the 
ICC,598 where human rights violations having occurred during Maidan and the conflict 
in Donbas are currently under investigation.  
Taken together these projects provide the impression that – at least at the 
financial level – the EU has been a strong backer of traditional transitional justice goals 
in Ukraine. The overview, however, raises questions about the EU’s commitment to the 
promotion of more transformative justice goals and efforts aimed at addressing 
gendered harms that are taking place in the context of the Donbas conflict. While the 
EU has not specifically supported efforts to address a broader range of human rights 
 
597 Two representatives of Ukrainian human rights organization interviewed in the context of this 
research mentioned the revision of Ukraine’s criminal code as their priorities. They have also advocated 
for the EU to push Ukraine to integrate humanitarian law provisions in its criminal code. See: 
Recommendations from participants of the EU Ukraine civil society seminar On human rights 
21.03.2017, Brussels: 3. Available at: http://ccl.org.ua/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/Recommendation_EU_Ukraine_CivilSocietySeminaronHumanRights_en-
1.pdf, accessed 5 August 2019. Both this document, as well as a draft of proposed revisions of the 
Ukrainian Criminal Code [in Ukrainian] were provided to the author by said representatives.  
598 In this regard a report commissioned by the European Parliament Research Service has found that 
‘The EU is a staunch supporter of the Rome Statute and the ICC, and its Member States taken together 
are the biggest contributor to the Court's budget. [...] The EU has provided funding for various actions 
relating to the Court, for example through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, 
which has supported measures such as building legal expertise and fostering cooperation of ICC states 
parties’.  
 
Ionel Zamfir, International Criminal Court: Achievements and challenges 20 years after the adoption of 
the Rome Statute (2018) European Parliament Research Service. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/625127/EPRS_BRI(2018)625127_EN.pd




violations inflicted as a result of the conflict, it should be noted that its two main 
implementing partners, the HRMMU and OSCE SMM, have been reporting on a 
broader range of harms than the traditional civil and political rights violations associated 
with transitional justice efforts. For instance, the OHCHR has continuously reported on 
socio-economic rights violations inflicted on IDPs and individuals living in the conflict 
zone. 
When it comes to EU support for efforts to pursue justice for gendered harms 
inflicted in the context of the conflict in Donbas the HRMMU and OSCE SMM have 
also ensured the integration of a gender dimension in their activities. The publication of 
the in the previous chapter repeatedly cited OHCHR report on conflict-related SGBV 
in Ukraine is the clearest example of these efforts. While this report focuses on the type 
of gendered harms that have dominated mainstream transitional justice practice, the 
OSCE SMM has published a report on the gendered dimension of the conflict in 
Donbas which zooms in on the occurrence of domestic violence, survival sex and 
socio-economic deprivation in line with the above-cited objective which the EU has 
formulated in relation to its support for the OSCE SMM.599 Nevertheless, during the 
interviews in Ukraine both EU officials as well as representatives of these implementing 
partners indicated that these partners had been the driving forces behind the inclusion 
of gender specific considerations. For instance, while the OHCHR’s report on SGBV 
has benefited from EU funding, interviewees in Kyiv specified that this report had not 
crystalized as a result of a specific EU demand.600 The HRMMU took the initiative to 
conduct research on the occurrence of conflict-related SGBV after it noted in the field 
 
599 OSCE 2018 (n531): 14.  




that stories about SGBV increasingly popped up in local media reports, without the EU 
having had a role in identifying priority areas of concern.601  
In Ukraine the EU has supported two projects focused on integration of 
women in conflict-prevention, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. 
These, however, do not directly focus on the pursuit of accountability for gendered 
harms that have taken place in the context of the conflict. Based on the notion that 
women’s participation is important in putting gender justice issues on the agenda in 
transitional justice trajectories these projects could contribute to these goals.602 
Overall the EU’s financial support for transitional justice related efforts in 
Ukraine seems robust with a prioritization of support for traditional transitional justice 
efforts over efforts that could advance a more transformative transitional justice agenda. 
However, some implementers have integrated a more transformative dimension in their 
activities focusing on a broader set of harms than those that have traditionally 
dominated transitional justice efforts. Similarly, while the EU has not supported any 
projects focusing on the pursuit of justice for gendered harms in particular, a gendered 
dimension has been integrated in some of the more generic projects the EU supports, 
 
601 These publications in local media contained explosive accusations about the behaviour of combatants 
on both sides, but had not been subjected to any type of verification. As both the gravity of the reported 
incidents was reason for extreme concern, as well as the way in which these (unsubstantiated) accusations 
were used to further dehumanize the enemy, the HRMMU decided to devote extra attention to the issue. 
Interview 1 Ukraine (n600). 
602 It Concerns the Projects ‘Women as Agents of Change, Peacebuilding and conflict prevention at the 
grassroots level in Ukraine’ (2017), which the EU funded with 561,065 EUR. For more information see: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/63644/women-agents-change-peace-building-and-conflict-
prevention-grassroots-level-ukraine_en, accessed 8 August 2019.  
 
The EU has also funded a bigger UNDP/UN Women project called ‘Restoration of Local Governance 
and Reconciliation in Crisis-Affected Areas of Ukraine’ (2016). The EU has funded this project with 10 
million EUR. 3 million EUR out of this amount is allocated to ensuring women’s participation in local 
governance. The project is funded under the IcSP.  
 
For more information, see: http://www.ua.undp.org/content/ukraine/en/home/projects/restoration-






with some of these projects having looked in a broader set of gendered harms than 
conflict-related SGBV.  
 
5.2.3 Conclusion  
These findings about the nature of EU engagement with past-focused (gender) justice 
efforts in Tunisia and Ukraine both confirm and put into question dominant insights 
from feminist scholarship on ‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’ as 
discussed in chapter 2. The type of financial support the EU has provided in Tunisia 
until 2014 provides the impression of a certain level of acknowledgement on the EU’s 
behalf of the socio-economic rights violations that are central to Tunisia’s transition. 
However, at the same time the complete lack of support for the TDC – lauded for its 
transformative approach towards gender justice – puts into question to what extent the 
EU recognizes the distinct nature of women’s experience of repression. In addition, the 
complete absence of EU budgetary commitments to support for transitional justice in 
Tunisia after 2014 – while official efforts are continuing until today – raises questions 
about the EU’s overall commitment to transitional justice in Tunisia.  
 The nature of EU engagement with transitional justice in Ukraine is more 
reminiscent of the mainstream approach towards transitional justice that international 
actors have been found to prioritize. However, also here the EU has failed to support 
efforts that specifically focus on attempts to pursue accountability for conflict-related 
SGBV. In the literature it has been suggested that with the securitization of conflict-
related SGBV and wartime rape, international support for initiatives aimed at pursuing 
accountability for this type of crimes has eclipsed other activities in the field of women’s 
rights, and even other transitional justice activities that do not focus on gender. 
However, neither in Tunisia nor in Ukraine the EU has supported activities 




or conflict-related instances of SGBV. The nature of the EU’s activities – or more 
adequately, lack of activities – in the realm of fighting against impunity for politically 
motivated SGBV, underlines the importance of not losing sight of the fact that even the 
implementation of the most basic type of ‘add and stir’ mainstreaming can still not be 
taken as a given when it comes to international engagement with women’s rights in 
societies in transition.  
 
5.3 POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE PAST IN 
TUNISIA AND THE ONGOING CONFLICT IN UKRAINE 
Besides providing financial support, the EU can use diplomacy and other political tools 
such as sanctions and conditionality to support efforts erected to deal with the past or 
human rights violations occurring in the context of ongoing conflict. The question to 
what extent diplomacy and economic pressure (sanctions and conditionality) can 
contribute to the pursuit of gendered transitional justice goals in third states has 
remained under-addressed feminist literature on ‘the patriarchy of internationalized 
transitional justice’,603 even though scholars have found that without this type of 
external pressure mechanisms are unlikely to be set up.604 In this regard Bell argued that 
in the context of from war-to-peace transitions: 
 
603 Examples of such studies from mainstream transitional justice literature include:; Kerr 2004 (n32); 
Peskin 2008 (n32); Subotić 2009 (n32); Spoerri 2011 (n32). 
604 Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, ‘Trials and errors: Principle and pragmatism in strategies of 
international justice’ (2004) 28(3) International Security 5. 
 
This section does not argue that transitional justice would succeed in Tunisia and Ukraine if the EU 
would put more pressure on the authorities in Tunisia and Ukraine. Subotić has for instance 
demonstrated that despite the exercise of significant international pressure on governments the Balkans, 
transitional justice did not yield the expected (or desired) results.604 Defending the use of conditionality as 
a tool to enforce transitional justice of course raises significant concerns from a post-colonial perspective. 
As Call has demonstrated both individuals from wealthy states, as well as individuals from core allies of 
wealthy states enjoy significantly more impunity from international criminal justice.  
 
Charles T Call, 'Is transitional justice really just' (2004) 11 Brown Journal of World Affairs 101.  
 




The degree and nature of internationalization of the conflict also influences the feasibility and 
shape of transitional justice mechanisms. It influences the types of carrots and sticks external 
actors may use to ensure parties accept transitional justice institutions in cases where the meta-
bargain presents mutual amnesty as an attractive proposition for both sides. International 
mediators may get otherwise recalcitrant parties to accept certain terms to gain international 
approval and financial and political support.605  
Civil society activists and representatives of IOs interviewed in the context of this 
research agreed that the financial and technical support the EU is providing or could 
provide to transitional justice is only of secondary importance.606 In fact, many explicitly 
stated that the real potential for the EU to contribute to transitional justice in Tunisia 
and Ukraine resides in the effective use of its political/economic leverage in both 
countries.607  
 
The objection that transitional justice mechanisms are externally imposed or culturally 
inappropriate should not, however, be overstated. In many instances, governments themselves 
request such mechanisms—support for domestic trials, or international or hybrid courts. 
Further, domestic NGOs often actively push for accountability, suggesting that people are not 
simply being told by Amnesty International that they should have trials. It may be the case, 
nonetheless, that the limited repertoires offered by international advisers dealing with 
transitional justice effectively narrow the range of options for countries engaging in it. 
 
In this regard it is important to note that representatives of local NGOs in both Tunisia and Ukraine 
emphasized the importance of transitional justice to succeed and the role the EU could play in making 
the authorities live up to their human rights commitments.  
 
Chandra Lekha Sriram, ‘Justice as peace? Liberal peacebuilding and strategies of transitional justice’ 
(2007) 21(4) Global society 579: 591. 
605 Christine Bell, 'Contending with the past: transitional justice and political settlement processes' (2017) 
Justice Mosaics: How Context Shapes Transitional Justice in Fractured Societies 92: 97. 
606 In relation to Ukraine one interviewee remarked: ‘Conditions should be imposed especially on 
important issues related to accountability, related to corruption, because these are very important things 
which affect mind sets of people who run the country, but which also affect millions of citizens in the 
country. So yes, the Ukrainian government needs support, a lot of support, but this support should not 
be unconditional. The EU has a lot of leverage over Ukraine, because it supports the Ukrainian 
government not only politically, but also economically. The EU puts a lot of money in reforming the 
Ukrainian state, and into saving it from bankruptcy, and to put it back on its feet again, but what is 
important is, that this support does not go unconditionally. There should be conditions, and not 
conditions which are only put on paper; when the conditions are not met the EU has to respond, 
adequately’. Interview 9 Brussels, 12 June 2017, Representative international NGO working on human 
rights in the Eastern Neighbourhood. See also: Interview 31 Tunisia (n586). 
607 The EU seems to share this opinion: ‘EU is Ukraine’s strongest supporter, says Mogherini in Kiev’. 
Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/41258/eu-ukraines-strongest-supporter-says-




This section therefore examines how the EU has used these tools to support 
mainstream, but also more transformative (gendered) transitional justice efforts in 
Tunisia and Ukraine. Getting a comprehensive picture of EU diplomacy in this field is 
near impossible, as so much of these activities take place behind closed doors. 
However, it is possible to examine to what extent the EU has used ‘naming and 
shaming’ to support human rights goals through analysis of publicly available annual 
human rights reports and public statements by high-ranking EU officials.608 In addition, 
overviews of EU sanctions, and statements relating to the dispersal of additional 
budgetary support to Tunisia and Ukraine (positive conditionality) provide insight in the 
extent to which the EU has used its economic leverage to support transitional justice 
efforts. Complemented with insights from interviews, this section argues that in the 
EU’s case, its failure to back up its financial support for transitional justice with 
thorough political backing puts into question its commitment to both mainstream and 
transformative (gendered) transitional justice goals. 
 
 
608 It is outside the realm of this thesis to judge whether ‘naming and shaming’ is a desirable or effective 
tactic. It considers the EU’s use of this tactic as a signal of its commitment to supporting certain human 
rights issues. It, however, is aware of the controversy that exists around the use of naming and shaming 
as a way to pressure states into human rights compliance. Emilie M Hafner-Burton, 'Sticks and stones: 
Naming and shaming the human rights enforcement problem' (2008) 62(4) International Organization 
689; Gina Heathcote, 'Naming and shaming: Human rights accountability in security council resolution 
1960 (2010) on women, peace and security' (2012) 4(1) Journal of Human Rights Practice 82. 
 
Literature on the EU’s use of ‘naming and shaming’ to address human rights violations abroad is very 
limited. It does, however, happen. Kinzelback and Lehmann for instance identified 17 shaming events in 
six countries in the EU’s 2014 annual human rights report.  
 
Katrin Kinzelbach and Julian Lehmann, Can Shaming Promote Human Rights? Publicity in Human 
Rights Foreign Policy: A Review and Discussion Paper (2015) European Liberal Forum: 26-28. Available 
at: 
https://www.gppi.net/media/Kinzelbach_Lehmann_2015_Can_Shaming_Promote_Human_Rights.pdf, 





5.3.1 EU use of political/economic leverage to support efforts to deal with the 
past in Tunisia 
In Tunisia this thesis looked into the EU’s use of political tools to support transitional 
justice efforts in relation to three issues: The Economic – later Administrative - 
Reconciliation Bill, the overall resistance against the TDC, and the attacks on the 
specialized chambers, all discussed in more depth in the previous chapter. These issues 
provided the EU with the opportunity to use its political tools to support a more 
transformative vision of (gendered) transitional justice in Tunisia, whereas a political 
response against the attacks on the Specialized Chambers would signal EU support for 
traditional transitional justice goals.  
Based on analysis of seven Tunisia chapters of the annual human rights reports 
published by the EU since 2011 (Appendix III),609 it appears that neither the Economic 
Reconciliation Bill nor the authorities’ obstructionism in relation to the TDC or 
Specialized Chambers have figured prominently on the EU’s human rights radar. In the 
2015 report the EU did mention the creation of the TDC,610 and in 2016 it alludes to 
the obstacles the TDC is facing, but neither specifies what these obstacles are – i.e. does 
the EU think they internal or external, or both? – nor calls upon the Tunisian 
authorities to facilitate the Commissioners’ work.611 In the 2018 report the EU does not 
mention the failure of the Tunisian Parliament to prolong the TDC’s mandate, 
something that has been heavily criticized by Tunisian CSOs.612 Neither does it refer to 
the publication of the report in the end of 2018. 
 
609 The 2012 country reports were not available online.  
610 Council of the European Union 2015 (n252). 
611 Council of the European Union 2016 (n252). 
612 Rihab Boukhayatia, 25 ONG adressent une lettre ouverte à Youssef Chahed à propos de la justice 
transitionnelle (29 April 2018) HuffPost Maghreb. Available at: 
https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/entry/25-ong-adressent-une-lettre-ouverte-a-youssef-chahed-a-




In 2017 the EU lauds Tunisia for the reforms it has made in the realm of 
combatting corruption, and then mentions the adoption of the Administrative 
Reconciliation Law almost as an afterthought: 
Significant progress in fighting corruption has taken place, namely with the adoption in 
February 2017 of the law to protect whistle blowers and the operation 'clean hands' launched in 
May 2017 by the Government. However, the adoption of the law on administrative 
reconciliation in October 2017 is considered by many in contradiction with these 
developments.613  
The EU does not indicate whether it belongs to the category of actors that consider this 
law in contradiction with Tunisia’s anti-corruption efforts. Moreover, it is remarkable 
that the EU did not mention the Economic Reconciliation Bill in the 2016 report when 
it was first put on the table and heavily contested through the popular Manich Msamah 
movement.614 
 Has the EU been more vocal about the attacks launched at the Specialized 
Chambers by the Union of Tunisian police forces and the generic unwillingness of the 
Ministry of Interior to summon the accused to court legitimizing suspects in their 
choice to not attend trials?615 The reports indicate this is not the case, as the EU 
expressed satisfaction over the fact that the Specialized Chambers had become 
functioning, stating that it: 
welcomed […] the launching of the process for the operationalisation of the Specialized 
Chambers in the courts of first instance, opening the possibility of judging cases of serious and 
systemic violations of human rights under the law on transitional justice.616  
 
613 Council of the European Union 2017 (n252): 46. 
614 Ihsan Mejdi, “Manich Msamah”: resistance in times of consensus (3 August 2017). Available at: 
 https://nawaat.org/portail/2017/08/03/manich-msamah-resistance-in-times-of-consensus/, accessed 5 
August 2019. 
615 Communique ́ de Presse - Justice transitionnelle : Inquie ́tudes des organisations de la socie ́té civile suite 
aux re ́centes attaques à l’encontre du processus  de justice transitionnelle (November 2018). Available at: 
https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Tunisia-Justice-transitionnelle-News-Press-releases-
2018-FRE.pdf, accessed 5 August 2019. 




As such the EU has not used its annual human rights reports to draw attention to the 
flaws in Tunisia’s transitional justice process.  
Public statements by high-ranking EU officials (The President of the 
Commission, the High Representative and the EU Ambassador to Tunisia) were 
identified as another avenue through which the EU could publicly support Tunisia’s 
transitional justice process. NGO interviewees for this research indicated that while 
human rights reports are a useful point of reference for the EU and the partner 
countries, and can also be used by NGOs in their advocacy directed at local 
governments or at the EU itself, they do not reach broad audiences. Public statements 
by high-ranking EU officials at carefully selected occasions were considered more 
impactful. However, the researcher did not identify any EU public statements in 
response to important developments in Tunisia’s transitional justice process and 
analysis of statements published in the wake of high-level meetings between EU 
officials and Tunisian authorities – published between 2011 and 2018 - did not make 
any reference to transitional justice.617 As the section on the EU’s political support for 
forward-looking gender justice measures in Tunisia will show, the EU Ambassador in 
particular, has used this avenue in Tunisia to express his support for progressive – 
forward-looking - gender justice outcomes.  
 In addition, interviewees for this research remarked that even if it might be 
understandable that the EU is hesitant to publicly defend the TDC itself, it could have 
provided funding to civil society advocacy efforts in this realm. In this regard one 
interviewee remarked in relation to international actors’ support for transitional justice 
in Tunisia in general – i.e. beyond the EU: 
And I mean we saw so many trainings, so many international experts, and they cost so much 
money. I know that the task is really hard, but at some point when you see how the situation is 
 




evolving, you need to readjust your strategy, you need to readjust how to use your money, and if 
training is not working… I think now it is not a lot of training we should be doing. Trainings are 
nice, like study visits are cool, but now you need to play a political game to help the TDC to 
convince the authorities to collaborate with the Specialized Chambers, to implement the 
reparations programme, for this type of efforts. And it is not a question of money, it is a 
question of helping them do their own advocacy work, and I guess… I don’t know, I don’t see 
what is happening inside, but sometimes I saw just training and workshops all the time, and it 
felt like they were spending money on the TDC, but was it exactly what the TDC needed at that 
time? I am not sure.618 
However, based on the overview of EU supported transitional justice projects above, it 
seems safe to conclude that the EU has not provided any such support to the TDC.  
 In view of the EU’s relative silence on the transitional justice process in Tunisia, 
it might not come as a surprise that the EU has not attached any financial incentives to 
support for transitional justice in Tunisia.619  In this regard it should be remarked that 
despite the obstacles Tunisia has faced in the realm of transitional justice, it has 
remained the core beneficiary in the Southern Neighbourhood of the EU’s ‘more for 
more’ incentive mechanism, which makes the provision of additional funding 
conditional upon human rights compliance and reforms. In this regard the European 
Commission website states: 
The country is also eligible for the "more for more" incentive mechanism, the so called 
"Umbrella" funds, a mechanism which rewards progress made in terms of reforms. In 2014, 
Tunisia was the first recipient of Umbrella funds with an amount of €50 million, then followed 
by an allocation of €71.8 million in 2015, €90.5 million in 2016 and € 95 million in 2017.620 
 
618 Interview 31 Tunisia (n586).  
619 The researcher could not find any documents indicating this was the case, and EU Delegation 
interviewees indeed confirmed the EU had not attached any financial incentives to support for Tunisia’s 
transitional justice process. The EU has made support conditional upon other reforms such as reforms 
aimed at combating terrorism in Tunisia: Frederica Zardo and Francesco Cavatorta, 'Friends will be 
friends? External–domestic interactions in EU-Tunisia and EU-Morocco security cooperation after the 
uprisings' (2018) International Politics 1. 
620 European Commission, Tunisia, Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-




This lack of political support for transitional justice in Tunisia in the face of consistent 
attacks by Tunisian authorities since 2015, combined with the previous section’s 
observation that 2014 was the last year in which the EU made a financial commitment 
to support for transitional justice in Tunisia puts into question the EU’s commitment to 
transitional justice when EU support seemed most urgent. Chapter 6 will discuss in 
more depth what this signifies about the factors driving EU support for (gendered) 
transitional justice.  
 
5.3.2 EU use of political/economic leverage to support efforts to deal with the 
ongoing conflict in Ukraine 
This section focuses on the EU’s use of political tools to support efforts to combat 
impunity for grave crimes taking place in Donbas both at the hands of Russia-backed 
separatists as well as those fighting on the Ukrainian side. It also looked into the issue 
of unpaid pensions to citizens living in the Donbas as an issue which could be the 
subject of more transformative (gender) justice efforts. As was the case for Tunisia it 
looks into human rights reports and public statements. It also looks into the sanctions 
the EU has issued in response to the Ukraine Crisis and the EU’s use of financial 
incentives to support reforms in Ukraine.  
The need to pursue accountability for grave human rights violations is 
mentioned consistently in the EU’s annual human rights reports on Ukraine since 
2014.621 More specifically, the EU has repeatedly stipulated the requirement that the 
Ukrainian authorities pursue accountability for the serious crimes that have taken place 
in the context of the Maidan Revolution, the annexation of Crimea, and the war in the 
 
621 For instance, in relation to Ukraine: Council of the European Union 2016 (n252): 35; and to Tunisia: 




Donbas.622 This is for instance reflected in this 2015 statement on killings that took 
place during Maidan after violent protests in Odesa (Kulikov Field Killings): 
Impunity and the lack of protection and justice for victims remain a cause of concern. 
According to the reports of the International Advisory Panel (IAP) of the Council of Europe on 
the investigations into the violent incidents during the Maidan demonstrations and the tragic 
events in Odessa in May 2014, the Ukrainian government failed to satisfy the requirements of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The IAP acknowledged that the investigation 
faced significant challenges but concluded that these challenges 'cannot excuse any failings 
which did not inevitably flow from them'.623  
The pursuit of accountability for these killings and the Maidan protests has been singled 
out as a priority area for the EU. However, the EU’s latest human rights report 
commented that ‘little progress was achieved in 2018 in the prosecution and judgement 
of high-profile cases related to the 2014 mass killings in Maidan and Odesa’.624 
 When it comes to the prosecution of those responsible for war crimes in 
Donbas the EU has consistently emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s ratification of 
the Rome Statute and called upon all sides to ensure that perpetrators are held to 
account:  
International human rights stakeholders, including the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission, 
have recorded a substantial number of violations of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law in the conflict affected areas of eastern Ukraine, particularly in 
territories not under the effective control of the government. The impunity enjoyed by the 
perpetrators on all sides remains a cause of serious concern and must be addressed.625  
However, over time the EU’s condemnation of Russia’s role in committing this type of 
violations and allowing impunity to persist has overshadowed the EU’s calls upon 
Ukraine to fulfil its obligations. In this regard the 2018 report stated: 
 
622 Council of the European Union 2017 (n252): 60. 
622 Ibid.  
623 Council of the European Union 2015 (n252). 
624 Council of the European Union 2018 (n252): 29.   




Human rights are generally respected and fundamental freedoms upheld in the area under the 
control of Ukrainian Government. The most severe human rights violations take place in the 
areas not under the control of the government (NGCA), both in the Crimean peninsula, which 
has been illegally annexed by Russia, and in eastern Ukraine, due to the conflict in Donbas, as a 
consequence of Russia's destabilising actions.626 
While it might be true that Russia is guilty of graver and more widespread human rights 
offenses in Ukraine, this does not take away the responsibility from Ukrainian 
authorities to prosecute grave crimes which are in the remit of its control to prosecute. 
This includes war crimes inflicted by combatants and security services from the 
Ukrainian side in the context of the Donbas. This was acknowledged by the EU itself in 
the 2016 human rights report on Ukraine, which stated that: 
The collapse of the rule of law and public order in the east of Ukraine in the area not under 
government control continues. The most severe cases of torture, ill-treatment and impunity are 
being recorded in particular in the areas not under Ukrainian government control. At the same 
time, the Ukrainian government has also been criticised by international watchdogs for cases of 
forced disappearances, arbitrary detention and ill-treatment.627  
The 2017 report on Ukraine added sexual violence to this list.628 As OHCHR reports 
indicate not much has changed in this regard between 2016/2017 and 2018, one 
wonders why the EU has shifted its rhetoric in this regard. It is true that in the 
meantime Ukraine has adopted an amnesty law. However, this law only provides 
amnesty for crimes that are not particularly grave crimes against the life and health of a 
person.629 Interestingly, the 2016, 2017, and 2018 human rights reports do not comment 
on the adoption of this law.  
 Besides calling for the pursuit of accountability for grave human rights 
violations the annual human rights reports also consistently highlight the plight of 
 
626 Council of the European Union 2018 (n252): 29.    
627 Council of the European Union 2016 (n252): 60.  
628 Council of the European Union 2017 (n252): 33. 




Ukrainian IDPs, partly as a result of measures by the Ukrainian government that restrict 
their access to government pensions. Here the EU explicitly urges ‘the authorities to 
adopt a long-term integration strategy for internally displaced persons (IDPs), and to 
resume social assistance and pension payments, which were suspended pending 
verification of their places of residence.630 This signifies attention on the EU’s behalf for 
the socio-economic harms inflicted on citizens during times of conflict. 
 When it comes to public statements on the situation in the Donbas EU officials 
have repeatedly raised the need to prosecute offenders of grave human rights violations. 
However, these statements have consistently singled out Russia as the culprit and 
ignored Ukraine’s responsibility in the perpetuation of this situation. In this regard 
statements have called upon Russia to ‘allow access of international organisations and 
human rights actors to the areas currently not under the control of the Government of 
Ukraine, including the Crimean Peninsula, and to respect international humanitarian 
law’, and to ensure ‘the immediate release of all illegally detained and imprisoned 
Ukrainian citizens in the Crimean peninsula and in Russia’.631 In March 2019 High 
Representative Frederica Mogherini forcefully condemned Russia’s human rights 
 
630 Council of the European Union 2016 (n252): 60.  
 
The 2017 report further expanded on this observation: ‘As a result of the conflict, there are 
approximately 1.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), who continue to face a difficult situation. 
The EU has called on the Ukrainian government to resume social assistance and pension payments which 
have been suspended for approximately 500.000 – 600.000 IDPs in 2016 pending verification of their 
places of residence. Voting rights of IDPs in local elections continue being restricted. In 2017, the 
authorities adopted an action plan towards NGCA as well as a long-term integration strategy for IDPs. 
Social assistance and pension payments have also been suspended in NGCA. The international 
community has repeatedly called on the Ukrainian authorities to resume these payments. The population 
in NGCA still needs to recur to court procedures for the recognition of for example birth certificates, 
which, according to UNHCR, raises the risk of statelessness’. Council of the European Union 2017 
(n252): 33. 
631 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on Ukraine  
FOREIG AFFAIRS Council meeting Brussels, 3 March 2014 (2014). Available at: 




violations in Crimea referring to December 2018 UNGA Resolution on Russia’s 
violations of international law in Crimea:632 
Since the illegal annexation by the Russian Federation, the human rights situation in the 
Crimean peninsula has significantly deteriorated. Residents of the peninsula face systematic 
restrictions of fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression, religion or belief and 
association and the right to peaceful assembly. […] The EU calls for full compliance with 
international human rights standards in the peninsula. All pending cases of human rights 
violations and abuses, such as enforced disappearances, torture and killings, violence, politically 
motivated prosecutions, discrimination and harassment should be thoroughly investigated. Full, 
free and unrestricted access for international human rights actors to the whole territory of 
Ukraine, including Crimea and Sevastopol, continues to be paramount. The EU recalls UNGA 
Resolution 73/263 of 22 December 2018, and calls for its full implementation, including the 
Russian Federation's obligations under applicable international humanitarian law.633 
Human rights defenders have welcomed the EU’s condemnation of Russia’s activities in 
the Crimea and Donbas.634 However, some of these organizations have also pointed out 
that while the EU employs a forceful rhetoric against Russia, it has not used sufficient 
pressure to ensure that Ukraine itself lives up to its responsibility to pursue 
 
632 The Resolution was tabled by Ukraine, and received strong backing from EU Member States such as 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Poland, the United Kingdom and Lithuania. See: 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12108.doc.htm, accessed 5 August 2019.  
 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 2018, Problem of the militarization of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea 
and the Sea of Azov, A/RES/73/194. Available at: https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/73/194, accessed 5 
August 2019. 
633 Council of the European Union, Declaration by the High Representative Federica Mogherini on 
behalf of the EU on the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (17 March 2019). 
Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/03/17/declaration-by-the-
high-representative-federica-mogherini-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-autonomous-republic-of-crimea-and-
the-city-of-sevastopol/, accessed 5 August 2019. 
634 Recommendations from participants of the EU Ukraine civil society seminar on human rights, 
21.03.2017, Brussels include a call upon the EU ‘[t]o impose additional sectoral sanctions against the 
Russian Federation for the massive human rights violations in the occupied Crimea’. Available at: 
http://ccl.org.ua/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/Recommendation_EU_Ukraine_CivilSocietySeminaronHumanRights_en-




accountability for war crimes and human rights violations committed on its own soil 
and/or by its own forces.635 
This approach is reflected in the EU’s use of economic measures to enforce 
human rights compliance. While its condemnation of Russia’s activities – both breaches 
of Ukraine’s territorial integrity as well as human rights abuses - is backed up with a 
sanctions regime,636 the EU has not used economic incentives to pressure Ukraine into 
human rights compliance. While sanctions would have been an unsuitable tool for this – 
after all the EU aims to foster good relations with Ukraine - the EU could have made its 
significant financial support for Ukraine or further political integration (e.g. visa 
liberalisation) conditional upon human rights compliance. In this regard it should be 
noted that visa liberalisation was made conditional upon reforms aimed at combatting 
corruption in Ukraine. However, similar conditionality has not been used in relation to 
human rights compliance.637  
As such, also in the Ukrainian context this overview of the EU’s use of its 
political and economic leverage to support mainstream and more transformative 
(gender) justice outcomes, puts into question the EU’s real commitment to these goals. 
Yes, the EU has used forceful language on Russia and even imposed sanctions. 
However, this is likely to make little difference as Russia is not dependent on EU 
support or interested in further integration with the EU. Ukraine is, and does have its 
 
635 Tanya Cooper, ‘This week, the EU should press Ukraine on fundamental rights’ (9 July 2018) Human 
Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/09/week-eu-should-press-ukraine-
fundamental-rights, accessed 24 August 2018; International Crisis Group, Ukraine: an opportunity for 
reinforced European diplomacy (31 January 2018). Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-
central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/ukraine-opportunity-reinforced-european-diplomacy, accessed 24 
August 2018.  
636 Council of the European Union, EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine. Available 
at: 
 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/, accessed 24 August 2018.  
637 Janek Lacoski, How EU conditionality is helping to transform Ukraine , ECFR (22 March 2016). 
Available at: 
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_how_eu_conditionality_is_helping_to_transform_ukraine6046




own human rights compliance problems. As such the EU could have used ‘naming and 
shaming’ and economic tools to convince Ukrainian authorities of the need to accept 
their responsibility in at least prosecuting the crimes they have de facto jurisdiction 
over. What the fact that the EU did not do so indicates about the drivers behind EU 
support for efforts to deal with the past/ongoing conflict will be discussed in more 
depth in the subsequent chapter.  
 
5.3.3 Conclusion 
While the overview of the EU’s financial support for efforts to deal with the past in 
Tunisia and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine provided the impression of a certain level 
of EU commitment to these issues, albeit limited in scope, and in the Tunisian case 
duration, this section’s findings put this commitment into doubt. In relation to Tunisia 
the EU’s near complete lack of public support for the TDC and Specialized Chambers, 
and silence on the Economic Reconciliation Bill, provide the impression of an 
international actor which abandoned transitional justice when its proponents were most 
in need of support. In Ukraine, the EU’s forceful language on Russia, backed up with a 
sanctions strategy, but lacklustre approach towards Ukraine’s own failure to live up to 
international human rights commitments, also provides the impression of an actor 
which is taking the path of least resistance.  
Section 5.2 argued that the overview of EU financial support for efforts to deal 
with the past in Tunisia and ongoing conflict in Ukraine provided the impression that 
particularly in Ukraine the EU has prioritized a mainstream approach towards support 
for transitional justice with relatively little specific attention for gendered experiences of 
conflict and repression. The fact that the EU prioritized mainstream approaches to 
support transitional justice confirmed feminist critiques of international actor’s priorities 




to transitional justice at all. This raises the spectre that critiques of prioritizing one or 
another type of transitional justice effort over the other are beside the point, as the 
problem really is that in Tunisia and Ukraine the EU is not really committed to support 
for efforts to pursue justice for harms inflict during times of conflict or repression at all.  
 
5.4 EU SUPPORT FOR FUTURE-FOCUSED GENDER JUSTICE EFFORTS 
IN TUNISIA AND UKRAINE 
This thesis’ tripartite conceptualization of a feminist transformative justice agenda 
distinguished between past and future focused gender justice efforts. Now that the EU’s 
engagement with the former have been discussed in the previous section, the remainder 
of this chapter looks into the EU’s engagement with future focused gender justice 
efforts and particularly its support for the fight against ‘everyday’ GBV in Tunisia and 
Ukraine. Despite the lack of EU interaction with women’s rights through a transitional 
justice paradigm, the EU has expressed a strong commitment to the promotion of 
women’s rights in the context of Tunisia’s and Ukraine’s political transitions. In this 
regard the EU’s priority is support for legislative and institutional reform to combat the 
‘continuum of violence’ experienced by women in Tunisia and Ukraine. 
Based on analysis of the overview of the EU’s budgetary commitments under 
ENI/ENPI, EIDHR, IcSP and the Instrument for Development Cooperation, this 
section finds that especially in Tunisia the EU’s support for forward-looking measures 
to combat GBV has been more robust than its support for (gendered) transitional 
justice efforts. Analysis of the EU’s use of political/economic leverage to advance these 
efforts confirms this finding. In Ukraine the EU’s direct financial support for the fight 
against GBV, however, has been less extensive, instead it has prioritized the gender 
mainstreaming of broader justice reform and SSR efforts to contribute to combating 




in Tunisia and gender mainstreaming in Ukraine, and why the EU has been a more 
active backer of the fight against GBV in Tunisia than in Ukraine. However, in absence 
of much consequential support for efforts to pursue justice for victims of conflict-
related SGBV in Ukraine, the EU’s support for efforts to address everyday GBV in 
Ukraine still is more substantial than its support for past-focused gender justice efforts.  
Combined with the findings from the previous sections, this raises the question 
of whether advocating for an increased focus on the continuum of violence is the most 
effective strategy to improve the EU’s response to gender justice in transition under all 
circumstances. After all, if the EU is already prioritizing forward-looking responses to 
GBV in Tunisia, the promotion of such approaches does not respond to the most 
obvious weaknesses of its support for gender justice there. Feminist authors have not 
implied that one type of engagement should come at the expense of the others. 
However, so far they have demonstrated limited awareness that international actors’ 
penchant for selective engagement with feminist ideas, can also come at the expense of 
the fight against impunity for politically motivated SGBV.638 In this light, it should be 
recognized that feminist calls for more future-oriented responses could be taken as an 
excuse not to engage with traditional transitional justice measures.  
 
5.4.1 EU support for the fight against the continuum of violence in practice in 
Tunisia 
In Tunisia the EU has both through financial support as well as through public 
statements provided significant support for the fight against VAW. The subsequent 
sections’ discussion of the EU’s budgetary commitments and political statements will 
illustrate this point, while also pointing out some remarkable characteristics of this 
 




support such as the timing of these actions and imbalance between certain types of 
support, which will serve as points of departure for the next chapter’s analysis of drivers 
behind EU engagement with gender justice in transition.  
Table 5.3: EU budgetary commitments supporting efforts to deal with GBV in Tunisia 
Year Amount Topic Instrument Implementer(s) 
2013 550,000 €  Prevention of Gender-Based 
Violence and Support for 
Women Victims in North-West 
Tunisia 
ENI/ENPI Cideal (Spanish 
NGO) 




Sensitization of Tunisian 
students to the preservation of 
women's rights and a better 
understanding of the patriarchal 
model  
EIDHR Images et Paroles 
de Femmes 
(Tunisian NGO) 
2014 157,731 €  
71,174 € 









2014  1,700.000 € 
 
Programme for the promotion 
of equality between men and 
women in Tunisia – Objective 
3: To contribute to the 
reduction of gender based 
violence and discrimination 
 
 
ENI/ENPI UNFPA, Tunisian 
NGOs 
 
The overview shows that between 2011 and 2018 the EU has spent a total of 2,778,721 
EUR on the fight against GBV and legally enshrined discrimination of women in 
Tunisia. This amount is only a fraction of the amount that the EU has spent on projects 
to promote gender equality more broadly such as projects focused on women’s socio-
economic development, gender-sensitive budgeting and women’s role in the fight 
against terrorism. Nevertheless, already, EU funding for efforts specifically targeted at 
combatting GBV, surpasses the amount the EU has spent on all types of mainstream 
and more transformative past-focused transitional justice efforts in Tunisia.  
 The support for efforts related to the struggle against GBV can be divided in 




iNGOs that sensitize Tunisians about the issue of GBV, advocate against it and provide 
services to victims. On the other hand, there is the big UNPFA implemented project 
that is part of the EU’s larger 7 million Euro support package for the Tunisian Ministry 
of Women and Children that aims to increase the government’s capacity to guarantee 
equality between men and women. This project has three axes (capacity strengthening 
of the ministry, women’s socio-economic empowerment, and the fight against 
discrimination and GBV). UNFPA is responsible for the management of the third 
component. This project had as its objectives to: 1) create an advocacy campaign aimed 
at the introduction of legislative reform to combat VAW and other types of 
discrimination, and 2) create and operationalise a national multi-sectoral strategy to 
combat VAW. An important sub-objective of the second objective was to create and 
operationalise four shelters for (female) victims of GBV.639    
Various civil society interviewees indicated that the EU had played a crucial 
supporting role in the battle for the adoption of a legislative framework to combat 
VAW.640 Nevertheless, these interviewees also raised criticism on the EU’s approach 
towards support for advocacy efforts around the Integral Law on VAW. More 
specifically they lamented the low percentage of funding the EU has allocated for 
advocacy and the fact that the money that has been allocated to advocacy efforts was 
allocated to UNFPA.  
During interviews Tunisian feminist activists indicated that because of these 
decisions, the EU had not made optimal use of its financial support to effectuate 
transformative change.641 They thought this was the case particularly, because UNFPA 
subsequently channelled this budget to the Tunisian Ministry of Women and Family 
Affairs, these feminist NGOs had no access to EU funding to support their own 
 
639 For an overview of the objectives, see: European Commission 2014 (n241).  
Interview 25 Tunisia (n292); Interview 26 Tunisia (n326).  




advocacy strategies. According to a representative of one of these NGOs the Ministry 
subsequently informed them that they were welcome to join the Ministry’s advocacy 
efforts, provided that they would follow its lead.642 As the Ministry championed a much 
less ambitious draft law than these feminist CSOs, this was considered out of the 
question.643  
Moreover, the money that UNFPA did allocate to Tunisian (feminist) NGOs, 
was earmarked for the establishment and running of shelters for GBV victims. 
Interviewees - some representatives of organizations who received EU funding to run 
shelters -  indicated that while service provision to victims is of crucial importance, an 
exclusive focus on this aspect by donors in the wake of the adoption of the law impedes 
feminist activists working on monitoring of implementation, and advocacy for more 
structural change in Tunisia’s attitude towards women.644 In this regard a Tunisian 
feminist activist, working for an iNGO stated: 
I: I think that there is not enough funding for the real issues related to gender.  
E: Which are according to you?  
I: Which are challenging the structures of power. When it comes to elections etc., we do have 
some funding for you know elections and women’s political participation. For VAW, yeah we 
still have some funds for there, but when it comes for example to deeply work on changing 
mentalities, develop models, mainstream gender in curricula etc., we are less funded than it 
should be. Probably because these are less visible in the short term, and donors including the 
EU are looking for quick wins, and very visible outputs to show off.645 
 
642 Ibid.  
643 However, the interviewee indicated that once alerted about this issue the EU has been an important 
ally for feminist advocacy, pushing the Ministry to change its attitude.  
644 Interview 26 Tunisia (n326); Interview 8 Tunisia (n292).  
 
The importance of more structural change is recognized in the EU’s political and operational strategic 
priorities for action 2016-2020 for Tunisia, which mentions the need to take action to ‘encourage legal 
reforms to eradicate all kinds of discrimination against women, with special reference to equal 
inheritance’. This document is confidential and not accessible online. It was provided to the researcher by 
an interviewee.  




Thus, while the EU’s financial support for the fight against GBV in Tunisia has been 
important, some aspects of it – its prioritization of cooperation with UNFPA and the 
Ministry of Women and Families in advocacy efforts most notably – raise questions 
about the factors that drive EU engagement with this issue, which will be explored in 
more depth in the next chapter.  
 The previous sections on EU engagement with past-focused (gender) justice 
efforts in Tunisia showed that financial support does not necessarily equal an EU 
political commitment to supporting these issues as well. However, when it comes to the 
fight against GBV in Tunisia human rights reports and public statements – by the EU 
Ambassador to Tunisia in particular – provide the impression that in this case financial 
and political support go hand in hand. Since the Revolution women’s rights have 
figured prominently in human rights reports and policy documents. For instance in 
2014 and 2015 the annual human rights country reports in Tunisia singled out GBV as a 
‘cause for great concern’.646 In 2017 the human rights report celebrated Tunisia’s 
adoption of the Integral Law on VAW, stating: 
Noteworthy progress must be acknowledged with regard gender. 2017 has been marked by the 
adoption of important laws to promote the progress of women. The framework law on the 
violence against women adopted on 26 July is a milestone not only for Tunisia, but an important 
example for the entire region. The EU Spokesperson issued a statement at this important 
occasion. The government decision to cancel a 1973 administrative decree has opened the 
possibility for Tunisian women to get married with non-Muslim. The new electoral law ensures 
an even stronger participation of women. The creation of a Presidential commission on 
individual liberties and equality in August 2017 is a recognition and an engagement to move 
ahead with further actions to ensure gender equality.647 
 
646 Council of the European Union 2014 (n252); Council of the European Union 2015 (n252): 58. 
Available at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12299-2016-INIT/en/pdf, accessed 20  




As indicated in this quote, this attention for GBV in EU human rights reports has been 
backed up in public statements by the EEAS,648 and high ranking EU officials. The EU 
Ambassador to Tunisia, Patrice Bergamini, also is a vocal supporter of women’s rights 
via traditional and social media.649 In his public remarks on this topic he has emphasized 
the link between EU support for women’s rights and democracy promotion, stating that 
in Tunisia women are ‘the first pillars of democracy’.650 
 
5.4.2 EU support for the fight against the continuum of violence in practice in 
Ukraine 
In Ukraine the EU’s direct (financial) support for the fight against GBV, and 
particularly legislative reform to more effectively tackle this issue, has been much less 
significant than in Tunisia. This is remarkable in view of the fact that the attempt to 
ratify the Istanbul Convention in Ukraine has experienced more resistance than efforts 
to push through legislative reform in this area in Tunisia. However, the subsequent 
sections’ discussion of the EU’s activities in Ukraine will show that, nevertheless, over 
the last two years the EU has slightly scaled up its commitments to fighting GBV in 
 
648 EEAS, Statement by the Spokesperson on the adoption by the Tunisian Parliament of the law on 
violence against women (28 July 2017). Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/30560/statement-spokesperson-adoption-tunisian-parliament-law-violence-against-
women_en, accessed 5 August 2019.  
649 L’Economiste Maghrebin, ‘Patrice Bergamini: Seule une societe ou les femmes sont pleinement 
epanouies est capable de prosperer’ (13 August 2018). Available at: 
https://www.leconomistemaghrebin.com/2018/08/13/femmes-societe-epanouies-prosperer/, accessed 
27 August 2018. This message was shared on the Delegation’s Facebook page as well on 13 August 2018, 
see: 
https://www.facebook.com/EUTunisie/photos/a.439444542740259/2377537568930937/?type=3&thea
ter, accessed 27 August 2018.  
 
He has expressed strong support for legislation introducing equal inheritance: Yassine Bellamine, ‘Pour 
l'ambassadeur de l'Union Européenne en Tunisie Patrice Bergamini, les lignes doivent bouger en matière 
d'héritage’ (13 August 2018) Huffpost. Available at: 
https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2017/03/08/patrice-bergamini-wonder-_n_15243078.html, 
accessed 27 August 2018.  
 
This article was also shared on his official twitter account on 15 August 2018. See: 





Ukraine, particularly through reliance of gender mainstreaming of its SSR and justice 
sector reform programmes.   
Table 5.4: EU budgetary commitments supporting efforts to deal with GBV in Ukraine 
Year Amount Topic Instrument Implementer(s) 
2015 160,143 € 
118,481 € 
Mobilization Among Internally 
Displaced Women for 
Addressing Domestic and 
Gender-Based Violence 








Centre of Gender Culture as a 
Platform for Empowerment of 











The total amount of targeted EU support for the fight against GBV in Ukraine is 
923,624 EUR. In Donbas the EU has supported the project ‘Mobilization of internally 
displaced women for addressing domestic and gender-based violence’.651 This aims to 
strengthen ‘the role of Ukrainian women’s community in ensuring gender equality and 
women’s rights’. Its primary objectives are: 
To empower internally displaced women by drawing public attention to the problem of 
domestic and gender-based violence; ensure organizational, resource and educational support to 
the women’s groups interested in the implementation of measures to combat violence; 
significantly improve capacity to implement preventive measures to combat domestic violence 
against internally displaced women; enhance their role in identifying and helping those who have 
suffered or suffer from various types and manifestations of violence.652  
Besides this project the EU has also started to support the Kharkiv Regional Gender 
Resource Centre to provide ‘informal gender education [to] young people and women, 
with the aim of helping them to grow into "gender sensitive leaders" and become active 
 
651 More information available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_lo/27178/Mobilization%20among%20internally%20displac
ed%20women%20for%20addressing%20domestic%20and%20gender-based%20violence, accessed 3 
December 2018.  
652 Socio Consulting, Mobilization of internally displaced women for addressing domestic and gender-
based violence (2017). Available at: http://sociocon.org/en/issledovaniya/social-policy/181.html, 




in decision-making process at both the local and regional levels’.653 In view of the 
rejection of the Istanbul Convention being driven by hostility against the use of the 
term ‘gender’, this project seems to be particularly relevant and timely.  
However, in absence of a large scale project to combat GBV with the Ukrainian 
authorities the EU’s targeted financial support for this issue in Ukraine is much less 
robust than in Tunisia. Taking into account that Ukraine’s total number of inhabitants is 
approximately four times larger than the total number of inhabitants of Tunisia, one 
would have expected a multiplication of the level of support provided to Tunisia. 
Instead the EU has allocated less than half the amount it allocated to efforts aimed at 
fighting GBV in Tunisia, to the same fight in Ukraine. In this regard it should also be 
remarked that none of the EU funds has gone directly into projects constructed around 
advocacy for the Istanbul Convention.  
Asked about this absence of targeted support for efforts to support the 
ratification of the Istanbul Convention at such a – seemingly – pivotal moment in 
time,654 EU officials indicated that they had opted to rely on gender mainstreaming 
rather than targeted action to support the fight against GBV in Ukraine. In this regard 
an official in the EU Delegation in Kyiv mentioned that the EU considered it: 
better, really to mainstream, to make sure that the gender component is ensured in all our 
policies, in all our assistance that is coming up, the new assistance let’s say from 2018 to 2022, 
because it is going to touch upon the education, upon the governance, judiciary etc., etc. 
The same interview specified that: 
It is rather… Again it is a question of where you want to put the money on. For the time being, 
we are thinking that we have to really invest in the reforms. We have to invest in the Association 
 
653 More information available at: Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, Centre of Gender 
Culture as a Platform for empowerment of women and youth (9 August 2018). Available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_me/49255/Centre%20of%20Gender%20Culture%20as%20
a%20Platform%20for%20empowerment%20of%20women%20and%20youth, accessed 3 December 
2018.  
654 The fieldwork took place at a time when many activists/experts believed that the Istanbul Convention 




Agreement to make this country more prosperous, more stable and so on, again the fight against 
corruption and all those issues, but without leaving gender you know completely, I mean we 
understand that we also have to integrate this perspective in. So I think for the benefit of the 
country it is better to have it incorporated than having it as a separate priority.655  
In Ukraine, two EU institutions are engaged in this type of efforts. The EU Delegation 
coordinates the justice reform programme and EUAM advises Ukrainian government 
agencies engaged in justice and civilian security sector reform. The EU Delegation has 
appointed two individuals as gender focal points, who in addition to their day-to-day 
activities raise awareness amongst colleagues about the need to integrate a gender 
dimension in their programming. EUAM houses a gender advisor, whose fulltime job is 
to translate EUAM’s commitment to the WPS Agenda into practice. To facilitate this 
task, he has established a gender focal point network. The focal point network consists 
of EUAM officials, who do not work specifically on gender issues, but who volunteer 
to take part in training and to become a contact for colleagues who need support with 
questions regarding this matter.  
When it comes to efficacy of these efforts both one of the focal points in the 
Delegation as well as the gender advisor in EUAM identified significant barriers to the 
successful execution of their role as drivers of gender mainstreaming, including a lack of 
understanding of the concept amongst colleagues, and limited commitment by the 
leadership in both institutions. The EUAM gender advisor for instance indicated that 
despite the mandate of the mission’s insistence on UNSCR 1325 guiding all of its 
activities, it has been a struggle to convince the mission’s leadership to implement the 
obligation to gender mainstream. In this regard he remarked that, while on paper he has 
created a very comprehensive gender strategy which obliges the mission to integrate 
‘gender into all documents, and all decision-making processes from the very outset of 
 




the mission through to operational activities’, this has not substantively changed the 
operation of the mission. Reflecting on this gap between policy and practice he 
remarked: 
I: Then reality is something different, but the management has approved and adopted the 
gender strategy. It is part of, now, of our collection of SOPs, and as such, if I wanted to make 
the case for gender mainstreaming I could refer to this document, as they approved it 
themselves. I haven’t done that so far. Although I have to say that it would be appropriate if I, if 
I kind of make the point you know, that we are actually not gender mainstreaming the way we 
are supposed to. We are not fulfilling the ideals or the purpose, the objective of our global 
mandate, because our global mandate needs to be gender mainstreamed, and it hasn’t happened. 
But I am currently waiting, I have decided not… You know as a gender advisor you are quite 
alone at times isolated and engaging in this battle is a bit [laughter], is a bit heavy. So I have 
decided to pick my battles - and I have had quite a lot of battles - but not to take it to full 
length, because I won’t, I probably won’t achieve anything anyway.656 
The notion that the gender advisor faces serious obstacles implementing the gender 
mainstreaming agenda was confirmed by other EU officials engaged in EUAM’s 
activities with one stating that gender advisors ‘are still often perceived as a ‘strange 
animal’.657  
In case of the Delegation’s existing portfolio of programmes, its support for 
justice sector reform seems to be the most obvious canal through which the adoption 
of the Istanbul Convention, and its successful implementation could be supported. At 
the time of the fieldwork, the first post-Maidan EU supported justice reform 
programme (8.6 million Euro 2013-2016) hosted its final conference.658 The 
programme’s core goals were to help the Ukrainian authorities create a justice reform 
 
656 Interview 2 Ukraine (n293).  
657 Interview 24 Brussels, 13 July 2017, Representative 1 EU CSDP HQ Brussels. 
658 Support to Justice Sector Reforms in Ukraine, Challenges, achievements and prospects of the Justice 
Sector Reforms in Ukraine to be discussed by legal professionals and experts, 23 November 2017 Kyiv. 
For more information, see: http://www.justicereformukraine.eu/challenges-achievements-and-prospects-
of-the-justice-sector-reforms-in-ukraine-to-be-discussed-by-legal-professionals-and-experts/?future=all, 




strategy 2015-2020 and to provide the expert assistance needed for the plan’s timely 
implementation.659 It had a strong focus on corruption and supported the design of 
anti-corruption legislation and the establishment of a number of anti-corruption 
agencies. Gender considerations did not play a significant role in these activities.660 This 
of course is not in line with the EU’s commitment to gender mainstreaming. However, 
a possible explanation for the absence of this component is that the programme was 
designed and for a large part implemented before the adoption of GAPII. This was 
acknowledged by an EU official who remarked that: In regards to gender 
mainstreaming in Ukraine the EU has been very slow. It still has not achieved to 
implement the Gender Action Plan, which supposedly should be finalized by now. That 
hasn’t happened.661  
However, progress seemed to be materializing at the time the fieldwork took 
place. The EU’s overall framework for EU support to Ukraine between 2018-2020, for 
instance, contains 47 times the term gender, and 13 times the term women.662 The 
document distinguishes four priority sectors of intervention, of which one is 
‘Strengthening institutions and good governance, including the rule of law and security’. 
Within this sector, the document specifies that one of the main expected results is 
strengthened effectiveness and efficiency in the fight against organised crime and 
against SGBV including domestic violence, and that progress will be assessed based on 
the number of sexual, gender-based and domestic violence offences prosecuted.663 The 
new EU justice reform support package (52.2 million Euro) focuses on consolidation of 
sector-wide justice reforms.664 Its programming document repeatedly refers to the 
 
659 Ibid. 
660 Interview 19 Ukraine (n288). 
661 Interview 2 Ukraine (n293). 
662 On a total of 29 pages. European Commission, Programming of the European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI) - 2017-2020 - Single Support Framework for EU support to Ukraine (2018-2020). 
663 Ibid: 8 & 18.  




importance of incorporating a gender perspective and identifies the pursuit of gender 
equality as a ‘significant objective’ in addition to the main objective of supporting good 
governance.665 The document contains one page which concretizes which actions the 
EU is planning to take to realize this goal.666 The guiding framework is UNSCR 1325, 
and the focus very much is on including more women in the national police forces, and 
ensuring that more women take on leading roles in this institution.667 The rationale 
behind this focus is that ‘support to policewomen has the potential to enact a cultural 
change within the police system, [which] is particularly relevant when the police is being 
transformed into a new type of "civilian" institution very different from the "Militsia" of 
the past’.668 In cooperation with Ukrainian CS ‘there will be a coordinated work on 
development of specialised modules on gender-based violence, domestic violence and 
hate crimes for the National Police’.669  
Some interviewees within the EU’s structures ensured that in line with these 
commitments over the course of 2018 gender concerns would indeed become more 
integral to the EU’s activities in Ukraine.670 The advisor also mentioned that a number 
of colleagues in the mission had started working very actively on gender issues – ‘within 
the last year, it is almost like a revolution happened’ – and that EUAM now had a small 
project package to support activities on domestic violence, e.g. providing the police 
with the tools and the understanding to work with domestic violence cases.671 Lastly, he 
also noted that the CSDP headquarters in Brussels were engaged in the drafting of 
operational guidelines that would facilitate his task as they would contain an instruction 
 
665 Ibid. 
666 Ibid: 18-19. 
667 However, the document does mention that women’s participation should also be increased in other 
institutions.  
668 European Commission 2016 (n245): 19.  
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670 Interview 8 Ukraine (n655); Interview 11 Brussels, 12 June 2017, Representative EU SGUA. This was 
also confirmed by CSDP/EUAM interviewees: Interview 25 Brussels, 13 July 2017, Representative 2 EU 
CSDP HQ; Interview 2 Ukraine (n293). 




from the leadership in Brussels to the CSDP missions to implement gender 
mainstreaming obligations. According to the EUAM gender advisor this meant that 
EUAM will ‘have a different situation quite soon; looking more into implementation 
than struggle’.672  
Nevertheless, despite these positive signs the EU’s use of political tools to 
support the fight against GBV in Ukraine provides the impression that its commitment 
to this issue in Ukraine remains much lower than in Tunisia. The Ukraine human rights 
reports have mentioned Ukraine’s failure to ratify the Istanbul Convention in 2016 and 
applauded the criminalization of domestic violence in 2017,673 but have since stopped 
mentioning the need to more seriously invest in the struggle against GBV. When it 
comes to public statements by high-ranking EU officials, it should be mentioned that 
the Istanbul Convention has never been invoked by any of them except for the EEAS 
Principal Advisor on Gender, Ambassador Marinaki during her visit to Ukraine in April 
2016.674 As her focus area is gender this is in line with the expectations, and therefore it 
would have been more meaningful if another EU official not specifically focusing on 
gender had invoked the issue as well.  
 
 
672 Ibid. In view of the large sums of money the EU is spending in these areas via the Delegation, and the 
direct access it has to Ukrainian security forces through EUAM, well implemented gender mainstreaming 
efforts could indeed turn the EU in a meaningful supporter of women’s rights. The fieldwork in Ukraine 
implied that this was still a struggle, but that significant progress had been made especially in EUAM over 
the last two years. This meant that in Ukraine forward-looking gender justice measures have been the 
ones that have received relatively most EU support. 
673 Council of the European Union 2016 (n252); Council of the European Union 2017 (n252). 
674 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine Sergiy Kyslytsya met with 
the European External Action Service Principal Advisor on gender / UNSC resolution 1325 
implementation Mara Marinaki (14 June 2016). Available at: https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-
offices-news/48420-zastupnik-ministra-zakordonnih-sprav-ukrajini-sergij-kislicya-zustrivsya-z-golovnim-
radnikom-jevropejsykoji-sluzhbi-zovnishnih-dij-z-gendernih-pitany-ta-vikonannya-rezolyuciji-rb-oon-




5.4.3 Conclusion: Forward-looking legislative and institutional reform as 
preferred vehicles for EU support for gender justice in transition 
International actors’ neglect of the continuum of violence experienced by women in 
societies in transition has been at the core of feminist critiques of ‘the patriarchy of 
internationalized transitional justice’.675 In line with this, more attention for the 
continuum of violence through support for legislative and institutional reform that can 
contribute to more effectively combatting ‘everyday’ GBV is a core component of most 
transformative justice approaches proposed in feminist transformative justice 
scholarship.676 This section, however, showed that addressing everyday instances of 
GBV already the EU’s gender justice priority in Tunisia and – to some extent - Ukraine. 
While the approaches the EU supports in both countries differ, both support for the 
adoption of legislation to combat VAW, as well as the gender mainstreaming of security 
sector reform are aimed at protecting women against future instances of VAW. 
Nevertheless, this overview of EU engagement with gender justice in transition 
raises certain questions such as 1) why the EU in both countries has prioritized 
cooperation with authorities over support for advocacy efforts by (local) feminist 
NGOs, 2) why the EU has prioritized targeted support over gender mainstreaming in 
Tunisia and vice versa in Ukraine, and 3) why the EU’s support for efforts to pursue 
legislative reform to combat VAW has been much more robust in Tunisia than in 
Ukraine. Chapter 6 will reflect in more depth on these questions and use them as hooks 
for answering one of the core research questions of this thesis regarding the drivers 
behind EU engagement with gender justice in transition.  
 
 
675 McWilliams and Ní Aoláin 2013 (n18); Aisling Swaine, ‘Beyond Strategic Rape and Between the Public 
and Private: Violence Against Women in Armed Conflict’ (2015) 37(3) Human Rights Quarterly 755. 




5.5 CONCLUSION  
This chapter aimed to provide a comprehensive factual overview of the nature of EU 
engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine in practice, and compare these 
findings with dominant insights in feminist scholarship about the nature of international 
support for gender justice in transition.  
In general, this chapter shows that EU (financial) support for both (gendered) 
transitional justice as well as forward looking gender justice efforts has been rather 
narrow compared to the overall amount of foreign aid the EU has provided to Tunisia 
and Ukraine during the years covered by this research. In Tunisia the EU provided just 
over 1 million EUR in support for efforts to deal with the past and slightly less than 3 
million EUR to contribute to forward looking efforts aimed at combatting GBV. Based 
on Ambassador Bergamini’s estimation that since 2011 Tunisia has received around 300 
million EUR in aid per year (which totals two billion four hundred million EUR over 
eight years),677 the EU’s support for gender justice in transition totals less than 0.002 % 
of the total amount of EU aid Tunisia received. In Ukraine the EU provided almost 29 
million EUR to transitional justice related efforts and a bit less than 1 million EUR of 
targeted support to forward-looking women’s rights efforts. Based on the estimation 
that the EU has provided a total of 15 billion in aid to Ukraine since Euromaidan,678 the 
total combine amount of EU gender justice and transitional justice support to Ukraine 
also constitutes only 0.002 % of its total aid. As such EU support for gender justice in 
transition in Tunisia and Ukraine is a rather negligible component of its total aid 
provision.  
Nevertheless, focusing on the balance between EU engagement with past- and 
future-focused gender justice measures the overview implies that significant gaps exists 
 
677 See section 4.3.4.  




between the EU’s approach towards gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine in practice 
and feminist theory on the nature of international engagement with gender justice in 
transition. Contrary to widespread beliefs about international actors’ engagement with 
women’s rights in societies in transition the EU has prioritized support for initiatives 
that address the ‘everyday’ occurrences of VAW, and been much less consistent in its 
support for initiatives aimed at pursuing accountability for past instances of politically 
motivated SGBV.  
This is not in line with the broadly held notion that politically motivated 
instances of SGBV dominate the agendas of international actors engaging with gender 
justice in transition. Moreover, this chapter found that this lack of engagement with 
efforts to pursue justice for victims of politically motivated SGBV is not primarily a 
result of the EU’s failure to gender mainstream transitional justice efforts, but rather 
because of its unwillingness to meaningfully engage with transitional justice at all. As 
legislative and institutional reform have been identified as tools to address the 
continuum of violence, the EU support for women’s rights that has materialized in 
Tunisia already and seemed to be prepared in Ukraine is encouraging. However, in 
absence of support for past-focused (gender) justice initiatives of a ‘mainstream’ or a 
‘transformative’ nature, the picture remains incomplete. The idea that past-looking 
gender justice efforts could be at risk of being side-lined, has gained relatively little 
attention in feminist literature. This chapter highlights the risk of taking this support for 
granted. 
This chapter serves as a basis for the next two chapters. More specifically, 
chapter 6 will look in more depth into the drivers behind the EU’s engagement with 
gender justice in transition by comparing this chapter’s findings to insights about the 
local gender justice opportunity structures discussed in the previous chapter. Based on 




transitional justice scholarship better equipped to identify and respond to the challenges 
posed by ‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’. Chapter 7, on its turn, 








6. FINDINGS II: The drivers behind EU 
support for gender justice in transition in 
Tunisia and Ukraine 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
What explains the discrepancies between the EU’s policy commitments in the field of 
support for gender justice in transition in Tunisia and Ukraine and its actual 
engagement with such efforts in practice?  A comparison of the previous chapter’s 
findings re EU engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine with chapter 4’s 
description of the local gender justice opportunity structures, shows that preferences of 
local political elites rather than predetermined EU gender justice policy priorities 
determine the nature of EU engagement in this sphere. These findings, combined with 
statements made by EU officials during the interviews suggest that the EU uses its 
engagement with gender justice to support the agendas of friendly political elites in Kyiv 
and Carthage.679 As such, the first part of this chapter fulfils objective 4 of this thesis, 
which is to identify the factors that drive EU engagement with gender justice in 
transition. 
 The remainder of the chapter looks into the implications of this finding for 
feminist theory on international engagement with gender justice in transition. It argues 
that as in both countries the EU has prioritized supporting gender justice efforts that 
are integral to a more transformative gender justice agenda, this thesis demonstrates that 
the feminist transformative justice agenda can also be instrumentalized for political gain. 
This challenges the assumption that opportunist engagement with gender justice in 
 




transition on behalf of international actors equals the prioritization of the pursuit of 
accountability for politically motivated SGBV. It also puts into question whether the 
transformative gender justice agenda is the right response to the flaws of ‘the patriarchy 
of internationalized transitional justice’. Therefore, this chapter argues that when it 
comes to defining the notion of transformative justice, feminist scholarship should 
adopt a more ‘politicized’ definition that emphasizes the need for international actors to 
balance the need to challenge the agendas of those in power to the extent that they 
exclude certain gender justice efforts, with embarking on gender justice efforts that 
enjoy local elites’ support. As such this chapter contributes partially to objective 6, 
which is to provide suggestions for theoretical and methodological innovations that will 
render feminist transitional justice better equipped to respond to the challenges posed 
by contemporary internationalized transitional justice practice.  
The focus of this chapter are the higher level (political) dynamics behind EU 
engagement with gender justice in transition. During the interviews individuals 
implementing EU transitional justice and gender justice related efforts, identified many 
practical obstacles restricting their ability to focus on these issues. These include the 
lack of buy in by ‘the leadership’ – reflected in a lack of human and financial resources 
to support work on these issues - and the absence of relevant legal frameworks to guide 
their activities in this realm. While this thesis acknowledges the existence of these 
barriers, its core focus is on disentangling why they exist, i.e. why has the EU not 
invested more in creating an enabling institutional environment for supporting gender 





6.2 THAT WHAT DOES NOT DRIVE EU SUPPORT WITH GENDER 
JUSTICE IN TRANSITION: POLICY COMMITMENTS AND 
GRASSROOTS GENDER JUSTICE PRIORITIES 
Before diving into the question of what the data suggests to be the factors that are 
driving EU support for certain gender justice issues, this section briefly reflects on what 
factors seem to be less influential: policy commitments to mainstream gendered 
transitional justice priorities, and priorities of (feminist) grassroots transitional justice 
actors. Based on a comparison between the previous chapter’s findings and chapter 4’s 
analysis of the EU’s policy framework on transitional justice, the key take-away is that 
EU’s engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine is only partly reminiscent 
of the approach set out in the Framework on Support for Transitional Justice.  
As discussed in chapter 4, the EU has significantly developed its policy language 
on transitional justice from a (transformative) gender justice perspective over the last 
ten years. While the 2008 Comprehensive Approach mentioned transitional justice only 
in relation to the need to pursue accountability for conflict-related SGBV including 
rape, slavery, sexual abuse and exploitation – ‘the most systematic and widespread 
manifestations of violence against women’680 – the Framework and 2018 EU strategy on 
WPS have a more comprehensive definition of the continuum of violence and the types 
of harms women experience during types of conflict and repression.681 Nevertheless, the 
EU still seems to associate transitional justice most closely with the pursuit of 
accountability for politically motivated SGBV. Moreover, where the EU invokes the 
need to support more future focused gender justice efforts – legislative reform, 
institutional reform and land reform amongst other issues – it does not depict these 
activities as inherent to its gendered transitional justice approach. As such one gets the 
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impression that in 2018 the EU still holds a vision on gendered transitional justice that 
prioritizes mainstream gendered transitional justice endeavours, but that it has started to 
explore the feasibility – or desirability? - of integrating more transformative approaches 
towards dealing with the past in a gender sensitive fashion. 
Now, the previous chapter’s examination of the EU’s activities in the realm of 
gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine, indicates that when it comes to financial support 
for past-focused gender justice efforts, the EU indeed prioritizes support for 
mainstream transitional justice efforts over more transformative ones. This was 
particularly the case in Ukraine where the majority of the EU’s funding for transitional 
justice has been directed towards the HRMMU and OSCE SMM, and where smaller 
badges of funding have been allocated to CSOs working on advocacy geared towards 
Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute and the fight against impunity for torture and 
ill-treatment. In Tunisia the largest share of EU transitional justice funding has been 
allocated to the Specialized Chambers, Tunisia’s transitional justice mechanism focused 
on the prosecution of offenders of grave human rights violations. As such, the EU’s 
approach towards financial support for past-focused transitional justice indeed is in line 
with what its policy language suggests about EU priorities in this field. 
However, the need to address gendered harms – of a narrow or broad nature – 
does not figure prominently in the EU’s engagement with transitional justice in Tunisia 
and Ukraine. This refutes the notion that the fight against impunity for conflict-related 
SGBV is an EU priority in the realm for support for transitional justice. Moreover, an 
in-depth look at the EU’s political support for efforts to fight impunity as such – so not 
specifically focused on SGBV - in Tunisia and Ukraine shows that despite some 
financial support, these efforts do not constitute a real foreign policy priority.  
This, however, does not mean that the EU has not engaged with gender justice 




supporter of forward-looking efforts to combat GBV and other types of discrimination 
through both financial as well as political tools. As such it could be argued that while 
the types of transitional justice efforts the EU does support in Tunisia and Ukraine, the 
EU’s real priority in the field of engagement with gender justice in transition is not 
support for efforts to pursue accountability for exceptional instances of politically 
motivated SGBV, but support for forward-looking efforts to address everyday GBV. 
The EU’s policy language on transitional justice/gender justice in transition thus much 
more closely reflects what feminist scholars assume to be international actors’ gender 
justice priorities abroad, than what the EU’s actual activities in this realm in Tunisia and 
Ukraine are.  
In itself this finding is not very remarkable; after all, the failure to implement 
gendered transitional justice commitments is a rather common characteristic of 
international engagement with gender justice abroad.682 What is remarkable though, is 
the fact that the EU is supporting other gender justice issues and most notably efforts 
to respond to the continuum of violence faced by women in societies in transition. As 
discussed in chapter 4, the EU does mention these efforts in other policy documents 
outlining its support for women’s rights abroad such as GAPII and increasingly in its 
policy framework on WPS. This includes statements outlining the EU’s commitment to 
‘support efforts that address the root causes of violence, such as exclusion, 
discrimination, structural inequalities and sexual and gender-based violence including 
violence against women and girls’.683 However, the EU has put less emphasis on them 
in its transitional justice strategy.  
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Is this because local grassroots actors have other gender justice priorities than 
the mainstream gendered transitional justice priorities traditionally prioritized by 
international actors? To some extent this is indeed the case, feminist actors in particular 
have prioritized the fight against the continuum of violence in both Tunisia and 
Ukraine, which is in line with findings about the priorities of feminist organizations in 
other countries experiencing transition.684 However, this observation only applies to a 
selection of local grassroots gender justice actors, and even for those actors forward-
looking gender justice efforts are not the only priority. In Tunisia feminist interviewees, 
for instance, constantly emphasized the importance of a successful transitional justice 
process as a basis for the country’s democratic transition.685 The fact that feminist 
organizations have consistently been represented amongst the signatories of manifestos 
calling upon the Tunisian authorities to allow for the country’s transitional justice 
process to be carried out, is reflective of this state of affairs.686 
Moreover, these feminist actors only present a segment of the countries’ 
women’s movements. Others, particularly female victims’ groups in Tunisia and 
peacebuilding activists in Ukraine, have focused more on the pursuit of justice – in the 
broad sense of the term – for female victims of conflict and repression.687 In Tunisia the 
EU has neither engaged directly with any of these female victims’ groups nor has it 
provided financial support to iNGOs cooperating with them. Moreover, it has not 
provided political backing to these – or other - groups when they expressed concern 
about the direction in which the country’s transitional justice process was moving. 
Therefore, to the extent that the EU has supported gendered transitional justice in 
Tunisia it did not support any of the signature issues of feminist victims’ groups such as 
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reparations for a broad range of gendered harms and the withdrawal of Circular 108. In 
Ukraine the EU has supported NGOs working with IDP women, but these are 
focusing on the issue of everyday domestic violence, and not the instances of more 
politically motivated violence that have occurred in Donbas.  
As such this thesis argues it is safe to conclude that neither the EU’s policy 
framework nor local grassroots actors’ gender justice priorities are the primary drivers 
of the EU’s support for gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine. The following sections 
will look into more detail in the reasons behind this absence of support for mainstream 
gendered transitional justice issues and past-focused transformative justice efforts.  
 
6.3 HOW TO EXPLAIN THE EU’S LACK OF MEANINGFUL 
ENGAGEMENT WITH MAINSTREAM GENDERED TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE EFFORTS? 
Combining the findings about the nature of EU engagement with gender justice from 
chapter 5 with chapter 4's insights about the role of politics in shaping Tunisia’s and 
Ukraine’s gender justice advances since their respective revolutions, this section argues 
that the (gender justice) agendas of local powerful political elites are at the root of the 
EU’s near complete lack of meaningful support for past-focused gender justice efforts 
such as the activities of the TDC in Tunisia, and efforts aimed at pursuing justice for 
conflict-related SGBV in Ukraine. Comparing the type of EU engagement with future-
focused gender justice efforts in Tunisia and Ukraine, it also argues that preferences of 
the Tunisian and Ukrainian authorities shape the exact nature of future focused gender 
justice efforts, i.e. whether the EU prioritizes support for legislative reform as it did in 





6.3.1 The local politics behind the lack of EU engagement with mainstream 
(gendered) transitional justice efforts 
Based on chapter 4’s insights regarding the gender justice priorities of governing elites 
in Tunisia and Ukraine, and interviews with EU actors working on relevant issues in 
Tunisia and Ukraine, this section identifies the drivers behind the absence of strong EU 
support for mainstream gendered transitional justice efforts. It uses the previous 
chapter’s observations regarding ‘remarkable’ aspects of the EU’s engagement with 
transitional justice in Tunisia and Ukraine as a starting point for this exercise. In Tunisia 
these observations concern the timing of EU support for transitional justice and the 
actors it has and has not provided funding to. In Ukraine these observations concern 
the EU’s strong political condemnation of Russia compared to its relative silence on the 
failure of Ukrainian authorities to live up to their commitments under international law, 
and the EU’s approach towards the question of amnesties in the context of the Donbas 
conflict. Comparing these findings to chapter 4’s observations about the EU’s broader 
foreign policy priorities in Tunisia and Ukraine, this sub-section concludes that absence 
of – political – backing for mainstream (gendered) transitional justice efforts on the 
EU’s behalf is guided by local political elites’ dislike of attempts to pursue accountability 
for past and ongoing politically motivated crimes.   
 Chapter 5 observed that the EU made its last budgetary commitments to 
support transitional justice efforts– of both a mainstream and more transformative 
nature – in Tunisia in 2014.688 This is remarkable as transitional justice efforts continue 
until today. It is true that the 2014 commitment to support the Specialized Chambers 
was implemented over the two/three succeeding years. However, it is also the case that 
during this period the need for support for civil society advocacy activities to support 
 




Tunisia’s transitional justice efforts only increased in importance. Linking back this 
finding to chapter 4’s discussion of broader political developments in Tunisia after 
2011, it becomes clear that the EU’s final budgetary commitments to support 
transitional justice have coincided with Nidaa Tounes’ victory of the 2014 legislative 
and presidential elections. As discussed, Nidaa Tounes is vehemently anti-transitional 
justice.689 This provides the impression that there is a link between the EU’s 
engagement with transitional justice in Tunisia and this shift of power.  
There could be some alternative explanations for this change in priorities, such 
as the fact that the ‘newness’ of the issue had worn off by 2014. However, here it 
should be noted that other international donors have continued to provide funding for 
transitional justice advocacy up till at least 2018.690  In doing so these donors seemed to 
acknowledge the pivotal moment the Tunisian transitional justice process had arrived at 
with on the one hand the TDC being about to publish its final report and the 
Specialized Chambers starting to consider cases, but on the other hand political hostility 
reaching a boiling point.691Another possible explanation for the EU’s reluctance to 
support the transitional justice process was offered to the researcher by an EU Member 
State diplomat. He argued that the EU – and its Member States – had been hesitant to 
engage with transitional justice in Tunisia as it was broadly considered to be an Islamist 
undertaking. 692 According to him this would not be good optics for the EU in Tunisia. 
However, before 2014 when Ennahda was still in power the EU did support transitional 
justice (related) initiatives which did not provide the impression that the EU was 
supporting an Islamist vision of transitional justice. Examples include the project 
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focused on supporting Tunisian CSOs’ transitional justice advocacy in marginalized 
regions such as Sidi Bouzid. Moreover, other donors have managed to support 
transitional justice efforts after 2014 without providing the impression of having bought 
in to a – supposed – Islamist transitional justice agenda, for instance by supporting 
iNGOs working with a broad coalition of both secular and Islamists Tunisian 
transitional justice actors.693 
 This thesis argues that a better explanation for this remarkable transitional 
justice timeline are the EU’s own shifting foreign policy priorities in combination with 
the shifting political landscape in Tunisia. As discussed in section 4.3.4 on the EU’s 
relations with Tunisia, 2015 marked the year of two major terrorist attacks in Tunisia. 
These attacks rendered efforts to reform Tunisia’s security sector in order to put it in a 
better position to deal with the significant terrorist threat, the EU’s core foreign policy 
priority in Tunisia. SSR requires cooperation of national authorities and therefore it was 
essential for the EU to safeguard strong ties with the Tunisian authorities. This was 
confirmed by an EU Member State diplomat working on SSR in Tunis, who 
emphasized the importance of safeguarding strong working relations with the 
authorities, and particularly the Ministry of Interior, to make sure that the EU’s 23 
million Euro security spending package could be effectively implemented.694 Both 
President Essebsi as well as the Minister of Interior have manifested themselves as 
some of the staunchest opponents of Tunisia’s transitional justice process.695 Examples 
of this opposition include the introduction of the Economic Reconciliation Bill by the 
President,696 and the sabotaging of the work of the Specialized Chambers, as discussed 
in more detail in chapter 4 and section 5.3.1.  
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The EU did not respond to these attacks. The fieldwork finished before the 
Ministry of Interior became involved in serious attacks on the (EU-funded) Specialized 
Chambers.697 Therefore, interviews did not touch upon the EU’s response to these 
developments. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, no public EU statements 
were issued against these serious attacks on the independence of the Tunisian judiciary. 
Asked about the Economic Reconciliation Bill an EU Delegation official stated that it 
was ‘not easy for the EU’ to support such an initiative, i.e. the law, instead of 
straightforwardly condemning this course of affairs. Reflecting on the tri-partite 
dialogues that are taking place between the EU, Tunisian CSOs and the government, 
this official mentioned: 
And then transitional justice of course was raised as a concern, the law on reconciliation. We 
discussed why the government wanted to have another approach than what is foreseen in the 
law. We didn’t reach really strong conclusions. The EU maintained that the IVD and 
commissions established under the IVD are independent, and if the government decides to 
create a new commission for economic reconciliation cases, it has to be an independent 
commission. You also need legal remedies, and for transitional justice you also need publication 
or broadcasting of the content and the conclusion [of the investigations], which was missing 
from the proposal. Again, the law is back, I mean every year, every summer it is back. We will 
see how it proceeds. It is not easy to support such a law from our side, because Tunisia agreed 
to a certain mechanism.698  
An EU Member State diplomat based in Tunis added to this that the EU had not 
publicly condemned attacks on Tunisia’s transitional justice process, as it was ‘too 
politically sensitive’, refusing to go in much more detail into the question why.699 Taken 
together the EU’s soft stance on and lack of support for transitional justice in Tunisia in 
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the wake of 2014, thus seems to be related to developments at the level of ‘core’ foreign 
policy priorities.   
A second remarkable feature of the EU’s support for transitional justice in 
Tunisia, concerns the actors it has provided support to. While the EU has provided 
support to iNGOs working on socio-economic rights related issues in Tunisia’s 
marginalized regions, and the fight against torture and ill-treatment, the EU’s only 
support focused on Tunisia’s official transitional justice mechanisms was in its entirety 
channelled through UNDP. This was a source of major critique amongst interviewees 
working for international human rights NGOs in Tunisia. This is logical as they are 
competing for the same funding as UNDP. Nevertheless, their critiques do highlight 
that the EU preferred to provide funding for technical support to transitional justice in 
Tunisia, rather than to much needed advocacy efforts.700 Moreover, by providing 
funding to another IO the EU created distance between itself and Tunisia’s transitional 
justice efforts. 
This is a tactic which has been used by other international donors in other 
difficult transitional justice environments, as highlighted by Arthur.701 She identified the 
creation of ‘pooled’ transitional justice funds. For instance, ‘in Guatemala, a major shift 
in international funding for TJ initiatives occurred in 2010 with the creation of PAJUST 
(Transitional Justice Accompaniment Program), administered by UNDP’.702 This was an 
instance of pooled funding by USAID, Sweden, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
the Basque government, the Catalan government, and the UN Peacebuilding Fund, 
which totalled nearly 35.9 million USD for a five-year period. Donors indicated that one 
of the reasons for adopting this approach was that ‘channelling funds through UNDP 
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and PAJUST has allowed donor governments to create some distance between 
themselves and TJ efforts, which have become more politically charged over the past 
several years, while still supporting important TJ work’.703 
EU interviewees familiar with the EU’s approach towards transitional justice in 
Tunisia did not as explicitly acknowledge that channelling support through UNDP 
served this goal. Instead, when asked about prioritizing cooperation with the UNDP 
one official remarked in an email exchange: ‘UNDP is our implementing partner, this is 
a normal way of working’.704  Nevertheless, other officials familiar with the EU’s 
engagement with transitional justice in Tunisia repeatedly invocated obstacles that 
prevented the EU from supporting Tunisian actors working on transitional justice, 
particularly the TDC’s malfunctioning and the population’s fatigue with the its work,705 
and the lack of institutional strength of some of these local transitional justice NGOs.706 
One official in Brussels, for instance, remarked:  
Yes, I mean I think it is a very sensitive dossier; there is the full process of transitional justice 
going on with the specific body that is dealing with it, which has a lot of problems, a lot of 
internal problems in functioning. […] So they have a practical problem but there is also, they are 
quite a big… It is really sensitive, there is really opposition from a very important part of the 
society. So it is, I mean I don’t think I am saying anything, you know, it is controversial…707  
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I:  In our call for proposals, it was two years ago, we had transitional justice, but we didn’t really 
receive proposals on that topic.  
E: Ah, so no organizations here…  
I: I mean there were proposals, but they were not strong enough, and then we selected only two. 
One which is working with detainees in Sousse, and the other one is legal aid to vulnerable 
groups, but that is why it is not 100 per cent transitional justice, it is something that helps, but 
yeah. And there is also the question whether we believe it is going to be successful or not… I 
mean the IVD we will see if their mandate is extended or not. It took a long, long time to 
handle the cases in the IVD, and there is a public fatigue and all this money invested in this 
institution with no results, because they still haven’t transferred the files to the court, because of 
different reasons, and that can be justified, but still IVD didn’t transmit a single file to the court.  
 




In this light channelling funding through UNDP must have appeared the safest option 
for EU engagement with transitional justice in Tunisia.  
In relation to Ukraine the previous chapter observed a large discrepancy 
between the EU’s consistent public condemnation of Russia, and its reluctance to 
express criticism in relation to Ukraine’s failure to live up to its commitments under 
international law. In principle the EU has significantly more leverage over Ukraine than 
over Russia. As such political/economic pressure applied to Ukraine for its failure to 
prosecute perpetrators of war crimes and other grave human rights violations on its 
own side, would likely be more effective. However, as mentioned, it has not done so. 
Asked about this silence during interviews, EU officials questioned the wisdom of 
publicly insisting on Ukraine to pursue justice in view of the fragile security situation. 
More specifically, SGUA officials argued against putting too much public pressure on 
Ukraine to pursue accountability for war crimes committed by its own forces, as Russia 
could use this for its anti-Ukraine propaganda.708  
Outsider observers, however, remarked that this was not the only reason why 
the EU had not been vocal about the need for Ukraine to pursue accountability. They 
believed that the EU’s hesitation to call out Ukraine was also borne out of fear to put 
the existing positive working relations in peril, which could negatively affect other more 
important reforms such as those related to energy security.709 While EU officials did not 
 
708 Interview 20 Brussels, (n285). 
709 Interview 14 Ukraine (n494); Interview 9 Brussels (n606).  
 
Others did not invoke energy security directly, but did mention that the EU could not prioritize one type 
of reforms over the other: Interview 1 Ukraine (n600). This interviewee stated:  
 
The EU excused much of the inexcusable behaviour of the Ukrainian government pointing at 
the fact that the country was going through a transition and fighting a war at the same time. This 
was a lost opportunity as it was at the same time the right momentum for reforms. Once the EU 
started realizing that it was not an effective strategy and started raising criticism, it was already 
too late, as it had already lost a lot of its credibility. Someone remarked that the international 
community should act as a good friend to Ukraine; a good friend should not be afraid to give 
honest feedback, because they want the best for you. The idea of unconditional support for 





directly mention energy security, many commented on the enormous progress Ukraine 
had already made over the last couple of years – more than it had achieved over the 
previous twenty years – and cautioned against overburdening Ukraine with too many 
demands, in order to not put at peril the progress that had been made.710 
The previous chapter also raised questions about the EU’s approach towards 
amnesties in the context of the Minsk peace process. As discussed, the Minsk II 
Agreement calls for Ukraine to provide an (seemingly unconditional) amnesty for 
individuals guilty of crimes committed in the context of the Donbas conflict.711 In 
principle the EU opposes unconditional amnesties.712 However, two EU Member States 
were involved in the negotiation of the Minsk Agreement, and the EU has consistently 
called on the full implementation of Minsk. To make things more complicated the EU 
has also consistently called on all parties to the conflict – even though it has been more 
vocal about Russia’s responsibility – to prosecute offenders of grave crimes. It, 
however, has not backed up these calls with meaningful political pressure on Ukraine.  
This thesis can only speculate about the role of politics in causing this situation 
as no EU official interviewed for this research displayed willingness to elaborate on the 
issue.713 Could it be that the EU has not put more pressure on Ukraine to pursue 
 
710 Interview 20 Brussels, (n285). This notion of Ukraine having made enormous strides is also reflected 
in public statements: European Commission, EU-Ukraine Summit: strengthening our partnership and 
highlighting significant reform progress achieved by Ukraine (24 November 2016). Available at: 
https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3988_en.htm, accessed 4 August 2019. 
 
711 Trilateral Contact Group, Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk agreements (12 
February 2015). Available at: 
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UA_150212_MinskAgreement_en.pdf, 
accessed 15 august 2018.  
712 Council of the European Union 2015 (n3).  
713 When it comes to the role of Germany and France in this process others have argued that both 
countries’ rather lenient stance towards Russia has been the subject of criticism of other EU Member 
States: 
 
‘Last, but not least, stakeholders not included in the Normandy Format continue to question its ability to 
deliver a full resolution to the conflict. Although the Obama administration and European officials 
publicly support France and Germany’s independent diplomatic enterprise, many officials and experts in 
Washington, as well as various EU officials, do not hide their concerns that the two most significant 
European players are handling the crisis by themselves. Eastern EU member states are concerned that 




accountability for grave crimes, because the EU’s ultimate aim is to guarantee stability in 
the Eastern Neighbourhood – both for economic and security purposes - even if this 
means allowing total impunity for the perpetrators of all types of crimes in the context 
in the Donbas conflict?714 If the EU believes this is an acceptable compromise, it could 
explain why it is not insisting more on Ukraine to take its responsibility in this regard. 
Interestingly, an in-depth examination of Germany’s and France’s public statements 
about the Minsk Agreement by Katherine Brown shows that amnesties for separatists is 
one of the clauses from the Minsk agreement that both Angela Merkel and Francois 
Hollande, who was still the President of France when Minsk II was signed, did not 
comment on publicly at all.715 Similarly, this researcher has not identified any EU 
 
Germany in the sense that they would not be tough enough with the Russians. […] For their part, both 
Berlin and Paris are well aware of the limitations of their efforts to identify a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict. […] Yet, they consider that their ability to bring Russia and Ukraine together has played a key 
role in limiting further escalation of the conflict. And their main concerns, beyond the restoration of 
Ukraine’s sovereignty, from the very beginning have been to avoid escalation, to contain the negative 
repercussions the conflict may have for European security, and to engage in a diplomatic process 
conducive to a political settlement.’  
 
Simon De Galbert, The Impact of the Normandy Format on the Conflict in Ukraine: Four Leaders, 
Three Cease-fires, and Two Summits, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available at: 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/impact-normandy-format-conflict-ukraine-four-leaders-three-cease-fires-
and-two-summits, accessed 8 August 2019.  
 
714 Ukraine would not be the first country in which the EU has remained silent in the face of 
unconditional amnesties, one interviewee shared that in Afghanistan the EU has also funded negotiations 
that resulted in a deal that provided an unconditional amnesty to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, ‘the Butcher of 
Kabul’. The European Union provided almost 3 million EUR funding for the ‘Afghan Peace Support 
Initiative’ itself, and afterwards provided funding that would allow the peace deal to be implemented.   
 
One interviewee mentioned that this situation even resulted in debate about the Framework’s language on 
Embassy, with individuals in the Afghan EU Delegation objecting against its rejection of unconditional 
amnesties. Interview 10 Brussels, 12 June 2017, Representative EEAS: 
 
I: So for example I work on Afghanistan, and we have been quite involved in this return of 
Hekmatyar, the Butcher of Kabul, with whom the government signed a deal, with his Hezb-e 
Islami party, where it gave some form of an amnesty, which is not in line with international 
standards. So you know, these challenges; the delegations were a little bit concerned about the 
language around our approach towards amnesties and so on.  
E: So they wanted to have more flexible language?  
I: Yeah, I would say so.  
 
715 Katherine Brown, Theoretical Explanations for the Minsk II: Power, Preferences, and Interactions 
Examined, Thesis - Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts 





documents or public statements reflecting on this specific clause of the Minsk 
agreement. This provides the impression that the issue of amnesties in context of the 
Donbas conflict, is one the EU prefers to ignore.  
This lack of strategy on how to balance the potentially competing aims of peace 
and justice in EU foreign policy is not limited to the EU’s efforts in the Ukrainian 
context. In her 2014 analysis of the EU support for peace and justice in foreign policy 
Davis found a near complete lack of in-depth policy reflection on how to balance 
conquering goals through for instancing sequencing of support:  
Some EU mediators have understood the EU’s support for the ICC to mean a prohibition on 
amnesties for crimes coming under the ICC’s jurisdiction, but this is not EU policy. The UN, in 
contrast, expressly prohibits its mediators from witnessing agreements that include amnesties 
covering these crimes. The mediation support concept does not provide options, 
encouragement or requirements for EU mediators to propose positive steps to seek justice for 
human rights violations committed during conflict.716 
As such she concluded that EU policy language provides the impression of justice being 
a low priority for EU in conflict-settings. However, a case-study of EU support for 
efforts aimed at advancing peace and justice in practice in the DRC, indicated that ‘in 
that country at least, peace 
mediation and justice were, separately and together, priorities for the EU’. This provides 
the impression of a rather arbitrary rather than strategic transitional justice actor. 
 The publication of the Framework in 2015 has clarified the EU’s position on 
some of these issues. The Council Conclusions for instance confirm the EU’s 
commitment to integrating questions of justice in crisis response and peacebuilding 
efforts: 
The Council recognises the desirability of integrating transitional justice into crisis response and 
peacebuilding including in any peace negotiations which the EU supports. The Council also 
 




encourages EU Special Representatives, who play an active role in efforts to consolidate peace, 
stability and the rule of law, to promote accountability and the fight against impunity for 
violations and abuses.717  
It also clarifies the EU’s position on amnesties by explicitly rejecting the permissibility 
of unconditional amnesties.718 However, the EU’s approach towards accountability in 
the context of the Donbas conflict provides the impression that the adoption of the 
Framework has not necessarily resulted in more consistency.  
Overall, these observations strongly support the notion that the EU’s lack of 
support for mainstream transitional justice efforts, most notably those aimed at the 
pursuit of accountability for grave crimes, in Tunisia and Ukraine is informed by the 
aversion of local political elites against such efforts. As discussed in chapter 4, appeasing 
local political elites is essential to the EU’s broader foreign policy interests in Tunisia 
and Ukraine. As such, in the context of this thesis’ case studies non-engagement with 
mainstream (gendered) transitional justice goals is reflective of the EU’s instrumentalist 
approach towards engagement with (gender) justice in transition. The more speculative 
reflections on the EU’s approach towards the amnesty clause in the Minsk agreement 
suggest that in the Ukrainian context broader geopolitical and geo-economic 
considerations have played a similar role in curbing the EU’s insistence on fighting 
impunity in the context of the Donbas war. The next section will expand the argument 
that priorities of political elites determine the EU’s gender justice in transition in 
Tunisia and Ukraine, by demonstrating that the EU’s support for forward-looking 
gender justice efforts in both countries is also shaped by elite actor preferences.  
 
 
717 Council of the European Union 2015 (n3): 4. 




6.3.2 The local gender politics behind the EU’s selective engagement with future 
focused gender justice efforts 
As discussed, EU policy documents have increasingly emphasized the importance of 
support for more forward-focused gender justice efforts and the need to address the 
continuum of violence experienced by women in societies transitioning from conflict 
and repression. As such, one could argue that the EU’s prioritization of support for 
legislative and institutional reform is not entirely out of step with EU policy 
commitments. Moreover, as (some) local women’s groups have been prioritizing these 
issues, EU support for them also corresponds with grassroots demands. This thesis 
agrees. However, it still argues that the agendas of local political elites are the key 
drivers behind the EU’s prioritization of these efforts. It does so, based on some of the 
previous chapter’s observations about the nature of EU engagement with forward-
looking gender justice efforts in Tunisia and Ukraine and chapter 4’s discussion of local 
gender politics. The first observation concerns the difference between the overall 
approach towards supporting efforts aimed at fighting GBV in Tunisia and Ukraine. 
The second observation concerns the exact nature of the type of efforts – provision of 
services, advocacy etc. - the EU has supported in the realm of the fight against GBV in 
Tunisia and Ukraine.  
As discussed in chapter 4, in the wake of their respective revolutions both 
Tunisia and Ukraine have pursued efforts aimed at tackling persistent levels of GBV. 
More specifically, both countries have pursued legislative reform to enhance the 
capacity to deal with this issue. Since chapter 4 showed that supporting efforts to 
address the continuum of violence experienced by women in countries in transition has 
increasingly become an EU priority in the era of WPS, one would expect the EU to be 
fully supportive of these attempts in both Tunisia and Ukraine. However, chapter 5 




of both a financial and political nature to this cause in Tunisia than in Ukraine. 
Comparing these findings with chapter 4’s insights about the role of local gender 
politics in shaping debates about gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine, this section 
argues that this difference between the EU’s approaches towards supporting GBV in 
Tunisia and Ukraine is further evidence of the way in which local political elites shaped 
the EU’s engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine.  
As mentioned, the EU has been supporting legislative reform to tackle GBV 
and other types of discrimination in Tunisia through financial and political means. This 
is in line with the EU’s conviction that bolstering women’s rights and gender equality is 
an integral component of and condition for Tunisia’s successful democratic transition.719 
This robust financial and political commitment to support for legislative reform is in 
stark contrast with the attitude of the EU Delegation in Ukraine, where the only high-
ranking EU official who has publicly called upon Ukraine to ratify the Istanbul 
Convention is the EEAS Principal Advisor on Gender, Ambassador Marinaki.720 As she 
is not a permanent EU fixture in Ukraine, and women’s rights are her only policy 
portfolio, this does not have the same importance as having the EU Ambassador raising 
this topic.  
 
719 This notion is captured in this 2018 statement which celebrates the advances Tunisia made over the 
course of 2017: ‘The period presented in this report was characterized by a consolidation of the transition 
in Tunisia, for instance through the adoption of electoral laws, the convening of municipal elections for 
the 6th of May 2018, the law on violence against women, the creation of a Commission on reforms related 
to freedoms and equality, and the adoption of the strategy for the reform of the public 
administration’.Commission Européenne & La Haute Représentante de l'Union Européenne pour les 
Affaires Étrangères et la Politique de Sécurité, Document de Travail Conjoint des Services : Rapport sur 
l'état des relations UE-Tunisie dans le cadre de la Politique européenne de voisinage révisée Mars 2017 – 
Mars 2018, Bruxelles, le 30.4.2018 SWD(2018) 180 final: 17.  
Similar references which connect support for women’s rights to support for Tunisia’s democratic 
transition can be found in: Commission Européenne & La Haute Représentante de l'Union Européenne 
pour les Affaires Étrangères et la Politique de Sécurité, Rapport sur l'état des relations UE-Tunisie dans le 
cadre de la Politique européenne de voisinage révisée Avril 2017, Bruxelles, le 26.4.2017 SWD(2017) 152 
final: 4. 
720 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine Sergiy Kyslytsya met with 
the European External Action Service Principal Advisor on gender / UNSC resolution 1325 
implementation Mara Marinaki (14 June 2016). Available at: https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-
offices-news/48420-zastupnik-ministra-zakordonnih-sprav-ukrajini-sergij-kislicya-zustrivsya-z-golovnim-
radnikom-jevropejsykoji-sluzhbi-zovnishnih-dij-z-gendernih-pitany-ta-vikonannya-rezolyuciji-rb-oon-




Connecting these findings to the insights about the controversies that have 
shaped the discourse around gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine after the Arab Spring 
and Maidan, this preparedness or unpreparedness to support legislative reform is 
directly linked to the local gender justice climate and particularly the preferences of local 
political elites. In Tunisia, since 2015, the process towards the adoption of legislation to 
fight GBV has been relatively smooth. In Ukraine, however, the ratification of the 
Istanbul Convention has become a topic of national controversy with the powerful 
Council of Churches having expressed opposition against the document due to its use 
of the term gender. While the Ukrainian President has expressed himself in favour of 
ratification, he has not exercised his influence to bring this goal any closer. The EU’s 
lack of support for advocacy efforts in favour of ratification suggests that it has 
replicated the President’s approach. In this regard one interviewee working on EU-
Ukraine Association in Brussels remarked: 
And then, very quickly, when we would like to raise an issue or push for example for the 
ratification of the Istanbul Convention our leadership says: ‘well what is the legal basis for that, 
we already have a lot of contentious issues, do we really need to add this too?’. That is one side, 
and on the Ukrainian side they are getting hammered with loads of stuff they need to do and are 
not doing. So they are also a bit allergic to yet another issue.721 
Interestingly, in Tunisia the EU has not only presented itself as a vocal backer of 
legislation to address VAW, but also of President Essebsi’s efforts aimed at 
guaranteeing equal inheritance rights. Contrary to the Integral Law on VAW, this 
legislation is very controversial amongst large shares of the Tunisian population because 
it contradicts Islamic law.722 If the EU’s approach towards the struggle against GBV was 
shaped by popular opinion – as one could argue is the case in Ukraine – one would 
expect the EU to have refrained from expressing public support for equal inheritance 
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rights in Tunisia. However, the EU has adopted the opposite approach. This 
strengthens the case that the preferences of political elites rather than populations at 
large determine the EU’s engagement with forward-looking gender justice efforts in 
Tunisia and Ukraine.  
In addition, section 5.4.1, which discusses the exact nature of EU support for 
the fight against GBV and other types of gender-based discrimination, found that while 
the EU has prioritized support for legislative reform in this realm in Tunisia, some 
aspects of this support confirmed the notion that the EU’s engagement in this regard is 
restricted by governing elites’ priorities. These aspects concern the exact nature of the 
EU’s support and its timing. When it comes to timing of the EU’s political support in 
particular, it should be noted that the EU has only become vocal on equal inheritance 
right after the President had already committed himself to this cause. When it comes to 
the nature of EU support for forward-looking gender justice efforts interviewees 
highlighted the EU’s failure to support (feminist) NGOs’ advocacy for issues that go 
beyond the scope of the government’s gender justice agenda.  
Furthermore, the fact that in Ukraine the EU has prioritized support for efforts 
to integrate women in the security forces also bolsters the claim that local authorities’ 
priorities shape the EU’s gender justice agenda. As described in section 4.4.3, one of the 
dominant Ukrainian narratives accompanying the conflict in Donbas has been the role 
that women have played in the defence of Ukraine’s territory against Russia, through 
the taking up of active combat roles.723 While these women faced severe resistance in 
the beginning, their choice has become more normalized, and even become a source of 
national pride.724 As discussed in section 4.4.2.4, this is reflected in the fact that recently 
 
723 Martsenyuk, Grytsenko and Kvit 2016 (n466). 





Ukraine has banned legislation that prohibits women from working in certain high risk 
jobs including certain positions in the military.725  Generally speaking, the Soviet vision 
of emancipation – still heavily shaping Ukraine’s vision on gender equality today – is 
constructed around women’s participation in the job market as the core indicator of 
gender equality.726 Therefore, support for integration of women in the security forces is 
one of the less disruptive gender justice efforts the EU could support in Ukraine. In 
Tunisia, to the contrary, the lack of women’s participation in the public sphere has been 
the key factor banishing the country to the lower ranks of global gender equality 
indexes.727  
This picture was confirmed during interviews with EU officials and other 
experts on the security in Tunisia: 
I: The point is I could just tell you ‘okay gender is a marvellous issue’, I could tell you…  
E: Yes, I appreciate you are open about this.  
I: But I just want to tell you that it is true that it is not so easy when you… Because two years 
ago you know, it was almost war time here. I mean we had a curfew, a state of emergency. We 
still have a state of emergency, but in the beginning of the curfew it was from 8 pm. That is very 
early in the evening. So that means that at 8 everyone was at home. It was a very stressful 
 
This shifting attitude towards women is also reflected in the lifting of a ban that prohibited women to 
work in 450 professions which were considered to be dangerous. Anti-Discrimination Centre 2018 
(n465).  
725 Human Rights Information Centre, In Ukraine more than 450 jobs are still banned for women – 
report (10 February 2017. Available at: 
https://humanrights.org.ua/en/material/v_ukrajini_zhinkam_dosi_zaboroneni_ponad_450_profesij__z
vit, accessed 28 November 2018.  
726 Tatiana Zhurzhenko, 'Free market ideology and new women’s identities in post-socialist Ukraine' 
(2001) 8(1) European Journal of Women's Studies 29; Maryna Bazylevych, 'Women Professionals in the" 
Marketplace" in Post-Socialist Ukraine: Socialist-Post-Socialist Continuum in Gender Categories' (2005) 
23(2) Anthropology of East Europe Review 41. 
727 In the 2017 World Gender Gap Index Tunisia scores 131st out of 144 nations for economic 
participation. Its overall ranking is 117th, with its highest sub-ranking being 55th for political participation. 
Ukraine, to the contrary, ranks 34th out of 144 nations for economic participation, while it ranks 103rd for 
political participation. Available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2017.pdf, accessed 
25 November 2018.  
 
The UNDP’s 2018 Gender Inequality index ranks Tunisia 95th and Ukraine 88th. However, also this index 
shows a huge discrepancy between women’s labour force participation in Ukraine (69.0 %) and Tunisia 
(24.3 %) versus men at 84.5 % in Ukraine and 70.6 % in Tunisia. Available at: 




atmosphere, and at that time, again it couldn’t be the top priority, for sure. And, I think 
speaking more and more with them [the Tunisian authorities], and explaining exactly the goal, 
explaining exactly what can be won, going further and further in this issue takes time. That’s all. 
That’s all.  
E: Okay… 
I: And if it is not well done, you take the risk that officially they will say yes, because politically 
they are obliged to say yes, but there will be not a single change in depth. I mean, if we really 
want to achieve any concrete results, we have to put a lot of – what’s the name – I mean a lot of 
people, a lot of money, and a lot of time into this. I mean it will not change by, it cannot be a 
magical change, do you understand what I mean?728 
This quote neatly shows that even if the EU is committed to supporting the integration 
of women in the security sector, it is not a priority, and also that the EU believed that in 
Tunisia the relevant authorities were not interested in working on this topic.729  
 
6.3.3 Conclusion 
While EU support for gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine is partly in line with the 
agendas of grassroots (feminist) gender justice actors, the exact nature of what it does 
and does not support betrays that the most significant factors behind EU engagement 
with gender justice in both countries are the agendas of governing elites. In both 
countries the absence of meaningful EU engagement with efforts to pursue 
accountability for past crimes reflects local authorities’ reluctance to engage with, or 
active objection against, mainstream transitional justice efforts. The type of forward-
looking gender justice issues the EU does support are also reminiscent of the priorities 
of local elites. This is nicely illustrated by a comparison between EU gender justice 
 
728 Interview 3 Tunisia (n694). 
729 It should be noted that since 2017 the EU has started to support WPS projects under the IcSP in 
Tunisia, but these all focus on women’s role in PVE/CVE efforts at the community level. These projects 
include: ‘Salam Prévenir l'Extrémisme Violent en Tunisie : Une Approche Basée sur les Droits Humains 





efforts in Tunisia and Ukraine. In Tunisia the EU’s readiness to support progressive 
legislative reform to improve Tunisian women’s legal standing, is reminiscent of Nidaa 
Tounes’ gender justice priorities as discussed in chapter 4. In Ukraine similar efforts 
have been pursued by local and international gender justice advocates, which means that 
also here the EU could have profiled itself as a champion of legislative reform aimed at 
combating GBV. However, in Ukraine the EU’s engagement with this issue has been 
rather subdued. This is in line with the lack of serious buy in from governing political 
elites in the Istanbul Convention. This suggests that also when it comes to forward-
looking gender justice support local gender politics rather than EU gender justice 
principles are at the core of the EU’s efforts in this realm. The implications of these 
findings for feminist theory will be discussed in the upcoming two sections.  
 
6.4 CO-OPTION OF TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACHES TOWARDS 
GENDER JUSTICE IN TRANSITION  
How do these findings relate to notions that international actors’ approach towards 
support for gender justice in transition is guided by instrumentalist motives? This 
section argues that while co-option of gender justice issues by international transitional 
justice actors has been traditionally associated with support for the pursuit of 
accountability of wartime-rape, the EU’s narrow gender justice agenda in Tunisia and 
Ukraine testifies to the fact that also support for a more transformative approach 
towards gender justice in transition can be subordinated to broader foreign policy goals. 
The fact that the EU wants to safeguard optimal relations with Tunisian and Ukrainian 
governing elites, and the fact that its gender justice support follows the gender justice 
priorities of these elites is a strong indicator that gender justice support is employed in 
such a way as to not jeopardize and even to strengthen working relations with partner 




justice in Tunisia and Ukraine differs from the priorities traditionally associated with 
‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’, the factors shaping this 
engagement are the same. This raises questions about the ability of a feminist definition 
of transformative justice constructed around certain harms and mechanisms is best 
suited to tackle the – apparently – multi-headed beast which it ‘the patriarchy of 
internationalized transitional justice’.  
As discussed in chapter 2, instrumentalization or co-option describes the notion 
that despite increased attention for gender justice in international politics, opportunism 
rather than ideological commitment to the cause has spurred international actors’ 
specific efforts in certain contexts. As the critique at the core of feminist scholarship on 
international engagement with gender justice is that international actors have prioritized 
support for the pursuit of accountability for conflict-related SGBV at the expense of 
other type of gender justice efforts, the notion of instrumentalization has been explored 
mostly in relation to this type of intervention.730 The embrace of transformative justice 
approaches that focus on a wider range of harms experienced by women in times of 
conflict and transition are suggested as a potential remedy against this opportunistic 
approach towards gender justice abroad. 
As discussed in section 3.5 on data analysis, the first version of the code book 
that functioned as the analysis framework for the interviews, and included 
‘instrumentalization’ as an overarching thematic code, did not really sync well with the 
data. This was related to the fact that the definition of the instrumentalization code was 
tied to the ‘essentialization’ code. This code was supposed to include statements 
referring or implying the EU’s prioritization of responding to politically motivated 
SGBV in its support for gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine. However, few 
 




statements suggested such an understanding of gender justice priorities on the EU’s 
behalf. Instead a category called ‘side-lining’ needed to be added to the code book to 
capture the many quotes that implied a reluctance on the EU’s behalf to engage with 
mainstream (gendered) transitional justice priorities. To capture the implications behind 
the quotes describing the type of gender justice efforts the EU did support the code ‘de-
politicization’ was added. De-politicization was used to describe quotes that imply that 
the EU is supporting gender justice efforts that are not politically sensitive for local 
political elites. Further reflection on the quotes in the ‘side-lining’ and ‘de-politicization’ 
categories resulted in the insight that instrumentalist attitudes can also be reflected in 
support for other gender justice efforts than support for the pursuit of accountability 
for wartime rape.   
In fact, the previous paragraphs’ core contribution to feminist thinking on 
international support for transitional justice is that in certain contexts support for the 
pursuit of accountability for politically motivated SGBV can actually be considered as a 
liability rather than a vehicle to advance other foreign policy interests. This is 
particularly the case when past-focused gender justice efforts are not high on the agenda 
of national political elites – for cultural and/or (geo)political reasons - and the 
conservation of good relations with these elites is central to the said international actors’ 
foreign policy strategy. In these cases, international support for efforts that have often 
been singled out as components of a more transformative approach because they 
address the ‘continuum of violence’, can actually be the contrary, as they reinforce the 
agendas of governing political elites. The exact nature of the type of future-focused 
gender justice efforts the EU does and does not engage with in Tunisia and Ukraine 
indeed supports the notion that support for ‘transformative’ justice efforts can also be 





6.5 DEFINING TRANSFORMATIVE 
Chapter 5 contains findings about the nature of EU support for gender justice in 
transition that diametrically oppose much of the dominant insights about ‘the patriarchy 
of internationalized transitional justice’ in feminist scholarship on this issue. As these 
findings are based on EU engagement with transitional justice in only two case study 
countries they are not representative of the entire field. It could well be that in other 
contexts the EU has prioritized the pursuit of accountability for wartime rape and 
ignored future focused gender justice efforts aimed at addressing the continuum of 
violence and inequalities experienced by women. Nevertheless, the fact that feminist 
theory on ‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’ does not account for 
the type of findings outlined in the previous chapter, indicates that some adjustments 
should be made in order to ensure that theory adequately covers the – multi-faceted – 
realities of international support for gender justice in transition. This section argues in 
favour of the development of a diversified theory of ‘the patriarchy of internationalized 
transitional justice’ and politicized definition of transformative justice.  
In feminist transitional justice scholarship on international engagement with 
transitional justice the ‘local’ has often been synonymous with grassroots gender justice 
actors.731 In this type of publications, the local fulfils the role of a source of inspiration 
for more transformative approaches towards gender justice in transition.732 This 
chapter’s findings emphasize the importance of acknowledging ‘the local’ as a core 
political factor shaping the nature of international engagement with gender justice in 
transition. In this understanding ‘the local’ is not necessarily a shortcut for more 
transformative, holistic approaches towards the pursuit of gender justice in transition, 
 
731 O’Reilly 2016 (n112Error! Bookmark not defined.). 




but rather a politicized entity in which gender justice is advanced according to political 
calculations.733  
These political calculations impact what constitutes an instrumentalist approach 
towards gender justice in transition on behalf of international actors. The notion that 
international actors’ engagement with women’s rights is determined by opportunistic 
motives is an often repeated concern in feminist literature.734 However, as many 
feminist transitional justice scholars take the fact that international actors prioritize 
support for the pursuit of accountability for conflict-related SGBV for granted, the 
existence of opportunistic motives has been explored almost uniquely in relation to this 
type of violence.735 Above discussed analysis of the linkages between the nature of the 
EU’s engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine and local authorities’ 
gender justice priorities suggests that motives behind other types of gender justice 
support can be equally opportunistic. This means that in certain contexts international 
support for transformative justice solutions can be equally instrumentalist as the focus 
on wartime rape in others. This suggests that when invocated as a potential solution for 
the flaws of ‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’ the definition of the 
term ‘transformative’ might need to be constructed around the notion that it addresses 
the unaddressed. 
At the same time, such a definition raises challenging questions about the role 
of international actors in shaping local gender justice trajectories and the merit of 
pragmatic vs more idealistic approaches towards support for gender justice in transition. 
When it comes to the role of donors in shaping gender justice trajectories, one could 
think of questions such as: Is it acceptable for a donor from the Global North to 
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intervene in delicate discussions about gender and nationhood in fragile periods of 
transition?; When different components of the women’s movement have different 
and/or even competing priorities, how can an outside actor determine what is the 
worthiest cause? When it comes to pragmatic vs more idealistic approaches, the need to 
weigh the added value of support for gender justice efforts that have some buy in from 
local powerholders and those that do not, comes to mind; i.e. is it more valuable to 
support gender justice efforts that are likely to yield tangible results for beneficiaries 
because they are condoned or even embraced by local authorities, than to support 
efforts that will likely not make much difference, because the circumstances will not 
allow for any progressive gender justice outcomes? The following sections look into 
what such a transformative approach might look like in practice and particularly what 
could (or should) be the role of international actors in advancing this ideal. 
 
6.5.1 Can internationalized transitional justice practice be transformative? A post-
colonial feminist perspective 
Having established a definition of ‘transformative gender justice in transition’ it is 
necessary to engage with the questions whether transitional justice as a concept is able 
to bring about “transformation” due to its philosophical, geographical and historical 
roots, and whether international support for such a phenomenon is desirable at all from 
a feminist perspective. As discussed in chapter 1, feminist transitional justice experts – 
particularly those adhering to the post-colonial feminist school of thought – have 
increasingly posited that transitional justice, because it is rooted in a masculine, neo-
colonial vision of post-conflict justice can never be used as a method to transform the 




democracy and peace.736 In this regard Moyo describes transitional justice as ‘one of the 
masculine human rights strategies that are reminiscent of imperial intervention in the 
lives of postcolonial subjects’.737 To the contrary, it has been argued that existing 
patriarchal power structures at both the international and local level have used 
transitional justice as a cosmetic measure that address only a fragment of the human 
rights abuses while forestalling efforts aimed at addressing structural inequality and 
effectuating social justice; a master’s tool poorly equipped to dismantle the master’s 
house.738 These observations apply to transitional justice’s role in curbing quests for 
more distributive justice both within transitional societies themselves, as well as 
between societies in transition and transitional justice donors in the Global North.739 In 
this regard Haynes has demonstrated how the insistence on the embrace of a free 
market economy in post-conflict Bosnia disproportionally harmed women. Both 
privatization and welfare reforms hit women harder, because women more often work 
public sector jobs and also more often are dependent on public services to safeguard 
their own and their families’ wellbeing.740 Alongside this prioritization of a narrow 
vision of transitional justice for economic reasons, post-colonial feminist scholars have 
also criticized international actors’ invocation of women’s rights to advance security-
related goals.741 These critiques have particularly gained momentum in the context of 
the War on Terror during which actors in the Global North justified armed intervention 
in Afghanistan under the pretext of liberating Afghan women from the oppressive 
Taliban Regime. This reasoning of course completely disregarded the enormous levels 
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of harm that the invasion inflicted on the women it alleged to save, and looked even 
more dubious when in the wake of the intervention women’s rights were forgotten or 
sacrificed in the pursuit of more ‘urgent’ security and economic development goals.742 
This presents feminists who are invested in the pursuance of justice for female 
victims of conflict and repression with a difficult dilemma. Is it desirable to advocate in 
favour of a practice – i.e. transitional justice – which while on paper might have some 
potential to contribute to progressive gender justice outcomes, in practice has often 
been used to advance narrow human rights agendas of political powers in the Global 
North, while curbing down more ambitious gender justice agendas of feminists in the 
Global South. In case of a negative response, one is confronted with the follow up 
question: what would be the consequences of (total) feminist disengagement with what 
has become the international community’s default tool to advance justice demands in 
societies in transition. In view of the fact that women’s and feminists’ absence from the 
table has long been considered a key obstacle to advancing of the cause, it is not 
surprising calls for total disengagement with transitional justice a rare – if not absent – 
from feminist transitional justice literature. Instead most (post-colonial) feminist 
scholars have looked for ways to do transitional justice better, advocating for – as 
discussed in chapter 1 – an approach that allocates more weight to the voices of local 
female victims and takes inspiration from initiatives by grassroots gender justice 
actors.743  In this regard Moyo for instance concludes that: 
 
Postcolonial legal reading could however, attempt to strike a balance between the need to 
decolonize humanitarian legal and human rights standards which form the normative basis of 
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transitional justice, on the one hand, and a recognition that these international legal standards 
can be both viperous and redeeming. Further, and against the backdrop that globalization has 
reconfigured, disrupted and destabilized the notion of the sovereign state, postcolonial legal 
scholarship can also engage with non-state actors and other locations of power so as to 
holistically address rights and sites that concern injustices perpetrated on postcolonial subjects 
and women.744 
Moyo thus still considers transitional justice to be a potent vehicle for transformative 
change, provided that grassroots actors or non-traditional centres of power set the 
agenda. This echoes the work of Otto who also posited that international security 
bodies and most notably the UNSCR can both act as restraining and facilitating factors 
when it comes to advancing women’s rights in societies in transition depending on 
whose interests and voices these bodies decide to prioritize.745 What are the implications 
of this for the role of international transitional justice donors? While on first sight, 
having international donors might seem antithetical to this bottom up vision, careful 
reading of (post-colonial) feminist transitional justice literature shows little appetite of a 
full denunciation of international transitional justice funding.746 This most likely reflects 
a reality where these funds are often he only means to support transitional justice 
initiatives of any nature – including grassroots, transformative gender justice initiatives. 
The goals for (post-colonial) feminist transformative justice proponents then thus is to 
make sure that more of the available funds are diverted in the latter type of efforts.747 
I.e. international support for transitional justice can be beneficial, provided that it is 
shaped by the priorities of grassroots actors on the ground.748 
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6.5.2 Conceptualizing a more transformative approach to supporting gender 
justice in transition: A practical perspective 
However, both post-colonial feminist analysis of efforts to reclaim transitional justice in 
post-conflict contexts,749 as well as this chapter’s findings put into question the extent to 
which simply relying more on ‘the local’ can be a shortcut towards a more gender just 
approach towards transitional justice.  
These observations beckon the development of a more practical vision of what 
it means to prioritize ‘the local’ in internationalized transitional justice practice. In 
(feminist) transformative justice scholarship the term local ownership often constitutes 
a shorthand for respecting the priorities of local civil society actors, who while often not 
interested in the standardized global transitional justice toolkit,750 do share a 
commitment to broader (social) justice principles. Under this model, it seems clear that 
international actors’ transitional justice and gender justice support should be directed to 
these critical, but transitional justice-supportive local voices.  However, as McAuliffe 
has pointed out,751 this focus on civil society actors obscures the fact that the local 
actors who are most likely to determine transitional justice outcomes are local (political) 
elites.752 In Tunisia and Ukraine these elites are democratically elected and – as both are 
middle-income countries - have the required resources at their disposal to support 
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transitional justice/gender justice efforts. However, they are also largely opposed to 
supporting serious efforts to deal with the human rights implications of past repression 
and ongoing conflict. At the same time these political elites do seem to be in favour of 
some gender justice advances.  
What does the insistence in post-colonial feminist and critical transitional justice 
literature on local ownership prescribe for international donors under this type of 
circumstances? The literature provides surprisingly little guidance on this point, because 
as Sharp has rightly remarked: 
Concepts like local ownership present a loose and often confusing theme in academic and policy 
discourse that subsumes a wide range of critiques and concerns, understanding global-local 
dilemmas requires one to unpack the concept, distinguishing concerns about actual control 
(agency, decision making, funding), process (bottom-up, participatory, homegrown), and 
substance (values, practices, priorities), even if those concerns are in practice highly related.753  
Looking into the question of international transitional justice funding, Arthur and 
Yakinthou argue in favour of a better balance between support for state-sanctioned 
transitional justice measures, international courts and local and international civil society 
initiatives, urging donors ‘to think more strategically and relationally about the choices 
they do make (including not intervening), and to ensure that civil society priorities, 
capacities and positioning are factored into that strategic thinking’.754 Since their 
research into the nature of international donor support for transitional justice found 
that civil society initiatives have been chronically underfunded, this implies there is need 
for a stronger focus on strategic support for civil society in countries in transition. In 
this vision, local ownership and international transitional justice funding can go hand in 
hand provided that funding is provided strategically to a range of local civil society 
actors. 
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Civil society interviewees for this research – from ideologically diverse 
backgrounds – shared this vision, with none of them contesting the central role that 
international donor funding plays in advancing transitional justice and gender justice 
goals in Tunisia and Ukraine, but with many of them questioning international donors’ 
strategies and priorities. However, this vision does not provide an answer to the 
question how international donors should spend – limited/finite – resources in case the 
dilemma is not between state-led transitional institutions vs grassroots transitional 
justice initiatives, but rather between supporting grassroots past-focused (gender) justice 
initiatives that do not enjoy much or any state buy-in or future-focused women’s rights 
efforts that can count on (some level) of support by not only (political) elites, but also 
(parts of) the local women’s movement.  
This thesis does not imply it has the definite answer to this dilemma. However, 
based on what was observed in Tunisia and Ukraine during this research, and insights 
from other contexts that have struggled with transitional justice for a longer period,755 it 
did identify some suggestions for progress. In particular, this thesis’ findings point at a 
need for international actors to find a balance between capitalizing on immediate 
(gender) justice opportunities, such as the opening up of the equal inheritance debate in 
Tunisia, when they occur, and fostering a roster of civil society actors dedicated to 
advancing transitional justice that can keep accountability issues on the agenda and 
jump in when the transitional justice climate improves. The latter is important as while 
in many contexts around the world attempts at the pursuance of accountability for past 
human rights abuses initially failed because of political resistance, the passage of time 
often created space for more successful efforts.756 In terms of the nature of the types of 
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international actors fund such an approach requires a shift from a funding model that is 
reactive and project based, to one that is strategic and focuses not necessarily on one-
off transitional justice projects (often driven by international transitional justice NGOs). 
This requires the fostering a resilient roster of the type of critical civil society actors – 
human rights lawyers, human (and women’s) rights NGOs, victims’ organizations – that 
have stepped in when space for transitional justice opened up in other country contexts.  
Doing this requires investing in these organizations’ capacity to carve out an 
existence beyond both transitional justice funding specifically as well as donor funding 
in general. This could include encouraging those actors who are focused on pursuing 
accountability for (gendered) harms that occurred in the past to also embrace more 
future focused efforts. It also requires support for the creation of networks between 
organizations whose core focus is transitional justice and (established) CSOs which 
have an interest in transitional justice but who have an operating model focused on a 
broader range of activities and where possible cooperation with authorities to advance 
human rights outcomes – e.g. the more established women’s rights NGOs in Tunisia 
and Ukraine. This echoes Arthur and Yakinthou’s recommendation that:  
Instead of trying to create networks on TJ from scratch, a more sound approach is to support 
existing and emerging networks already working on TJ-related issues, which are more likely to 
have deep roots (and legitimacy) in communities.757 
While these responsibilities fall within the first place on these local actors themselves, 
international donors could direct funding in a way that support rather than hinders such 
efforts. In this regard hindering occurs when donors reward a client-driven, project-
orientated mind-set and inspire competition between local actors, and when they do not 
make meaningful efforts to reach out to a broad range of local civil society actors. 
When it comes to EU support for women’s rights in Tunisia and Ukraine this includes 
 




providing more support for local CSOs’ advocacy efforts in relation to a broad range of 
issues; a key concern of CSO actors interviewed for this research was the EU’s 
tendency to approach civil society actors as service providers.  
This approach on the level of financial support should go hand in hand with 
continuous political support by international donors for more controversial gender 
justice efforts. While in some cases providing scarce financial resources to transitional 
justice efforts that are not viable at a certain point in time, might be inopportune when 
these resources could also be directed towards future-focused gender justice efforts that 
will pay off directly, political support is less susceptible to a similar type of calculation. 
In this regard, it should be noted that several representatives of both local and 
international transitional justice NGOs emphasized during interviews for this research 
that at times when transitional justice is difficult, political support can be more 
meaningful than support for another (technical) transitional justice project – i.e. more 
workshops, trainings and study visits.758  
To some extent the EU is doing this already. Clearly, in its approach towards 
support for gender justice in transition in Tunisia and Ukraine, the EU has capitalized 
on openings for women’s rights progress that have occurred in Tunisia and Ukraine’s 
gender justice opportunity structures. However, it has mostly failed to invest in long-
term transitional justice gains by providing the type of support required to create a 
durable tissue for transitional justice advances. Instead the EU has provided support to 
technical ‘in-the-now’ transitional justice efforts driven by iNGOs and IOs, which – in 
the Tunisian case, has been taken away as soon as local governing elites’ appetite for 
transitional justice waned. As such, for the EU to follow up on its commitment to 
fostering local ownership would require a significant transformation of its own support 
 




towards transitional justice, which would be characterised by a more long-term focus on 
shoring up the capacities of (potential) local transitional justice actors and by providing 
more significant, continuous political support for efforts to pursue accountability for 
past crimes.  
Taken together, this section thus finds that gender justice support that qualifies 
as transformative in one context can be just a confirmation of the status quo in another, 
and that one of the most important types of transformation should take place at the 
level of the way in which international actors provide their transitional justice support. 
At the level of feminist scholarship on internationalize transitional justice practice, this 
means, that the definition of transformative gender justice should be a more 
contextualized one. When it comes to the invocation of ‘transformative justice’ as a 
remedy against the flaws of the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice, it 
should constitute a definition centred around the notion of addressing those gender 
justice issues that have been neglected by those in power. It also indicates that simply 
relying more on ‘the local’ as a solution for the flaws of ‘the patriarchy of 
internationalized transitional justice’ is not sufficient. Instead ‘the local’ should be a 
much more tangible construct in analyses of international engagement with gender 
justice in transition. This means that demonstrating in-depth understanding of the 
(gender) politics that are present in local contexts should be central to feminist 
reflections on a more transformative approach towards gender justice in transition in an 
internationalized transitional justice context. This will contribute to more context-
specific, diversified critiques of ‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’.  
 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter compared the nature of EU engagement with gender justice in transition in 




and chapter 4’s insights about local gender justice opportunity structures in order to 
establish which factors are driving EU engagement with gender justice in transition. 
Linking back the outcomes of the comparison to insights of the EU’s overarching 
foreign policy priorities in and ties with Tunisia and Ukraine this chapter concluded that 
what type of gender justice issues the EU does and does not engage with is informed by 
the desire to appease local governing elites.   
 From a feminist perspective this finding is remarkable as the co-option or 
instrumentalization of gender justice issues for political gain by international actors has 
traditionally been associated with exclusive support for the pursuit of accountability for 
politically motivated SGBV. Focusing more on the continuum of violence experienced 
by women rather than only the narrow set of politically motivated instances of SGBV 
inflicted on women in times of conflict and transition is a central component of the 
feminist transformative justice agenda. As the internationalization of transitional justice 
practice has gone hand in hand with this centralization of wartime rape to transitional 
justice narratives, the embrace of a transformative justice agenda has been suggested as 
a potential remedy to these essentialist tendencies. However, through the example of 
EU engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine this chapter demonstrated 
that a broader conceptualization of gender justice in transition can be subjected to a 
similarly selective approach.  
The two core take-aways at the level of need for theoretical innovation are that 
there is need for a more diversified theory of ‘the patriarchy of internationalized 
transitional justice’ that recognizes that the patriarchy can manifest itself through the 
prioritization of different types of gender justice issues. This means that when it comes 
to defining the notion of ‘transformative justice’ as a remedy for the flaws of ‘the 
patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’, feminist scholars should adopt a 




international actors’ engagement with gender justice in transition and allows for the 
development of an ambitious, but at the same time realist feminist agenda of 
international support for gender justice in transition.  
To arrive at this more diversified theory of ‘the patriarchy of internationalized 
transitional justice’ and politicized vision of ‘transformative justice’ feminist scholarship 
on international engagement with gender justice in transition will need to embrace a 
number of methodological innovations at the level of case study selection and research 
design. Chapter 7 identifies these innovations against the background of recent 
development the field of transitional justice itself and international politics more 
broadly, and illustrates them with (methodological) observations made in the context of 

































7. DISCUSSION: Diversifying feminist 
transitional justice scholarship to meet the 
demands of a field and a global order in 
transition 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
What methodological innovations should be embraced to arrive at a more diversified 
theory of ‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’? Based on recent 
developments in the field of transitional justice itself and in international politics more 
broadly this section argues that this type of theoretical innovation requires the 
consideration of a wider range of case studies and more reliance on methods that allow 
insight in what international actors do in practice rather than what they state in policy.  
Section 7.2 links the need for the consideration of a wider range of case studies 
to developments in the field of transitional justice itself. While initially war-to-peace 
transitions generated most international transitional justice support, over the last decade 
a wider range of types of transitions has entered the radar of international transitional 
justice actors. The fact that these transitions have different features, including at the 
level of the type of gendered harms and political dynamics that define them, will likely 
impact the way in which international actors engage with them. A second relevant 
development in the field of transitional justice is the fact that over the last decade a 
range of high-profile transitional justice contexts have emerged in closer vicinity of ‘The 
Global North’. As transitions and the implementation of transitional justice measures 
are associated with concerns about stability, the fact that that these concerns are 




Feminist scholars have mostly used contexts in the Global South transitioning from 
conflict to peace as a backdrop for the examination of international engagement with 
transitional justice. These developments, however, challenge the wisdom of such an 
exclusive focus.  
Section 7.3 argues that the recent embrace of a more interest-driven, 
transactional approach towards foreign policy by actors that have traditionally presented 
themselves as champions of transitional justice support abroad, further strengthens the 
need for methodological innovation. More specifically, it argues that that as overall 
shifts in foreign policy have not – yet – been followed up by more modest policy 
language in value-centred fields such as transitional justice and the WPS Agenda, and in 
the EU’s case have actually been accompanied with more ambitious policy language in 
the field of WPS, the use of analysis of generic policy documents as a method to 
enhance understanding of the nature of international engagement with gender justice in 
transition could provide a flawed image. As discrepancies between both EU policy and 
practice, and feminist theory and practice exist particularly in relation to the EU’s 
priorities under the ‘protection pillar’ of the WPS Agenda, these issues should be at the 
centre of the contemporary feminist research agenda.  
 
7.2 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
To enhance understanding of the different ways in which gender justice support can be 
co-opted by international actors, feminist scholars need to increase the range of 
transitions and range of contexts that figure as the backdrop to the study of 
international support for transitional justice. Much feminist writing on ‘the patriarchy of 
internationalized transitional justice’ focuses on international actors form the Global 
North that intervene in contexts in the Global South which are going through a 




scholarship is attuned to find a prioritization of certain responses by international 
actors, and a certain set of political dynamics that shape these responses. At first sight, 
this predisposition to certain case studies makes sense as international transitional 
justice actors have engaged most intensively with these contexts. However, due to 
recent developments in internationalized transitional justice practice, insights based on 
this narrow range of case studies have lost some of their more explanatory power for 
the field as a whole. These developments include the increase of international 
engagement with transitions from authoritarianism to democracy in the wake of the 
Arab Spring, and the emergence of (potential) new transitional justice hotspots in the 
Global North or its near vicinity. As the notion that politics, history, and geography 
shape international engagement with transitional justice is central to much feminist 
theorizing on transitional justice, these developments should be reflected in feminist 
scholarship on international support for gender justice in transition.  
 
7.2.1. A widening of the conceptual boundaries of internationalized transitional 
justice practice 
This section argues that the choice of case studies at the basis of this thesis is a first 
factor that can explain the discrepancies between dominant perspectives in feminist 
theory about the nature of international transitional justice support and this research’ 
findings. The type of transitions that have dominated feminist scholarship on 
international engagement with transitional justice are war-to-peace transitions where 
conflict-related SGBV has occurred at a large scale. Through its inclusion of Tunisia 
this thesis has focused on international engagement with gender justice within a type of 
transition- i.e. from authoritarianism to democracy - that has received much less 
attention in feminist scholarship on international transitional justice support. The fact 




internationalization of transitional justice practice as a whole and the international 
acknowledgement of the gendered dimensions of transitional justice coincided with the 
widening of the original scope of the field to include war-to-peace transitions. However, 
as more recently transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, have also increasingly 
become the topic of internationalized transitional justice practice, feminist scholarship 
on ‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’ needs to expand its case study 
scope to guarantee its insights are relevant to the field as a whole.  
Feminist scholars have prioritized the study of international support for 
gendered transitional justice in the wake of conflicts.759 This includes places such as the 
Balkans,760 Timor-Leste,761 a number of African contexts including the DRC762 and 
Sierra Leone,763 the genocide in Rwanda;764 and Afghanistan.765 In most of these 
contexts international actors have intervened through a combination of peacekeeping 
missions, conflict mediation, and subsequently support for the establishment of post-
conflict transitional justice institutions such as international or hybrid courts.766 As in 
many of these contexts conflict related SGBV has been prevalent, and often rape was 
used as a weapon of war, most of the international efforts in these countries, including 
support for transitional justice measures, have attempted to address this issue. In this 
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light it is not surprising that feminist scholars have found that the pursuance of 
accountability for wartime rape has dominated international actors’ transitional justice 
agendas.  
However, transitional justice as a field covers a much broader span of 
transitions than the war-to-peace kind.767 These have received significantly less attention 
from feminist scholars exploring international support for gender justice in transition. 
This is logical, as increased attention for the gendered dimensions of transitional justice, 
coincided with the internationalization of transitional justice, which in its turn emerged 
in response to the occurrence of grave conflicts in the 1990s.768 As discussed in chapter 
2, before that point neither transitional justice initiatives,769 nor the gendered aspects of 
transitions could count on serious international engagement.770 However, these days the 
international character of transitional justice practice is no longer restricted to the 
confines of war-to-peace transitions. With the emergence – and premature halting of - a 
new wave of transitions from authoritarianism to democracy in the wake of the Arab 
Spring, which sparked high levels of international engagement, transitions from 
authoritarianism to democracy have also increasingly become the subject of 
international engagement.771  
Tunisia is a case in point; a country experiencing a transition that qualifies as a 
classic transition from authoritarianism to democracy as witnessed in Latin America in 
 
767 Teitel 2000 (n45).  
768 Hirschauer 2014 (n7). 
769 Muck and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2016 (n32). 
770 In this regard O’Rourke finds that: ‘The global expansion of transitional justice activity is occurring at 
the same time as growing international recognition and institutionalization of the need for a gender 
perspective in conflict and post-conflict activities, most notably through the Women, Peace and Security 
(WPS) agenda initiated by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (the Resolution) … Whereas 
transitional justice activity motivated little feminist concern or engagement in the paradigmatic transitions 
of the Latin American Southern Cone, it is now an area of concerted feminist analysis, policy, and 
activism’. O'Rourke 2012 (n6): 38.  
771 Habib Nassar, 'Transitional Justice in the Wake of the Arab Uprisings: Between Complexity and 




the 1970s/1980s.772 While the Latin American countries organized the efforts to deal 
with a dictatorial past without significant international interference in or support for 
these efforts, both Tunisia’s transition as well as its transitional justice trajectory have 
become the object of high levels of international engagement right from the start.773 
This development materialized in response to local demands for transitional justice. 
However, the overwhelming scale of this engagement and the swiftness with which IOs 
and iNGOs arrived on the scene,774 aptly illustrates the field’s professionalization and 
ever increasing appetite for new ‘projects’.775 Most importantly – in the context of this 
chapter’s argument - it signifies the extent to which internationalization of transitional 
justice practice increasingly has now engulfed transitions from authoritarianism to 
democracy as well.  
It is important to study international engagement with transitions from 
 
772 Padraig G McAuliffe, 'Transitional Justice’s Expanding Empire: Reasserting the Value of the 
Paradigmatic Transition' (2012) 2(2) Journal of Conflictology: 34; Diana Preysing, '‘Transitional Justice 
discourse in transition' in Transitional Justice in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia (2011–2013) (Springer 2016). 
773 Eric Gobe, (2016) Introduction.Justice et politique dans le monde arabe entre autoritarisme, réforme 
et revolution, 12. Gobe states in relation to the internationalization of transitional justice in Tunisia:  
 
‘Toutefois, la lecture du témoignage de Khaled Kchir donne des indices sur la manie ̀re dont les « 
professionnels » sont intervenus dans le processus d’élaboration de la loi sur la justice transitionnelle en 
Tunisie. L’ICTJ, le PNUD, le Haut commissariatde Nations Unies aux droits de l’Homme ont fourni un 
soutien logistique et de formation aux diffe ́rentes commissions, nationale et de ́partementales, chargées 
dans le cadre d’un processus « participatif » d’émettre avis et recommandations sur la mise en place d’un 
dispositif de justice transitionnelle et, plus particulièrement,sur la cre ́ation d’une commission Ve ́rite ́. Au 
niveau de l’ANC, des « experts internationaux » ont e ́te ́ sollicités pour exposer à la Commission de la 
le ́gislation ge ́ne ́rale leurs recommandations.’  
 
Translation: ‘However, Khaled Kchir's testimony provides clues as to how "professionals" have 
intervened in the process of drafting the transitional justice law in Tunisia. ICTJ, UNDP, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for human rights provided logistical and training support to the various 
national and departmental committees, which were entrusted as part of a "participatory" process to issue 
opinions and recommendations on the establishment of a transitional justice system and, more 
specifically, on the creation of a truth commission. At the level of the ANC, "international experts" were 
asked to present their recommendations to the General Law Commission.’ 
 Khaled Kchir was amongst the ten representatives of Tunisian civil society selected in 2011 to take part in 
the national technical commission tasked with organizing the national dialogue around transitional justice. 
See: Khaled Kchir, Élaborer un projet de loi sur la justice transitionnelle en Tunisie (2012-2013) : un 
témoignage (2016) Des Justices en Transition dans le Monde Arabe (Rabat : Centre Jacques-Berque). 
774 The ICTJ for instance organized Tunisia’s first conference on transitional justice in April 2011, only 
three months after the ousting of Ben Ali. See: http://tjtunis.blogspot.com, accessed 23 April 2019. 




authoritarianism to democracy in addition to studying their engagement with from war-
to-peace transitions, as comparative research on the features of each of these transitions 
demonstrates big discrepancies about the dynamics that drive them. Bell has for 
instance argued that: 
If the contours of transitional justice institutions in transitions from authoritarianism are at least 
partly set by a consensus on the normative end-goal of democracy, transitional justice 
mechanisms in intrastate conflict settings are shaped by navigating a lack of consensus as to the 
state’s endpoint and nature.776  
She argues that this can both contribute to as well as diminish the opportunities for 
transitional justice measures to be embraced and implemented, depending on a number 
of factors including: ‘1) the balance of power and the nature of the military-political 
deal; 2) the internationalization of the conflict and post-conflict-environment; 3) the 
regional human rights system in which the conflict arises; 4) the mobilization and 
political power of civil society (including victims’ groups); and 5) the scale, nature and 
context of  conflict including its relationship to law’.777  
When it comes to the impact of the nature of transition on the gendered 
dimension of the measures to deal with the aftermath, feminist research has suggested 
that a legacy of wide-scale conflict increases the likelihood of the adoption of measures 
to deal with politically motivated gendered harms. Through a comparison of the DRC’s 
and South Africa’s response to SGBV and GBV Lake has found that large scale 
conflicts that have resulted in a complete breakdown of state structures, create openings 
for NGOs to influence legal processes in ways that have proved impossible in countries 
where the state is stronger.778 As state structures tend to be present in countries 
transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy, and are more often absent in 
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countries transitioning from widespread violent conflict, more international engagement 
with the former type of transitions might thus impact gender justice issues they tend to 
prioritize.  
Another reason why addressing GBV in from authoritarianism-to-democracy 
transitions might be deprioritized relates to the levels of SGBV that has been inflicted 
during the period of repression. While repressive regimes have also used politically 
motivated instances of SGBV to oppress political opponents, the scale and nature of 
the occurrence of this type of harms in most instances differs from the scale and nature 
witnessed in certain conflicts.779 The scale at which crimes take place, and the time that 
has passed since these crimes took place, inform the both local as well as international 
actors’ attitudes towards them.780 While little research has been done on this issue in 
relation to from authoritarianism-to-democracy transitions, research on transitions 
following conflicts with low-intensity violence – and accordingly lower levels of 
conflict-related SGBV – indicates this has impacted the extent to which SGBV has 
figured in peace talks and efforts to deal with the past.781 
When it comes to reactions of international actors a recent quantitative study by 
Benson and Gizelis for instance finds ‘a significant relationship between reports of 
sexual violence in a conflict and the likelihood that the UNSC will address a civil 
conflict in a resolution as well as how often’. They also find: 
Evidence that reports of systematic sexual violence go together with a higher intensity in UNSC 
response, measured by the type of action called for in resolutions in a conflict-year, as well as 
the number of resolutions calling for high levels of action (e.g., sanctions or the outside use of 
force). 782   
 
779 Ximena Bunster-Burotto, 'Surviving beyond fear: women and torture in Latin America.' (1994). 
780 Lake 2018 (n147). 
781 Sara E Davies, Jacqui True and Maria Tanyag, 'How women’s silence secures the peace: analysing 
sexual and gender-based violence in a low-intensity conflict' (2016) 24(3) Gender & Development 459; 
Swaine 2015 (n675). 
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Therefore, in contexts where rape has systematically been used as a weapon of war in a 
(very) recent past, politically motivated SGBV is likely to dominate international actors’ 
gender justice agendas. The contrary is true as well; if politically-motivated SGBV has 
targeted only a relatively small category of victims and/or this has occurred in a 
relatively distant past, it will likely result in less public outcry.783 As widespread 
politically-motivated rape is more likely to occur in conflict settings, this suggests that 
international actors might prioritize other gender justice issues – or neglect gender 
justice altogether - in other types of transitions. 
All in all, these observations suggest that now that democracies from 
authoritarianism to democracy have entered the remit of internationalized transitional 
justice practice, it is paramount to incorporate them as case studies in feminist studies 
of international engagement with transitional justice. This in itself will likely result in a 
more diversified understanding of the gender justice priorities of international 
transitional justice actors, thereby ensuring that feminist critiques stay in tune with 
broader developments in the field.  
 
7.2.2 A widening of the geographical boundaries of internationalized transitional 
justice practice 
The focus on war-to-peace transitions in feminist scholarship on international support 
for transitional justice has gone hand in hand with a prioritization of case studies in the 
Global South, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia, as key recipients of 
transitional justice support. This makes sense as since WWII most major conflicts have 
taken place in these parts of the world.784 However, if one takes into account the full 
range of transitions covered by transitional justice scholarship, it is clear that these 
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countries have never been the only societies which are dealing with legacies of violence 
and oppression.785 Moreover, as over the last decade some of the major conflict zones 
around the world have moved closer to the borders of the Global North,786 it becomes 
increasingly urgent to diversify case study selection to allow for the inclusion of more 
case studies in this part of the world. Proximity to countries in transition – and the 
economic and security related concerns that go hand in hand with it - is likely to affect 
the considerations that shape international actors’ support for transitional justice.787 
Studying more transitional justice interactions between neighbouring actors, will 
provide a more diverse and nuanced picture of the drivers behind international 
engagement with women’s rights issues in societies in transition. This on its turn, will 
change the notion of what types of approaches qualify as opportunistic at what times.  
As noted, in studies of international engagement with gender justice in 
transition most of the recipient countries of international transitional justice support are 
situated in the Global South, particularly the African and Asian continents.788 This is in 
line with the fact that the majority of conflicts since WWII have taken place in Africa 
and Asia.789 Exceptions to this exist, such as the Balkan wars, which have catalysed 
major international engagement with transitional justice,790 and have been the back drop 
 
785 Northern Ireland and Spain are examples of European countries that experienced a transition from 
either conflict to peace or authoritarianism to democracy. In addition, countries that are not experiencing 
a paradigmatic transition have relied on transitional justice measures to address histories of violence or 
oppression. Matt James, 'Uncomfortable comparisons: the Canadian truth and reconciliation commission 
in international context' (Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 2010) 23. 
786 In this study ‘Global North’ refers broadly to higher income, democratic countries, that have greater 
levels of global political and economic influence. ‘Global South’ refers to lower and middle-income 
countries – listed as such by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) - that tend to hold 
less power. The research recognizes that these terms are contested, but this definition serves best for the 
purposes of this thesis.   
787 And even here it is often forgotten that also within the Global North itself countries have been bound 
by colonial ties, See: Bill Rolston and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, 'Colonialism, Redress and Transitional Justice: 
Ireland and Beyond' (2018) 7(2) State Crime Journal 329. 
788 Fletcher and Weinstein 2018 (n70). 
789 Therese Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, 'Armed conflicts, 1946–2014' (2015) 52(4) Journal of Peace 
Research 536. 
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to multiple feminist studies on international engagement with transitional justice.791 
However, Northern Ireland to the contrary has virtually received no attention as a case 
study to examine international support for transitional justice notwithstanding large EU 
Peace fund interventions.792 Similarly, if one looks beyond the scope of war-to-peace 
transitions, other countries in the Global North or its near vicinity which could qualify 
as case studies for the study of international engagement with gender justice in 
transition, have not figured as case studies for the feminist study of international 
support for transitional justice.  This includes European countries dealing with legacies 
of authoritarianism such as Spain and various countries in Eastern Europe, but also 
former European colonial powers which need to come to terms with legacies of 
colonialism.  
This is related to most of these countries having experienced very little 
international engagement with their transitional justice efforts. For some – e.g. the 
transitions in Eastern Europe - this lack of engagement can be explained by the fact 
that their transitions took place before the field had become properly internationalized. 
In other contexts in the Global North where ‘transitions’ have started, transitional 
justice processes have neither materialized, nor been called for by international actors.793 
This of course is related to the fact that those international actors from the Global 
North that have been the champions of the fight against impunity abroad, have been 
 
791 Elissa Helms, 'Women as agents of ethnic reconciliation? Women's NGOs and international 
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Doris E Buss, 'The curious visibility of wartime rape: Gender and ethnicity in international criminal law' 
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assessment of international gender policies in Bosnia' (2005) 12(3) International Peacekeeping 391. 
792 Some exceptions include: Linda Racioppi and Katherine O'Sullivan See, 'Grassroots peace‐building 
and third‐party intervention: the European Union's special support programme for peace and 
reconciliation in Northern Ireland' (2007) 32(3) Peace Change 361; Sean Byrne and others, 'The EU 
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much more reluctant to apply similar scrutiny at home.794 As it is easier to study 
something that exists, than that what is absent – not in the least because these same 
actors that refuse to implement transitional justice at home are some of the core 
funders of (feminist) research on transitional justice,795 this reality severely reduces the  
for feminist research into international engagement with transitional justice in such 
contexts.  
As transitional justice interactions between the Global North and Global South 
have been the core back-drop of feminist scholarship on ‘the patriarchy of 
internationalized transitional justice’,  it is not surprising that many have found that 
colonial attitudes shape international engagement with gender justice in transition.796 
These attitudes include a predisposition to lecture third countries about a narrow 
selection of human rights standards, while ignoring those that put the Global North in a 
less flattering light.797 It entails readiness to fully fund and in some cases even 
implement transitional justice measures, while demonstrating disdain for or neglecting 
the priorities of the  citizens and in some cases the political elites of the countries at 
hand.798 When it comes to the gendered dimensions of transitional justice in particular, 
feminist scholars have found a tendency by international actors to use the occurrence of 
 
794 Katherine Gallagher, 'Universal jurisdiction in practice: Efforts to hold Donald Rumsfeld and other 
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conflict-related violence as a justification for military intervention in other countries,799 
to subsequently ignore women’s rights once presence on the ground has been 
established.800 This has resulted in warnings by scholars such as Aroussi ‘to be careful 
that the grand project of dispensing justice for women victims does not become a 
political cover-up for interventionist policies that have nothing to do with women's 
well-being’.801 It is largely based on this type of observations that feminist scholars have 
established a direct, exclusive connection between the phenomenon of co-option and 
the tendency to focus predominantly on the pursuance of accountability for conflict-
related SGBV.  
However, as the geographical areas in which some of the major conflicts of the 
last five to ten years have occurred, have shifted in the direction of Europe again,802 the 
kind of considerations that shape international engagement with transitional justice 
generally speaking, and gender justice in transition specifically, might be changing. 
While most of the countries where these conflicts take place still qualify as the ‘Global 
South’,803 the proximity of recipient countries might impact the extent to which 
 
799 Meghan Mackenzie, 'Securitizing sex? Towards a theory of the utility of wartime sexual violence' 
(2010) 12(2) International Feminist Journal of Politics 202. 
800 Siobhan Mullally, 'Women, Peace and Security in Contemporary Pakistan: Meeting the Challenge of 
Security Council Resolution 1325?' (2011) Irish Studies in International Affairs 53. 
801 Aroussi 2010 (n23).  
802 The 2018 Global Peace Index report finds that: ‘The ten-year trend in peacefulness finds that global 
peacefulness has deteriorated by 2.38 per cent since 2008, with 85 GPI countries recording a 
deterioration, while 75 improved. The index has deteriorated for eight of the last eleven years, with the 
last improvement in peacefulness occurring in 2014. In Europe, the world’s most peaceful region, 61 per 
cent of countries have deteriorated since 2008. Not one Nordic country is more peaceful now than in 
2008’, and that ‘Since 2008, the average country score has deteriorated by 2.38 per cent. Over this period 
of time there were only two years in which global peace improved. The fall in peacefulness over the 
decade was caused by a wide range of factors, including increased terrorist activity, the intensification of 
conflicts in the Middle East, rising regional tensions in Eastern Europe and northeast Asia, and increasing 
numbers of refugees and heightened political tensions in Europe and the US’.  
 
However, it also found that in some regions in Europe, the Balkans in particular, peacefulness has 
increased. 
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traditional transitional justice supporters are willing to support potentially disruptive 
transitional justice efforts. While further afar disruption as a result of insistence on 
controversial transitional justice measures mostly affects the local population, more 
nearby disruption could have a host of consequences impacting the – real or imagined – 
security of actors in the Global North themselves. Here one could think of the ‘risk’ of 
mass influx of migrants, a surge in terrorism and disruption of energy supply.  
Reflecting on the extent to which the EU is consistent in its approach towards support 
for the ICC, Davis has observed that historically the EU’s policy language on the ICC 
has been much stronger in relation to Sub-Saharan African countries than the 
Neighourhood: 
The EU is on more difficult ground when it comes to consistent practice beyond its borders. 
There is, for example, a much greater emphasis on justice in sub- Saharan Africa through the 
Cotonou agreement and EDF than in the EU’s neighbourhood through the ENP. This may well 
reflect African leadership on the issue of compliance with the ICC, at least in the early days – 
the strength of the ICC clause in the Cotonou agreement is as much as product of the support 
of ACP signatories as their EU counterparts, after all. However, geographic – or geopolitical – 
inconsistency of this type can be interpreted as double standards.804 
The EU’s approach towards transitional justice in this thesis’ case studies, Tunisia and 
Ukraine, does indeed imply a certain level of cautiousness when it comes to challenging 
the agendas of neighbouring political elites who are sceptical about transitional justice. 
EU officials indeed confirmed that part of the EU’s ‘leniency’ on the matter of 
transitional justice has been inspired by the desire to safeguard good relationships with 
friendly political elites, and to avoid further destabilization in the neighbourhood.805 An 
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approach on the EU’s behalf that has previously been witnessed in Morocco as well.806  
Including more case studies in or on the borders of the Global North in 
feminist examinations of international support for transitional justice will therefore 
likely diversify and enrich feminist understanding of ‘the why’ behind international 
engagement with gendered transitional justice. Proximity certainly is not the only factor 
that might impact international responses to transitional justice, and more research 
would need to be conducted into the issue whether and under which circumstances 
proximity impacts the nature of international actors’ engagement with gender justice in 
third countries. However, to facilitate such research more in-depth data about 
transitional justice support in surrounding countries should be collected first. 
 
7.2.3 Conclusion 
As a wider range of types of transitions has increasingly entered the radar of 
international transitional justice actors, feminist transitional justice scholars aiming to 
enhance understanding of the nature of, and drivers behind, international engagement 
with transitional justice need to widen the scope of case studies they take into account. 
In line with the fact that war-to-peace transitions have been the core concern of 
international transitional justice support, so far most literature has focused on these 
when analysing ‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’. However, due to 
the different properties of this type of transition compared to transitions from 
authoritarianism to democracy some of the insights derived from the study of 
international engagement with these contexts might not easily translate to the wider 
 
806 Arthur has even argued that the EU’s approach towards funding for transitional justice in Morocco, 
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field. A second development which needs to be reflected in case study choice is the fact 
that over the last decade transitions have come closer to home – with home referring to 
the EU/Global North – again. As the potential for unrest on the borders might 
influence the type of transitional justice measures international actors are willing to 
support, paying more attention to this factor in analysis of ‘the patriarchy of 
internationalized transitional justice’ is important. Considering cases with one or both 
characteristics will contribute to the creation of a more robust, diversified theory of ‘the 
patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’. The next sections will look into the 
way in which recent developments in international politics reinforce the need for such 
an approach by virtue of the declining reliability of analysis of policy documents as a 
source to get insight in the nature of the patriarchy of internationalized transitional 
justice.  
  
7.3 DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS  
This section argues that developments in international politics only further increase the 
need for above discussed diversification on the level of case studies, and also requires 
feminist scholars to rethink their strategies for data collection. Lately, scholars studying 
international support for human rights have detected a ‘transition’ in the international 
attitude towards these norms,807 with actors that have traditionally acted as their 
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guardians, having adopted an increasingly dispirited attitude towards them. This is 
significant from a transitional justice perspective, as it predominantly concerns the 
human rights commitments that have been at the conceptual core of mainstream 
transitional justice practice. This development has been referred to as the emergence of 
a ‘post-human rights world’.808 It is an additional factor which could explain the 
divergences between this thesis’ conclusions on the nature of EU support for gender 
justice in Tunisia and Ukraine, and the dominant insights on ‘the patriarchy of 
internationalized transitional justice’ in feminist publications from an earlier date. The 
EU is one of the international actors that has recently publicly embraced a more 
‘pragmatic’ approach towards foreign policy, and based on the interview data underlying 
this thesis, section 7.3.1 indeed argues that the EU’s prioritization of local political 
elites’ gender justice priorities in Tunisia and Ukraine is in line with this development.  
When it comes to the methodological and theoretical implications of this 
development for the feminist study of international support for transitional justice, 
section 7.3.2 argues that besides that it reinforces the need for more (diversified) case 
study research, it puts into question the potential of analysis of generic policy 
documents to provide robust insight in the nature of international priorities in the realm 
of support for gender justice in transition. After all, when international actors’ 
commitment to universal values is faltering and local circumstances will become more 
guiding in their engagement with third countries, generic policy language will be 
increasingly unable to capture these priorities. In the EU’s case this situation is 
exacerbated by the fact that despite the fact that it has become more pragmatic across 
the board, its WPS language has only become more ambitious and sophisticated.  
This thesis’ findings about the discrepancy between policy and practice indeed 
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confirm that EU policy documents are an unreliable source to enhance understanding 
of the nature of its engagement with transitional justice. Section 7.3.3 argues that this is 
particularly the case when it comes to the EU’s engagement with substantive women’s 
rights issues – or what has been referred to as ‘the protection pillar’ of the WPS 
Agenda. This is also the area where the biggest discrepancy between the findings of this 
thesis and feminist theory occurred. This section therefore emphasizes the importance 
of putting substantive gender justice issues at the core of the research agenda of 
feminist researchers interested in the consequences of ‘principled pragmatism’ on 
international support for transitional justice.  
 
7.3.1 The impact of the EU’s embrace of ‘principled pragmatism’ on its 
approach towards gender justice in transition 
With the peace vs justice debate more or less having been qualified as a relic from the 
past in the early 2000s transitional justice scholars increasingly took (international 
support for) the pursuance of accountability through the pursuance of criminal trials for 
grave crimes as a given. However, quite recently scholars and practitioners have 
detected a shift in international actors’ attitudes to the human rights principles that have 
been at the core of the anti-impunity movement.809 While the backlash against 
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international courts by countries in the Global South has received significant 
attention.810 The consequences of these developments for transitional justice as such, 
and particularly the challenges of less support for global human rights norms from 
actors in the Global North has been the topic of less academic debate. This is slowly 
changing, though, as is reflected in an abundance of conferences, workshops and 
debates on the theme, and in for instance Mallinder’s 2017 inaugural lecture at the 
Transitional Justice Institute on ‘Atrocity, Accountability, and Amnesty in a ‘Post-
Human Rights World’?’811 Mallinder identifies 2016 as ‘the year that human rights 
activists started to sound alarm bells’.812 The election of Trump underlined ‘the decline 
in the quality of democracy in established democracies’, and raised the point that: 
Western democratic states that experience a decline in democracy may withdraw from 
championing human rights abroad. This could mean, for example, that they engage less in 
developing international human rights institutions and norms; that they spend less supporting 
human rights overseas; and that they are less likely to pressure states to be human rights 
compliant. Although the record of Western democratic states in championing human rights has 
been patchy to say the least, such a withdrawal would weaken the ability of national and 
international human rights defenders to pressure governments.813 
So far a purely feminist analysis of the consequences of these developments on 
international engagement with gender justice in transition has not materialized.  
The EU is a good example to illustrate the consequences of these developments 
in global politics on the study of international engagement with gender justice in 
transition, as with the 2016 publication of the EU Global Strategy, the EU openly 
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embraced ‘principled pragmatism’ as its foreign policy motto.814  According to the 
document itself, the embrace of principled pragmatism entails a shift to a foreign policy 
approach guided by principles, [which] ‘stem as much from a realistic assessment of the 
current strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better 
world’.815 The last time the EU published a foreign policy strategy was the 2003 
publication of the European Security Strategy (2003), which was titled ‘A Stronger 
Europe in a Better World’,816 neatly summarizing the notion that the promotion of EU 
values such as human rights and democracy abroad, was at the core of the EU’s own 
security. The EUGS is titled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A 
Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’. While the EU’s 
own strength is still at the core of this title, the ‘better world’ part has been forsaken.  
This shift of focus to the EU itself rather than the outside world is reflected in 
the five EU foreign policy priority concerns it identifies: (1) the security of the EU 
itself; (2) the neighbourhood; (3) how to deal with war and crisis; (4) stable regional 
orders across the globe; and (5) effective global governance. These are remarkable 
mostly in terms of what they do not mention: the promotion of democracy abroad. 
Back in 2003 the EU posited that ‘[t]he best protection for our security is a world of 
well-governed democratic states’.817 In 2016 democracy no longer figures between EU 
foreign policy priorities.818 Instead, the EU has pledged allegiance to the promotion of 
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resilience,819 which it defines as ‘the ability of states and societies to reform, thus 
withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises’.820 A word count by 
Wagner and Anholt neatly demonstrates this primacy of resilience in the EUGS. 
One of the most striking differences between the EU Global Strategy of 2016 and the European 
Security Strategy of 2003 is the ubiquity of resilience as a new leitmotif. Whereas the term was 
entirely absent in the 2003 document, the EU Global Strategy of 2016 mentions it no less than 
40 times. This puts ‘resilient/resilience’ ahead of ‘human rights’ (mentioned 31 times), 
‘democratic/democracy/democratization’ (23 times), and ‘human security’ (4 times).821 
The embrace of resilience fits in with and serves the EU’s overall goal of being a 
‘principled pragmatic’ actor on the global stage. This presents a break with its past 
insistence on being a ‘force for good’.822 The EUGS explains this shift referring to the 
changing security environment, and the acknowledgement on the EU’s behalf that other 
countries are not necessarily interested in the adoption of values and institutions 
prescribed by the EU. In this regard Nathalie Tocci, the penholder of the EUGS, has 
remarked: 
The EUGS stands firm on the affirmation of the EU’s internal values … [and] its firmness on 
this point is all the more important given that those values are being questioned within, as 
evident with the rise of extreme-right populism across the continent. But this does not mean 
that the EU expects its internal liberal values to be adopted externally too.823 
The fact that the EU hints at the possibility of a less value-centred approach is notable 
from a transitional justice perspective. If international actors set the bar for democracy 
and human rights promotion lower, it will be more difficult to hold them to account for 
their foreign policy choices, and to ‘name and shame’ them into approaches that respect 
 
819 Ana E Juncos, 'Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm: a pragmatist turn?' (2017) 26(1) 
European Security 1. 
820 European Union 2016 (n189): 23. 
821 Wagner and Anholt 2016 (n818): 414.  
822 Biscop 2016 (n814).  
823 Nathalie Tocci, Framing the EU global strategy. A stronger Europe in a fragile World (2017 




their international human rights commitments. As human rights are central to 
contemporary transitional justice practice, this could hugely impact the EU’s approach 
towards support for transitional justice generally speaking and gendered transitional 
justice in particular.  
First, reduced commitment to democracy promotion might affect the contexts 
in which and the type of transitional justice the EU might prioritize. While the 
occurrence of a democratic transition is not required for transitional justice measures to 
be effectuated,824 in practice in most cases where such measures have been implemented 
this happened in the broader framework of an – attempted – transition to democracy.825 
Moreover, one of the justifications for the implementation of transitional justice 
measures has been its presumed contribution to fostering the consolidation of 
democratic governance.826 Therefore, if democracy promotion is less of a foreign policy 
priority, the incentive to engage with – certain types of - transitional justice measures is 
likely to be less strong, and opportunities to do so will be fewer in number. In this vein, 
the EU’s willingness to forge closer relations with regimes that do not adhere to the 
EU’s core values,827 also raises questions about how the EU will reconcile its 
commitment to support for transitional justice initiatives with its desire to forge close 
relations with local political elites that might be against such initiatives all together. 
Second, the EU’s overall prioritization of stability, might also change the type of 
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transitional justice measures the EU will prioritize if it does decide to engage with 
transitional justice in a certain context. As certain types of transitional justice measures 
have been identified as having a more destabilizing impact than others,828 the EU might 
prefer support for the less controversial ones.  
More concretely, if the EU believes that cooperation with authoritarian regimes 
is necessary to achieve foreign policy goals, it might insist less on the implementation of 
transitional justice mechanisms, and particularly criminal tribunals, to pursue 
accountability in case of partner regimes committing atrocity crimes. Similarly, now the 
EU’s key priority is guaranteeing stability in its neighbourhood, questions arise about its 
willingness to engage with transitional justice initiatives that could inflame tensions 
between different segments of society.829 This might result in a complete neglect of 
transitional justice efforts or the prioritization of transitional justice compromises, and 
transitional justice efforts which emphasize reconciliation – be it of a ‘real’ or perceived 
nature.830 However,  little empirical research has been conducted to understand the 
consequences of the embrace of principled pragmatism on EU transitional justice 
efforts in practice. Through the findings of this thesis fieldwork, the following 
paragraphs discuss how the EU’s approach towards gender justice in Tunisia and 
Ukraine suggests that principled pragmatism is indeed shaping its approach towards 
(gendered) transitional justice abroad.  
When it comes to connecting the lack of serious EU support for the fight 
against impunity for SGBV to its embrace of principled pragmatism, no direct links can 
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be established. However, it is remarkable that at the level of thematic policy documents 
neither the EUGS itself, nor the policy document that sets out the EU’s strategy 
towards promoting resilience – a key EUGS concept - mention transitional justice.831 
According to a representative of a Brussels-based transitional justice NGO, especially 
the failure to mention transitional justice in the policy framework on resilience, was a 
lost opportunity for the EU to anchor transitional justice in its overall foreign policy 
approach.832 Her  disappointment stemmed from the fact that resilience has replaced 
‘democracy’ as the EU’s foreign policy leitmotif, and the policy framework on resilience 
therefore is a key guiding framework for EU activities abroad. Resilience refers to the 
need to equip societies and individuals with the tools to persist in the face of 
adversity.833 A strategy that prioritizes the strengthening of resilience comes with a 
different set of priorities than a strategy that is centred around promoting democracy.834 
Nevertheless,  transitional justice mechanisms could in theory contribute to both goals. 
The absence of any references to transitional justice in the policy framework on 
resilience, however, suggests that the EU did not see a clear role for support to 
transitional justice in its overall approach towards resilience.  
As discussed in chapter 6, the interviews also provided an insightful account of 
how the EU’s prioritization of stability in the neighbourhood affects its willingness to 
engage with transitional justice. No EU interviewee would bluntly admit that support 
for transitional justice had been subdued as a result of the need to stay on good terms 
with the Tunisian and Ukrainian authorities. To the contrary, some EU officials when 
asked about the impact of the EUGS on its support for transitional justice denied any 
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changes. In this regard one EU official argued that as transitional justice was essentially 
a value-centred activity, the EU’s approach to it had not been affected too much by 
aforementioned tendencies: ‘I think with transitional justice it doesn’t really impact my 
work personally, because transitional justice is, I would say, more of a positive agenda. 
We are trying to help’.835 However, other statements did suggest links between the EU’s 
embrace of principled pragmatism and the nature of its support to transitional justice in 
Tunisia and Ukraine. Understanding the ways in which principled pragmatism has 
impacted EU engagement with gendered transitional justice therefore functions as a 
puzzle: separately, statements or even entire interviews do not provide a coherent 
picture of the drivers behind EU engagement with (gendered) transitional justice, but 
taken together they do point in the direction of a bargain with significant consequences 
for the default conceptualization of EU support for gender justice in societies in 
transition.  
Taken together the statements discussed in section 6.3.1 of the previous chapter 
demonstrate that the EU has a strong interest in safeguarding good relations with the 
Tunisian and Ukrainian authorities respectively, and that EU officials recognize that 
certain types of transitional justice support could impact these relations negatively.  This 
ambivalent stance towards transitional justice, and particularly openness to the notion 
of compromises for the sake of stability – on the ground and in the EU -  was not 
restricted to statements on Tunisia and Ukraine. Several EU officials and civil society 
actors who were interviewed for this research also mentioned other recent instances in 
which the EU had opted for less insistence on the pursuance of accountability through 
criminal tribunals. A European Member State diplomat advising the European Council 
on security related matters in the MENA region mentioned that he had been engaged in 
 




exercises to determine the EU’s approach towards transitional justice in Iraq in the 
wake of ISIS. Knowing that the researcher was based in Belfast, he expressed great 
interest in Northern Ireland’s experience with amnesties, stating that safeguarding 
stability was the EU’s core priority for Iraq.836 
In relation to Sudan several civil society representatives lamented that the EU 
had set aside its commitment to not cooperate with officials indicted by the ICC, by 
agreeing to cooperate with Sudan to stem the flow of migrants to Europe. This is an 
obvious example of how the EU’s more interest-driven approach towards external 
relations is affecting its commitment to international legal norms.837 Another EU official 
mentioned in relation to Afghanistan that when the Framework on Support for 
Transitional Justice was drafted, officials working on Afghanistan opposed the strong 
anti-impunity rhetoric employed in the document: 
So for example I work on Afghanistan, and we have been quite involved in this return of 
Hekmatyar, the Butcher of Kabul, with whom the government signed a deal - with the Hezb-e 
Islami, his party – which included some form of an amnesty, which is not in line with 
international standards. So the delegations were a little bit concerned about language around our 
approach towards amnesties and so on.  
This does not constitute definite evidence of the existence of a connection between the 
choices the EU has made in relation to support for gender justice in transition in 
Tunisia and Ukraine, and the embrace of principled pragmatism. Nevertheless, these 
statements indicate that in several instances support for the pursuance of traditional 
transitional justice goals did not coincide with overall EU foreign policy goals, resulting 
in EU neglect of certain standards that are core to its vision on transitional justice set 
out in the Framework, particularly in the area of impunity.  
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7.3.2 The consequences of more pragmatism for the feminist study of ‘the 
patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’ 
What is the methodological significance of these shifts at the level of international 
politics for feminist scholarship on international engagement with transitional justice? 
This section argues that this thesis demonstrates that these developments demand a 
more careful approach towards the analysis of policy documents as a tool to understand 
the nature and motivations behind international support for gender justice in transition, 
as policy language in value-focused policy documents has not yet caught up with the 
overall changes in foreign policy priorities.  
Over the last five years the EU has embraced a more robust commitment to the 
need to incorporate a gender dimension in its foreign policy. This is reflected in the 
creation of the position of the EEAS Principal Advisor on Gender and the adoption of 
the revised GAP which puts more onus on EU institutions to put gender 
mainstreaming commitments in practice.838 More recently the EU has also adopted a 
revised policy framework stipulating its approach towards the implementation of its 
commitments under the WPS Agenda. In relation to its scope of applicability this 
document states that: 
The WPS Agenda strives to cover all aspects of the connection between gender and conflict but 
its relevance is not limited to conflict situations. It aims to ensure that the rights, agency and 
protection of women and girls are observed and upheld before, during, and after conflict, and 
that a meaningful and equitable role in decision-making is secured for women of all ages during 
all stages of peace making and peacebuilding. Therefore, the WPS Agenda is centrally placed in 
the full spectrum of the EU’s common foreign and security policy.839  
This is an ambitious vision on the scope of applicability of the WPS Agenda and, as 
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discussed in chapter 4, the document as a whole is a sophisticated discussion of the 
EU’s commitments under this framework in both internal and external affairs across a 
range of domains including transitional justice. It is also more comprehensive at the 
level of both the themes and the contexts that it covers than the 2008 Comprehensive 
Approach. This means that the text better answers to feminist demands in relation to 
international engagement with gender justice in transition, which was reflected in 
positive feedback at its publication from the feminist expert community.840  
While a strong policy framework is a vital starting point for change, a good text 
is no guarantee of actual implementation. This is of course always the case, but as the 
updated WPS contradicts broader trends in EU foreign policy as discussed in the 
previous section, the likelihood that discrepancies between policy and practice will 
transpire seems even more profound. The fact that the suggested approach for EU 
implementation of its commitments under the WPS Agenda signals an increase in 
ambition across policy areas, while the EUGS expressed the need for a more tailored, 
country specific and above all pragmatic approach to foreign policy as a whole, raises 
questions about the feasibility of the new WPS commitments. Put differently: how 
realistic is the notion that the EU can fulfil all of its WPS commitments in a much wider 
range of contexts, when the EUGS suggests a recognition on the EU’s behalf for the 
need to make certain trade-offs between value-centred and interest-focused goals if 
stability demands this?  The fact that the document does not reflect in any depth on any 
possible tendencies further reinforces the concern that inspired by/responding to 
critiques in feminist scholarship, and helped by increased levels of in-house expertise – 
the creation of the position of the Principal Advisor guaranteed availability of more 
resources including a seasoned specialist in the field of WPS to strategy development in 
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the area of WPS - the EU has drafted the strategy feminists want, rather than the 
strategy it can deliver.  
As discussed in chapter 4, the Framework on Support for Transitional Justice 
identifies the WPS Strategy as a key framework for guidance for attempts to incorporate 
gendered considerations in transitional justice efforts. Even though the fieldwork for 
this thesis was conducted one year in advance of the adoption of the revision of the 
EU’s WPS Strategy, its findings provide relevant insight in the extent to which the EU’s 
transitional justice specific WPS commitments have been implemented in practice. This 
is the case as the new WPS Framework, while it does acknowledge the continuum of 
violence in more general terms, still associates transitional justice mostly with the fight 
against impunity for conflict-related SGBV:  
The WPS Agenda also emphasises the need to prevent and protect women and girls from sexual 
and gender- based violence. It considers that sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime 
against humanity or an act of genocide (under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court1). Thus, the WPS Agenda focuses on victims’ rights to justice and redress for sexual and 
gender-based violence and stresses the importance of ending impunity for such crimes.841  
As discussed in detail in the previous chapters, the EU has instead prioritized support 
for more forward-looking gender justice efforts.  
The publication of the EU’s revised approach towards the WPS Agenda in 2018 
has to some extent mitigated the inconsistencies between previous policy language and 
contemporary practice.842 As said, the document puts much more emphasis on the 
interlinkages between the EU’s activities in the sphere of WPS and more generic 
GEWE support. In relation to the EU’s support for women’s rights in the 
Neighbourhood, the revised approach towards the WPS Agenda for instance states that 
‘The WPS Agenda and GAP II are both relevant policy frameworks for eliminating all 
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forms of discrimination and violence that women and girls suffer from’.843 However, 
this language implies that the EU is doing all of this at the same time, instead of 
tailoring its women’s rights support to other foreign policy priorities as it has been 
doing in Tunisia and Ukraine.  
To be more indicative of the EU’s actual approach towards support for 
women’s rights abroad, the document would require a genuine reflection on the 
consequences of the embrace of ‘principled pragmatism’ on the EU’s approach to 
value-centred policies. However, such a reflection is absent from this and other similar 
policy documents that exclusively focus on the EU’s role as a force for good. The 
Revised Strategy to the implementation of the WPS Agenda does not mention the term 
‘principled pragmatism’ or a synonymous term once. The same applies to the EU’s 
Framework on Support for Transitional Justice. The question whether it is desirable 
from a feminist (advocacy) perspective for the EU to set more ‘pragmatic’ women’s 
rights standards presents a different field of inquiry outside the direct scope of this 
thesis. In the context of this section the core take away is that EU policy language on 
WPS and gendered transitional justice is an increasingly unreliable source of 
information about the nature of EU support for gender justice in transition.  
Only through a mapping of the actual efforts the EU had undertaken to support 
gender justice in transition in Tunisia and Ukraine, this thesis was able to provide an 
accurate picture of both the nature of this support as well as the motivations that are 
driving EU support with gender justice in transition at the substantive level. While in 
other contexts the EU might support a more comprehensive gender justice agenda that 
incorporates all elements set out in the strategy, the fact that it does not in Tunisia and 
Ukraine implies that carefulness in relation to the representativeness of the document’s 
 




policy language for the EU’s actual activities in practice is warranted. As other 
international actors might display similar tendencies, and it will take time for policy 
language to catch up with reality – if it ever will - the implication for feminist 
scholarship on the patriarchy of transitional justice is that the study of international 
engagement with gender justice through textual analysis should take into account a 
wider range of policy documents than just the value-centred ones and/or triangulate 
findings more with empirical data.  
 
7.3.3 Putting the ‘Protection’ P back at the centre of analysis 
The WPS Agenda has been perceived as constructed around three pillars: prevention, 
protection and participation. 844 This section argues that the findings of this thesis 
demonstrate that the WPS Agenda’s rhetoric on ‘protection’ is increasingly difficult to 
reconcile with international actors’ actual engagement with women’s rights in transition 
in certain contexts in the current era. However, it seems that this issue has received less 
attention in feminist literature, as more recently concerns about instrumentalization 
have been explored mostly in relation to international actors’ approach towards 
participation, particularly in relation to international actors’ depiction of women’s role 
in the War on Terror.845 Therefore, this section argues that the methodological 
innovations suggested in this section should go hand in hand with increased attention 
for the ways in which the emergence of principled pragmatism impacts international 
actors’ support for efforts aimed at ‘protecting’ women against the consequences of 
conflict and repression in a range of different contexts.  
Many contemporary feminist critiques of the WPS Agenda concern the 
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imbalance between the extent to which international actors engage with each of the 
above discussed Ps, and particularly the prioritization of the participation pillar.846 While 
increased gender sensitivity and more emphasis on women’s participation in a wider 
range of contexts is a feminist goal, the desirability of the expansion of a framework 
that in practice has mostly been used to integrate women in security structures has been 
questioned.847 The WPS-ization in the sense that it shifts the focus to more female 
participation in traditional security efforts fits in with the global shift towards more 
interest-based foreign policy. However, the findings of this thesis suggest that the EU’s 
embrace of a pragmatic approach towards foreign policy has also impacted the type of 
substantive, ‘protection-type’ of women’s rights issues it engages with, and that these 
changes do not sync well with dominant insights in feminist theory about international 
actors’ transitional justice priorities. Therefore, the following paragraphs suggest the 
need for more critical reflection on the nature of gender justice support that takes into 
account all three pillars of the WPS Agenda.  
As discussed in the theory chapter, feminist critiques of international actors’ 
engagement with gender justice in transition have increasingly focused on the 
opportunistic nature of this support. Opportunism is reflected in the focus on a narrow 
category of women’s rights violations – conflict-related SGBV – which allows actors 
from the Global North to lecture and even intervene in the Global South, while not 
needing to consider the way in which the Global North itself perpetuates inequality.848 
Opportunism is also reflected in a focus on the integration of women in patriarchal 
security structures,849 and even the use of individual women to achieve security goals 
without thinking about these women’s own security and rights.850 This latter critique has 
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increasingly dominated feminist scholarship as the scope of the WPS Agenda has 
broadened, now also covering counter-terrorism efforts. Ní Aoláin and other feminist 
scholars have underscored the risk that the wording of UNSCR 2242 suggests an 
intention on behalf of the international community to instrumentalize women for 
counter-terrorism purposes in a way that does not contribute to a more secure and 
enabling environment for women.851  
This thesis’ findings on EU engagement with gender justice in Ukraine, where 
conflict related SGBV has occurred, and the government has failed to ratify the Istanbul 
Convention but the EU has largely abstained from serious efforts to address these 
issues, and instead focused on gender mainstreaming the security sector, illustrate that 
this concern about the fractional nature of international engagement with the WPS 
Agenda is also valid outside the realm of counter-terrorism efforts. EUAM’s use of the 
WPS Agenda as the guiding framework for the gendered aspects of its work is 
particularly remarkable, as it does not undertake any efforts to address the women’s 
rights violations resulting from the conflict in the Donbas, including instances of 
conflict-related SGBV. As the WPS Agenda’s guidelines are not tailored to addressing 
the gender justice issues that fall within the remit of EUAM’s mandate, they are mostly 
invoked as a tool to contribute to a better balance of male/female staff in EUAM and 
the Ukrainian institutions with which it works. EUAM’s gender advisor questioned the 
efficacy of such an approach:852  
E: It must be a bit strange to be talking about 1325 all the time, and then to not focus on what is 
probably one of the most relevant events in Ukraine from a 1325 perspective?  
I: Yes. It is very arbitrary; it is very strange.  
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E: At the beginning I didn’t really realize that was completely off topic for EUAM.  
I: Yeah. Thank god my colleagues in the other organizations deal with this, so I don’t have to lie 
awake at night thinking I am not doing what I am supposed to do, no [laughter], because you 
are absolutely right. For me working with 1325 makes hardly any sense at all.853 
In view of this, feminist critique that raises the risk of international support for 
women’s participation usurping support for other more substantive gender justice issues 
remains relevant in this era of principled pragmatism.  
However, the prioritization of this problem in the scholarship has distracted 
from the study of the consequences of the current shifts in global politics on the nature 
of the type of gender justice issues international actors engage with and prioritize in 
societies in transition. This of course concerns the previous chapter’s findings about the 
lack of meaningful EU support for the pursuance of accountability for politically 
motivated SGBV. Some might argue, that in this regard feminists have consistently 
criticized international actors for not putting enough efforts to combat impunity for 
SGBV.854 However, the overall consensus in feminist scholarship is that if international 
actors engage with gendered transitional justice, they prioritize the pursuance of 
accountability for politically motivated sexual violence. What is remarkable then about 
the EU’s approach towards gender justice in Tunisia - and to a lesser extent - Ukraine is 
what it did support in absence of support for the pursuance of accountability for sexual 
violence: i.e. legislative (and other) reform to deal with structural VAW. This refutes 
some core feminist critiques about international actors’ failure support efforts to 
address the continuum of violence experienced by women.  
The EU’s own policy language also differs from its actual efforts in practice in 
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Framework in such situations. 




relation to this specific issue. As mentioned, the Transitional Justice Framework, the 
Comprehensive Approach, and the also the new Strategy towards EU implementation 
of the WPS Agenda all imply that the EU’s priority in this realm still constitutes the 
pursuance of accountability for sexual violence.  This means that it is in relation to 
substantive gender justice support in particular, that textual analysis should be employed 
with extra care as a strategy to enhance understanding of the EU’s engagement with 
gender justice in transition.  
However, what is perhaps more important first is to put international 
engagement with substantive gender justice issues, or what some refer to as the 
‘protection pillar’ back on the feminist research agenda as a component of international 
actors’ approach toward support for gender justice that requires more examination. The 
fact that the notion that sexual violence has been the international community’s core 
priority in the field of WPS and gendered transitional justice support has dominated 
feminist scholarship and advocacy makes putting in question the universal validity of 
this notion a challenge.  The difficulties encountered during the analysis phase of this 
research, as touched upon in section 3.6, illustrate this point. Feminist theory was the 
starting point of this thesis, and feminist critiques concerning essentialist and 
instrumentalist tendencies on behalf of international actors shaped the interview guide 
that guided the fieldwork. Feminist experts – both within and outside EU institutions - 
and feminist NGO activists were amongst the interviewees whose insights were sought 
for during this stage.  
Many of these actors insisted that conflict-related SGBV is the EU’s key gender 
justice concern at the substantive level: 
I think the problem with the whole – I think this is a broader problem not just one of the 
European Union, it is a challenge for the transitional justice community as well – is that gender 




way in which gender has been really truly taken seriously in transitional justice processes. And 
when it comes to policy I think there is a problem in the sense that whatever the policy says, in 
reality the actual implementation of it, or the actual work around it tends to focus primarily on 
women as victims of sexual violence. So the whole gender component becomes a so called 
women’s issue of sexual violence.855  
These actors constituted the interviewees with most thematic expertise in the era of my 
research. Since their visions coincided with EU policy language and dominant insights 
from the scholarship it was hard to challenge these notions even though these 
interviewees often did not have geographically specific expertise on Tunisia and 
Ukraine. Therefore, even when already during the first phase of the fieldwork in 
Brussels interviews with EU officials working on Tunisia and Ukraine specifically 
suggested that in both countries the EU was not prioritizing the pursuance of 
accountability for conflict-related SGBV, it took until the analysis phase for these 
insights to really land.  
And even at that point, as discussed in section 3.6, the code book was still 
designed around the insights from the literature that informed the research. However, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, once the coding started the descriptive codes 
about EU engagement with politically motivated SGBV in Tunisia and Ukraine 
remained remarkably empty. As a result, the ‘essentialization’ and ‘instrumentalization’ 
thematic codes did not contain many nodes after the first round of coding was finished. 
Instead the category ‘side-lining’ had emerged to summarize EU engagement with the 
more traditional aspects of gender justice in transition. The ‘de-politicization’ theme, 
inspired by O’Rourke’s concerns about a ‘de-politicizing’ impulse in feminist 
transitional justice scholarship’ contained 215 references from 45 transcripts.856 Only 
thanks to this structured approach this thesis could arrive at the conclusion that to the 
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extent that the EU does entertain an instrumentalist approach towards support for 
gender justice in transition in Tunisia and Ukraine it is through support for forward-
focused efforts to address the continuum of violence, rather than to engage with more 
controversial efforts to pursue accountability for past instances of SGBV. 
Nevertheless, looking back at the interview transcripts it occurs that due to 
difficulties in letting go certain insights from feminist theory at the data collection stage, 
the line of questioning, inspired by critiques expressed in academic literature and 
feminist experts, was not always optimally geared towards capturing the real lacunae in 
EU engagement with gender justice abroad. This failure to step outside the boundaries 
of the literature might be a result of my rather limited experience as an academic 
interviewer. Still, this does not take away from the fact that if the fieldwork would have 
built on a more diverse body of feminist critiques on international engagement with 
gender justice in transition, it would have been easier to acknowledge this misfit 
between theory and practice already at the data collection stage.  
While critiques of international actors’ focus on women’s participation are 
timely and relevant, a better understanding of the range of gender justice issues 
international actors engage with in societies in transition is important as ‘protecting’ 
women against harm is a viable component of the WPS Agenda as well. Centring 
feminist debates more about this issue is important to allow for enhanced 
understanding of the ways in which the emergence of foreign policy pragmatism is 
impacting international engagement with gender justice in transition. Moreover, as 
feminists have found that the focus on participation facilitates international actors’ co-
option of the feminist agenda, focusing more on the issue of protection can contribute 





7.4 CONCLUSION: METHODOLOGICAL INNOVATION TO 
FACILITATE THE CREATION OF A DIVERSIFIED THEORY OF ‘THE 
PATRIARCHY OF INTERNATIONALIZED TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE’ 
This chapter aimed to identify what type of methodological innovations should be 
embraced to achieve the goal of theoretical diversification in feminist scholarship on 
international engagement with gender justice in transition in view of developments in 
the field of transitional justice itself as well as global politics more broadly. It identified 
innovations aimed at making the literature more representative of international 
transitional justice practice, and innovations aimed at guaranteeing more robust data 
collection.  
To render findings regarding the patriarchy of internationalized transitional 
justice more representative of the current state of the field, feminist scholars should 
study of a wider range of transitions, including transitions from democracy to 
authoritarianism, as these have become the subject of increased international scrutiny 
since the Arab Spring.  Section 7.2 highlights that due to the different properties of 
these transitions, some feminist insights about international engagement with 
transitional justice based on the war-to-peace model might not capture international 
actors’ engagement with other types of transitions. It also highlights the need to 
consider more case studies of transitions taking place in the Global North or its 
borders, because the political calculations that drive international engagement with 
transitions in these contexts are likely to differ from the calculations driving engagement 
with transitions further afar.  
To render findings regarding the nature of international engagement with 
gender justice in transition more robust and reliable, section 7.3 emphasized the need 
for less reliance on analysis of policy language as a means to understand the nature of 




is particularly urgent in light of recent shifts in international politics. The combination 
of the public embrace of a more transactional, interest-based foreign policy model by 
the actors who have traditionally presented themselves as champions of human rights 
and other values, with adoption of ever more sophisticated language on WPS by these 
same actors, has widened the gap been policy and practice. This renders analysis of 
policy documents – even less – reliable as a source of insight in the nature of 
international engagement with gender justice in transition than before. Section 7.3 
illustrated this point through a look at the recent developments in EU policy language 
on WPS.  
Through this analysis the chapter provided one final suggestion for theoretical 
innovation in feminist scholarship, which is to focus particularly on the nature of 
international actors’ engagement with substantive women’s rights issues. This 
suggestion is inspired by the observation that while the divergence between policy and 
practice seems to be widening increasingly at this level in particular, it has been the 
topic of less recent feminist scholarship than the links between international actors’ 
support for women’s participation and broader foreign policy goals.  Therefore, this 
chapter argues that to capture the consequences of principled pragmatism on 
international engagement with gender justice in transition, feminist scholars need to 
embrace both methodological innovation as well as shift their thematic priorities back 
to the study of what type of substantive gender justice issues dominate international 


















8. CONCLUSION: The patriarchy of 
internationalized transformative justice?  
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Finding remedies for the flaws associated with internationalized transitional justice 
practice has since long been a core goal of feminist transitional justice practice. A 
feminist transformative justice agenda, which emphasizes the need to acknowledge a 
broader range of gendered harms, has been put forward to combat international actors’ 
use of support for women’s rights in the service of other foreign policy goals. This 
thesis aimed to identify the theoretical and methodological innovations which are 
required to guarantee feminist transitional justice scholarship’s ability to respond to the 
political realities of the contemporary internationalized transitional justice environment. 
It used an in-depth examination of EU engagement with different types of past- and 
future focus gender justice efforts in Tunisia and Ukraine as a vehicle to answer this 
question.  
 It found that EU policy language on gender justice in transition provides the 
impression of an international gender justice actor which prioritizes support for the 
mainstream gendered transitional justice goals traditionally associated with ‘the 
patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’ despite some attempts to embrace 
more transformative justice language. This image was, however, refuted by chapter 5’s 
findings about the nature of EU engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine 
in practice. Instead of prioritizing support for efforts aimed at the pursuit for 
accountability for grave (gendered) human rights violations, the EU has prioritized 





Does this mean the EU is different from the gender justice supporters studied 
by other feminist scholars interested in international actors’ engagement with gender 
justice in transition? Section 8.2’s reflection on the core findings about the nature of EU 
engagement with gender justice in transition and the drivers behind it suggests 
differently. Indeed, chapter 6’s comparison between the findings about the nature of 
EU gender justice support and the local gender justice opportunity structures in Tunisia 
and Ukraine, showed that political opportunism also is at the root of the EU’s 
engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine. As such section 8.2 concludes 
that the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice is a multi-headed beast which 
co-opts gender justice issues according to what is most politically convenient in each 
individual country context.  Support for different types of gender justice support, 
including approaches that have been hailed as potentially more transformative, can also 
be used for political gain.  
As such this thesis has questioned the wisdom of constructing a definition of 
transformative justice around a predetermined set of harms and mechanisms. Instead, 
as section will 8.3 reiterate, it emphasized the need for a diversified theory of ‘the 
patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’, and the embrace of a definition of 
‘transformative’ that is centred around the notion of challenging vested interests. To 
achieve these theoretical aims this thesis argues that feminist transitional justice 
scholarship needs two embrace two types of methodological innovation: 1) 
consideration of a broader range of case studies when examining the nature of 
international engagement with gender justice in transition, and 2) less reliance on 
analysis of policy documents to determine the nature of international engagement with 
gender justice in transition.  
These suggestions are based on findings about the activities of only one 




that the fact that the case studies under scrutiny speak to recent developments in 
internationalized transitional justice practice itself and shifting attitudes towards the role 
of human rights and other values in global politics, extends the relevance of these 
findings beyond the specific scope of this research. More specifically, both trends imply 
that international support for transitional justice will be determined increasingly by 
context-bound politics rather than universal norms. This means that while this thesis 
does not provide an unequivocal recipe for a remedy against the flaws of ‘the patriarchy 
of internationalized transitional justice’, it does confirm the need for a context-bound, 
politically sensitive approach towards the feminist study of international transitional 
justice practice in the 21st century. Section 8.5, however, concedes that a more 
systematic examination of the EU’s support for gender justice in transition in a broader 
range of contexts –in terms of locations where these transitions are taking place, the 
type of transitions it concerns, and the types of gendered harms relevant to them – 
could contribute to a more robust understanding of the balance of these factors in 
determining the EU’s engagement with gender justice in transition in third countries 
across the globe.  
 
8.2 THE NATURE OF AND MOTIVATIONS BEHIND EU GENDER 
JUSTICE SUPPORT IN TUNISIA AND UKRAINE: CO-OPTING 
TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE APPROACHES? 
To make the planned theoretical and methodological contribution to feminist 
transitional justice scholarship the thesis first had to provide in-depth insight in the 
nature of and motivations behind EU engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and 
Ukraine. To do so, it used a multi-level case study design that combined analysis of EU 
budgetary commitments with interviews with a range of relevant stakeholders in 




Tunisia and Ukraine.  The two findings chapters combined concluded that while 
political calculations drive EU engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine, 
the nature of this support is not in line with dominant feminist assumptions about the 
gender justice issues international actors prioritize. Instead of prioritizing support for 
the pursuit of accountability for politically motivated SGBV, the EU has put its political 
and financial weight behind legislative reform (Tunisia) and institutional reform 
(Ukraine) to break the continuum of ‘everyday’ GBV in line with the gender justice 
priorities of governing political elites. Therefore, in response to the question where one 
should locate the EU’s actions in practice on the tripartite transformative gender justice 
conceptualization, this thesis concludes that they qualify as examples of forward-looking 
transformative justice efforts. This finding, however, rather than being a conclusion 
functioned as a catalyser for a range of other queries, including questions about the 
suitability of the current feminist approach towards defining ‘transformative’ in 
targeting the flaws of internationalized transitional justice practice.  
 
8.2.1 The nature of EU engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine 
This thesis examined EU engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine 
through a tripartite transformative justice lens. It looked into the extent to which the 
EU engaged with mainstream and transformative past-focused gender justice efforts on 
the one hand and more future focused gender justice efforts on the other. While doing 
so, it took into account EU financial and political support for each of these efforts.  
Through a comparison between the different types of gender justice efforts the 
EU engages with both financially and politically, followed by a comparison between the 
findings on Tunisia and Ukraine, the thesis concludes that to the extent that the EU 
engages with past-focused gender justice efforts it indeed still prioritizes mainstream 




EUR in transitional justice funding was allocated to projects contributing to more 
transformative justice goals,857 and in Ukraine the  core beneficiaries of the EU’s 
28,854,522 EUR funding for transitional justice in Ukraine – the HRMMU and OSCE 
SMM – have not only reported on the occurrence of civil and political rights violations 
in the context of the Donbas conflict, but also harms of a socio-economic nature.858  
Nevertheless, concerns around women’s specific experiences of conflict and 
repression have figured only marginally in the design of these EU interventions. In 
Ukraine interviewees indicated that to the extent gender did figure in the project 
outputs this was a result of decisions on behalf of the implementing partners.859 This 
observation includes the OHCHR’s landmark report on the occurrence of SGBV in the 
Donbas.860 Moreover, despite the embrace of some transformative projects in Tunisia, 
these interventions still fall short of a full embrace of a more transformative approach 
towards the pursuit of past-focused gender justice efforts. They neither expand the 
notion of gendered harms that should be the subject of transitional justice efforts, nor 
rely on a broader array of transitional justice tools in order to ensure that if justice is 
pursued for certain gendered harms, this results in progressive outcomes for the female 
victims at hand. As such, the EU’s approach towards gendered transitional justice in 
Tunisia and Ukraine broadly confirms existing insights about ‘the patriarchy of 
internationalized transitional justice’.861  
However, both an in-depth examination of the EU’s political support for past-
focused (gendered) transitional justice efforts and a comparison with the level of 
support –financially and politically speaking – it has provided to forward-looking gender 
justice efforts put these findings in a different light. Analysis of EU annual human rights 
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reports and public statements by EU officials displays a near complete absence of 
political back up to the EU’s financial support for transitional justice efforts. This is 
significant as many interviewees for this research believed that in both countries 
political support by powerful international actors was direly needed to advance 
transitional justice efforts. This finding is more striking when compared to the EU’s 
engagement with forward-looking gender justice issues in Tunisia. In this realm money 
has been allocated enthusiastically – 2,778,721 € for efforts uniquely targeted at 
combatting GBV - and high-ranking EU officials have joined the Tunisian President in 
calls for legislative reform that would contribute to a more gender equal society which is 
free of GBV.862  
This means that while the EU’s support for past-focused transformative gender 
justice efforts has been rather minimal, the EU’s support for forward-focused 
transformative gender justice efforts has eclipsed its support for both mainstream and 
transformative past-focused gender justice efforts in Tunisia. 
In Ukraine the picture is more complex. Yes, the EU has provided more 
funding to efforts to combat GBV than to transitional justice efforts specifically aimed 
at addressing gendered harms – it has not earmarked any funding for past-focused 
gender justice activities – but its support for the fight against GBV has neither been 
very robust. This is most clearly reflected in an absence of significant EU financial and 
political support for the ratification of the Istanbul Convention. At the same time, 
during the time of the fieldwork, the EU seemed to have arrived at a critical junction, 
with many officials reporting that the EU was about to invest in increased gender 
mainstreaming of its SSR and justice reform efforts in a fashion that could greatly 
contribute to efforts aimed at addressing GBV. Nevertheless, the key take away from 
 




the research seems to be that in terms of supporting gender justice in transition – of any 
type – the EU has been significantly more financially committed and politically vocal in 
Tunisia than in Ukraine.  
The overarching conclusion is that when examined through the tripartite gender 
justice framework at the core of this thesis, the EU’s engagement with gender justice in 
transition in Tunisia and Ukraine qualifies thus as much more transformative as one 
would expect based on insights from feminist literature on ‘the patriarchy of 
internationalized transitional justice’. The EU’s prioritization of support for more 
forward-looking gender justice measures, such as legislative and institutional reform, 
over mainstream past-focused gender justice efforts refutes the notion that politically 
motivated SGBV has usurped all other gender justice concerns of international actors 
engaging with women’s rights in societies in transition. These findings put into question 
the applicability of dominant feminist insights about the nature of the efforts prioritized 
by international transitional justice actors on the case studies central to this research. 
They also raise questions about the reasons why the EU has failed to engage with 
efforts that forge a transformative link between the past and the future.  
 
8.2.2 The drivers behind EU engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and 
Ukraine 
While the nature of the EU’s support for gender justice efforts in Tunisia and Ukraine 
does not correspond to insights from feminist theory, the findings about the drivers 
behind the EU’s choices in this area did align with insights from the literature. A 
comparison between the findings about EU gender justice priorities on the one hand, 
and the priorities of local governing political elites on the other, confirms the broadly 
held feminist belief that instrumentalist motives drive international actors’ engagement 




with EU officials and other relevant stakeholders. Feminist transformative justice 
scholarship has emphasized the importance of prioritizing the voices of and agendas of 
local gender justice actors,863 and to some extent the EU’s support benefits efforts 
championed and implemented by local women’s movements. However, overall this 
thesis’ findings suggest that this is only the case to the extent that these agendas 
coincide with the agendas of governing political elites. Therefore, ‘the local’ which 
shapes EU engagement with gender justice is that of local, patriarchal power structures. 
As such Ní Aoláin’s observation that local and international patriarchies reinforce each 
other in the internationalized transitional justice realm also stands within the context of 
this research. 
At the time of the fieldwork, dealing with the past and fighting impunity did not 
figure highly on the agendas of Tunisia’s and Ukraine’s political elites to say the least. In 
Tunisia, President Essebsi and his Nidaa Tounes party were at the verge of pushing 
through a bill that would provide amnesties to businesspeople and officials who 
engaged in corrupt practices under the previous regime.864 In Ukraine, attempts to 
pursue accountability for conflict-related SGBV could literally be counted on one hand 
by the end of 2018.865 While this was partly a consequence of the lack of effective 
control over the separatist forces in Donbas, it also reflected reluctance on behalf of the 
authorities to hold the ‘heroes’ defending the motherland accountable for war crimes.866 
This reluctance was codified through the 2016 adoption of a law preventing 
prosecutions of soldiers for less serious offences and providing reduced sentences for 
those convicted of war crimes. The EU’s silence on transitional justice and particularly 
the fight against impunity – identified as an EU priority in the Framework – seemed to 
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serve the purpose of safeguarding strong ties with both countries’ friendly political elites 
as more urgent foreign policy priorities took centre stage. While interviewees were 
hesitant to make blunt statements like this, security concerns and broader reforms were 
regularly invoked as an excuse for the EU’s absence in the realm of promoting 
transitional justice.867  
Even in the realm of forward-focused gender justice efforts, the EU engaged 
with certain issues and relied on certain methods while neglecting others according to 
the preferences of local political – and in Ukraine’s case religious - establishments. 
While the EU supported forward-looking gender justice efforts in both countries, the 
type of support provided in Tunisia differed significantly from the type of support 
provided in Ukraine even though a similar set of gender justice issues had animated 
international and grassroots gender justice actors in both countries. Again, a 
comparison between the EU’s activities in this regard with the gender justice priorities 
of the Tunisian and Ukrainian ruling classes shows remarkable convergence between 
what these actors prefer and what the EU prioritizes in its programming and diplomatic 
exchanges: legislative reform in Tunisia to support Essebsi in his quest to become the 
second Bourguiba, and gender mainstreaming of EU support for SSR – rather than 
meaningful support for the blasphemous Istanbul Convention – neatly staying in line 
with Poroshenko’s motto ‘Army, language, faith’.  
As mentioned in chapter 6, the focus of this thesis were the higher level 
(political) factors that determine the nature of EU engagement with gender justice in 
transition. The centrality of foreign policy interests to international actors’ has been 
recognized by other scholars studying internationalized transitional justice practice.868 
However, as pointed out in chapter 6, both interviewees for this research as well as 
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other publications have identified other factors such as individuals, institutional 
arrangements, and access to information as important factors in shaping international 
actors’ engagement with transitional justice/gender justice in transition.869 While this 
thesis acknowledges the existence of these factors, its core focus is on disentangling 
why they exist, i.e. why has the EU not invested more in creating an enabling 
institutional environment for supporting gender justice in transition. Nevertheless, 
recognizing and mapping the role of individuals and institutional arrangements is 
important when one wants to come up with suggestions for (incrementally) improving 
international actors’ transitional justice efforts. While foreign policy interests will likely 
continue to determine the boundaries of international actors’ engagement with gender 
justice in transition, within these overarching boundaries it might be possible to 
optimize international actors’ transitional justice activities by identifying weaknesses at 
the operational level that hamper international actors from optimally implementing the 
type of transitional justice support that does fit within their broader foreign policy 
approach. 
Thus, while the nature of EU engagement with gender justice in transition does 
not confirm feminist critiques of the gender justice preoccupations of international 
actors, the drivers behind this engagement are reminiscent of what feminist scholars 
have argued to be the core motivations behind international engagement with gender 
justice in transitions. This suggests that the defining feature of the patriarchy of 
internationalized transitional justice is not necessarily what type of gendered harms it 
does and does not engage with, but rather the type of calculations that define 
engagement with gender justice in transition in any given context. This raises questions 
about what focus feminist scholars should adopt when creating a feminist 
 




transformative justice agenda that aims to remedy the flaws of internationalized 
transitional justice practice.   
 
8.3 THEORETICAL INNOVATION 
Based on these findings the thesis argues in favour of a more diversified theory of ‘the 
patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’ which recognizes that international 
actors’ co-option of women’s rights for political gain is not related to support for one 
type of gender justice issue. To the extent that the feminist transformative justice 
agenda is invoked as a tool to address the flaws of internationalized transitional justice 
practice, this thesis argues in favour of a more politicized definition of the term 
transformative, which is sufficiently agile to respond to the multi-fold appearances of 
‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’.  
Over the last fifteen years, transformative justice has become the rallying cry of 
critical transitional justice scholars including many feminists who question the capacity 
of mainstream transitional justice practice to contribute to meaningful justice outcomes 
for victims and societies at large. However, an unequivocal definition of the term has 
failed to emerge. Based on an analysis of feminist transformative justice literature this 
thesis identified a core set of characteristics most commonly associated with this 
concept including recognition of the continuum of violence,870 respect for the priorities 
of local gender justice actors,871 and an emphasis on mechanisms/interventions that put 
female victims and women as a group in a better societal position.872  
However, the findings about EU engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and 
Ukraine show that approaches that combine one or more of these characteristics can 
also be used to consolidate local patriarchal power structures. Does this thesis reject a 
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definition of transformative that focuses on addressing the continuum of violence, and 
that definitions of transformative justice should be constructed around dealing with 
political instances of past-violence? It does not, as it is aware of the limitations of its 
findings. First, it relies on the study of the activities of just one international actor in 
only two contexts over a recently recent period of time. Indeed, both historical data as 
well as suggestions by interviewees in relation to the EU’s activities in other countries 
imply that in other contexts the EU has prioritized mainstream (gendered) transitional 
justice goals over addressing the continuum of violence experienced by women in 
societies in transition.873 Second, the findings demonstrate that the EU failed to support 
gender justice efforts that establish a bridge between the past and the future such as 
reparations. This means that the EU has only prioritized one component of the two 
more transformative gender justice approaches that this thesis has identified as being 
fundamental to a feminist transformative justice agenda. Lastly, while cutting the 
transformative justice concept into components is a useful analytical tool to identify 
what an international actor does and does not support, in feminist scholarship all of 
these components are connected and interdependent.  
Nevertheless, when it comes to defining transformative justice this thesis would 
argue there is need for a definition that is both more flexible and more politicized in 
order to do justice to the fact that gender justice trajectories differ significantly across 
societies in transition. This requires the embrace of a definition of ‘transformative 
justice’ which is not constructed around certain mechanisms or harms, but around the 
notion of addressing the unaddressed and challenging the status quo/patriarchal power 
structures. Embracing such a definition requires in-depth understanding of context-
specific local gender justice opportunity structures before putting forward 
 





recommendations for more transformative justice approaches. The methodological 
innovation that is required to arrive at such an understanding is reiterated in the next 
section. 
When it comes to the role of international actors in supporting gender justice in 
transition, this thesis explored the dynamics between ever increasing demands for more 
local ownership in transformative justice literature and a reality in which international 
funding remains vital to many transitional and transformative justice activities.874 With 
regard to the question whether local ownership is at all compatible with international 
transitional justice funding in middle income countries in transition such as Tunisia and 
Ukraine, this thesis follows the line that in this type of contexts the emphasis should 
shift from funding state-level transitional justice institutions to civil society initiatives, 
echoing previous findings by Arthur and Yakinthou.875 However, looking at the 
Tunisian and Ukrainian experiences with gender justice in transition this thesis 
identified a second challenge; which gender justice or transitional justice initiatives to 
fund in case of competing priorities between various local actors and different levels of 
state/elite buy-in. This thesis argues there is need for a balance between capitalizing on 
support for gender justice issues that can count on local elite buy-in, and creating a 
durable tissue of civil society actors who can step in when space opens up to work on 
gender and transitional justice issues that are too controversial to advance at earlier 
points in time.   
This research’ observations of the EU’s efforts in Tunisia and Ukraine, suggest 
that in the EU’s case the embrace of such an approach would require significant shifts 
in its approach towards supporting gender justice in transition. While the EU has 
adjusted its approach to the gender justice priorities of national authorities, it has largely 
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failed to invest in a more sustainable transitional justice tissue. The EU could improve 
in this regard by focusing less on one-off transitional justice projects driven by iNGOs 
or IOs, investing more in network building between local civil society actors, and 
providing more support for advocacy also in relation to gender justice issues that can 
count on state buy-in.  Nevertheless, this thesis is careful to not cast strong judgements 
about the EU’s choice to support an approach towards support for gender justice in 
transition that prioritizes convergence with gender justice priorities of local authorities. 
While this approach has obviously come at the expense of support for certain core 
gendered transitional justice goals, one could think of several reasons why a ‘pragmatic’ 
approach towards support for gender justice in transition is preferable over a more 
confrontational – transformative - one. E.g. by aligning itself with government priorities 
the EU ensures that its gender justice funding actually contributes to improvements in 
the situation of women on the ground. These dilemmas highlight the need for more 
(evaluative) research into the question how international actors can address the 
unaddressed in the most optimal fashion, as evidence about the impact of international 
actors’ transitional justice support remains scarce.876 Section 8.5 will reflect on the 
implications of this absence of evidence in terms of developing a future research 
agenda.  
 
8.4 METHODOLOGICAL INNOVATION  
This thesis confirmed that there is need for methodological innovations in the feminist 
approach towards the study of internationalized transitional justice practice in order to 
understand the nature of and drivers behind international actors’ engagement with 
gender justice in transition; a first step towards developing a transformative justice 
 




agenda that responds to the gaps in contemporary internationalized transitional justice 
approaches. This need for methodological innovation is particularly urgent in light of 
recent developments in the field of transitional justice itself and global politics more 
broadly. The former concerns the growing international attention for and engagement 
with transitions from authoritarianism to democracy.877 The latter concerns the apparent 
shift towards a ‘post-human rights world’.878 To arrive at a diversified theory of the 
patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice which is rooted in reliable data and 
representative of the field as a whole this thesis argues in favour of diversification of 
case studies and less reliance on analysis of (generic) policy documents in the feminist 
study of internationalized transitional justice practice  
Internally, this thesis’ case studies at the local level, Tunisia and Ukraine, are two 
settings that represent transitions that have remained underexplored in feminist – and 
mainstream – scholarship on international engagement with transitional justice.879 
Tunisia is experiencing a transition from authoritarianism to democracy,880 and while 
Ukraine is grappling with the Donbas war, it concerns a low-intensity conflict that has 
not received much attention from feminist scholars studying ‘the patriarchy of 
internationalized transitional justice’.881 As these types of transitions come with a 
different set of political dynamics and legacy of human rights violations – including 
gendered harms – this might affect the approach international actors take towards 
support for gender justice in this type of contexts. One could argue that it only makes 
sense that these transitions have not received much attention in feminist scholarship on 
international engagement with gender justice in transition, as historically they have not 
constituted an important arena for international transitional justice interventions. 
 
877 Nassar 2015 (n771). 
878 Mallinder 2017 (n808). 
879 Sharp 2014 (n46); O’Rourke 2012 (n6).  
880 Preysing 2016 (n772); McAuliffe 2016 (n772). 




However, this is changing, as is particularly well demonstrated by the Tunisian 
experience, and therefore in order for feminist scholars to develop comprehensive 
critiques of internationalized transitional justice practice, it is necessary to take these 
transitions into account as well.   
When it comes to methods, the internationalization of a broader set of 
transitions, puts into question the reliance on generic policy documents as a source of 
reliable information about international actors’ gender justice priorities. Most guiding 
documents for international engagement with gender justice in transition – most 
notably the WPS Agenda – were created with war-to-peace transitions in mind. This 
makes them an ill-fitting source to learn more about the nature of and motivations 
behind international engagement with gender justice in different types of transitions. 
Furthermore, developments in global politics, most notably the erosion of international 
actors’ commitment to international human rights norms, and public openness to a 
more transactional foreign policy approach, even further reduces the authority of these 
documents as a reliable source of information about the priorities of international actors 
in terms of transitional justice support.  
The challenges the researcher faced when examining the EU’s support for 
gender justice in transition, and the contradictory findings that arose from analysis of 
policy documents and EU activities in practice seem to support this point. While the 
EU has adopted a less ambitious overall foreign policy approach in terms of human 
rights and democracy promotion, it has simultaneously significantly geared up its policy 
rhetoric on WPS and gendered transitional justice. This is contradictory, and the 
findings of EU engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine in practice 
indeed demonstrated the EU’s failure to live up to this more ambitious policy language. 
Because the thesis is lacking a historically comparative element, it cannot argue with 




however, found strong indications that its embrace of a more pragmatic approach 
shapes its engagement with transitional justice in Tunisia and Ukraine.  
Reflecting on the struggles the researcher experienced in bringing together the 
findings from the fieldwork with existing insights from feminist theory, this thesis’s last 
recommendation is to invest in feminist theorization around the notion of 
instrumentalization or co-option with particular attention for the substantive dimension 
of international gender justice support. Since the notion that instrumentalist motives 
guide international engagement with gender justice in transition has gained traction, 
feminists have explored in much depth how this is related to these actors’ increasing 
preoccupation with the participation pillar of the WPS agenda.882  
This thesis’s findings indeed demonstrate that focusing on promoting women’s 
participation in security operations has indeed well served the EU in Ukraine, 
confirming earlier findings by for instance Deiana and McDonagh.883 Feminist scholars 
have also found connections between the securitization of wartime rape and 
international actors’ broader foreign policy agendas.884 However, as discussed, the 
findings of this thesis demonstrated that in Tunisia and Ukraine the EU has abstained 
from this issue because focusing on this type of politically motivated instances of GBV 
did not serve its political interests in these contexts. This implies that support for 
multiple types of gender justice efforts – including the ones that seem on first sight less 
politicized in the sense that they do not deal with harms inflicted on women during 
conflict or repression – can serve broader foreign policy agendas. This notion is 
currently not reflected in feminist theory on internationalized transitional justice 
practice.885  
 
882 Ní Aoláin 2016 (n76); Muehlenhoff 2017 (n38); Powell 2015 (n734). 
883 Deiana and McDonagh 2017 (n38). 
884 Hirschauer 2014 (n7). 
885 At the local level O’Rourke has greatly contributed to enhancing insight in this phenomenon, 





8.5 DEVELOPING A FEMINIST (RESEARCH) AGENDA FOR 
INTERNATIONALIZED TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PRACTICE 
Theoretical and methodological innovation in feminist transitional justice scholarship 
can contribute to getting better insight in the nature of and drivers behind 
internationalized transitional justice practice. This, on its turn, of course serves the more 
ambitious goal of identifying ways to improve these efforts. As discussed in section 8.3, 
this research has identified a number of ways for international actors to advance 
transformative gender justice goals in middle-income countries in transition, where a 
range of gender justice priorities are competing for financial resources and political 
support. However, more research –  with local stakeholders and informed by clear 
insight in the actual nature of internationalized transitional justice support – is needed 
to develop this agenda. This section identifies avenues for further research both aimed 
at providing more robust insight in the nature of, drivers behind and impact of 
internationalized transitional justice practice and creating locally-driven guidance for 
international actors on how to optimally contribute to advancing gender justice in 
transition.   
 
8.5.1 Enhancing understanding of the nature of, drivers behind and impact of 
internationalized transitional justice support   
This thesis proposes an ambitious agenda for future feminist research into international 
engagement with gender justice in transition in a ‘post-human rights world’ informed by 
both the limitations of this thesis as well as its suggestions for methodological and 
theoretical innovation. Key to this agenda is the replication of this thesis’ highly 
contextualized approach to studying international engagement with transitional justice 




with more countries in transitions, and then the international level – i.e. looking into the 
interactions of more international actors with these local contexts.  
When it comes to replicating this thesis’ research approach, it would be 
particularly beneficial to compare findings about the EU’s approach towards gender 
justice in Tunisia and Ukraine with its gender justice priorities in a contemporary 
example of a typical war-to-peace transition with high levels of conflict-related SGBV. 
These case study contexts could be located both in the near vicinity of the EU – e.g. 
Syria – and further afar – e.g. Colombia the DRC or South Sudan. Looking at EU 
support for gender justice efforts in Syria – particularly political support for accounts to 
pursue accountability for conflict-related SGBV - would allow for more insight in the 
question, whether if widespread conflict-related SGBV and wartime rape are prevalent 
the EU is willing to overcome political barriers to provide meaningful support to efforts 
to pursue accountability for these crimes. Increased insight in EU engagement with 
these issues in contexts such as Colombia, the DRC and South Sudan, of which the 
internal struggles present a less direct foreign policy concern to the EU than those in 
Tunisia, Ukraine and Syria, would allow for more in-depth examination of how the 
presence or a lack of strong foreign policy interests affects EU engagement with gender 
justice in transition. 
Collecting data about a range of contexts – for instance ten to fifteen countries 
– would provide a robust picture of the nature of EU engagement with gender justice in 
transition, allowing for better informed guidance on how to improve the EU’s efforts in 
this field to make it a more effective supporter of transformative gender justice ideals. A 
table which classifies findings about EU financial and political engagement in each 
context while providing information about the level of SGBV experienced by each of 




type of transitions these countries are experiencing, could be used to test hypotheses 
about the drivers behind EU gender justice support.   
This thesis would also be interested in a robust historical comparison between 
EU engagement with different countries in the EU’s near surroundings over time to 
acquire more robust evidence in relation to the question whether the shift towards 
principled pragmatism has indeed caused the EU’s gender justice priorities to shift. 
Such an examination could take into account EU engagement with transitional justice in 
Northern Ireland, the Balkans and Morocco in the past, and EU support for transitional 
justice in Tunisia, Ukraine, Libya and Syria in the present (or near future).  Besides 
conducting more research on the EU’s activities in this field it would also be beneficial 
to compare the EU’s activities in the area of gender justice in transition in a specific 
context with those of other international actors who have a different set of political and 
security interests in these contexts. This would contribute to getting a better grasp of 
the extent to which the EU’s activities are emblematic of the international approach 
towards gender justice in transition as a whole or just reflective of the EU’s transitional 
justice activities. 
 
8.5.2 Understanding the impact of international support for gender justice in 
transition 
The dilemmas international actors face when engaging with gender justice in transition 
– particularly the question how to balance support for gender justice issues that do and 
do not have government buy in – also call for more research into the impact of 
different types of gender justice approaches. Measurement of effects of transitional 




praxis.886 Nevertheless, in-depth understanding of the effects of international support 
for different types of gender justice in transition is essential in order to advance a 
feminist agenda for internationalized transitional justice practice. Getting this type of 
insight – particularly when it comes to the effects of isolated inventions/projects - 
requires a joint effort between (feminist) transitional justice scholars, donors and 
practitioners. This section suggests some efforts that could be taken to measure the 
impact of international support for gender justice in transition.  
 Insight in the effects of transitional justice efforts remains scarce. While some 
academics have attempted to measure transitional justice’s contribution to societal and 
political objectives such as peace, democracy and the rule of law at the macro-level,887 
there has been a surprising lack of evaluative research at the practitioner level. In this 
regard Arthur has remarked that:  
Perhaps the biggest information gap in relation to TJ is whether it achieves the social change 
outcomes it sets out to achieve. That this gap remains so large is a puzzling issue. The donor 
community has poured billions of dollars into TJ efforts (including the international tribunals), 
but with almost no data upon which to base its funding decisions, and almost no interest in 
understanding the impact of its assistance.888  
Furthermore, based on her experience as a transitional justice practitioner for a big 
international transitional justice NGO, she observes that: 
The few evaluations that are undertaken are primarily focused on the project level – rather than 
the TJ intervention level (like a truth commission) – including even small projects with budgets 
of less than $200,000.889  
 
886 Arthur 2018 (n34): 234.  
887 Olsen, Payne and Reiter 2010 (n826); Thoms, Ron and Paris 2010 (n158); Geoff Dancy et all, ‘Behind 
Bars and Bargains: New Findings on Transitional Justice in Emerging Democracies’ (2019) 63(1) 
International Studies Quarterly 99; Phuong Ngoc Pham et al, ‘Evaluating transitional justice: The role of 
multi-level mixed methods datasets and the Colombia reparation program for war victims’ (2016) 1(4) 
Transitional Justice Review 3; Elisabeth Bunselmeyer and Philipp Schulz, ‘Quasi-experimental research 
designs as a tool for assessing the impact of transitional justice instruments’ (2019) The International 
Journal of Human Rights 1. 
888 Arthur 2018 (n34): 234 




She ascribes this reluctance to evaluate to the notion that “it pays to be ignorant”; i.e. 
both for transitional justice NGOs as well as individual transitional justice advocates in 
donor entities it might be more beneficial to have no research on the impact of 
transitional justice as long as there are some ‘core supporter’ are willing to allocate 
funds without evidence, rather than to risk gathering evidence that might uncover the 
inefficiency of certain transitional justice activities.890 
 Besides this opportunistic attitude on behalf of transitional justice advocates, 
there are practical challenges associated with evaluating complex transitional justice 
projects. However, in this regard Arthur remarks that ‘claims made by TJ advocates that 
their work is too complex and therefore “cannot be measured” (meaning assessed or 
judged” are simplistic and misleading and must be challenged’.891 In this regard it is 
encouraging that over the last decade transitional justice scholars have developed both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches to measure the impact of transitional justice 
mechanisms across contexts and smaller-scale interventions in specific countries.892 
There should be more synergies between donors, gender justice practitioners and 
scholars to develop methodologies to measure the impact of transitional justice 
interventions. Scholars interested in contributing to advancing insight in the impact of 
transitional justice interventions, need to recognize the fact that international donor 
funding is scarce and making funding decisions therefore inevitably implies choosing 
between various actions. It is therefore important that academic research reflects this 
reality by making comparisons between different courses of actions that are meant to 
advance similar types of goals. This thesis’ conceptual framework which distinguishes 
between different components of the transformative gender justice agenda could serve 
 
890 This phenomenon has been identified originally in a generic development context by Pritchett: Lant 
Pritchett, ‘It Pays to Be Ignorant: A Simple Political Economy of Rigorous Program Evaluation’ in 
Reinventing Foreign Aid (MIT Press 2008).  
891 Arthur 2018 (n34): 235.  




as a basis for this type of research, but one could also think of research that compares 
between support for advocacy vs. technical assistance.  
  
8.5.3 Developing a bottom-up feminist agenda for internationalized transitional 
justice practice   
Better insight in the nature of, drivers behind and impact of internationalized 
transitional justice support can contribute to the development of feminist remedies for 
the flaws of contemporary internationalized transitional justice practice. Section 8.3 
summarized the suggestions to improve international engagement with gender justice in 
transition in middle-income countries put forward in this thesis, based on its findings 
on the nature of EU engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine. However, 
these suggestions could benefit from the type of extensive comparative research on 
international engagement with gender justice in transition described in the previous 
paragraph, and more feedback from local stakeholders to address post-colonial 
(feminist) critiques of internationalized transitional justice practice. This section sets out 
steps to realize this objective.  
 Interviews with civil society actors in Tunisia and Ukraine were a central 
component to data collection efforts carried out in the context of this research. Initially, 
the aim of the interviews with these actors was to get better insight in the nature of EU 
support for these actors and their perspectives on the EU’s approach to support for 
gender justice in transition. However, as chapter 5 showed, only a handful of local civil 
society actors in Tunisia and Ukraine have benefited from EU support for gender 
justice efforts. As a result, few civil society interviewees in Tunisia and Ukraine could 
provide detailed insight in the nature of EU gender justice support. That said, many 
civil society interviewees did provide critiques on the EU’s approach in this regard. 




put into question the adequacy of some of these interviewees’ perceptions of the EU 
activities/priorities in the realm of gender justice support. Of course this is not entirely 
surprising in view of the fact that the majority of interviewees did not qualify as 
recipients of such support themselves. 
 The fact that the provision of international transitional justice support – and 
international aid in general – remains such an opaque affair, is a huge obstacle to 
improving it and particularly to incorporating local actors’ visions in attempts to reform 
certain practices. While many big iNGOs often have ‘business development’ 
departments/roles responsible for analysing the donor funding landscape and 
maintaining regular contacts with donor agencies, most local CSOs do not benefit from 
this level of expertise and access.   In order to respect the need to prioritize local 
perspectives in debates around internationalized transitional justice practice, while also 
developing well-informed critiques about this phenomenon, it is therefore important to 
share the type of data-driven insights about the nature of internationalized transitional 
justice practice provided by this thesis with local stakeholders. Such an effort can ignite 
a bottom-up discussion about what should be the role of international actors in supporting 
gender justice in transition.  
Future research on EU engagement with gender justice in transition in different 
contexts could therefore focus on the impact (broadly defined, along various axes) of 
EU support for gender justice issues with buy in from local authorities’ vs the impact of 
EU support for gender justice efforts that do not enjoy similar support. This requires 
careful consideration of what qualifies as impact – does recognition of unrecognized 
gender justice issues in itself qualify as a gain for instance? – and careful selection of 
case studies where the EU has adopted a more assertive approach towards support for 




each of these approaches, one can provide recommendations for the most optimal 
approaches towards ‘addressing the unaddressed’.  
 
8.5.4 Identifying institutional inroads for improving international actors’ 
performance as gender justice supporters 
This thesis focuses on the higher-level politics driving international engagement with 
gender justice in transition. Nevertheless, it acknowledges that within the boundaries set 
by international actors’ foreign policy interests, there might be room to improve their 
gender justice efforts, by equipping individuals working within these institutions with 
tools to more efficiently design and implement gender justice efforts. Interviewees 
within the framework of this research and also other studies have identified information 
gaps – in relation to local transitional justice trajectories, local stakeholders’ gender 
justice needs/priorities, and about transitional justice/gender justice in general – as an 
important obstacle to the successful design and implementation of gender 
justice/transitional justice efforts. This research did not explore these information needs 
in any depth as its focus was on identifying the nature of and drivers behind EU gender 
justice support. However, mapping these needs in more detail in relation to specific 
country contexts and across contexts will allow for the development of tools that can 
support gender justice advocates within donor entities to more effectively advocate for, 
design and implement gender justice projects.   
 
8.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Co-option of gender justice issues for political gain is a real issue at both the local and 
the international level, which has rightly alarmed feminist scholars studying international 
engagement with gender justice in transition. However, through an in-depth study of 




different approaches that could be qualified as mainstream or transformative, this thesis 
has demonstrated that co-option does not necessarily crystalize in the sense that has 
received most attention in feminist scholarship. Moreover, trends in the field of 
internationalized transitional justice practice and global politics more generally suggest 
that international attitudes towards gender justice in transition might be diversifying and 
changing. To capture these developments, feminist transitional justice scholarship on 
‘the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice’ will need to diversify as well, 
both at the theoretical and the methodological level. This will constitute a first step 
towards creating an informed critique of the patriarchy of internationalize transitional 
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APPENDIX I: CODING MANUAL 
Coding manual: EU support for (transformative) gender justice in a 
neighbourhood in transition 
 
GENERAL DESCRIPTIVE CODES 
 
These codes capture tendencies in the EU’s approach towards gender justice in 
transition. Codes on EU engagement with gender justice in Tunisia and Ukraine 
specifically are aggregated under these codes.  
 
1. The EU’s shifting approach to security 
 
This research is constructed around the idea that EU support for gender justice (in 
transition) is inextricably linked to broader developments in the field of EU foreign 
policy and particularly the EU’s approach towards security. Therefore, it is necessary to 
capture 1) the extent to which the EU’s approach towards security has evolved in the 
eyes of the interviewees, and 2) how this has influenced the EU’s attachment to the 
promotion of ‘European values’ in third countries.  
 
The aim is not to use these references to argue that there is a shift in EU foreign policy 
(as this has been already established in existing literature), but rather to use these 
statements as input for an analysis of the way these developments impact EU support 
for TJ and gender justice. This is necessary as when directly asked about support for 
gender justice in transition EU officials often do not make the link with broader 
developments in the field of EU foreign/security policy, as despite the EU’s adherence 
to the WPS Agenda various interviewees did not display understanding that this means 
that gender is integral to all the EU’s security efforts and therefore that broader 
developments in the field of EU security policy automatically impact the EU’s 
engagement with the WPS Agenda as well.  
 
The codes were initially based on interviews conducted in Brussels, but remarks by 
interviewees in Tunisia and Ukraine neatly fitted into these nodes 
 
Code Description Example 
1.1 Security is 
human security 
This code contains references and 
remarks which imply that ‘human 
security’ or a value based approach is still 
at the heart of EU security policy. 
So the vision was to 
really engage and to step 
up cooperation for us to 
help the first line of 
defence when it comes to 
the EU to tackle the 
threat with a very 
focused, with a very 
concrete focus on 
prevention, on youth, on 
women, and on human 
rights and rule of law 
responses, and 
comprehensive responses 




in a way. And with 
Tunisia with the added 
element of the foreign 
terrorist fighters’ 
phenomenon, which in a 
way transformed into a 
returnees’ problem now. 
Returnees meaning the 
returnees that went to 
Syria, Iraq to fight 





This code contains references and 
remarks which imply that concerns of 
local civil society organizations, including 
women’s groups, constitute serious input 
for EU security policy. Recognition of 
the concerns of these local actors is a 
core characteristic of adherence to the 
human security ideal.  
I1: And then what I also 
wanted to say, and I 
already said, is that we 
had, you know in the 
ENP Review this four 
key priorities, right, and 
one of them is security, 
because this is also 
related to your research. 
And so, then we wanted 
after the adoption of the 
Review, because we said 
we would do it, to 
consult the civil society 
on it. Actually we are 
consulting the civil 
society on all the issues, 
on all the topics of the 
ENP Review, be it 
specifically on a topic or 
on all the topics you 
know of the ENP 
Review. You know we 
have these civil society 
fora, regional fora that 
we organize. There is one 
for the South coming up 
in July, and there was a 
preparatory meeting for 
that in April in Tunis, 
and then specific topics 
are selected for those 
discussions, and then in 
the preparatory meeting 
for example for the 
forum in July, the 
preparatory meeting of 
April they selected 
security and migration 
for discussion for 
obvious reasons. 
 
1.1.2 HR and RL 
are central to 
security 
This code contains references and 
remarks which imply that values such as 
human rights and the rule of law are at 
the centre of EU security related 
interventions in third countries.  
In response to the 
question how 
cooperation with third 
country governments 
that are not democratic 
might impact EU 




rights and democracy, 
the interviewee 
emphasizes the central 
role of human rights and 
democracy in all of the 
EU’s support for security 
related interventions in 
third countries. Security 
cooperation also doesn’t 
come at the expense of 
other types of traditional 
EU cooperation with 
third countries. EU 
support for security 
related projects is not an 
obstacle to the EU’s 
commitment to human 
rights and gender. To the 
contrary, as both 
commitments are always 
incorporated in the EU’s 
security policies and 
programmes directed at 
third countries as this is a 
requirement. 
 
1.2 Shift to hard 
security  
This code contains references and 
remarks which imply that the EU is 
increasingly prioritizing hard security 
goals in its foreign policy, which has 
resulted in an increased willingness to rely 
on hard security measures, and less 
emphasis on the promotion of 
democracy and related values as a core 
dimension of EU security policy.  
 
Obvious examples of this shift include 
the EU’s increased focus on CT measures 
in third countries, and its willingness to 
cooperate with repressive regimes. It also 
entails a readiness to look away when 
grave violations of EU values are taking 
place in third countries, when this is 
(seemingly) beneficial for EU (short 
term) security goals.  
‘The prioritization of the 
fight against terrorism 
has changed EU foreign 
policy in the sense that 
the question ‘what does it 
bring to our own 
security?’ has increasingly 
influenced or determined 
the EU’s choices and 
efforts in the field of 
foreign policy. Money for 
development is now also 
being used to increase 
security. We are in the 
process of 
mainstreaming counter 
terrorism into activities 








This code contains remarks or references 
that indicate that officials with security 
backgrounds are increasingly dominating 
EU foreign policy. This has been linked 
by some interviewees to the EU’s 
approach towards TJ and gender.  
‘So I think that even 
within this you have 
some people who are 
really focused on conflict 
prevention, peace 
building, who are really 
trying to promote this 
from within, but then 
some people are coming 
at maybe from other 
divisions, counter 




hard security approach. 
So obviously, they are 
going to potentially have 
to work together. 
Though sometimes I 
think that they don’t 
push too much either, 
because you know 
terrorism would be 
considered, or kind of 
issues related to 
terrorism or violent 
extremism would be 
considered the remit of 
the counter terrorism 
division, so the PRISM 
people won’t kind of 






This code contains remarks and 
references which imply that the EU has 
paid less attention to the security 
concerns of local and to a certain extent 
international CS organizations. This is 
reflected in reduced support for 
grassroots organizations who work on 
peacebuilding and community security, 
and increased bureaucratic pressure on 
CS organizations in the name of security.  
 
The importance of the recognition of 
grassroots organizations in security effort 
is a the core of the WPS agenda, and the 
fact that the EU seems to be engaged in a 
move into the other direction implies that 
the EU’s shift to hard security is coming 
at the expense of its commitment to the 
WPS Agenda.  
I: Well don’t get me 
started on that, because I 
would have a lot to say 
about that from a 
personal perspective. In 
the last dialogue that we 
had on women’s 
participation in the peace 
processes in Ukraine this 
was something that was 
brought up a lot. The 
programming tends to 
focus on a specific view 
of what the relations 
between men and 
women are in Ukraine, 
and that they are not 
taking into account the 
voices of women 
themselves there.  
 
E: The EU?  
 
I: It was not, it was a 
dialogue between civil 
society and the EU, and 
OSCE. So I can assume 
this was also targeted at 
the EU. It was targeted 
at donors in general, but 
basically the 
programming was made 
in such a way that it is 
not looking at the 
priorities, the actual 
priorities of activists, and 
women on the ground, 
women’s groups 
including, and referring 
also to a saviour kind of 
complex, and a 




that trend. Some of the 
participants there were 
saying that this was not 
useful, as they have to 
answer these constant 
proposals in a way that, 
is, is not you know 
connected to reality and 
to their needs. There is 
quite a few things on 
having a gender lens, a 
recommendation that 
came over and over 
again, please adopt a 
gender lens when you do 
programming, when you 
do analysis, and do not 
just look at numbers of 
women, look at the, you 







This code contains remarks or references 
which indicate that the EU is increasingly 
willing to cooperate with repressive 
governments for the sake of (short term) 
security goals. For many interviewees this 
seemed to be one of the clearest 
indicators of the EU’s prioritization of 
hard security goals. Moreover, such a 
shift was considered to be particularly 
detrimental for the promotion of TJ 
goals.  
I: And this is the case for 
example with Egypt 
where they are 
reinforcing their 
partnership with Egypt, 
because it seen as such 
an important partner to 
respond to migration and 
terrorism, whereas 
basically what Egypt is 
doing is, well basically it 
is murdering its citizens 
and arresting its people. 
It is not respecting 
human rights including 
of women – especially - 
but it is also driving the 
problems. Like when you 
are doing these kind of 
things, you are clearly 
part of the problem, and 
that is kind of what we 
are trying to do in the 
context of our work on 
counter terrorism 
approaches. It is to say 
basically you are 
reinforcing those 
institutions that are 
causing a lot of these 
problems. And it is not 
only because of terrorism 
that we shouldn’t be 
working with them, it is 
also because they are not 
respecting the human 
rights of their citizens 
and people who on their 




should not be kind of 
providing a green light to 
this kind of behaviour by 
providing them with 




money for security 
purposes   
Remarks or references which imply that 
the EU has rebranded budgets that were 
previously destined to support 
development or value oriented policies as 
financial sources to support security 
efforts. Both EU as well as non-EU 
interviewees referred to this tendency, 
and this is something that can be 
triangulated through a control of EU 
budgets.  
E: And in my interviews 
with some women’s 
organizations they 
expressed the concern, 
what you mentioned, that 
the funding for CVE has 
exploded and that it is 
also diminishing funding 
for for example other 
types of civil society 
engagement.  
 




This code contains remarks and 
references which reflect the EU’s use of 
contradicting messages when it comes to 
its approach towards security, and the 
role which HR and RL commitments play 
in this policy. As (EU) interviewees did 
not (often) explicitly refer to this type of 
behaviour themselves, it was deducted 
from the use of contradictory statements 
from EU interviewees during the 
conversations I had with them, and also 
from remarks by NGO representatives 
who actually did mention this tendency 
on behalf of the EU.  
 
This observation is important input for 
the instrumentalization theme. As it 
seems that the EU is not really 
instrumentalizing either women as 
individuals but rather it is 
instrumentalizing (women’s) rights 
language to cover up the shift to hard 
security the EU policy has made. This is 
slightly different from the observation in 
feminist literature that international 
actors use the women’s rights agenda to 
justify security interventions, as the EU 
does not use the women’s rights 
argument to say it should make certain 
interventions, but rather uses (women’s) 
rights language to make interventions 
seem acceptable.  
I1: But we have 
concluded the 
discussions with Egypt, 
and human rights and all 
this is included in the 
partnership priorities.  
 
I2: So there are elements 
within the partnership 
priorities that refer to 
human rights, the 
importance of civil 
society. Now those were 
very long protracted 
discussions, but the fact 
is that they are in there, 
and they are there, 
because we both agreed 
that they should be there, 
including the Egyptians 
agreeing that they should 
be there. Now, whether 
it comes out in a form, 
whether you as an 
individual will feel when 
they finally publish, and 
you can read them, that 
is the perfect expression 
of human rights, is 
another. I’m not thinking 
it isn’t, but that is not, 
there will be all sorts of 
interpretations. I am sure 
there will be a lot of 
interest, but that gives us 
something to work from. 
That is a public, political 
commitment between the 
EU and Egypt that 
includes references to 




our starting point. You 
know there is a 
recognition there that 
other elements of the 
relationship that might 
be, you know, where it 
might be easier to 
advance on the economy 
for example, it is an 
easier relationship, but 
we have something in 
writing with Egypt that 
says, you know we will 
cooperate in this area, 
and we will move 
forward. 
        
1.3.1 Gap between 
HQ and ground 
This code contains references and 
remarks which indicate that the language 
used by EU policy makers in Brussels 
does not really resonate on the ground. 
I: In fact, frankly 
speaking I don’t know 
exactly what was said in 
Brussels, but, I totally 
understand the concept 
of the mainstreaming of 
gender. The point is that 
I think, that sometimes 
even if it comes from the 
UN Resolutions, and you 
want to support these 
UN Resolutions now, the 
main difficulty as far as I 
know, is at the time you 
have to, and it is not so 
easy. You have to 
transform the kind of 
theoretical idea in 
concrete results.  
 
E: The theoretical idea 
you mean is gender?  
 
I: Yeah, because it is… I 
notice, honestly, 
honestly, that in the field 
here, even inside the 
different Member States 
you do not have exactly 
the same point of view 
about what could be 
done in terms of gender 
into. I mean for the 
security and armed 
forces, because for 
instance northern 
countries of the EU are 
perhaps more advanced 
in terms of gender 
approach than other 
countries. It is not, even 
if everybody shares the 
same general idea, we do 




approach inside our own 
military forces, inside our 
military security forces 
etc., and just because 
someone has to tell you, 
one story was an eye 
opener to me, in a 
meeting with Libyan 
security forces and armed 
forces, a meeting 
between - to say quite 
generally – people from 
the international 
community on one side, 
and people from 
intelligence and armed 
forces on the Libyan 
side. One person from 
an international 
organization - to not be 
so accurate… 
 
1.3.2 Words and 
no deeds 
This node contains remarks or references 
that indicate that the EU’s rhetoric on 
(women’s) rights and TJ is often not 
translated in concrete action. This is for 
example reflected in the limited impact of 
EU human rights dialogues and the EU’s 
reluctance to use its 
leverage/conditionality to push partner 
countries to live up to their commitments 
in the field of TJ and women’s rights.  
I2: Maybe I could make 
the more general point 
that the EU is most 
comfortable intervening 
on core issues. So when 
we talk about energy 
policy, energy security 
for example, or 
competition law, or 
transport, or border 
management. Then there 
is a huge number of 
experts, there is an EU 
acquis, and there is 
money. We know what 
we want, we know how 
to do it, and we know 
how to put pressure to 
get it done. When we talk 
about issues such as 
doing gender, or 
promoting a little bit 
more promotion of 
gender equality in 
Ukraine, or how to deal 
with issues of historical 
memory, how does 
Ukraine see its past, how 
does it define its identity, 
how does it deal with 
language, very hotly 
debated issues in 
Ukraine, then we see that 
there is a problem, but it 
is much harder for the 
EU to react. Because 
sometimes either there is 
no EU competence, like 




any rules or 
competencies on how to 
deal with historical 
memory for example. If 
Ukraine outlaws the 
communist party, the 
swastika, the hammer 
and the sickle, the … of 
St. George, we don’t 
know what EU law says 
about it. So the EU then 
has to turn to OSCE or 
Council of Europe and 
ask them for an opinion, 
and push that opinion 
politically, but it is a very 
different logic from this 
is what is what we want 
on the energy market and 
electricity, and now we 
are going to push that, 
because you already have 
a template. 
 
1.3.3 Using HR to 
obscure 
This code contains remarks and 
references which allude to the EU’s 
tendency to use HR language to obscure 
certain security tendencies which are not 
in line with EU values.  
 
These can be direct remarks by NGO 
representatives, but also contradictory 
statements by EU officials. In this regard 
I remarked during the coding: 
 
‘In the methodology chapter I already 
alluded to the fact that EU officials can 
be skilful in using rhetoric to obscure real 
interests/intentions. This I now 
recognized as a category in the data 
analysis. Sometimes I even catch myself 
not understanding certain statements, 
because they seem to be so 
contradictory.’ 
I2: I think it is just a new 
buzzword. And there is 
the question of how 
long, I think that it 
sounds better, while 
actually what they are 
planning is not that great, 
and it leaves a lot of 
room for many 
governments also outside 
the EU to talk about 
national security 
resilience. And sort of 
this, that is … me. So 
yeah, not a big fan, and I 
am not sure about the 
military part either I must 
say. Because that is also 
changing a bit the focus 
of the EU 
  
 
2. EU approach to transitional justice  
 
This parent code contains references of interviewees from all three case study sites to 
the EU’s approach towards transitional justice. This includes references to the process 
that resulted in the EU’s Policy Framework on Support to Transitional justice, the EU’s 
actual activities in the field, and the obstacles which hampered the adoption of the 
Framework and which continue to hamper the EU’s activities in the field as identified 
by the interviewees. As I aimed to put all references to the EU’s approach towards and 
support for gender justice under one node, references to the gendered dimensions of 




to collect and categorize the views of the interviewees, without adding my own 
interpretation of these views, the technique I used for coding was ‘descriptive coding’, 
Descriptive coding ‘summarizes in a word or short phrase – most often as a noun – the 
basic topic of a passage of qualitative data’.893 According to Tesch these codes ‘are 
identifications of the topic, not abbreviations of the content. The topic is what is talked 
or written about. The content is the substance of the message’. Descriptive codes where 
used to indicate 1) what aspect over EU support for TJ the interviewee was talking 
about, and 2) what the interviewee considered to be obstacles to this effort.  
 
 
Code Description Example 
2.1 Creation EU 
TJ strategy 
This code contains all references to the 
process that resulted in the creation of the 
EU’s Framework on Support to TJ. It’s 
core function to be used as a source of 
reference for a description of the EU’s 
creation of the TJ strategy. This 
information is not available in the 
literature.  
‘I: To be honest I don’t 
know. The idea maybe 
started back in 
2005/2006. I don’t think 
there ever really was a 
draft, maybe there was, I 
never saw such a thing. I 
think the main impetus 
was, we had an action 
plan on human rights 
and democracy from 
2012-2014, and that 
included a commitment 
to develop this 
transitional justice policy. 
I joined the EEAS in 
July 2014, and at that 
stage there had been a 
kind of wide consultation 
with civil society. I think 
there had been an initial, 
a discussion actually back 
in this COHOM in an 
informal setting on kind 
of whether there was 
support for such a policy 
framework. See when I 
joined in July 2014 I kind 
of started the proper 
drafting process. There 
had been a concept note 
I think for this, it was 
organized with I think 




This code contains the references the 
interviewees made to the role of 
individuals in the creation of the EU’s 
Framework. This was a recurring theme 
when interviewees discussed the coming 
into existence of the Framework. These 
codes refer both to the positive as well as 
negative impact individuals had in this 
process.  
‘And then through the 
years, and also through 
our advocacy work we 
got to a turning point 
with the adoption of the 
action plan. I think it was 
in 2012. If I am not 
mistaken. And you know 
as in any other, or most 
of the policy 






was also a coincidence of 
several elements. The 
COHOM chair at the 
time was an expert 
actually on transitional 
justice, and was a person 
with also a keen interest 
in the field, and his 
assistant [name assistant], 
who by the way is back 
in Brussels, so you might 
want to interview him. 
He is now policy officer 
with [name third 
organization]. So he is 
not dealing with 
transitional justice at the 
moment, but you know, 
he was actually right in 
the heart of the decision 
making process back 
then.’ 
 
2.2 Impact EU 
strategy 
This code contains all references to the 
way the adoption of the Framework has 
impacted EU activities in the field of 
transitional justice or EU foreign policy 
generally speaking. The note does not 
contain references which discuss the 
success of the strategy or attach value 
judgements to EU support to TJ, but 
rather contains interviewees’ perceptions 
of the ways in which the strategy has (or 
hasn’t) changed behaviour and activities.  
E: So, then 1,5 year ago. 
What has been the 
impact, and also 
importantly, how do 
colleagues for example in 
the regional desks 
respond to it?  
 
I: Yeah I think the 
challenge always is to 
keep it known and 
relevant. I mean we have 
a huge turn-over of staff 
here. There is mobility 
every three to four years, 
and there is a lot more 
turn-over even with that. 
So it is really trying to 
constantly have trainings, 
ensure that one is kind of 
aware of this. I mean I 
send, and I cannot sort 
of overburden either, but 
I would send the heads 
of political sections and 
the human rights focal 
points in our delegations 
every six months a 
reminder of the existence 
of the policy framework. 
They are reminded that I 
am here, if they need 
help in terms of 
transitional justice 
thematic support. We 
organize trainings. So 
there has been one this 




another one in October 
on transitional justice, 
but also on justice issues 
more broadly. So I think 
that is the main 
challenge. I think the 
awareness is quite good, 
but it could be better. I 
mean I am still meeting 
people who don’t know 
about this policy in 
countries that you would 
expect, you know, 
should know about it. 




EU TJ support 
This code contains references to the EU’s 
resources for transitional justice support, 
and serves mostly as a source of practical 
information, which is not available in the 
literature or easily accessible via the EU’s 
websites.  
And on the Facility 
actually, now there are 
few financial instruments 
supporting transitional 
justice projects. One is 
the EIDHR, the 
European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human 
Rights, it is a thematic 
program. Another is the 
Instrument Contributing 
to Stability and Peace 
(ICSP), another thematic 
instrument and as part of 
the ICSP there will be, 
and I don’t know if they 
will call it a facility, but 
there will be a specific 
programme supporting 
justice in conflict, so it 
will not be transitional 
justice, it will be justice 
in conflict. You might 
wish to discuss with 
someone from the FPI 
Unit, because they are 
discussing the new 
facility now. I mean 
these months. So you 
might wish to contact 
[name EU official in FPI 
Unit] who is in charge of 
the, or [name EU official 
in FPI Unit] actually, he 
is the head of division, 
and he might be here 
willing to meet you, or to 




EU support to 
TJ 
This node contains references to various 
issues which interviewees consider to be 





support for TJ. These are descriptive, but 
they serve as inspiration for more thematic 
nodes, which interpret the occurrence of 
these obstacles within the larger EU 
foreign policy context. 
2.4.1 Lack of 
support NGO 
community  
This node contains two child nodes that 
refer to a lack of support of the NGO 
community (in Brussels) for TJ as a core 
obstacle to the creation and 






This node contains references which point 
at a hostile NGO community as a major 
obstacle to the adoption of an EU 
framework on support for TJ. Various 
interviewees have pointed out that 
peacebuilding and (particularly) human 
rights NGOs which are active in Brussels 
displayed a hostile attitude towards the 
idea of transitional justice, and that this 
hampered the creation of the TJ strategy, 
and impacted the EU’s conceptualization 
of TJ. 
 
I am not yet sure how this point will 
inform my broader theoretical framework, 
but it seems important to note this point, 
as it indicates that it is not only 
unwillingness on the EU’s behalf which 
hampers effective EU TJ support. It could 
indicate that some NGOs consider TJ as a 
concept to susceptible to political 
engineering and a distraction from the 
EU’s commitment to ‘core issues’ such as 
ICJ and the defence of civil and political 
rights.  
I: I think it was trying to 
accommodate very, very 
diverse views. So, I think 
in principle people 
support the idea of 
transitional justice, but it 
is then when this is 
translated into kind of 
the concrete blocks there 
are challenges. The idea, 
the NGO, the kind of 
NGO community here, I 
had a lot of difficulties 
with this issues were they 
felt that by having a 
policy on transitional 
justice we were diluting 
our support to the ICC. 
So it was quite a 
challenge trying to bring 




priority for civil 
society  
This node contains references which 
indicate that while civil society might not 
necessarily be hostile against TJ, it is also 
not a priority.  
E: Okay, are you familiar 
with the Transitional 
Justice Strategy the EU 
published in 2015?  
 
I1 & I2: No I2: No, we 




This node contains references which 
indicate that TJ is not a high priority for 
the European Union, which obviously 
impedes its support for the topic. The fact 
that interviewees think that TJ is a low 
priority can be used to construct more 
analytical explanations for the EU’s 
approach towards TJ. I.e. if TJ is a low 
We had also joint 
initiatives with UNDP, 
with NGOs here to try 
to discuss the basic of 
transitional justice, but it 
is true that it brings to 
the second question ‘is it 
a priority?’, I mean ‘does 
the EU consider 
transitional justice a 




priority the EU might put it aside when 
other issues occur.  
context?’. Yes, but at the 
time the needs to reform 
the whole judiciary and 
independent, I mean 
streamline the 
independence of justice 
was somehow even more 
priority than the work on 
transitional justice. 
 




This code contains references which 
indicate that a lack of human and financial 
resources is a key obstacle to the EU’s 
support for TJ. This exemplifies the fact 
that TJ is not a high priority for the EU.  
 
These codes refer specifically to the lack 
of FTEs which are specifically dedicated 
to working on TJ, and financial resources 
specifically attributed to support for TJ 
projects.  
I: The other challenge is 
resource issues, I mean I 
listed my responsibilities, 
I mean you should have 
really someone fulltime 
working on transitional 
justice.  
 
E: Yes, I was already 
wondering, because it 
sounded like a pretty 
heavy workload.  
 
I: You know, it should 
be a fulltime job for 
someone, and the 
resources are not 
dedicated to it. So I don’t 





This node contains references which refer 
to the ambiguity of the concept as one of 
the reasons underlying some of the other 
obstacles. This is to say that due to its 
nature transitional justice does not fit in 
many of the existing structures in EU 
institutions and civil society. This is a 
reason for the lack of expertise on the 
topic and as a result the hostility against 
the concept. 
The section working on 
conflict prevention and 
peace building was not 
fully on board at the 
start, as to them the 
concept transitional 
justice was not 
completely clear. 
 
2.4.3.1 Lack of 
expertise 
This code contains references which 
indicate that a lack of expertise on TJ 
amongst EU officials generally speaking is 
a huge obstacle to successful 
implementation of the policy, because 
when people are not aware of the strategy 
or the nature of the topic they will not 
implement it. Lack of expertise seems to 
be related to the ambiguity of the concept.  
I: Well, everywhere in 
the world there is a 
section, and then, if it is 
applicable. So obviously, 
in countries, I mean you 
see some strange things 
where countries where 
there is no question of 
transitional justice, and 
then they give an 
analysis. So, that also 
kind of shows a lack, you 
know again, that is also a 
sign to me, that again 








This node contains references which 
indicate that hostility of certain EU 
officials or certain departments (notably 
DEVCO) against the concept was a key 
obstacle to adoption of the strategy and its 
implementation. Hostility can be a 
consequence of lack of expertise, but also 
be incited by other factors such as the idea 
that it will increase workload.  
there was also resistance 
internally coming from 
DEVCO. You know the 
cooperation and 
development directorate. 
They were not keen on 
having a policy 
document on transitional 
justice to start with, 
because they thought the 
EU was already doing 
much in the field. That 
they didn’t need another 
policy document. That it 
would have been another 
constraint on the staff in 
Brussels and in 
Delegations. They were, 
I think well, they were 
quite hostile actually to 
the entire process. And 
this also was one reason 
to delay the process, 
because at the beginning 
they were considering to 
publish a 
communication, which 
requires, you might 
know, a quite complex 
decision making process 
within the EU, and it 
does require the 
consensus, the 
agreement by all the 
actors, and it is also a 
much more powerful 
document than a staff 
working document. This 
wasn’t possible, because 
of the resistance by 
DEVCO. You will see in 
other interviews, if my 
assessment, my analysis 
would be corroborated 
by others, but I believe 
one of the reasons why 
we didn’t end up with a 
communication, it is 
because DEVCO was 




other types of 
support 
This node contains references which 
indicate that the fact that TJ is often 
conflated with other types of support and 
most notably rule of law and justice 
reform is one of the major obstacles to 
implementation of the TJ strategy, as 
officials responsible for TJ think they are 
E: Okay, that is fine. So, 
with regard to the whole 
idea that transitional 
justice is a part of general 
rule of law reform, I 
heard some criticism on 
EU approaches to 
transitional justice which 
kind of put it on one pile 




doing TJ while they are actually doing 
something else.  
 
This node is important in constructing the 
de-politicization argument, as the type of 
support the EU is providing under the 
denominator of TJ is often much less 
controversial than what actual TJ support 
would be.  
 
Conflation with other types of support is 
partly a result of the lack of expertise on 
TJ.  
Do you actively work on 
that to raise awareness 
that it is not 
synonymous, and that 
you can combine it, but 
that it takes more than 
just technical…  
 
I: Yeah, no this is 
definitely a problem. I 
mean even with 
DEVCO who would 
lead a lot on justice 
related issues, there is a 
tendency to throw 
everything into the one 
pot. So I have worked a 
lot with them to try to 
instil some kind of 
concrete analysis of what 
projects relate to 
transitional… I mean 
sometimes it is a case 
that they are transitional 
justice, but they are not 
called transitional justice, 
you know it could be 
reconciliation issues, you 
know which is totally 
fine, not everything 
needs to be labelled 
transitional justice, but at 
the same time we need to 
be clear what is this, and 
when it is a priority in 
our strategies, it needs to 
be translated in 
programming and 
development work on 
this specific issue, and 
having a huge project 
where we are funding 
reform of the justice 
sector, that is not, you 
know sometimes… I saw 
at the beginning certainly 
a trend to tell me that in 
certain countries, yes this 
justice sector reform is 
transitional justice. So 
yeah, but then again, it is 
a work in progress. 
There has been a 
turnover again of a 
number of staff in 
DEVCO on this. 
 
2.4.4 Lack of 
cooperation 
target countries 
This node contains references which 
indicate that a lack of willingness on behalf 
I mean what I would say 
again caveating 
everything is, and this is 




of the EU’s partner countries to invest in 
TJ is a key obstacle to EU TJ support.  
 
This is important input for arguments 
about EU neo-colonial attitudes 
to transitional justice, it 
is a support, we are not 
doing transitional justice 
or, I mean it has to be, 
for transitional justice to 
be successful there has to 
be a desire on the part of 
the government, a desire 
on the part of civil 
society. So there is only 
so much pressure you 
can put, like illegitimate 
transitional justice 
processes are those that 
have no government buy 
in, like look at Kosovo 
and this failed working 
party on transitional 
justice. I mean we 
funded so much of 
money pumped into this, 
expertise so on, and it 
ended in nothing. So I 
think we also, I mean, I 
think were we can have 
the most impact is where 
a country genuinely, and 
the government wants to 
act on transitional justice. 
And we shouldn’t be 
really in my view be 
forcing it too much. I 
think we can support 
civil society in the 
country in trying to 
change public opinion, in 
trying to push the 
government a bit. But 
yeah I would sometimes 
be a little bit reluctant 
when people say that, 
yeah we can have clear 
criteria about you know 
dealing with the past, 
about reconciliation, but 
we shouldn’t be dictating 





2.5 EU and 
transformative 
justice 
This note contains references to EU 
support for transformative justice. This 
includes direct references to the word 
transformative justice as well as references 
to types of TJ support which are generally 
considered to be transformative such as 
those focused on reparations, institutional 
reform and socio-economic rights.  
E: So if you look at 
developments in the 
academic community 
focussing on transitional 
justice, there is a lot of 
emphasis on 
transformative justice 
and the importance of 
socio-economic rights. I 




strongly presented in the 
European strategy.  
 
I: Right.  
 
E: Were there any 
attempts to have 
stronger language in that 
regard. I: Yeah, I think 
there was, I mean I think 
the issue is, we see it for 
example with the ICTJ 
which is the lead NGO, I 
mean they are even 
trying to move their 
approach a little bit away 
from this kind of four 
pillars, and yeah bring in 
this kind of more 
transformative approach. 
I don’t think it is really 
the role of the EU to be 
the kind of novelty setter 
on this. And I think the 
decision had to be taken, 
I mean the Special 
Rapporteur is starting to 
kind of explore these 
issues in the reports, but 
I don’t think, kind of the 
discussions were 
developed far enough to 
have. I mean certainly 
there were suggestions 
from NGOs. There were 
ideas kind of a little bit 
more evolved in the 
draft, but this is a bit of a 
criticism about all our 
work on human rights 
issues, that we prioritize 
more of the civil political 
rights over the socio-
cultural rights. And yeah 
it’s a tricky one, 
particularly anything to 
do with, I mean 
obviously, I mean in 
terms of transitional 
justice we found so 
much work on this, but I 
suppose the concern a 
little bit also around 
when we were bringing 
in this whole idea about 
the socio-economic 
rights, the need to move 
more in this direction, 
people were a little bit 
fearful what this would 





also to supporting 
transitional justice. So I 
think at the end of the 
day this is really why, 
there was definitely 
thought given, 
consideration given to it, 
but at the end it was kind 
of, yeah taken out again. 
 
2.6 TJ in context 
CSDP 
This node contains references to the role 
TJ plays in the EU’s broader foreign 
policy.  
 
This node aims to capture references to 
the idea that EU support to TJ is integral 
to the EU’s foreign policy and that as a 
result developments in the EU’s attitude 
to third countries impact the way it 
approaches support for TJ.  
 
This node does not capture exactly how 
these broader security developments 
impact TJ support, but they will feed in to 
thematic nodes about the EU’s approach 
towards TJ.  
E: And then if you look 
at, so there is a 
transitional justice 
strategy, but there, well 
documents have been 
published to which 
transitional justice could 
be relevant. Well it 
wasn’t in the Global 
Strategy, but that of 
course is a really big one, 
but I just went through 
the resilience 
communication and it 
isn’t there. I think 
something is mentioned 
in relation to justice, but 
not transitional justice. Is 
that a problem, or how 
does this? I: Yeah I 
mean, again with these, I 
mean with the Global 
Strategy, I don’t think I 
ever expected you would 
have transitional justice, 
I mean it is still very 
much in line with the 
principles, and it is not 
that it is not at all 
compatible with it. I 
mean again we have so 
many policies and 
documents on everything 
under the sun here, that 
you know would fall 
asleep if you would turn 
the Global Strategy into 
links to every single 
policy we have. So, you 
know that was not the 
aim of it. On the 
resilience 
communication, yeah 
again there were 
suggestions to put 
transitional justice into 
the document, again in 
editing and when you are 
having comments from 




didn’t make the final cut. 
I don’t know. In my view 





3. EU support for gender justice (in transition) 
 
The topic of this thesis is EU support to gender justice in transition with a specific 
focus on the gendered dimension of EU transitional justice support. However, it 
proved to be very difficult to discuss these topics in one breath with the majority of 
interviewees. There are two reasons for this: 1) The EU’s efforts in the field of 
transitional justice have not been profoundly gender mainstreamed; 2) the concept of 
gendered transitional justice or gender justice in transition as promoted in feminist 
literature has become complex to such an extent that many instances which are 
considered as gendered ‘transitional justice’ in the literature would not be recognized as 
such by interviewees. As a result of these factors I made a separate category for EU 
support for gender justice which contains ‘EU support for gendered transitional justice’ 
as one of its sub categories.  
 
This code is essential in understanding what types of gender justice in transition the EU 
does and does not support. It contains both generic remarks about EU support to 
gender justice in transition as well as Tunisia and Ukraine specific remarks. The child 
codes have been designed based on remarks by the interviewees rather than according 
to some existing structure in order to identify the activities and concerns dominating 
EU support for gender justice. Doing so made that I discovered that some issues which 
figure prominently in the literature do not seem to be on the EU’s agenda/radar at all.  
 
The information stored under this code is essential input for thematic codes which 
discuss the EU’s support for (certain types of) gender justice in transition within the 
context of broader EU foreign policy tendencies.  
 
Code Description  Example 
3.1 EU & gender 
mainstreaming 
This code contains 
remarks or references to 
EU efforts to gender 
mainstream its own 
activities. This concerns 
EU activities generally 
speaking (there’s a 
separate node on EU 
support for WPS, which 
is gender mainstreaming 
security related efforts) 
While this is not a type 
of direct support to 
gender justice gender 
mainstreaming is one of 
the EU’s main tools to 
advance women’s rights 
and gender equality in 
E: Maybe more concrete, when you 
make a policy do you actually start 
at the first stage thinking about 
how does this affect men and 
women differently or is it most of 
the time we draft a policy and then 
a gender expert looks at it and 
makes an extra gender paragraph?  
 
I1: Well I haven’t been working on 
this for years, but as far as my 
experience goes for a couple of 
months actually, because I haven’t 
been working on this before, it is 
rather the second option. So 
people who are working on specific 
sectors draft the policy, or the 
action document, the intervention, 
and then it is consulted with 
colleagues, or with the colleagues 




third countries (in 
transition). This raises 
questions about the EU’s 
actual (financial) 
commitments in this 
field, to which the 
answers can be very 
instructive for this 
research. This code 
therefore contains 
information about the 
practicalities of EU 
gender mainstreaming 
such as the policy 
framework guiding the 
EU’s gender 
mainstreaming efforts, 
the financial and human 
resources reserved for 
this exercise, and the way 
gender mainstreaming is 
implemented in practice.  
 
Commission, and then they have 
the possibility to comment, and to 
bring in dimensions like gender, or 
environment, or like all kinds of 
cross-cutting issues. 
 
3.1.1 General remarks gender mainstreaming 
3.1.1.1 GAP 2016-2020 This code contains 
references to and views 
on the GAP 2016-2020 
by EU officials and 
NGO representatives. 
The GAP is the 
framework guiding the 
EU’s gender 
mainstreaming efforts. 
References to GAP by 
EU officials indicate 
awareness of the 
obligation to gender 
mainstream. However, 
references to GAP 
without reflection on the 
way GAP has impacted 
the interviewee’s 
activities implies a 
commitment to gender 
mainstreaming that does 
not reach below surface 
level.  
I1: Yeah, first of all we have a 
formal dimension to this, because 
we have an EU Gender Action 
Plan for 2016-2020, which also 
applies to neighbourhood 
countries. So we have certain 
thematic priority areas which are 
quite broad, and which involve 
physical integrity, psychological 
integrity, economic and social 
rights, and political participation. It 
is actually the whole range. Yeah so 
we are supposed to implement this 
action plan into our work, which 
means that in our, all new 
programmes that we are designing 
we have to think about the gender 
dimension, to think how, well first 
of all the problem that we tackle 
differently affects men and women, 
and how we want to respond to 
this, and how we can design our 
programmes in a way that they also 
respond to the specific, well the 
specific gender dimension of a 
certain reform area. 
 
3.1.1.2 Resources for 
gender mainstreaming 
This code contains 
references to financial 
and human resources 
I: And then they don’t have 
budget. So you have a really good 
action plan, a lot of initiatives, 




that the EU has allocated 
for gender 
mainstreaming. These 
are important indicators 
of the EU’s actual 
commitment to gender 
mainstreaming and can 
be triangulated as well.  
implement it. So, I think that it is 
also the, a question that really some 
people, they don’t perceive, and 
they are just still a little bit like the 
patriarchy, patriarchal ideas. They 
don’t really perceive, I mean the 




leadership and mentality 
change. 
This code contains 
references or remarks 
concerning the 
(importance of) 
commitment of EU 
leadership to gender 
mainstreaming in order 
to create a change of 
mentality amongst 
individuals. This has 
been identified as a key 
condition for successful 
gender mainstreaming. 
The main thing is that gender is 
not only the gender person in 
charge of implementing a GAP. 
No, it is an institutional thing. You 
have to take it as that, because 
obviously one person cannot 
mainstream gender. That is 
impossible. You know, make sure 
that, you know, that will be the 
person that is designing, that is 
implementing, that is monitoring, 
he will look at specific issues on 
gender. But that for many people I 
mean they don’t see it. They really, 
you know I had colleagues that 
they ask you ‘but is it true that 
women are in a worse position 
than men, but that is really true?’. 
Because they have maybe… Firstly, 
because they maybe only see, I 
mean the situation of women that 
they have around, and they 
perceive maybe, but it even the 
wrong perception, because we have 
the main, maybe less issues than 
developing countries, less but we 
have the same, we share the same. 
I mean here in you know the access 
to highest positions and all that, I 
mean getting lower salaries etc., 
 
3.1.1.5 ‘Add and stir’ 
mainstreaming 
This code contains 
references which imply 
that most of the EU’s 
efforts to gender 
mainstream policies 
continue to adhere to the 
‘add and stir’ formula, 
which means that gender 
is grafted on to existing 
policies in a final stage of 
the policy making 
process.  
E: Maybe more concrete, when you 
make a policy do you actually start 
at the first stage thinking about 
how does this affect men and 
women differently or is it most of 
the time we draft a policy and then 
a gender expert looks at it and 
makes an extra gender paragraph?  
 
I1: Well I haven’t been working on 
this for years, but as far as my 
experience goes for a couple of 
months actually, because I haven’t 
been working on this before, it is 
rather the second option. So 
people who are working on specific 
sectors draft the policy, or the 
action document, the intervention, 
and then it is consulted with 
colleagues, or with the colleagues 




Commission, and then they have 
the possibility to comment, and to 
bring in dimensions like gender, or 
environment, or like all kinds of 
cross-cutting issues. 
 
3.1.2 EU gender 
mainstreaming TJ 
This code contains 
remarks to the EU’s 
efforts to gender 
mainstream its efforts in 
the field of transitional 
justice 
I: Honestly I think it was a tick-of-
the-box exercise meaning that 
there is nothing specific in the 
transitional justice policy. Again, I 
think it was also because there was 
no expertise in house to go deeper. 
On the other hand, I believe that 
the EU is quite strong on its 
gender policy. You know there 
have been documents, there is a 
new GAP, so there are guidelines, 
it’s, they now have clear criteria 
about selecting proposals. So both 
at policy and implementation level 
the EU is taking a strong stand on 
gender policy, and I believe that 
this is reflecting on the TJ. It is still 
too early, too premature to see any 
independent, or innovative 
developments within the 
transitional justice framework. So I 
believe that, because the EU has a 
strong gender policy, that you will 
also find actions in the field of 
transitional justice, or attention and 
focus in the discourse and in the 
policy on transitional justice. 
 
3.1.3 EU gender 
mainstreaming 
security/EU support for 
WPS Agenda 
This code contains 
references and remarks 
which allude to the EU’s 
efforts to gender 
mainstream its efforts in 
the field of security and 
its commitment to the 
WPS agenda. As EU 
support for WPS  
E: Do you think the EU actually 
wants to put a lot of money, 
people, resources, and time 
generally in this issue?  
 
I: I think that it becomes more and 
more important, because as you 
know special – I don’t know 
exactly what is the term?  
 
E: Principal advisor on gender?  
 
I: Yeah, there is a principal advisor. 
It is quite new, it was last year, and 
in any, in any EU Delegation one 
person is in charge of gender. Here 
it is the head of the political section 
for instance. E: [name head of 
political section]? 
 
3.1.3.1 EU support for 
gender mainstreaming 
community security efforts 
This code contains 
references to EU efforts 
to gender mainstream 
security activities at the 
community security 
level. This includes the 
So that UN resolution on that - 
that was of course very much 
supported by my country as well, 
by Spain, I mean as a footnote – 
also I think links to security and 
counter terrorism in the sense that, 




incorporation of women 
and women’s groups in 
efforts to prevent 
violence from 
interrupting and in 
peacebuilding efforts.  
Minusma is tackling terrorism, so 
the gender lens in what Minusma is 
doing is very important to really 
succeed on security and counter 
terrorism when it comes to the 
future of Mali. So there there is a 
real link I see, but from a strictly 
counter terrorism perspective we 
look at gender mainstreaming as 
one of the elements of PVE/CVE 
as we look at youth also as a key 
element. 
 
3.1.3.2 EU support for 
gender mainstreaming SSR 
This code contains 
references to EU efforts 
to gender mainstream 
support for ‘hard’ 
security reform in third 
countries. This concerns 
support for the 
incorporation of women 
in security agencies, but 
also for the introduction 
of a gender perspective 
in the activities of these 
security agencies.  
It is not, even if everybody shares 
the same general idea, we do not 
have the same approach inside our 
own military forces, inside our 
military security forces etc., and 
just because someone has to tell 
you, one story was an eye opener 
to me, in a meeting with Libyan 
security forces and armed forces, a 
meeting between - to say quite 
generally – people from the 
international community on one 
side, and people from intelligence 
and armed forces on the Libyan 
side. One person from an 
international organization - to not 




I: This person was in charge to 
explain to the Libyans that they 
should enhance the gender 
approach in the stream, and the 
Libyan, the chief of the Libyan side 
said ‘okay this time guys we are 
twenty on this room, ten from 
Libya, ten from the international 
community’. 
 
3.2. Targeted support 
gender equality  
Besides gender 
mainstreaming the EU 
also provides targeted 
support to women’s 
rights and gender 
equality in third 
countries this node 
contains references or 
remarks which allude to 
(the importance of) this 
type of support.  
Then on the second pillar of that 
project; we launched a call for 
proposals last year, for a budget of 
2.8 million euro (as part of the 7 
million programme mentioned 
above) and we have five new 
projects on…  
 
E: For civil society?  
 
I1: Yeah, on economic and political 
participation of women. So we are 
going to have two economic 
projects. One with TAMSS. 
 
3.2.1 EU efforts to combat 
violence against women 
This code contains 
references to EU 
E : Et qu’est-ce qu’était le rôle de 
l’UE pour changer la perspective 




support directly targeted 
at combatting violence 
against women in third 
countries.  
 
I : En fait je n’ai pas grande idée 
honnêtement, je ne peux pas dire 
…, mais lors de plaidoyer de la 
Délégation de l’UE était avec nous. 
Ils ont vraiment pousse pour 
meilleure loi, une meilleure loi pour 
que ça passe, pour que ça soit 
l’auteur des atteintes et de nos 
atteintes aussi, mais ils n’ont pas 
empêché du tout l’amélioration et 
l’adoption de la loi au contraire, ils 
ont vraiment appuyé ce processus. 
Voilà, mais la coalition on a reçu de 
financement à la fin de la part de 
l’UNFPA aussi, un petit montant 
pour assurer notre suivi et notre 
plaidoyer pour la loi intégrale. 
 




This code contains 
references to EU 
activities focused on the 
adoption of legislation to 
criminalized GBV. This 
entails support for local 
and international 
feminist advocacy. 
So there are many, you know, 
different areas of working. The 
main one is about the GBV law 
and advocacy work and also the 
revision of discriminatory 
dispositions regarding women. 
 
3.2.1.2 EU support for 
service provision victims 
GBV 
This code contains 
references to EU 
activities focused on the 
provision of services to 
victims of GBV.  
E: No, but I also think that the 
concept of, I mean I like the 
concept of gender mainstreaming, 
but I think that for this type of 
actors like the EU, let’s say who are 
not completely ‘woke’ it is 
sometimes better to make sure to 
do gender specific support like for 
example supporting Istanbul 
Convention or supporting 
advocacy on that, or putting 
political pressure.  
 
I: I agree with that, but I don’t 
think they are going to do it. I 
mean their gender mainstreaming is 
really very formal and weak, and 
their attention to gender based 
violence, and gender based 
discrimination is you know like 
very specific on you know health’s 
rights, and international support to 
specific victims, which is very 
good, but not enough. 
 
3.2.1.3 EU support 
accountability for conflict 
related SGBV 
This code contains 
references to the EU’s 
commitment to and 
support for the 
pursuance of 
accountability for victims 
E: Do you think this is on the EU’s 
agenda at all? Combatting sexual 
and gender based violence are 
priorities of EU external action in 
the field of women’s rights and 





of SGBV. (This is a type 
of gendered TJ support, 
but it is imaginable that 
the EU supports this 
type of activities even 
when there is no clear 
support for TJ)  
I: I mean, this is somehow 
something where you know EU 
has probably, there is not that 
much the EU can do to prevent 
these crimes apart from working 
on a ceasefire which they try to do 
– not the EU directly, but some 
Member States – but one thing 
they could do, and I think they do 
it, is to work with the victims on 
the rehabilitation side, because 
something that we see in this 
conflict is that people who are 
affected by the conflict including 
combatants who come back from 
the war, they do not get sufficient 
support. There are no institutions 
nor mechanisms that could support 
former combatants, women, 
children. There are different 
vulnerable groups who have gone 
through traumatic experiences as a 
result of the conflict, and who need 
psycho-sociological, and 
sometimes medical rehabilitation, 
but the mechanisms are either non-
existent, or there are some private 
initiatives, and they are not 
sufficient. 
 
3.2.1.4 EU humanitarian 
support victims SGBV 
This code contains 
references to EU 
activities focused on the 
provision of services and 
humanitarian aid to 
victims of conflict 
related SGBV.  
E: Of what there is can you give 
examples?  
 
I1: There have been projects with 
IDP women so far with IDP 
women’s organizations, for 
example for community building, 
but also relating to domestic 
violence there has been a project, 
which I think is ending this year, 
but what will continue in some, or 
at least the content of it will 
continue in some form. Also on 
domestic and gender based 
violence and implementing referral 
systems and shelters, which has 
been implemented with, via a civil 
society organization. What else, 
there have been, yeah there is an 
ongoing call for civil society which 
also contains a gender equality 
element, but I mean it is an open 
call, so it depends on which 
organizations will apply, but there 
is a possibility for these 
organizations to actually apply and 
get selected. 
 
3.2.2 Other targeted efforts 
to support gender equality 
This code contains 





of EU targeted action to 
support women’s rights 
and gender equality.  
3.3 EU support for gender 
justice through diplomacy 
This code contains 
references to the EU’s 




conditionality to support 
women’s rights in third 
countries.  
Because this is for the operational 
part let’s say, but on policy issues 
you probably know that we have an 
action plan for Tunisia 2013-2017, 
and in the framework of this action 
plan, which is linked to the 
association agreement, the on a 
yearly basis we organize the 
association council which is this 
stock taking exercise, and the 
forward looking exercise to discuss 
our relationship with Tunisia. The 
association committee which 
prepares the association council, 
and thematic sub committees, so 
including Justice and Human 
Rights, and gender issues as well. 
So before all these formal, political, 
high-level meetings we organize 
mainly in Tunis, but it occurred 
that we organized some events in 
Brussels, but we organized trilateral 
meetings between us, the Tunisian 
civil society, and Tunisian 
authorities. So we have both levels 
of interventions, so dialogue at the 
political level, and more at the 
operational level with projects, 
involvement of civil society. So this 
project is quite operational, but if 
you want it targets more the 
political level rather than I don’t 
know, providing pipelines for 
water or more concrete issues 
which are relevant, but let’s say for 
rule of law and justice you often 
have these kind of more political 
projects let’s say. 
 
3.3.1 EU use political 
dialogues to support GJ in 
transition 
This code contains 
references to EU 
support for gender 
justice through the use 
of political/human rights 
dialogues 
Because this is for the operational 
part let’s say, but on policy issues 
you probably know that we have an 
action plan for Tunisia 2013-2017, 
and in the framework of this action 
plan, which is linked to the 
association agreement, the on a 
yearly basis we organize the 
association council which is this 
stock taking exercise, and the 
forward looking exercise to discuss 
our relationship with Tunisia. The 
association committee which 
prepares the association council, 
and thematic sub committees, so 
including Justice and Human 
Rights, and gender issues as well. 
So before all these formal, political, 




mainly in Tunis, but it occurred 
that we organized some events in 
Brussels, but we organized trilateral 
meetings between us, the Tunisian 
civil society, and Tunisian 
authorities. So we have both levels 
of interventions, so dialogue at the 
political level, and more at the 
operational level with projects, 
involvement of civil society. So this 
project is quite operational, but if 
you want it targets more the 
political level rather than I don’t 
know, providing pipelines for 
water or more concrete issues 
which are relevant, but let’s say for 
rule of law and justice you often 
have these kind of more political 
projects let’s say. 
 
3.3.2 EU use conditionality 
to support GJ in transition 
This code contains references to the 
EU’s use of conditionality to pressure 
third country governments to live up 
to their women’s rights 
commitments.  
The way the human 
rights dialogue is 
conducted depends 
very much on the 
issue at hand. With 




indicates that the 
Ukrainian 
counterpart, the 
MoI is actually very 
willing to work on 
it. However, it has 
to be passed by the 
parliament, but the 
parliament has its 
own way of doing 
things. The 
question is 
therefore what is 
the best moment to 
bring it before the 
parliament again 
with an eye on 
avoiding to be 
rejected again. 
There is a gender 




achieve a better 
result. In relation to 
conditionality the 
interviewee remarks 
that the Istanbul 
Convention is a 








productive, as it is 
the parliamentarians 
who vote on it and 
for whom EU 
leverage does not 
really matter. 
 
3.4 Obstacles This code contains references to the 
obstacles hampering the EU’s 
support to gender justice in 
transition.  
- 
3.4.1 Obstacles EU 
support WPS  
This code contains references to the 
internal and external factors that 
hamper EU support for the 
implementation of the WPS agenda 
in third countries.  
- 
3.4.1.1 WPS no priority 
EU under difficult 
circumstances 
This code contains references that 
indicate that the EU’s commitment to 
the WPS Agenda falters under 
difficult circumstances. This includes 
situations in which partner countries 
are not willing to work on the 
implementation of the WPS agenda 
(in certain sectors), the EU wants to 
avoid engagement in conflict. 
Generally speaking it concerns 
situations in which the introduction 
of a gendered lens to security is 
considered to be a spoiler of other 
EU interests.  
I: But I just want to 
tell you that it is 
true that it is not so 
easy when you, 
because two years 
ago you know, it 
was almost war time 
here. I mean we 
have a curfew, state 
of emergency. We 
have still state of 
emergency, but in 
the beginning of the 
curfew it was until, 
it was from 8 pm, it 
is quite, it is very 
early in the evening. 
So that means that 
everyone at 8 was at 
home. It was a very 
stressed 
atmosphere, and at 
that time, again it 
couldn’t be the top 
priority, for sure. 
And, I think 
speaking more and 
more with them, 
and explaining 
exactly the goal, 
explaining exactly 
what can be won, 
going further and 
further in this issue 
takes time. That’s 







3.4.1.2 WPS politically 
sensitive partner countries 
This code contains references which 
indicate that unwillingness of partner 
countries to adhere to the WPS 
agenda is a significant obstacle to the 
EU efforts in this field  
Yeah, and in this 
case, in the case of 
the projects we 
have in preventing 
violent extremism is 
quite, as you may 
know, is a quite 
sensitive area of 
intervention and 
especially when it 
comes to women’s 
involvement. First 
of all, even if we 
want to target 
specifically women, 
and involve women, 
we need to make 
sure that all security 
measures are in 
place. We always 
have to take into 
account women in 
our security 
projects, and in 
order to do that we 
talk with, through 
our project 
implementers, 
through the local 
CSOs to understand 
how to better deal 
with this. Whether 
we need to label our 
project as CVE or 
not to avoid putting 
at risk women’s 
lives, and what kind 
of security measures 
we can put in place 
to make sure that 
they our protected 
and to make sure 
that there won’t be 
negative effects on 
them. 
 
3.4.1.3 One dimensional 
notion of participation and 
prevention 
This code contains references which 
indicate that even when the EU is 
living up to its commitments in the 
field of WPS the EU’s understanding 
of women’s participation and 
prevention are one-dimensional in 
the sense that the EU favours 
women’s participation only in certain 
security activities and a type of 
prevention which does not take into 
account what are generally considered 
to be the root causes of violence such 
as (gender) inequality and poverty.   
E: Combatting 
gender based 
violence is one of 
the EU’s priorities 
in third countries. 
What are your other 
priorities in the 
field?  
 
I: What we are 
doing recently is to 
empower. I mean 
the logic is to try to 





consider women as 
victims to empower 
women in the sense 
that, I mean, we are 
working on 
preventing and 
reacting. When we 
say reacting usually 





victims, but the 
problem is that we 
need to empower 
them. We need to 
provide them with 
skills, with 
expertise, with the 
knowledge to be 
able to play a key 
role in their private 
and public life. 
 
3.4.2 Obstacles gender 
mainstreaming EU  
This code contains references to the 
ways in which internal factors hamper 
the EU’s commitment to gender 
mainstreaming as described by 
interviewees. They are often 
interconnected.  
- 
3.4.2.1 EU lacking 
template for gender 
mainstreaming 
 I2: Maybe I could 
make the more 
general point that 
the EU is most 
comfortable 
intervening on core 
issues. So when we 




competition law, or 
transport, or border 
management. Then 
there is a huge 
number of experts, 
there is an EU 
acquis, and there is 
money. We know 
what we want, we 
know how to do it, 
and we know how 
to put pressure to 
get it done. When 
we talk about issues 
such as doing 
gender, or 
promoting a little 




of gender equality 
in Ukraine, or how 
to deal with issues 
of historical 
memory, how does 
Ukraine see its past, 
how does it define 
its identity, how 
does it deal with 
language, very hotly 
debated issues in 
Ukraine, then we 
see that there is a 
problem, but it is 
much harder for the 
EU to react. 
Because sometimes 
either there is no 
EU competence, 
like the EU doesn’t 
haven’t any rules or 
competencies on 
how to deal with 
historical memory 
for example. If 
Ukraine outlaws the 
communist party, 
the swastika, the 
hammer and the 
sickle, the … of St. 
George, we don’t 
know what EU law 
says about it. So the 
EU then has to turn 
to OSCE or 
Council of Europe 
and ask them for an 
opinion, and push 
that opinion 
politically, but it is a 
very different logic 
from this is what is 
what we want on 
the energy market 
and electricity, and 
now we are going to 
push that, because 
you already have a 
template.  
 
3.4.2.2 Gap vision HQ and 
reality in practice 
 And again, here in 
Tunisia it seems to 
be easy to 
cooperate, because 
they have …, 
because they always 
say yes, but in fact it 
is not so easy, 
because after having 
said yes, they do 




do. That is why 
when people come 
from Brussels, 
saying we do not 
see any clear results 
in terms of gender 
issues, sometimes it 
is quite difficult to 
explain to them 
why, because I give 
the explanation I try 
to honestly provide 
to you, but without 
any judgment. I 
don’t judge them, I 
don’t say, I just say 
that is the way they 
act, that’s the 
constraints they 
face, that is the 
political blockade. I 
do not judge, I just 
tell you the truth 
what is my 
observation on the 
ground in the level 
of co-chairing two 




3.4.2.3 Gender advisors as 
a strange species 
 In relation to the 
gender advisors the 
interviewee 
remarked that they 
are still often 
perceived as a 
‘strange animal’. 
Focal points to the 
contrary are police 
persons themselves, 
so other police 
persons feel as if 
they can they can 
talk to this person 
on a more equal 
footing. In this 
context the 
interviewee also 
indicates that with 
his own strong 
background in 
intelligence and 
military security he 
has not been 
exposed that much 
to gender himself. 
In this light he also 
considers the focal 
point system a good 









3.4.2.4 Lack of resources, 
training and expertise 
 So it is, when I say 
gender 
mainstreaming, I 
think that the 
Commission now 
has this, is aware 
that you have to do 
it, I mean in the 
planning process. I 
mean it must be 
there, it cannot only 
be at the end, but I 
see that, that means 
also that you need 
to have enough 
resources, because 
the gender analysis, 
sometimes you 
need to have data, 
sometimes data is 
not available in the 
country, so you 
need to find 
somehow, I mean 
maybe the agency 
of statistics in the 
country to facilitate, 
in order to allow 
them to get some 
data in the area that 
you need, and that 
takes time, and that 
is a cost that you 
need to consider in 
order to, because it 
is not, I mean 
something that you 
will do at the end 
just including, I 
mean gender is 
mainstreamed here. 
No, you need to 
have a baseline, the 
baseline will inform 
your indicators, also 
otherwise you 
cannot report. If 
you don’t know the 
baseline, if you 
don’t know the 
previous situation, 
how are you going 
to measure. I mean, 
which has been the 







mentality in EU 
institutions 
 So, I think that it is 
also the, a question 
that really some 
people, they don’t 
perceive, and they 
are just still a little 
bit like the 
patriarchy, 
patriarchal ideas. 
They don’t really 
perceive, I mean the 
importance of it 
really, and how you 
will… 
 
3.4.3 Obstacles EU 
support for targeted action 
women’s rights and gender 
equality 
This code contains what have been 
identified by interviewees as core 
obstacles to the EU’s use of targeted 
action as a way to promote gender 
justice in third countries.  
 
3.4.3.1 Mainstreaming at 
the expense of targeted 
action 
Various interviewees alluded to the 
fact that a core obstacle to the EU’s 
support for gender justice in third 
countries is that the EU’s adherence 
to gender mainstreaming as a strategy 
to achieve this goal has come at the 
expense of its support for more 
targeted action. This is problematic, 
as the EU’s commitment to gender 
mainstreaming has not yet fully been 
translated into practice.  
E: Ah okay, yes. 
And so for example 




no violence against 
women, combatting 
violence against 
women as well. And 
now the EU there is 
basically going to 
fund the whole 
ministry of women 
to set up all the 
services, could you 
imagine something 
similar happening in 
Ukraine, or? I: But I 
think the situation 
is a bit different, see 
here this is the 
country that, ehm, I 
mean the economic 
situation, let’s face 
it in Tunisia is 
different than it is 
here. Here we also 
have the 
Association 
Agreement that if 
you want to bring 
the let’s say EU 
closer, the Ukraine 
closer to the EU, 
and you want to 
have a stable 





have to bring a 
number of reforms. 
I am not so sure 
whether there will 
be really, whether it 
will be so beneficial 
you know to 
finance the whole 
ministry 
establishing and so 
on, or in our idea so 
far it was better 
really to 
mainstream, to 
make sure that 
actually this women, 
the gender 
component is 
ensured in all our 
policies in all our 
assistance that is 
coming up, the new 
assistance let’s say 
from 2018 to 2022. 
Because it is going 
again to touch upon 
the education, upon 
the governance, 
judiciary etc., etc. 
So I think there is 
room for targeted 
let’s say 
intervention, I 
mean I can say for 
example, I mean 
you know all the 
sensitivity training, 
and the legal 
training for the 
judges, prosecutors, 
police you the ones 
who are the first, 
for example, who 
are the first ones 
who are attending 
women, let’s say 
 
3.4.3.2 Service delivery at 
the expense of structural 
change 
Various interviewees also alluded to 
the fact that the EU’s targeted action 
to support gender justice has 
prioritized service delivery over 
support for (feminist) advocacy 
aimed at enforcing structural change.  
I2: Yeah I think 
that when they talk 
about security, it is 
different than when 
we talk about 
security, and for 
sure it is also a 
matter of who you 
listen to and that 
goes in the 
experience you just 






it is not necessary to 
include civil society 
in security 
discussions, but 
rather using them as 
implementers. And 
then more towards 
service delivery. But 
there is still opening 
for discussion, but 
yeah, yeah it will 
affect I think in the 
long run. It is 
harder and harder 
for many to 
internationally find 
money for advocacy 
work, or to actually 
be the watchdog 
that civil society is 







These codes were created to test to what extent insights from feminist theory regarding 
the motivations and convictions driving international support for gender justice in 
transition are reflected in the EU’s approach towards this topic. Each parent code 
therefore contained child nodes reflecting ideas from feminist theory. Through coding I 
subsequently hoped to discover to what extent feminist critiques were repeated by CS 
representatives monitoring the EU’s efforts in this regard, and reflected in remarks 
voiced by EU officials themselves.  
 
However, during the coding process I also nuanced my understanding of these 
processes through remarks made by interviewees resulting in the addition of new codes 
which I had initially not foreseen.  
 
I also found that some of the obstacles hampering EU promotion of (specific 
components of) the women’s rights agenda as identified in the descriptive codes 
discussed above were good indicators of the tendencies dominating the EU’s approach 
to women’s rights promotion in transition.  
 
Already (early on) during the coding process I found that while some remarks reflected 
perspectives and behaviours which have been associated with essentialist and 
instrumentalist views on the feminist agenda, the EU’s approach towards women’s 
rights in transition (in Tunisia and Ukraine) seems to be best captured by the de-




In feminist literature essentialization refers to the tendency of international actors who 
engage with the WPS Agenda and/or support for women’s rights in times of transition 




notion of what entails a gendered harm. This essentialist notion of womanhood both 
racialises and sexualises women. Characteristics of this essentialist approach are: 
 
- The tendency to approach women solely in their capacity of victims 
- The tendency to reduce the scope of harms to those resulting from sexual and 
gender based violence, neglecting harms resulting from socio-economic rights 
violations 
- The tendency to exceptionalise SGBV by associating it to times of conflict or 
repression, overlooking persistency of this type of harms during times of 
relative ‘normalcy’.  
- The tendency to depict both victims as well as perpetrators as ‘others’ 
invigorating the white saviour complex.  
 
Each of these indicators of essentialist behaviour were translated into codes to examine 
to what extent EU officials indeed displayed these tendencies, or CS representatives felt 
that they were confronted with this type of notions when interacting with the EU to 
support women’s rights.  
 
I found that while essentialization of women’s rights seems to occur it is not as 
prevalent as one would expect based on the literature. EU officials sometimes referred 
to women’s vulnerability, but most would add that the EU also recognizes women in 
their capacity as actors. Moreover, while combatting violence against women is a 
priority of the EU’s women’s rights agenda, in the context of this research this seemed 
to be in line with the topics feminist activists in Tunisia and Ukraine were working on.  
 
One of the most interesting findings in the context of this research on promotion of 
gender justice in transition is that in Tunisia and Ukraine the EU has mostly ignored the 
‘exceptional’ type of women’s rights violations that took place during the dictatorship in 
Tunisia and are currently taking place in the context of the Donbass conflict in Ukraine. 
This goes against the idea commonly held in feminist literature that international actors 
engaging with women’s rights in countries in transition focus on ‘exceptional’ violence 
at the expense of addressing the continuum of harms women in these societies are 
experiencing.  
 




This code contains remarks or references 
which allude that the EU approaches 
women in third countries predominantly 
in their capacity as victims. In feminist 
literature this is the core characteristic of 
an essentialist approach wards women’s 
rights protection.  
And there is a small 
component also on 
witness protection and 
victims, so especially 
focussing on women and 
girls. So that’s vulnerable 
groups meaning women, 
girls and minors. So that’s 





This code contains remarks or references 
that indicate that the EU prioritizes or 
exclusively addresses physical harms when 
supporting women’s rights in transition 
Likewise, if there are 
specific concerns around 
gender, for example 
sexual and gender based 
violence those issues 









This code contains remarks or references 
which indicate that the EU is only 
interested in ‘exceptional’ harms when 
engaging with women’s rights in societies 
in transition such as (sexual) violence 
inflicted on women during times of 
transition.  
 
If the EU has mainstreamed its TJ efforts 
one would expect this to be one of its core 
priorities when supporting transitional 






This code contains remarks and references 
which allude to the EU’s tendency to 
present ‘others’ as victims and 
perpetrators. Such an approach lifts the 
EU of the burden to take a critical look at 
the way its own policies disadvantage 
women in third countries  
The place of the woman 
in the MENA region is 
not the same that we can 
have in the EU etc. And 
for sure it is necessary to 
develop during workshop 
or during project etc. the 
gender dimension, but I 
think we have to be very - 
what is the name carefully 
it is called, cautious? – 
because otherwise we 
could appear like if you 
would like to impose 
something totally different 
from them, and without 
any explanation why it is 
better to have more 
women inside the security 
forces etc. It is, I mean, I 
don’t know if you have 
this term in English, but I 
mean we have to be with 
a pedagogic, pedagogical, 
I don’t know, I mean, 
that, yeah we have to 
explain them. 
 
6.4.1 EU as a 
women’s rights 
pioneer 
This code contains remarks in which EU 
officials describe the EU as being an 
example when it comes to protection of 
women’s rights.  
In the EU we don’t even 
notice human rights 
anymore, as they are part 
of our culture, but in the 
regions (Kharkov & Lviv) 
this is less self-evidentiary. 
Therefore, it is important 
to make police people on 
the ground aware of the 
importance of respect for 
human rights. Respect for 
human rights is always a 
priority for the EU. In 
Ukraine we provide basic 
training on them to the 
national police for 
example with respect to 





specifically, the mission 
has a gender advisor. This 
is telling according to the 
interviewee as it shows 
the importance the EU 
detaches to the issue of 
gender. Initially 
Ukrainians were not very 
open to the idea as they 
were not used to the 
concept, but now they are 
starting to appreciate it 
more as they get more 





In the literature instrumentalization refers to the tendency of international actors to 
support (components of) the women’s rights agenda on the condition that it serves 
broader interests. This tendency includes both the instrumentalization of women as 
individuals under the premise of empowerment, and the instrumentalization of the 
feminist agenda as a whole. The notion of instrumentalization has emerged in feminist 
literature particularly in relation to the appropriation of the WPS agenda in the context 
of the War on Terror.  
 
Instrumentalization is closely linked to the prioritization of the participation pillar of the 
WPS Agenda, partly spurred by the feminist agenda that promoting women’s 
participation is not only the right thing to do, but also the smart thing, as engaging 
women increases the chance that societies will become and remain peaceful and secure. 
Instrumentalization occurs when this focus on participation is embraced while 
disregarding the other components of the feminist security agenda, incorporating 
women as individuals into already existing security practices to promote traditional 
security interests, and paying lip service to the feminist agenda as an ideal to legitimize 
traditional (non-feminist) approaches towards international security. This is detrimental 
for gender justice in transition as in this fashion the engagement and participation of 
women does nothing to advance their own security and can even have detrimental 
consequences. 
 
During the coding of the interviews I conducted in Brussels women indeed were often 
referred to as useful resources in the fight against terror. However, in the Tunisian 
context they were mostly perceived to be useful in community security efforts and 
nobody mentioned the need to integrate more women or a gender perspective in SSR 
efforts. In the Ukrainian context officials did refer to the benefits of integrating women 
in security forces, but also mostly ignored the need to integrate a gender dimension, 
failing to link increased participation of women to better outcomes for women.  
 
Regarding the use of the women’s rights agenda, and particularly the notion that women 
need to be protected against their own men from exceptional types of politically 
motivated SGBV to justify certain interventions, I did not encounter this type of 
language. However, I did identify another way in which the EU instrumentalizes the 
feminist agenda: the use of women’s rights language not to justify interventions, but 
rather to tone down the recent tendencies in EU foreign policy which prioritize hard 





Moreover, the EU’s support for gender justice issues that have buy in from local 
political elites at the expense of more ‘controversial’ gender justice issues also suggest 
that women’s rights are co-opted for political purposes on the EU’s behalf.  
 
Code Description  Example 





This code contains remarks or references 
which allude to the EU’s tendency to use 
individual women or groups as women in 
the implementation of EU security 
strategies without providing clear benefits 
in return. 
I: So I think that there are 
those actors that exist in 
the Tunisian context that 
are pushing that agenda. I 
think that the priorities of 
the EU at the moment, in 
my humble opinion, are 
much more on countering 
migration to Europe, and 
on ensuring security so 
that there aren’t any more 
violent terrorist incidents 
that occur here. Personally 
that is the way I see it, but 
that is a very cynical view. 
So I do think that to your 
point that are women 
instruments, are 
instrumentalized, I think 
that is probably accurate 
as opposed to genuinely 
valuing the unique voices 
that women have, and that 
it can serve both security, 
and their own promotion 
in the society, and I think 
that the two go hand in 
hand, but that the former 
is more prioritized than 
the latter. 
 
7.2 EU support 
for partial 
participation 
This code contains remarks or references 
which indicate that the EU’s support for 
women’s participation is only partial in the 
sense that it only supports women’s 
participation in instances it considers 
beneficial for achievement of other 
interests. This indicates that the support of 
women’s participation is not incited by the 
conviction that it is ‘the right thing’ to do, 
and that it is not unconditional.  
Subsequently the 
researcher asked to what 
extent police missions also 
recognize that gender 
mainstreaming is 
important not only 
because it can be 
instrumental to the 
success of the mission, 
but also because the WPS 
Agenda obliges states to 
protect women. In 
response to this the 
interviewee answered that 
recognizing the 
importance of addressing 
the specific vulnerabilities 
women experience in the 
contexts in which the EU 
CSDP missions operate is 
for many officials 






7.3 EU neglect 
of priorities 
local women  
This code contains references or remarks 
which allude that when the EU supports 
the participation of women in security 
efforts it does not take into account the 
priorities of these women themselves. This 
implies that the EU’s support for women’s 
participation is not significantly changing its 
views on what constitutes security and how 
to achieve and preserve a secure society.  
I: Well don’t get me 
started on that, because I 
would have a lot to say 
about that from a 
personal perspective. In 
the last dialogue that we 
had on women’s 
participation in the peace 
processes in Ukraine this 
was something that was 
brought up a lot. The 
programming tends to 
focus on a specific view of 
what the relations 
between men and women 
are in Ukraine, and that 
they are not taking into 
account the voices of 
women themselves there.  
 
E: The EU?  
 
I: It was not, it was a 
dialogue between civil 
society and the EU, and 
OSCE. So I can assume 
this was also targeted at 
the EU. It was targeted at 
donors in general, but 
basically the programming 
was made in such a way 
that it is not looking at the 
priorities, the actual 
priorities of activists, and 
women on the ground, 
women’s groups 
including, and referring 
also to a saviour kind of 
complex, and a 
disconnect. So they saw 
that trend. Some of the 
participants there were 
saying that this was not 
useful, as they have to 
answer these constant 
proposals in a way that, is, 
is not you know 
connected to reality and 
to their needs. There is 
quite a few things on 
having a gender lens, a 
recommendation that 
came over and over again, 
please adopt a gender lens 
when you do 
programming, when you 
do analysis, and do not 
just look at numbers of 




know, more in detail. 
Yeah. 
 




The idea that the EU does not take into 
account the security concerns of the 
women it relies on to implement certain of 
its own security policies is reflected in 
remarks which allude to the EU’s use of 
women’s groups as implementers of policy 
rather than (co-)developers.  
I: Another thing that I 
find, maybe it is a positive, 
for call for proposals that 
are been by the EU to 
implement projects in 
Tunisia, the priority is 
given for NGOs coming 
from the North. They 
have the lead, they have 
the lead, and they 
associate Tunisian local 
NGOs as partners, as 
associated NGOs etc. The 
question is the following. 
Do the Tunisian, the local 
NGOs not have the 
capacity to implement 
such projects? For 
example, if I think to 
[name organization], I can 
say that we have the 
necessary skills, capacity 
etc. to implement this 
project. We don’t need 
the help or the assistance 
of other North NGOs to 
assist us in this 
implementation. I am for 
the exchange between the 
NGOs, but not in one 
sense, in a unique sense, 
that the North NGOs are 
assisting the local NGOs. 
Local NGOs can also 
help some NGOs from 
the North. Local, for local 
NGOs they are from the 
North, they need our 
experience, we have our 
experience, they have their 
experience and we can 






cover up FP 
tendencies  
This code contains references or remarks 
which indicate that the EU instrumentalizes 
feminist language to cover up broader 
tendencies in its FP which from a feminist 
perspective are not desirable at all.  
So yeah, to go back to 
your question it is a 
challenge to, yeah, at 
Brussels level probably. 
There is an increasing 
scepticism, but at the 
same time on some other 
aspects there is increasing, 
apparent progress on 
language that is not 
necessarily followed by 
the necessary capacity, 
resources, and 
institutional culture that 











I introduced the side-lining code during the coding process, as I realized that while 
most of my thematic codes were based on the assumption that gendered concerns – be 
it in a good or a bad sense – shape EU foreign policy, in reality gender is often left 
completely out of the equation. The side-lining codes acknowledge this reality and also 
specify under what circumstances the EU leaves aside gender as a policy and 
intervention shaping factor.   
 
This code also contains codes that contain remarks which refer to the EU’s side lining 
of transitional justice. These practices seem to be connected, as the circumstances under 
which gender are side-lined the most fall within the traditional domain of transitional 
justice.  
 
Code  Description  Example 
8.1 EU side-
lining TJ 
This code contains remarks or references 
which allude to the EU’s reluctance or 
refusal to engage with transitional justice in 
third countries even if transitional justice is 
high on the agenda in these countries.  
 
The EU not engaging with TJ in this type 
of situations goes against its commitment 
to support locally rooted initiatives.  
 
These locally initiatives do not necessarily 
have to be already established TJ 
mechanisms. They can also be efforts to 
facilitate the establishment of this type of 
mechanisms at a later point in time.  
The EU, EUAM, 
however, is not planning 
to get involved, as it has 
only an advisory 
function. EUAM advises 
at the strategic level and 
is not involved at the 
operational level. EUAM 
also does not advise on 
anything related to the 
investigation or 
prosecution of war 
crimes in the Crimea or 
Donbas, as, again, the 
EU does not cover 
anything that relates to 
the conflict. 
 
8.1.1 TJ as a 
spoiler 
This code contains remarks or references 
which explicitly imply that the EU side-
lines TJ because it is too controversial and 
might impede other EU interests in third 
countries. It also contains remarks which 
indicate that the EU’s support for TJ is 
mostly limited to contexts where the EU 
has no other overriding interests. 
 
This code is important as part of the 
argument that the EU’s approach towards 
gender justice in transition can best be 
qualified as a strategy of ‘de-politicization’, 
supporting the type of gender justice 
efforts which are not likely to stir 
controversy in third countries or embroil 
The same issue with 
maybe some of the 
colleagues in delegations 
when they reflect on the 
reality on the ground. It 
is not always directly in 
line with our policy 
framework. So for 
example I work on 
Afghanistan, and we 
have been quite involved 
in this return of 
Hekmatyar, the Butcher 
of Kabul, with whom 
the government signed a 
deal with the Hezb-e 
Islami, his party, where 
it gave some form of an 




the EU in situations it prefers not to be 
embroiled in.  
line with international 
standards. So you know, 
these challenges, so the 
delegations were a little 
bit concerned about 
language around our 
approach towards 
amnesties and so on.  
 
E: So they wanted to 
have more flexible?  
 




This code contains remarks or remarks 
which allude to the EU’s reluctance or 
refusal to engage with (certain) instances of 
injustice inflicted on women in third 
countries even if the EU has explicitly 
committed to making these efforts, these 
issues are persistent, and the local 
feminist/women’s movement is grappling 
with them.  
In terms of the gender 
dimension of all of this 
we have focused more – 
so I guess from the EU 
perspective, I would say 
that there was no 
interest, and that I didn’t 
feel strongly that the EU 
had that as a priority, I 
have to say. I, our other 
donor in part of this 
programming was the 
Canadians, and in their 
reporting templates, and 
their strategic priorities 
they emphasized much 
more the gender 
dimension, and how that 
was one of their key 
interests that they were 
seeking from 
implementers. So I 
personally didn’t feel like 
the EU had that as a 
strong priority, and was 









This code contains remarks or references 
which indicate that the EU is not 
implementing its commitments in the field 
of gender mainstreaming. This is telling as 
both EU policy documents as well EU 
officials have implied that gender 
mainstreaming is the EU’s tool of choice 
when promoting women’s rights in third 
countries. Not putting in practice gender 
mainstreaming effectively side-lines 
women’s rights particularly when the EU is 
not engaging in targeted action to support 
women’s rights.  
I: Yeah, but this is, I 
mean this is very 
traditional, this is very 
traditional understanding 
of the roles, and I mean, 
we don’t even have to 
go too far, because I 
mean we had, I mean 
sometimes I also hear it 
from my colleagues here. 
I mean I had recently a 
discussion about 
vocational training, well 
training in general.  
 






I: No, I mean training in 
Ukraine, I mean for the 
education in Ukraine, 
and I mean I thought 
this would be a very nice 
sector actually to really 
to work on from the 
gender perspective, and 
then a colleague told me, 
I mean what is the issue? 
I mean there is no 
gender problem in the 
education, 70 per cent of 






This code contains remarks or references 
which indicate that the lack of 
implementation of the EU’s gender 
mainstreaming commitment is a result of 
the lack of a clear template for gender 
mainstreaming. This remark was often 
made in comparison to EU efforts in other 
fields where there does exist a clear 
regulatory framework.  
 
However, the fact that such a framework 
has not been created, or the lack of 
recognition of existing legal frameworks 
which enshrine the EU’s and its MS’s 
obligations in the field of women’s rights is 
also a choice. Thus the (perceived) lack of 
such a template implies that the EU is not 
acknowledging the importance of gender 
justice despite its rhetoric in this field.   
When we talk about 
issues such as doing 
gender, or promoting a 
little bit more promotion 
of gender equality in 
Ukraine, or how to deal 
with issues of historical 
memory, how does 
Ukraine see its past, how 
does it define its identity, 
how does it deal with 
language, very hotly 
debated issues in 
Ukraine, then we see 
that there is a problem, 
but it is much harder for 
the EU to react. Because 
sometimes either there is 
no EU competence, like 
the EU doesn’t haven’t 
any rules or 
competencies on how to 
deal with historical 
memory for example. If 
Ukraine outlaws the 
communist party, the 
swastika, the hammer 
and the sickle, the … of 
St. George, we don’t 
know what EU law says 
about it. So the EU then 
has to turn to OSCE or 
Council of Europe and 
ask them for an opinion, 
and push that opinion 
politically, but it is a very 
different logic from this 
is what is what we want 
on the energy market 
and electricity, and now 
we are going to push 
that, because you already 










Remarks or references which indicate that 
the EU is not mainstreaming gender in its 
transitional justice support. 
I: I think I have written 
about this, so I should 
be able to remember. I 
think the problem is, 
and by the way the EU, 
the EEAS, is currently 
doing its third – I think 
it is the EEAS and the 
European Commission, 
I can’t remember – is 
currently doing its third 
implementation report 
on 1325 and 1820, and 
this will include 
something on the 
European Union, 
women and transitional 
justice. I think the 
problem with the whole 
– I think this is a 
broader problem not 
just one of the European 
Union, it is a challenge 
for the transitional 
justice community as 
well – is that gender is 
not actually taken 
seriously at all. 
 
8.2.3 Gender as 




This code contains remarks or references which 
indicate that the EU is not living up to its gender 
mainstreaming commitments in certain fields, 
because officials consider devoting attention to 
gender concerns a potential spoiler for the 
successful implementation of core policies.  
 
This mentality results in a half-hearted approach 
towards gender mainstreaming, meaning that gender 
mainstreaming, if implemented at all, is only applied 
when gender mainstreaming does not require the 
EU to reconsider its core interests/policies.  
I2: And then, very 
quickly, when we would 
like to raise an issue or 
push for example for the 
ratification of the 
Istanbul Convention our 
leadership says: ‘well 
what is the legal basis for 
that, we already have a 
lot of contentious issues, 
do we really need to add 
this too?’. That is one 
side, and on the 
Ukrainian side they are 
getting hammered with 
loads of stuff they need 
to do and are not doing. 
So they are also a bit 




as a spoiler to 
EU security 
policy 
Remarks or references which indicate that 
SSR and security policy more generally 
speaking is one of the fields in which the 
EU is not living up to its commitment to 
gender mainstream. 
I: But I just want to tell 
you that it is true that it 
is not so easy when you, 
because two years ago 
you know, it was almost 
war time here. I mean 
we have a curfew, state 
of emergency. We have 
still state of emergency, 
but in the beginning of 




was from 8 pm, it is 
quite, it is very early in 
the evening. So that 
means that everyone at 8 
was at home. It was a 
very stressed 
atmosphere, and at that 
time, again it couldn’t be 
the top priority, for sure. 
And, I think speaking 
more and more with 
them, and explaining 
exactly the goal, 
explaining exactly what 
can be won, going 
further and further in 
this issue takes time. 








Remarks or references which indicate that 
the EU is not applying conditionality when 
a third country breaches or does not live up 
to its women’s rights commitments, as this 
might hamper cooperation with this 
country in other fields.  
In response to the 
critique that the EU 
does not sufficiently use 
its leverage to enforce 
reform in neighbouring 
countries and 
particularly Ukraine, the 
interviewees reply that 
the EU is a political 
body, and that it needs 
to look at the bigger 
picture. There are a lot 
of forces at play, and the 
EU is involved in loads 
of reform processes in 
Ukraine. The EU cannot 
just be tough on Ukraine 
in order to safeguard 
future cooperation. 
Moreover, we also need 
to acknowledge that 
Ukraine cannot do 
everything at once. The 
EU does use 





at expense of 
targeted action 
This code contains references and remarks 
which imply that the EU’s adherence to 
gender mainstreaming as the key strategy to 
support gender equality and women’s 
rights has come at the expense of EU 
support for targeted action.  
 
This is particularly problematic taken into 
account that the EU is not living up to its 
commitment to gender mainstream all of 
its policies.  
Generally, in the past we 
have seen that most 
emphasis was on 
mainstreaming, but it is 
also important to have 
targeted programmes. 
Specific funding 
allocations are needed. 
Within all development 
policies and instruments 
we need to have more of 
a focus on gender 





same goes for EU 
funded activities. The 
interviewee really 
appreciates the GAP, 
but stresses the 
importance of 
continuing to push the 





The remarks catalogued under the previous codes indicate that instrumentalization is 
not a pervasive issue in the EU’s approach towards mainstream gendered transitional 
justice issues in third countries, and that in a multitude of situations the EU is actually 
more inclined to side-line women and gender issues than to rely on them in the urge to 
achieve other policy goals. However, despite this lack of unfaltering commitment to 
gender mainstreaming and gender justice, this does not mean that the EU is not 
engaged in any type of support for gender justice at all. To the contrary, various 
interviewees who voiced criticism on the EU’s approach towards support for gender 
justice in third countries in transition, at the same time indicated that the EU is an 
important, and active supporter of women’s rights. This code therefore combines the 
insights from the previous code on side-lining with new insights about the 
circumstances under which the EU does support gender justice (in transition), and in 
doing so to elucidate the nature of the EU’s support to gender justice. 
 
It finds that the EU most effectively supports gender justice when it relies on targeted 
action, and when the stakes are not high for the EU itself. This thesis qualifies this 
approach as de-politicization. This is not to imply that the EU’s approach towards 
gender justice in transition is not politicized, as exactly because the EU seems to be 
making deliberate choices when/where and when/where not to engage in certain types 
of gender justice promotion, gender justice is clearly considered to be a politically 
relevant topic. Instead the term ‘de-politicization’ implies that the EU only supports the 
type of gender justice issues which are not politically sensitive at the local level.   
 
This tendency is not restricted to the EU’s approach towards women’s rights in third 
countries, it also applies to other issues to which the EU adheres on paper, but support 
for which is not considered to be at the core of the EU’s welfare and security. One of 
these issues is transitional justice. The EU adheres to the notion that after grave and 
widespread human rights violations accountability should be pursued, and on paper 
ascribes to the idea that the pursuance of justice is essential for the creation of stable, 
democratic societies. However, as the side-lining note indicates, these ideals are easily 
put aside when the EU perceives that the destabilizing qualities of transitional justice 
mechanisms might impede more urgent EU foreign policy goals. Since TJ is often side-
lined this automatically results in the side-lining of some of the most prolific issues of 
gender justice in transition that have traditionally dominated the international discourse 
on women’s rights, such as conflict related sexual violence. Without transitional justice 
support it is also impossible to gender mainstream activities in such a fashion that the 
EU is engaging in support for transformative gender justice.  
 







This code contains references or remarks 
which indicate that when the EU supports 
TJ it is the type of support it considers not 
to be impeding other FP objectives. This 
concerns the type of measures the EU 
supports, the countries in which it is 






This code contains remarks or references 
which allude explicitly to the EU’s 
tendency to avoid support for TJ 
measures which are controversial at the 
local level, and as a result could negatively 
impact the EU’s relations with third 
country governments. 
Now for the EU 
perspective on progress 
made in transitional 
justice. As I told you it is 
not an easy subject in 
Tunisia like anywhere. 
This manipulation of 
information was very 
difficult for us, because 
we were approached by 
many organizations 
saying completely the 
opposite what we should 
do, what we shouldn’t. 
They couldn’t agree 
together.  
 
E: You mean Tunisian 
civil society?  
 
I: Yes, Tunisian civil 
society. You had even 
fights against the 
coalition for transitional 
justice, and the others. So 
if we would fund one and 





support with rule 
of law reform  
This code contains remarks or references 
which indicate that the EU conflates 
support for TJ with rule of law reform. 
This approach provides the impression 
that the EU is supporting (politically 
controversial) TJ efforts while actually 
engaging with the more technical, and less 
controversial exercise of rule of law 
reform  
I: Yes, yes I do.  
 
E: And what is your 
view on their role in this 
whole process?  
 
I: Well, it is also a part 
of the EU’s strategy to 
ensure stability and 
security in Tunisia. 
They are working, I can 
give you the example of 
their justice reform 
programme. They are 
working very hard with 
the ministry of justice 
and UN to put in place 
the specialized 
chambers, but otherwise 
for example you cannot 
see the victim’s place in 
the global picture; ‘so 




A, we need to select 
judge B, we need to take 
into consideration the 
capacities here or there’, 
and all the 
understanding of this 
victim is this file that 
will be transferred by 
the TDC to the 
specialized chambers. 
Okay, but what, how 
should I act as a victim? 
What are my rights in all 
this process, how do I 
proceed etc.? This is 
absent from the, from 
the global picture, 
something that we are 
working on, and we will 
issue very recently a 
briefing paper on this, 
but it’s as I told you, 
they work very hard on 
the process, but still, and 
naturally of course in a 
bigger picture that is 
related to stability and 






This code contains remarks or references 
which allude to the EU’s tendency to 
adhere to the UN’s TJ doctrine, and to 
support TJ through other international 
actors, who are responsible both for the 
creation and implementation of projects. 
This is a type of de-politicization as it 
creates a barrier between the EU and the 
(messy reality) of transitional justice 
practice, and to some extent takes 
responsibility for certain choices off the 
EU’s shoulders.  
I should also mention the 
UN had a big role, the 
special rapporteur. I 
mean you have read the 
policy framework, it is 
very much modelled on 
the kind of UN 
approach, which is what 
the EU normally uses for 
these things. I mean 
sometimes on certain 
issues I think we would 
go further than the UN, 
but the UN is normally 
the agreed line. So 
particularly on sensitive 
issues, things around 
amnesties and so on, I 
really relied on the 
position of the UN on 
this. From the gender 
perspective UN Women 
were consulted heavily as 
were other gender 
experts here. 
 
9.1.4 No use of 
conditionality in 
relation to ICJ 
obligations 
This code contains references which 
indicate that the EU is reluctant to impose 
conditionality in order to assure that third 
countries which receive EU support 
Civil society is also quite 
critical towards EUAM 
itself. Their main 
criticism concerns 




adhere to their commitments under 
international criminal law, which is a core 
pillar of TJ and is generally considered to 
be at the core of the EU’s support for TJ 
as well. Not prioritizing ICJ in certain 
contexts seems to be a type of de-
politicization  
incidents such as the 2 
May incident in Odessa. 
They expect EUAM to 
be more critical towards 
the Ukrainian authorities 
and to demand more in 
exchange for its support. 
However, generally 
speaking conditionality is 







This code contains remarks which indicate 
that the EU is developing a preference for 
the support of socio-economic rights in 
societies in transition. However, these 
were not directly related to TJ support. 
Nevertheless this seemed to be an 
interesting development with an eye on 
the EU’s traditional focus on CPR.  
And where there is 
interesting thought 
around things like socio-
economic rights, justice 
around socio economic 
rights, the problem could 
be that then big actors, 
whether it would be the 
EU, or whether it could 
be big international 
NGOs, or whether it 
could be individual 
donors is that they just 
sort of see this chocolate 
box of transitional justice 
options and they all pick 
the apparently easy ones, 
and then that whole 
connection with the 
human rights, impunity, 
accountability for human 
rights violations, which 
may have been there in 
the original thought of 
how to deal with socio-
economic rights, gets put 
by the waste, just because 
it is difficult politically. 






This code contains references or remarks 
which indicate that when the EU supports 
gender justice in transition it is the type of 
support it considers not to be impeding 
other FP objectives. This concerns the 
modality through which the EU supports 
gender justice, the countries in which it is 






types of gender 
justice in 
transition 
This code contains references or remarks 
which explicitly allude to the fact that 
when the EU supports women’s rights it 
prefers to support projects and causes 
which are not likely to stir controversy or 
impede other EU FP goals. 
E: And maybe even 
though you are not 
working on the, it must 
be a bit strange to be 
talking about 1325 all the 
time, and then not focus 
on what is probably the 




Ukraine from a 1325 
perspective? So…  
 
I: Yes. It is very arbitrary; 
it is very strange.  
 
E: Yeah, to me I didn’t, 
first I didn’t really realize 
that was completely off 
topic for EUAM, but I 
mean, I would think that 
the main advocacy 
should also be there.  
 
I: Yeah. Thank god my 
colleagues in the other 
organizations deal with 
this, so I don’t have to lie 
awake at night thinking I 
am not doing what I am 
supposed to do, no 
[laughter], because you 
are absolutely right. For 
me working with 1325 






This code contains references or remarks 
which indicate that the EU prioritizes 
service delivery over feminist advocacy 
when supporting women’s rights in third 
countries and particularly when 
supporting the fight against violence 
against women. This facilitates the support 
for women’s rights while avoiding getting 
embroiled in battles about culturally 
sensitive issues feminist advocates tend to 
engage with.  
E: Okay, and if you look 
at international political 
actors such as the EU, 
how important are they?  
 
I: They were extremely 
important in different 
levels, and even when we 
have had issues with the 
ministry, we turned back 
to the EU to help us to 
sort out the issue. When 
there were some issue 
with the funding, because 
the EU did a huge 
mistake.  
 
E: Oh?  
 
I: They transferred all the 
money to UNFPA.  
 
E: Yes, I know, I spoke 
to UNFPA as well.  
 
I: And then UNFPA 
channelled all the money 
to the ministry.  
 
E: Ah, and not to civil 
society?  
 
I: When we approached 




EU was very interested 
into our strategy. We 
invited them, and we 
presented the coalition’s 
strategy etc., and [name 
EU official] was very 
enthusiastic at that time, 
and asked us ‘all the 
money is at UNFPA, 
send a request to 
UNFPA’. Then UNFPA 
told us ‘we gave all the 
money to the ministry, so 





This code contains references or remarks 
which indicate that when the EU engages 
in support for women’s rights it prioritizes 
bureaucratic procedures over actual 
substance. Many interviewees indicated 
that this rigid adherence to all types of 
bureaucratic procedures comes at the 
expense of opportunities to affect real 
change in the field of women’s rights.   
 
This is a characteristic of de-politicization 
as the EU uses these standards to keep 
firm control over the gender justice efforts 
which are conducted in its name.  
I: I know, I know, I 
know, but it is 
frustrating. So you know 
it is going from the 
beneficiary, and you are 
going up, up, up. So 
believe me, the process, 
all of it is not easy. 
However, we have been, 
we most, I mean, we 
have had not very good 
experiences, but you see 
funding organizations, 
which are also learning, 
and trying – the locals 
who are here – trying to 
understand. And we have 
to also raise our voices 
sometimes, and say no. I 
took the risk. I take the 
risk. When sometimes, 
when there is an 
exaggeration, I have no 
problem to say ‘that’s it, I 
am done, I am done’. I 
don’t play with people’s 
lives, that is what it is. 
Because when you go, 
you see deep, deep in a 
miserable community, 
women in a miserable 
situation. You are trying 
to find a solution with 
her, and that is how we 
work. For me everybody 
must respect that. If I 
don’t see, and I don’t feel 
respect, I don’t work. I 
prefer that I don’t go to 
her at all, than going, 
starting, and then giving 
up. For me that is worse. 







women and one 
of trainings 
This code contains remarks or references 
which allude to the EU’s habit to conflate 
counting women and providing one-off 
trainings with gender mainstreaming. This 
is a sign of de-politicization as this 
approach allows the EU not to really look 
into its policies with a gender perspective 
in mind, which could possibly require the 
EU to change certain policies and 
activities which it considers to be crucial 
to a successful FP.  
E: Yes, also, because I 
spoke with them this 
morning, she said we 
don’t do gender specific 
things like for example 
putting a lot of money on 
the Istanbul Convention, 
we prefer to do gender 
mainstreaming in all our 
activities, which 
theoretically would be 
great if they actually did 
it, but…  
 
I: They don’t do it. 
Gender mainstreaming in 
their perception would 
be making grantees 
report on number of men 
and women who 
attended their events. It 









This code contains remarks/references 
which indicate that as with its support to 
TJ the EU outsources its support for 
gender justice to other international actors 
such as UN Women at the expense of 
local (feminist) women’s groups.  
Though the EU is not 
involved in the conflict, 
the EU does finance 
projects through IcSP to 
contribute to conflict 
resolution specifically 
focussing on women, 
youth and children. They 
might not be the most 
visible projects, and it is 
always good to do more, 
but the funding is 
limited. Through the 
OSCE budget the EU is 
also indirectly supporting 
conflict resolution 
efforts. This is a 









This code contains remarks/references 
which indicate that the EU prioritizes 
cooperation with and even follows the 
lead of local authorities when it comes to 
matters of gender justice.  
Voila, and then you have 
the dimension of the 
projects of course which 
tries to support this 
process. One point 
maybe on the 
programmes is the fact 
that we do a lot of 
budget support in 
Tunisia, which means… 
E: It goes to the 
authorities directly? I: 
Yes, on the basis of 
certain conditions. So, 
yes they have to respect 
these conditions, and it is 




leverage, you know we 
say ‘fine we support your 
strategy or your reforms 
in this field, justice for 
instance, women, but 
okay you should comply 
with this, this, this’, to 
see if that is the 
appropriate way to, we 
think that is the good 
way to work also, 
because attached to that 
you have a number of 







APPENDIX II: LIST OF EU BUDGETARY COMMITMENTS 
Relevant EU commitments per category (Transitional Justice, Gender, Justice, 
Security) 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE TUNISIA [Search terms: Justice Transitionnelle, IVD, 




2011    Soutien de la Délégation au séminaire ''Assises de la Justice transitionnelle en Tunisie'' à la cité des 
Sciences de Tunis les 9-10/12/2011 8,423 €      [CODE TJ 
TN] 
TRAVEL ACADEMY SARL*  




2012    La défense des droits économiques et sociaux des groupes vulnérables des régions de Monastir et du 
Bassin Minier (Gafsa) 218,944 €       [CODE TJ 
TN] 
AVOCATS SANS FRONTIERES - BELGIQUEASBL*ASF ADVOCATEN ZONDER GRENZEN ANWALTE OHNE GRENZEN  
  Belgium 
 
2012    Périphéries actives: Appui à la participation et libre expression de la société civile et des groupes 
vulnérables du Gouvernorat de Sidi Bouzid 206,489 €     
 [CODE TJ TN] 
GRUPPO DI VOLONTARIATO CIVILE ASSOCIAZIONE*G.V.C  
  Italy 
 
2012    La lutte contre la torture et les mauvais traitements en Tunisie 438,593 € [CODE TJ TN] 
ORGANISATION MONDIALE CONTRE LA TORTURE ASSOCIATION*OMCT WORLD ORGANISATION AGAINST 
TORTURE  
  Switzerland 
 
2014    DROUCE - Droits sociaux et citoyenneté  65,662 €   [CODE TJ TN] 
IMED ISTITUTO PER IL MEDITERRANEO ASSOCIAZIONE*  
  Italy 
 
2014    La défense des droits économiques et sociaux des groupes vulnérables des régions de Monastir et du 
Bassin Minier (Gafsa) 21,894 €       [CODE TJ 
TN] 
AVOCATS SANS FRONTIERES - BELGIQUEASBL*ASF ADVOCATEN ZONDER GRENZEN ANWALTE OHNE GRENZEN  
  Belgium 
 
2014    Périphéries actives: Appui à la participation et libre expression de la société civile et des groupes 
vulnérables du Gouvernorat de Sidi Bouzid 31,697 €     
 [CODE TJ TN] 
GRUPPO DI VOLONTARIATO CIVILE  
  Italy 
 
2015    CONTRIBUER À RENDRE LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE ACTRICE DE LA GOUVERNANCE 
LOCALE EN MATIÈRE DE GESTION DES RESSOURCES NATURELLES ET DANS LE RESPECT 
DES DROITS HUMAINS 375,737 €       [CODE TJ 
TN] 
ANA YAKEDH - IWATCH  
  Tunisia 
        
AVOCATS SANS FRONTIERES - BELGIQUEASBL*ASF ADVOCATEN ZONDER GRENZEN ANWALTE OHNE GRENZEN  
  Belgium 





GENDER TUNISIA [Search terms: Genre, Femme] 
 
ENI/ENPI     
 
2013    Prévention de la Violence fondée sur le genre et accompagnement des femmes victimes dans le 
Nord-Ouest Tunisien 550,000 €       
 [CODE GENDER TN] 
FUNDACION CIDEAL DE COOPERACION E INVESTIGACION*  
  Spain 
 
2016    MISSION DE FORMULATION POUR LA MISE EN OEUVRE DE LA BUDGÉTISATION 
SENSIBLE AU GENRE EN TUNISIE 21,976 €     
 [CODE GENDER TN] 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 
21,976 €     
 
2016    ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE DE DÉMARRAGE POUR LE PROGRAMME DE PROMOTION 
DE L'ÉGALITÉ HOMME-FEMME EN TUNISIE 20,076 €    [CODE 
GENDER TN] 
DAI EUROPE LIMITED  
  United Kingdom 
20,076 €        
  
2017    ANALYSES GENRE SECTORIELLES –TUNISIE 138,084 €  [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA*  
  Belgium 
138,084 €        
  
2017    MISSION D'APPUI AU MINISTÈRE DE LA FEMME, LA FAMILLE ET L'ENFANCE, AU 
CONSEIL DES PAIRS ET SES PARTENAIRES 137,715 €     [CODE 
GENDER TN] 
INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING EXPERTISEGEIE*ICE  
  Belgium 
137,715 €      
 
2017    MISSION DE FORMULATION POUR LA MISE EN OEUVRE DE LA BUDGÉTISATION 
SENSIBLE AU GENRE EN TUNISIE 10,704 €     
 [CODE GENDER TN] 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 
10,704 €         
 
2017    FLAG : FEMMES, LEADERSHIP, APPUI ET GESTION 826,546 €  [CODE GENDER 
TN]   
ASSOCIAZIONE PONTES RICERCHE E INTERVENTI  
  Italy 
        
CENTRE TUNISIEN POUR L'ENTREPRENARIAT SOCIAL*TUNISIAN CENTER FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP  
  Tunisia 
 
        
2017    CLEF: COSMÉTOLOGIE ET FEMMES, ÉMANCIPATION ET ÉGALITÉ DE LA FEMME 
RURALE À TRAVERS LA VALORISATION ET LA COMMERCIALISATION DES RESSOURCES DU 
TERRITOIRE 653,903 €        
 [CODE GENDER TN] 
ASSOCIATION DE KAIROUAN POUR L'AUTO-DEVELOPPEMENT  
  Tunisia 
        
ASSOCIATION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT DURABLE D'ELGUETAR  
  Tunisia 
        
 
2017    PARFAIT: PARTICIPATION DES FEMMES POUR L'AVANCEMENT ET L'INNOVATION 
DE LA TUNISIE 500,000 €       [CODE GENDER 
TN] 





  France 
        
EUROPEAN PARTNERSHIP FOR DEMOCRACY  
  Belgium 
        
 
2017    PAROLE AUX FEMMES 465,209 €     [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
ACTION ASSOCIATIVE  
  Tunisia 
        
FUNDACION CIDEAL DE COOPERACION E INVESTIGACION*  
  Spain 
        
2017    LES FEMMES, ACTRICES DE LA GOUVERNANCE LOCALE DANS LES GOUVERNORATS 




2018    PRÉPARATION ET EXPÉRIMENTATION DE LA MISE EN OEUVRE DE LA 
BUDGÉTISATION SENSIBLE AU GENRE EN TUNISIE 240,520 €   
 [CODE GENDER TN] 
AECOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT EUROPE SL  
  Spain 
240,520 €         
 
2018    ANALYSES GENRE SECTORIELLES –TUNISIE 68,986 €  [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING  
  Belgium 
 
68,986 €         
 
2017    AUDIT FINANCIER ET DE SYSTÈME DU DPD ET DPC 1 DU PROGRAMME EGALITÉ 
HOMME ET FEMME 18,525 €       
 [CODE GENDER TN] 
MOORE STEPHENS LLP*  
  United Kingdom 
18,525 €         
 
2017    MISSION DE FORMULATION POUR LA MISE EN OEUVRE DE LA BUDGÉTISATION 
SENSIBLE AU GENRE EN TUNISIE 10,704 €     
 [CODE GENDER TN] 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 
10,704 €         
 
2018    DÉVELOPPEMENT ET MISE EN OEUVRE D’UN SYSTÈME DE SUIVI ET D’ÉVALUATION 
(S&E) POUR LE « PROGRAMME DE PROMOTION DE L’ÉGALITÉ ENTRE LES FEMMES ET LES 
HOMMES EN TUNISIE »        [CODE 
GENDER TN] 
28,500 € 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 




2014    Sensibilisation des étudiants Tunisiens à la préservation des droits de la femme et à une meilleure 
comprehénsion du modèle patriarchal 167,282 €    [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
IMAGES ET PAROLES DE FEMMES ASSOCIATIO*  
  Tunisia 
 
2014    Projet de lutte contre l’abus sexuel des filles 157,731 €   [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE DES DROITS DE L'ENFANT*ATUDE ATDE  




        
FEMMES & LEADERSHIP ASSOCIATION*F&L  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    Sensibilisation des étudiants Tunisiens à la préservation des droits de la femme et à une meilleure 
comprehénsion du modèle patriarchal 132,534 €    [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
IMAGES ET PAROLES DE FEMMES ASSOCIATIO*  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    Promotion de l’égalité professionnelle femmes-hommes en Tunisie  126,566 € [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
ASSOCIATION DES RESPONSABLES DE FORMATION ET DE GESTION HUMAINE DANS LES 
ENTREPRISES*ARFORGHE  
  Tunisia 
        
FONDATION AGIR CONTRE L'EXCLUSION*FACE  
  France 
        
2014    Promotion de l’égalité professionnelle femmes-hommes en Tunisie 113,434 € [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
ASSOCIATION DES RESPONSABLES DE FORMATION ET DE GESTION HUMAINE DANS LES 
ENTREPRISES*ARFORGHE  
  Tunisia 
        
FONDATION AGIR CONTRE L'EXCLUSION*FACE  
  France 
 
2014    Projet de lutte contre l’abus sexuel des filles 71,174 €   [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE DES DROITS DE L'ENFANT*ATUDE ATDE  
  Tunisia 
        
FEMMES & LEADERSHIP ASSOCIATION*F&L  
  Tunisia 
 
IcSP 
      
2017    ''SALAM PRÉVENIR L'EXTRÉMISME VIOLENT EN TUNISIE : UNE APPROCHE BASÉE 
SUR LES DROITS HUMAINS ET LA CONSOLIDATION DE LA PAIX'' 998,001 € 
 [CODE GENDER TN] 
ASSOCIACIO NOVACT  
  Spain 
499,000 €         
ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE DES FEMMES DEMOCRATES  
  Tunisia 
99,800 €         
 
2017    FEMMES ET JEUNES POUR LA PAIX 320,000 €   [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
FONDAZIONE TERRE DES HOMMES ITALIAONLUS*  
  Italy 
64,000 €         
HELP CODE ITALIA ONLUS  
  Italy 
96,000 €         
 
Development Cooperation Instrument 
 
2012    Centre femme Solidarité soutien à l'inclusion et à l'économie sociale feminine dans le gouvernorat de 
Jendouba 352,744 €        
 [CODE GENDER TN] 
COOPERAZIONE PER LO SVILUPPO DEI PAESI EMERGENTI ONLUS ASSOCIAZIONI*COSPE  
  Italy 
 
2012    « Création et consolidation des Groupements de Développement des Oasis (GDO) de femmes et de 
jeunes de Gafsa pour la promotion d’activités génératrices de revenus par la valorisation des produits et des 
sous produits oasiens 300,000 €       




ASSOCIATION POUR LA SAUVEGARDE DE LA MEDINA DE GAFSA*ASM DE GAFSA  
  Tunisia 
        
 




2011    Mission de Formulation et d'identification du projet justice en Tunisie 159,929 €  
 
         [CODE JSR TN] 
INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT GROUP*IMG  
  Serbia (Republic of) 
 
2013    Soutien à l'améliortation du système de justice des enfants en Tunisie 1,800,000 €  
 
         [CODE JSR TN] 
UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND*UNICEF LE FONDS DES NATIONS UNIES POURL'ENFANCE  
  United States 
 
2016    IDENTIFICATION ET FORMULATION DE LA TROISIÈME PHASE DU PROGRAMME 
D'APPUI À LA RÉFORME DE LA JUSTICE (PARJ 3) 203,304 €    [CODE JSR 
TN] 
PARTICIP GMBH CONSULTANTS FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND UMWELT*  
  Germany 
203,304 €         
 
2018    RENFORCER L’IMPLICATION DE LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE DANS LA RÉFORME DE LA 
JUSTICE EN TUNISIE 1,000,000 €       [CODE JSR 
TN] 
ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE DE LUTTE CONTRE LES MALADIES SEXUELLES ET LE SIDA*ASSOCIATION DE LUTTE 
CONTRE LESM.S.T. ET SIDA  
  Tunisia 
        
AVOCATS SANS FRONTIERES - BELGIQUEASBL*ASF ADVOCATEN ZONDER GRENZEN ANWALTE OHNE GRENZEN  
  Belgium 
1,000,000 €         
 
 




2016    MISSION D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE AU DÉMARRAGE DU PROGRAMME D'APPUI À LA 
RÉFORME ET MODERNISATION DU SECTEUR DE LA SÉCURITÉ DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
TUNISIENNE 
163,782 €         [CODE SSR TN] 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA*  
  Belgium 
163,782 €         
 
2017    MISSION D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE AU DÉMARRAGE DU PROGRAMME D'APPUI À LA 
RÉFORME ET MODERNISATION DU SECTEUR DE LA SÉCURITÉ DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
TUNISIENNE 46,107 €        
 [CODE SSR TN] 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA*  
  Belgium 
46,107 €      
 
2018    APPUI À LA MISE EN PLACE DU CONTRÔLE DÉMOCRATIQUE SUR LE SECTEUR DE LA 
SÉCURITÉ EN TUNISIE. 1,108,596 €     [CODE SSR TN] 
CENTRE POUR LE CONTROLE DEMOCRATIQUE DES FORCES ARMEES GENEVE FONDATION*GENEVA CENTRE FOR 
THE DEMOCRATICCONTROLE OF ARMED FORCES DCAF  
  Switzerland 






2018    MISSION D'APPUI À LA NÉGOCIATION D'UN NOUVEAU CONTRAT DE SERVICE POUR 
L'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE DE LONG TERME AU PROGRAMME D'APPUI À LA RÉFORME ET 
MODERNISATION DU SECTEUR DE LA SÉCURITÉ EN TUNISIE 55,600 € [CODE SSR TN] 
ALTAIR ASESORES SL  
  Spain 




2016    BORDER SECURITY MANAGEMENT IN TUNISIA'S SOUTHERN BORDERS, 
PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 1,193,065 €     
 [CODE SSR TN] 
DANSK FLYGTNINGEHJAELP FORENING*DANISH REFUGEE COUNCIL DRC  
  Denmark 
1,193,065 €         
 
2016    ENHANCING INCLUSIVE AND DEMOCRATIC SECURITY GOVERNANCE OF TUNISIA'S 
BORDERS 805,016 €        
 [CODE SSR TN] 
INTERNATIONAL ALERT LBG*IA  
  United Kingdom 
805,016 €         
 
2017    RÉINSERTION SOCIO-PROFESSIONNELLE DES JEUNES SORTANT DE PRISON EN 
RISQUE DE RADICALISATION 531,633 €      [CODE SSR 
TN] 
FONDATION AGIR CONTRE L'EXCLUSION  
  Tunisia 
372,143 €         
FONDATION AGIR CONTRE L'EXCLUSION*FACE  
  France 
159,490 €   
 
2017    ''SALAM PRÉVENIR L'EXTRÉMISME VIOLENT EN TUNISIE : UNE APPROCHE BASÉE 
SUR LES DROITS HUMAINS ET LA CONSOLIDATION DE LA PAIX'' 998,001 € 
 [CODE SSR TN] 
ASSOCIACIO NOVACT  
  Spain 
499,000 €         
ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE DES FEMMES DEMOCRATES  
  Tunisia 
99,800 €         
 
2017    PROMOUVOIR LA PARTICIPATION SOCIALE, ÉCONOMIQUE ET POLITIQUE DES 
JEUNES MARGINALISÉS DANS LES ZONES LES PLUS TOUCHÉES PAR LE PHÉNOMÈNE DE 
L’EXTRÉMISME VIOLENT EN TUNISIE. 800,000 €     
 [CODE SSR TN] 
I CHANGE  
  Tunisia 
40,000 €         
INTERNATIONAL ALERT LBG*IA  
  United Kingdom 
760,000 €         
 
2017    Renforcer la résilience des jeunes tunisiens pour prévenir les tentatives de récidive et de 
recrutements par les entités extrémistes  646,442 €     
 [CODE SSR TN] 
ASSOCIATION DES JEUNES ET HABILITES*ASSOCIATION JEUNESS ET HABILITES CHABEB W MAHARAT  
  Tunisia 
40,403 €         
ASSOCIATION FORUM DES SCIENCES SOCIALES APPLIQUEES*ASSF APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE FORUM  
  Tunisia 
193,933 €         
 
 
2017    FEMMES ET JEUNES POUR LA PAIX 320,000 €   [CODE  SSR TN] 
FONDAZIONE TERRE DES HOMMES ITALIAONLUS*  




64,000 €         
HELP CODE ITALIA ONLUS  
  Italy 




TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE UKRAINE [Search terms: Transitional Justice, Torture, 




2014    Civic campaign against torture and ill-treatment in Ukraine 140,583 €  [CODE TJ UA] 
KHARKIV HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION GROUP*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Civic campaign against torture and ill-treatment in Ukraine 119,417 €  [CODE TJ UA] 
KHARKIV HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION GROUP*  
  Ukraine 
 
2017    COMBATTING TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT IN GEORGIA ARMENIA AND 
UKRAINE 1,000,000 €        [CODE TJ 
UA] 
INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL REHABILITATION CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF WARS AND TOTALITARIAN REGIMES (IRC)  
  Ukraine 
        
UKRAINIAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION*  
  Ukraine 
 
2017    PARLIAMENTARY CAMPAIGN FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS AND UNIVERSALITY OF THE 
ROME STATUTE (RS) OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) SYSTEM (PGA ICC 
CAMPAIGN) 1,120,000 €        [CODE TJ 
UA] 
CENTER FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES CIVIC ORGANIZATION*PO CCL  
  Ukraine 
 
2018    FIGHT AGAINST TORTURE, ILL-TREATMENT AND IMPUNITY IN UKRAINE 275,000 € 
 
         [CODE TJ UA] 
KHARKIV HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION GROUP*  
  Ukraine 
275,000 €         
KHARKIV INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCHES*  
  Ukraine 
        
ODESSA REGIONAL ORGANIZATION OF ALL UKRAINIAN NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE OF 
VOTERS OF UKRAINE CIVIC ORGANISATION*ORO CVU  
  Ukraine 
        
TERRITORY OF SUCCESS*TERYTORIYA USPIKHY  





2015    SUPPORT TO OSCE SPECIAL MONITORING MISSION IN UKRAINE 2,000,000 € [CODE TJ 
UA] 
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE*OSCE ORGANISATIONPOUR LA SECURITE ET LA 
COOPERATIONEN EUROPE  
  Austria 
 
2015    SUPPORT TO THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING MISSION IN UKRAINE 3,199,522 € 
 
         [CODE TJ UA] 
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS*OHCHR HAUT COMMISSARIAT DES NATIONS UNIES 
AUX DROITS DE L'HOMME HCDH  





2016    FURTHER SUPPORT TO THE OSCE SPECIAL MONITORING MISSION 7,000,000 € [CODE 
TJ UA] 
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE*OSCE ORGANISATIONPOUR LA SECURITE ET LA 
COOPERATIONEN EUROPE  
  Austria 
7,000,000 €   
 
2016    OSCE SPECIAL MONITORING MISSION TO UKRAINE 6,000,000 € [CODE TJ UA] 
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE*OSCE ORGANISATIONPOUR LA SECURITE ET LA 
COOPERATIONEN EUROPE  
  Austria 
6,000,000 €         
 
2017    FURTHER SUPPORT TO THE OSCE SPECIAL MONITORING MISSION IN UKRAINE 
5,000,000 € 
 
         [CODE TJ UA] 
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE*OSCE ORGANISATIONPOUR LA SECURITE ET LA 
COOPERATIONEN EUROPE  
  Austria 
5,000,000 €         
 
2018    CONTINUING SUPPORT TO THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING MISSION IN 
UKRAINE 3,000,000 €        [CODE TJ 
UA] 
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS*OHCHR HAUT COMMISSARIAT DES NATIONS UNIES 
AUX DROITS DE L'HOMME HCDH  
  Switzerland 
3,000,000 €      
 
 




2015    MOBILIZATION AMONG INTERNALLY DISPLACED WOMEN FOR ADDRESSING 
DOMESTIC AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 160,143 €    
 [CODE GENDER UA] 
ALL UKRAINIAN CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION CONVICTUS UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    MOBILIZATION AMONG INTERNALLY DISPLACED WOMEN FOR ADDRESSING 
DOMESTIC AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 118,481 €    
 [CODE GENDER UA] 
ALL UKRAINIAN CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION CONVICTUS UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
        
 
Development Cooperation Instrument 
 
2017    CENTRE OF GENDER CULTURE AS A PLATFORM FOR EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN 
AND YOUTH 645,000 €        [CODE 
GENDER UA] 
KHARKIV REGIONAL ORGANIZATION KHARKIV REGIONAL GENDER RESOURCE CENTER  
 
2017    ''WOMEN AS AGENTS OF CHANGE, PEACE BUILDING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION 











2014    Consolidation of Justice Sector Policy Development in Ukraine 1,000,000 € [CODE JSR UA] 
CONSEIL DE L' EUROPE*COUNCIL OF EUROPE  
  France 
 
2014    Ukraine - EU Speedometer: Constitutional and Judicial Reforms 114,612 € [CODE JSR UA] 
CENTRE FOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL REFORMS CIVIL ORGANISATION*CPLR  
  Ukraine 
 
2015    FINANCIAL AND SYSTEMS AUDIT PROJECT TO SUPPORT JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM 
IN UKRAINE CONTRACT N. 2013/328-160 18,110 €    [CODE JSR UA] 
ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA*ERNST ET YOUNG REVISEURS D ENTREPRISES  
  Belgium 
 
2015    CONSOLIDATION OF JUSTICE SECTOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN UKRAINE 640 € 
         [CODE JSR UA] 
CONSEIL DE L' EUROPE*COUNCIL OF EUROPE  
  France 
 
2016    TWG: STRENGTHENING THE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF UKRAINE IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
1,311,731 € 
 
         [CODE JSR UA] 
DEUTSCHE STIFTUNG FUR INTERNATIONALE RECHTLICHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT IRZ-STIFTUNG*  
  Germany 




2014    Ensuring access to justice through free legal aid delivery and introduction of high quality standards 
of human rights protection in Ukraine 22,211 €      [CODE JSR 
UA] 
ALL-UKRAINIAN CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION UKRAINIAN LEGAL AID FOUNDATION*ULAF  
  Ukraine 
 
2016    IMPROVEMENT OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND DEFENCE OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR 
TRIAL FOR VULNERABLE GROUPS IN UKRAINE 259,999 €    [CODE JSR 
UA] 
KHARKIV HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION GROUP*  
  Ukraine 
        
KHARKIV INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCHES*  
  Ukraine 
 
 




2016    RULE OF LAW IN UKRAINE–  POLICY AND BUDGETARY ANALYSIS IN THE AREA OF 
POLICE/LAW-ENFORCEMENT REFORM 83,357 €    [CODE SSR UA] 
DAI EUROPE LIMITED  
  United Kingdom 
83,357 €         
 
2018    SUPPORT TO CYBERSECURITY IN UKRAINE 153,600 €  [CODE SSR UA] 
STANTEC  
  Belgium 




2017    SUPPORT TO POLICE REFORM IN UKRAINE 1,500,000 €  [CODE SSR UA] 




  Sweden 
1,500,000 €         
 
Complete overview of all EU commitments per instrument  
EU commitments in Tunisia and Ukraine under the ENI/ENPI 
ENI/ENPI Tunisia 
2011 
2011    Engagement secondaire : destinés à soutenir les mesures de relance économique 89,000,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Appui Budgétaire PEFESE (programme Education, formation professionnelle et enseignement supérieur en 
lien avec l'employabilité) 61,300,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Programme d'appui aux politiques publiques de gestion des ressources en eau pour le développement rural et 
agricole 50,000,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Engagement de la troisième tranche du programme PAI  20,000,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Appui au Fonds National Maîtrise de l’Energie (FNME) 16,000,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Bonification d'intérêts sur prêt de la BEI 9,890,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Appui au Fonds de Dépollution (FODEP) 2,500,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Activité B.9.1du PASRI : Approche audit technologique 2,000,000 € 
DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FUR INTERNATIONALE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GIZ) GMBH*  
  Germany 
        
2011    Electoral assistance to Tunisia - Phase II 805,545 € 
ELECTORAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL SERVICES LIMITED LBG*  
  United Kingdom 
        
2011    EU Tunisia Migration Cooperation Agenda 799,953 € 
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR MIGRATIONPOLICY DEVELOPMENT*INTERNATIONALENZEMTRUM FUR 
MIGRATIONSPOLITIKENTWICKLUNG ICMPD  
  Austria 
        
 
2011    Création d'une commission mixte de consultation pour la radio tunisienne 233,289 € 
FONDATION HIRONDELLE MEDIA FOR PEACE AND HUMAIN DIGNITY*  
  Switzerland 
        
2011    Profil Environnement de pays Tunisie 197,408 € 
EURONET CONSULTING EESV*  
  Belgium 
        






SAFEGE SA*  
  France 
        
2011    AT pour le Renforcement des Capacités de l’Agence Nationale de Promotion de la Recherche Scientifique 
(ANPR)  176,760 € 
DANISH MANAGEMENT AS*  
  Denmark 
        
2011    Assistance technique pour le renforcement des capacités institutionnelles de la Direction Générale de la 
prévisison du Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Internationale 170,749 € 
PROTISVALOR MEDITERRANEE SAS*PVM  
  France 
        
2011    Mission de Formulation et d'identification du projet justice en Tunisie 159,929 € [CODE JSR 
TN] 
INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT GROUP*IMG  
  Serbia (Republic of) 
        
2011    Evaluation finale des programmes d'appuis budgétaires Education secondaire et MANFORM II 147,810 € 
HTSPE LIMITED*  
  United Kingdom 
        
2011    Formulation du Programme d'Appui à la Société Civile en Tunisie 131,848 € 
COWI AS*KAMPSAX GEODAN GEOPLUS KAMPSAX DATA GEOPLAN GEOMASTERS GEODATA AGRINOVA 
INTERNATIONAL KAMPSAX INTERNATIONAL KAMPSAX TEKNIK  
  Denmark 
        
2011    Mission d'appui au démarrage du Projet d’Appuis au Système de Recherche-Innovation (PASRI) en Tunisie 
128,078 € 
DFC SA*  
  Spain 
        
2011    Assistance Technique pour l'étude, l'évaluation et l'optimisation des instruments financiers d'incitation à 
l'innovation et la création d'entreprise 127,674 € 
DFC SA*  
  Spain 
        
2011    Mission d'appui institutionnel à la préparation des appuis complémentaires du programme PEFESE 108,134 € 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA*  
  Belgium 
        
2011    Etude de faisabilité de six projets pilotes pour la valorisation du patrimoine culturel et intégration dans le 
développment local pour la création d'emploi 106,576 € 
CAMBRIDGE EDUCATION LIMITED*  
  United Kingdom 
        
2011    Assistance technique pour le compte du Ministère tunisien de la santé Publique pour la création d'un 
organisme d'accréditation/certification des services de santé 105,425 € 
CONSEIL SANTE SA*  
  France 
        
2011    Organisation des activités d'information et de communication 2012 90,000 € 
ASK EVENT SUARL*ASK' EVENT  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Analyse des informations relatives au système de gouvernance de la nouvelle Libye. 82,000 € 
NATURAL PERSON ; PERSONNE PRIVÉE ; PRIVATPERSON - Art. 21(2) RAP  
  Spain 
        
2011    Organisation des journées du cinéma européen 2011 68,750 € 
ASSOCIATION DE COURT-METRAGE ET DOCUMENTAIRE MAGHREBIN*ACDM  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    "Soutien à la société civile en Tunisie" 60,000 € 
NATURAL PERSON ; PERSONNE PRIVÉE ; PRIVATPERSON - Art. 21(2) RAP  
  Spain 
        
2011    Analyse des informations relatives aux éléctions pour l'Assemblée Constituante dans le cadre du renforcement 
de la bonne gouvernance  54,000 € 
NATURAL PERSON ; PERSONNE PRIVÉE ; PRIVATPERSON - Art. 21(2) RAP  




        
2011    Mission de suivi pour le Programme d'Appui à l'Intégration  47,560 € 
AIDE A LA DECISION ECONOMIQUE SA*  
  Belgium 
        
2011    Assistance Technique au profit du Ministère du Commerce et du Tourisme pour le développement et la mise 
en place de nouvelles activités d'essais 33,000 € 
TRANSTEC SA*  
  Belgium 
        
2011    Audit financier et de système du programme P3A2 10,000 € 
FIDUNION TUNISIE SA*FT  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Mission d'AT pour l'établissement d'entités privées du type IMF (institutions de microfinance) ainsi que le 
développement de l'environnement propice pour permettre le développement du secteur de la microfinance en 
Tunisie 9,986 € 
SELF-EMPLOYED NATURAL PERSON  
  France 
        
2011    Préparation d'une conférence sur la microfinance 9,917 € 
TUNINVEST FINANCE GROUP SA*TFG  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Organisation de la 3ème édition du cinéma euro-maghrébin à Nabeul 9,900 € 
SOCIETE TOURISTIQUE KHEOPS HOTEL SA*  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Elaboration et mise en oeuvre du plan de communication et visibilité du projet de mise à niveau 
environnementale de certaines installations du Groupe Chimique Tunisien (GCT) 9,900 € 
MEDIA HORIZON SARL*  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Mission d'étude ex-post du jumelage ''Renforcement des services vétérinaires en Tunisie TU05/AA/HE/08 
9,688 € 
FRANCE VETERINAIRE INTERNATIONAL GIP*FVI  
  France 
        
2011    Appui à la Conférence internationale sur ''la corruption et la malversation : quoi faire?, du 22 au 24/09/2011 
9,600 € 
SOCIETE MEHARI HAMAMET SA*  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Appui aux journées de l'entreprise de l'IACE sur le thème '' L'entreprise et le schèma de développement : 
Engagement et Equité'', les 9 et 10 décembre à Sousse. 9,400 € 
MEC SERVICE SARL*MUSIC ELECTRIC COOL SERVICES  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Appui au Colloque international de Réalités sur "Le religieux et le politique dans un Etat de droit: expériences 
comparées", les 17 et 18 novembre 2011, à Hammamet 9,400 € 
RELAIS PALAIS DE TUNISIE SA*HOTEL ALHAMBRA THALASSO  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Appui à la conférence de l'Académie de la latinité du 1er au 3 décembre 2011 à Hammamet- Al Hambara 
Thalasso 9,400 € 
RELAIS PALAIS DE TUNISIE SA*HOTEL ALHAMBRA THALASSO  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    7ème colloque intenational de l'Université de Tunis El Manar du 6 au 8 Juin 2011 à Hammamet 9,275 € 
SOCIETE MEHARI HAMAMET SA*  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Appui au colloque de l'Université de Droit de Sfax sur le thème ''Institutionnalisation de l'Etat de droit'', les 6-
7 décembre 2011 9,095 € 
HOTEL LES OLIVIERS SA*LES OLIVIERSPALACE H.O.S.A  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Soutien de la Délégation au séminaire ''Assises de la Justice transitionnelle en Tunisie'' à la cité des 
Sciences de Tunis les 9-10/12/2011 8,423 €      
 [CODE TJ TN] 




  Tunisia 
        
2011    Contribution au financement pour la restauration de la bibliothèque de l'Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes 
(IBLA) 8,000 € 
EGLISE CATHOLIQUE EN TUNISIE SOCIETE DE FAIT*PRELATURE DE TUNIS SOLIDARITE IBLA  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Audit du Programme d'appui à la compétitivité des entreprises et à la facilitation de l'accés au marché PCAM : 
ENPI/2008/20216 8,000 € 
CONSEIL ETUDE GESTION AUDIT SARL*  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Appui à l'organisation du Festival de cinéma Afrique-Méditerranée, à Thala, du 27 au 31 juillet 2011 7,894 € 
BACK STAGE TECHNOLOGIE SARL*B.S.T BACK STAGE TECHNOLOGY  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    contrat a pour objet de financier une mission d'assistance technique qui contribuera à l'élaboration des 
''guidelines'' en vue du lancement d'une appelle à propositions, par l'UE, ayant comme objectif de faciliter 
l'implantation des acteurs opérant 7,500 € 
F.A.C.Y. SA*  
  Belgium 
        
2012 
2012    Programme d’Appui à la Relance (PAR) 2 63,000,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
        
2012    Projet de création d’emplois et accompagnement à la réinsertion en complétant les dispositifs de l’Etat en 
Tunisie 6,476,777 € 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION*ILO ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DU TRAVAIL OIT  
  Switzerland 
        
2012    Création d'une IMF 'greenfield' à destination des populations défavorisées en Tunisie. 1,835,791 € 
MICROCRED SA*  
  France 
        
2012    Appui au processus constitutionnel et parlementaire en Tunisie 1,809,778 € 
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME*UNDP PROGRAMME DES NATIONS UNIESPOUR LE 
DEVELOPPEMENT PNUD  
  United States 
        
2012    Appui au développement de la microfinance en Tunisie par l'introduction du microcrédit accompagné et 
intégré 1,401,692 € 
ASSOCIATION POUR LE DROIT A L'INITIATIVE ECONOMIQUE INTERNATIONAL*ADIE INTERNATIONAL AI  
  France 
        
2012    Inclusion financière des populations rurales enclavées à travers le ''Branchless banking'' 1,200,004 € 
ENDA INTER-ARABE ASSOCIATION*ENDA-IA  
  Tunisia 
        
2012    La lutte contre la torture et les mauvais traitements en Tunisie 438,593 € [CODE TJ TN] 
ORGANISATION MONDIALE CONTRE LA TORTURE ASSOCIATION*OMCT WORLD ORGANISATION AGAINST 
TORTURE  
  Switzerland 
        
2012    CTAA / PACKTEC - Lots N° 1, 2 et 4 : Système de Chromatographie (GC/MS) ; Spectromètre - ICP / Ms ; 
et Système de Chromatogra-phie (GC/MS/MS) 415,442 € 
LA PRECISION ELECTRONIQUE SARL*  
  Tunisia 
        
2012    Contribution à la mise au point d’un modèle intégré d’amélioration, d’aménagement et de gestion agro-sylvo-
pastoraux orienté vers les communautés vulnérables des zones périphériques du parc national de Bou-Hedma 
397,386 € 
CENTRE TECNOLOGIC FORESTAL DE CATALUNYA CONSORCIO*CTFC  
  Spain 
        
2012    Appui au MFPE pour le pilotage du programme d'urgence pour l'emploi 327,640 € 
AMC ERNST & YOUNG SARL*AMC E&Y  




        
2012    Renforcement des capacités de la radio tunisienne en vue d'assurer une couverture complète des travaux de 
l'Assemblée nationale constituante puis des prochaines élections générales en jouant pleinement son rôle de service 
public et de proximité 306,530 € 
FONDATION HIRONDELLE MEDIA FOR PEACE AND HUMAIN DIGNITY*  
  Switzerland 
        
2012    Projet d’appui aux initiatives de développement local et de création d’emploi dans le contexte rural de la 
Délégation de Sakiet Sidi Youssef, Gouvernorat du Kef 247,753 € 
ASAMBLEA DE COOPERACION POR LA PAZASOCIACION*ACPP  
  Spain 
        
2012    Suivi et mise à disposition d'assistance technique pour la mise en oeuvre du Programme d'Appui à la Relance 
243,895 € 
AIDE A LA DECISION ECONOMIQUE SA*  
  Belgium 
        
2012    La Maison Tunisienne du Droit et des Migrations 239,445 € 
FRANCE TERRE D'ASILE-ASSOCIATION*  
  France 
        
2012    Renforcer les capacités de la société civile et promouvoir la participation des populations défavorisées dans la 
délégation de Tajerouine (avec extension envisagée dans deux autres délégations du gouvernorat de Siliana) 223,956 € 
CAISSE CENTRALE DE LA MUTUALITE SOCIALE AGRICOLE*CCMSA  
  France 
        
2012    Project to support innovative approach to productive work for youth in Tunisia and the MENA region 
200,000 € 
UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION*UNIDO ORGANISATIONDES NATIONS UNIES 
POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT INDUSTRIEL ONUDI  
  Austria 
        
2012    Formulation du programme d'actions pilote dans le cadre de l'initiative ENPARD en Tunisie 
199,660 € 
CENTRE INTERNATIONAL DES HAUTES ETUDES AGRONOMIQUES MEDITERRANEENNES INSTITUT 
AGRONOMIQUE MEDITERRANEEN DE MONTPELLIER CIHEAM IAMM  
  France 
        
2012    Etude de faisabilité sur le processus de mise en oeuvre d'une centrale de risques en Tunisie 187,390 € 
MICROFINANZA SRL*  
  Italy 
        
2012    AT pour Améliorer l'Accés à l'Information et l'éfficacité des appuis à la société civile en Tunisie 182,932 € 
COWI AS*KAMPSAX GEODAN GEOPLUS KAMPSAX DATA GEOPLAN GEOMASTERS GEODATA AGRINOVA 
INTERNATIONAL KAMPSAX INTERNATIONAL KAMPSAX TEKNIK  
  Denmark 
        
2012    Mission d'appui institutionnel à la préparation des appuis complémentaires du programme d’appui aux 
politiques publiques de gestion des ressources en eau pour le développement rural et agricole  PAPS-EAU 173,184 € 
AGRECO GEIE*  
  Belgium 
        
2012    Appui technique à la mise en place d'une gestion budgétaire par objectif 
160,000 € 
AIDE A LA DECISION ECONOMIQUE SA*  
  Belgium 
        
2012    Etude de positionnement stratégique de l’infrastructure qualité tunisienne, son développement et son 
intégration dans l’espace Euro-Méditerranéen 
144,916 € 
ACE INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANTS SL*  
  Spain 
        
2012    Mission de suivi du programme PEFESE 
128,070 € 
ACE INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANTS SL*  
  Spain 
        
2012    Mission d’identification et de formulation d'un appui complémentaire au projet de réalisation des installations 





SAFEGE SA*  
  France 
        
2012    Appui au MFPE pour le pilotage du programme CAP Emploi 
102,220 € 
AMC ERNST & YOUNG SARL*AMC E&Y  
  Tunisia 
        
2012    Assistance technique au profit de l'administration tunisienne dans le domaine des PPP 
97,988 € 
XAVIER GHELBER*CABINET GHELBER  
  France 
        
2012    Prestations additionnelles - Assistance technique au profit de l'administration tunisienne dans le domaine des 
PPP 
97,860 € 
XAVIER GHELBER*CABINET GHELBER  
  France 
        
2012    Evaluation à mi-parcours du Programme Environnement et Energie 
70,831 € 
EURONET CONSULTING GEIE*  
  Belgium 
        
2012    Organisation des Journées du Cinéma Européen (JCE) dans les villes de Tunis, Sousse, Sfax, le Kef, 
Kairouan, Monastir, Gabés et Gafsa 
70,000 € 
ASSOCIATION DE COURT-METRAGE ET DOCUMENTAIRE MAGHREBIN*ACDM  
  Tunisia 
        
2012    Organisation des activités d'information et de communication 2012-2013 
61,000 € 
ASK EVENT SUARL*ASK' EVENT  
  Tunisia 
        
2012    Join EU TASK Force/World Bank STAR Tunisian Asset recovery workshop 
50,330 € 
ITALTREND C&T SPA*  
  Italy 
        
2012    Évaluation à mi-parcours du B-GCT 
41,462 € 
AGRECO GEIE*  
  Belgium 
        
2012    Dialogue Interculturel à travers l'Art du Tapis - DIART 
40,000 € 
ASSADAKAH SARDEGNA-CENTRO ITALO ARABO E DEL MEDITERRANEO ASSOCIAZIONE*  
  Italy 
        
2012    Collines Perchées: Art et Citoyen 
40,000 € 
GOETHE-INSTITUT EV*  
  Germany 
        
2012    De l'Histoire orale à YouTube. Récits de la province tunisienne et générations face à face 
29,698 € 
ARCI NUOVA ASSOCIAZIONE COMITATO TERRITORIALE DI CATANIA*ACI N A CATANIA ARCI CATANIA  
  Italy 
        
2012    Culture et arts au service de l'interaction sociale dans le gouvernorat du Kef 
28,400 € 
FUNDACION CIDEAL DE COOPERACION E INVESTIGACION*  
  Spain 
        
2013 
2013    PAR III Engagement pour appui budgétaire 65,000,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  




        
2013    Réhabilitation selon les standards internationaux de Tribunaux et Etablissements pénitentiaires avec une 
dotation de matériel informatique 10,000,000 € 
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR PROJECT SERVICES*UNOPS BUREAU DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LES SERVICES 
D'APPUI AUX PROJETS  
  Denmark 
        
2013    Programe d'Appui à la Société Civile en Tunise - PASC TUNISIE 3,399,228 € 
STICHTING EUROPEAN PARTNERSHIP FORDEMOCRACY*EPD  
  Netherlands 
        
2013    Réhabilitation selon les standards internationaux de Tribunaux et Etablissements pénitentiaires avec une 
dotation de matériel informatique 2,300,000 € 
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR PROJECT SERVICES*UNOPS BUREAU DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LES SERVICES 
D'APPUI AUX PROJETS  
  Denmark 
        
2013    Soutien à l'améliortation du système de justice des enfants en Tunisie 1,800,000 € [CODE JSR 
TN] 
UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND*UNICEF LE FONDS DES NATIONS UNIES POURL'ENFANCE  
  United States 
        
2013    Prévention de la Violence fondée sur le genre et accompagnement des femmes victimes dans le 
Nord-Ouest Tunisien 550,000 € 
FUNDACION CIDEAL DE COOPERACION E INVESTIGACION*  
  Spain 
        
2013    Observation, Suivi et Suivi des Elections 395,000 € 
ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE POUR L'INTEGRITE ET LA DEMOCRATIE DES ELECTIONS*ATIDE  
  Tunisia 
        
2013    Citoyenneté active, éléctions et transition démocratique en Tunisie 394,018 € 
ASSOCIATION DES AGENCES DE LA DEMOCRATIE LOCALE*ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL DEMOCRACY AGENCIES 
AADL/ALDA  
  France 
        
LAM ECHAML ASSOCIATION*  
  Tunisia 
        
2013    Supporting Civil Society Organisations and Political Actors in Elections and Institutional Reforms to 
Strengthen the Democratic Process in Tunisia 332,499 € 
DEMOCRACY REPORTING INTERNATIONAL GGMBH*DRI  
  Germany 
        
2013    APPUI À L’ AMÉLIORATION DE L’ ENVIRONNEMENT INSTITUTIONNEL ET LÉGAL DES 
ORGANISATIONS DE LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE TUNISIENNE 273,865 € 
PARTICIP GMBH CONSULTANTS FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND UMWELT*  
  Germany 
        
2013    Connecter les agents publiques : préparer des réformes inclusives 210,982 € 
ASSOCIATION BULGARIAN SCHOOL OF POLITICS*BSOP  
  Bulgaria 
        
CENTRE DES ETUDES MEDITERRANEENNESET INTERNATIONALES SOCIETE CIVILE*CEMI  
  Tunisia 
        
2013    IDENTIFICATION ET FORMULATION D'UN PROGRAMME D'APPUI AU SECTEUR DES 
MEDIAS ET SECTEUR DE LA CULTURE EN TUNISIE 200,240 € 
SOFRECO-SOCIETE FRANCAISE DE REALISATION D'ETUDES ET DE CONSEIL SA*  
  France 
        
2013    Défense de la liberté de l’information en Tunisie 200,000 € 
ASSOCIATION REPORTERS SANS FRONTIERES*RSF  
  France 
        
2013    Mobiliser la société civile tunisienne sur le suivi des relations UE-Tunisie, dans le cadre du dialogue 
structuré avec l'Union européenne 200,000 € 
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK*RESEAU EURO-MEDITERRAEEN DES DROITS DE L'HOMME  
  Denmark 
        
2013    Mission d'appui au renforcement de la planification régionale et la prospective pour l'éducation 154,932 € 




  Belgium 
        
2013    Evaluation du Programme d'Appui à l'Accord d'Association dans ses trois phases (P3A, P3A2, P3AT) 
151,150 € 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 
        
2013    Organisation des activités d'information et communication 2013-2014 130,000 € 
MASTER EVENTS SARL*  
  Tunisia 
        
2013    Assistance technique pour lélaboration d’une stratégie de développement et la formulation d’un projet de 
jumelage institutionnel pour le compte de l’Institut National de Météorologie 125,078 € 
PARTICIP GMBH CONSULTANTS FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND UMWELT*  
  Germany 
        
2013    Appui l'identification et à la formulation d’un programme de promotion de l'égalité entre les femmes 
et les hommes en Tunisie 113,873 €      [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
SOFRECO-SOCIETE FRANCAISE DE REALISATION D'ETUDES ET DE CONSEIL SA*  
  France 
        
2013    Mission d'assistance technique en communication 113,200 € 
ARS PROGETTI SPA - AMBIENTE RISORSE E SVILUPPO*  
  Italy 
        
2013    Assistance Technique pour le compte du Ministère du tourisme pour la formulation d'un projet de jumelage 
institutionnel d'appui à la mise en place d'un système de promotion de la qualité dans le secteur touristique 109,890 € 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 
        
2013    Organisation, Réalisation et Logistique de la Première Résidence Euromaghrébine de Photographes à Sfax, 
Tunisie 94,714 € 
LDK CONSULTANTS ENGINEERS & PLANNERS SA*  
  Greece 
        
2013    Mission d'appui au démarrage d'appui à la compétitivité des services (PACS) - volet santé 94,506 € 
AGENCE EUROPEENNE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET LA SANTE SCRL AEDES*  
  Belgium 
        
2013    Mission d'appui au démarrage du Programme PACS Tunisie - Composante TIC 87,880 € 
ASTEC GLOBAL CONSULTANCY LIMITED*  
  Ireland 
        
2013    Mission d'appui institutionnel à la préparation des appuis complémentaires du projet PAZD II Services de 
soins de première ligne en Tunisie 75,978 € 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 
        
2013    Assistance technique pour le compte du Ministère de l'industrie pour la formulation d’ un projet de jumelage 
institutionnel 73,095 € 
TRANSTEC SA*  
  Belgium 
        
2013    AT pour le compte du Ministère du Transport pour la formulation d’ un projet de jumelage institutionnel 
d’appui au renforcement des autorités maritimes et portuaires en Tunisie 65,320 € 
ALATEC INGENIEROS CONSULTORES Y ARQUITECTOS SA*  
  Spain 
        
2013    Journées du Cinéma Européen - JCE 2013 59,919 € 
SOCIETE CINEFILS SARL*  
  Tunisia 
        
2013    Mission d'assistance technique sur l'état des lieux et identification des besoins des opérateurs du secteur 
transport routier-logistique volet 3- PACS 20,000 € 
NATURAL PERSON ; PERSONNE PRIVÉE ; PRIVATPERSON - Art. 21(2) RAP  
  France 
        
2013    Création et Impression des livres d'art de la Première Rencontre Euromaghrébine d'Ecrivains 19,998 € 
NOVAPRINT SARL*  




        
2013    Expertise pour la rédaction de deux décrets relatifs au régime des concessions en appui à l'Unité de suivi des 
concessions 18,800 € 
XAVIER GHELBER*CABINET GHELBER  
  France 
        
2013    Manifestation d'ouverture des journées du cinéma européen 2013 17,242 € 
SINGAPORE TUNISIAN INVESTMENT COMPANY HOTEL THE RESIDENCE SA*STIC  
  Tunisia 
        
2013    Création et Impression des livres d'art de photographies et catalogues des expositions du Projet Sfax - 
Première Résidence Euromaghrébine de Photographes 15,650 € 
NOVAPRINT SARL*  
  Tunisia 
        
2013    Création, Edition et Impression Brochure de Coopération 2012 de l'UE en Tunisie 15,217 € 
ASK EVENT SUARL*ASK' EVENT  
  Tunisia 
        
2013    Etude de positionnement stratégique de l’infrastructure qualité tunisienne, son développement et son 
intégration dans l’espace Euro-Méditerranéen 12,300 € 
ACE INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANTS SL*  
  Spain 
        
2014 
 
2014    PAR III Engagement pour appui budgétaire 45,000,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    EU Electoral assistance to Tunisia 2014 1,025,273 € 
ELECTORAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL SERVICES LIMITED LBG*  
  United Kingdom 
        
2014    Valorisation des acquis de la recherche dans le domaine de l’eau 998,605 € 
INSTITUTION DE LA RECHERCHE ET DE L ENSEIGNEMENT SUPERIEUR AGRICOLES*IRESA  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    IESS, Initiatives d'Emploi en Economie Sociale et Solidaire en Tunisie 799,923 € 
CENTRE TUNISIEN POUR L'ENTREPRENARIAT SOCIAL*TUNISIAN CENTER FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP  
  Tunisia 
        
CHAMBRE REGIONALE DE L'ECONOMIE SOCIALE ET SOLIDAIRE PROVENCE-ALPES-COTE D'AZUR (CRESS PACA)*  
  France 
        
2014    Renforcement des capacités de l'UGTT pour l'institutionnalisation et l'opérationnalisation du Dialogue Social 
au service de la croissance et de l'emploi aux niveaux national et regional 799,810 € 
ULANDSSEKRETARIATET FORENING*THE LO/FTF COUNCIL  
  Denmark 
        
UNION GENERALE TUNISIENNE DU TRAVAIL*  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    Ma TerrE : Marketing Territorial pour l’ Emploi 706,572 € 
ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE POUR LE LEADERSHIP, L'AUTO-DEVELOPPEMENT ET LASOLIDARITE*  
  Tunisia 
        
COMITATO EUROPEO PER LA FORMAZIONEE L'AGRICOLTURA ONLUS ASSOCIAZIONE*EUROPEAN COMMITTEE 
FOR TRAINING AND AGRICULTURE  
  Italy 
        
2014    Partenariat tuniso-allemand pour la formation dans les techniques de soudure, de brasage et de test 619,585 € 
CENTRE TECHNIQUE DES INDUSTRIES MECANIQUES ET ELECTRIQUES*  
  Tunisia 
        
GSI - GESELLSCHAFT FUR SCHWEISSTECHNIK INTERNATIONAL MBH*GSI  
  Germany 
        
2014    Pour l'accès à l'emploi des personnes en situation de handicap en Tunisie 550,000 € 
AGENCE NATIONALE POUR L'EMPLOI ET LE TRAVAIL INDEPENDANT*  




        
ASSOCIATION FEDERATION HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL*HI HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION  
  France 
        
2014    Les Produits de terroir au service de l’emploi et du développement local 470,908 € 
ASAMBLEA DE COOPERACION POR LA PAZASOCIACION*ACPP  
  Spain 
        
ASSOCIATION DE DEVELOPPEMENT ET DECOMMUNICATION SOCIALE*  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    Création d'emplois dans le Sud tunisien au service de l'agriculture et de l'artisanat : économie solidaire et 
professionnalisation des métiers agricoles 392,686 € 
CENTRE INTERNATIONAL DES HAUTES ETUDES AGRONOMIQUES MEDITERRANEENNES INSTITUT 
AGRONOMIQUE MEDITERRANEEN DE MONTPELLIER CIHEAM IAMM  
  France 
        
SOCIETE MUTUELLE DE SERVICES AGRICOLES AL INTILAKA*  
  Tunisia 
        
 
2014    Mobilisation d'assistance technique en appui à la mise en oeuvre de la réforme de Gestion Budgétaire par 
Objectifs 298,600 € 
AIDE A LA DECISION ECONOMIQUE SA*  
  Belgium 
        
2014    MISSION D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE ET DE FORMATION AU PROFIT DU MINISTERE DE LA 
SANTE DANS LE CADRE DU PROJET D'APPUI À LA RÉDUCTION DES INÉGALITÉS SOCIALES 
264,690 € 
AGENCE EUROPEENNE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET LA SANTE SCRL AEDES*  
  Belgium 
        
2014    Identification et formulation d'un programme d'appui au développement régional et local en Tunisie 
243,030 € 
HTSPE LIMITED*  
  United Kingdom 
        
2014    JAMAITY.ORG 210,228 € 
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK*RESEAU EURO-MEDITERRAEEN DES DROITS DE L'HOMME  
  Denmark 
        
THE BRITISH COUNCIL ROYAL CHARTER*  
  United Kingdom 
        
2014    Mission de suivi du Programme d'appui aux politiques publiques de gestion des ressources en eau pour le 
développement rural et agricole PAPS-EAU 139,464 € 
PARTICIP GMBH CONSULTANTS FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND UMWELT*  
  Germany 
        
2014    Assistance technique pour le compte de ''Statistiques Tunisie'' pour l'élaboration d'une stratégie de 
développement des statistiques régionales en Tunisie 128,722 € 
AIDE A LA DECISION ECONOMIQUE SA*  
  Belgium 
        
2014    Formulation d'un programme d'appui au secteur privé tunisien 120,182 € 
APPLICATION EUROPEENNE DE TECHNOLOGIES ET DE SERVICES SARL*AETS  
  France 
        
2014    Assistance technique pour appuyer l'administration tunisienne dans la formulation de projets d'appui 
institutionnel au profit de la douane tunisienne 114,804 € 
BKP DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH & CONSULTING GMBH*  
  Germany 
        
2014    Identification d'un programme d'appui au secteur privé tunisien 92,856 € 
APPLICATION EUROPEENNE DE TECHNOLOGIES ET DE SERVICES SARL*AETS  
  France 
        
2014    Organisation logistique du deuxième Forum de la Presse Maghrébine-Hammamet 89,573 € 
LDK CONSULTANTS ENGINEERS & PLANNERS SA*  
  Greece 




2014    Assistance technique pour le compte du Ministère du Transport pour la formulation d’ un projet de jumelage 
institutionnel d’ appui au renforcement des institutions de l’ aviation civile en Tunisie 73,154 € 
TRANSPORT & INFRASTRUCTURE EXPERTISE GROUP -TIEG EZHZ*  
  Slovakia 
        
2014    Rencontre d'écrivains autour du thème ''Littérature et engagement'' 69,953 € 
CONCEPTION, ETUDES ET COOPERATION DE FORMATION SA*CECOFORMA  
  Belgium 
        
2014    Organisation des Journées du Cinéma européen 2014 67,800 € 
KANTAOUI FILMS*  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    ''Le Projet Sfax en Europe'' . Expositions en Belgique et Espagne des photos de la Première Résidence 
Euromaghrébine de Photographes 58,998 € 
PARTICIP GMBH CONSULTANTS FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND UMWELT*  
  Germany 
        
2014    Mission d'assistance technique et de formation au profit du Ministère de la santé et du Ministère du commerce 
dans le cadre du PACS- volet santé 55,836 € 
AGENCE EUROPEENNE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET LA SANTE SCRL AEDES*  
  Belgium 
        
2014    Assistance technique d'un expert juriste santé pour appuyer la révision du cadre institutionnel de l'Instance 
Nationale de l'Accréditation santé (INASanté). 20,000 € 
NATURAL PERSON ; PERSONNE PRIVÉE ; PRIVATPERSON - Art. 21(2) RAP  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    Conception et réalisation d'une lettre d'information bimestrielle et du rapport d'activité 2014 20,000 € 
ECOM SARL  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    création et impression de livres d'art –  2ème rencontre Euromaghrébine d'écrivains –  ''Littérature et 
engagement'' 20,000 € 
NOVAPRINT SARL*  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    Etude cartographie régionale des inégalités en Tunisie 15,000 € 
CCM CONSULTING GROUP INTERNATIONALNETWORK SARL*  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    Impression et diffussion d'une lettre d'information bimensuelle et du rapport d'activités 2014 15,000 € 
IMPRIMERIE FINZI SARL*  
  Tunisia 




2015    ENGAGEMENT SECONDAIRE POUR LE DÉCAISSEMENT DES MONTANTS D'APPUI 
BUDGÉTAIRE DU PROGRAMME PAR IV 53,000,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
        
2015    ENGAGEMENT SECONDAIRE POUR LE DÉCAISSEMENT DES MONTANTS D'APPUI 
BUDGÉTAIRE DU PROGRAMME PAR IV 46,500,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
        
2015    IDENTIFICATION ET FORMULATION D'UN PROJET DE SOUTIEN À LA MISE EN OEUVRE 
DU PLAN QUINQUENNAL, À LA RÉFORME DE L'ADMINISTRATION ET DES ENTREPRISES 
PUBLIQUES 270,644 € 
PARTICIP GMBH CONSULTANTS FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND UMWELT*  
  Germany 
        
2015    IDENTIFICATION ET FORMULATION D'UN PROGRAMME D'APPUI À L'ÉDUCATION, LA 
MOBILITÉ, LA RECHERCHE ET L'INNOVATION EN TUNISIE 179,108 € 
EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT TRUST  
  United Kingdom 




2015    IDENTIFICATION ET FORMULATION D'UN PROJET DE DÉVELOPPEMENT RÉGIONAL 
INTÉGRÉ EN TUNISIE 166,590 € 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA*  
  Belgium 
        
2015    ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE DE DÉMARRAGE POUR LE PROGRAMME DE PROMOTION 
DE L'ÉGALITÉ HOMME-FEMME EN TUNISIE 146,150 €   [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
DAI EUROPE LIMITED*  
  United Kingdom 
        
2015    2ÈME RENCONTRE EUROMAGHRÉBINE DE PHOTOGRAPHES ''LE PROJET KAIROUAN'' 
93,796 € 
LDK CONSULTANTS ENGINEERS & PLANNERS SA*  
  Greece 
        
2015    3ÈME RENCONTRE EUROMAGHRÉBINE D'ÉCRIVAINS AUTOUR DU THÈME ''LITTÉRATURE 
ET FRONTIÈRES'' 73,916 € 
LDK CONSULTANTS ENGINEERS & PLANNERS SA*  
  Greece 
        
2015    ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE À LA DÉFINITION DU CADRE UNIQUE D'APPUI UE-TUNISIE 2017-
2020 53,687 € 
INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING EXPERTISEGEIE*ICE  
  Belgium 
        
2015    MISSION PEFA 20,000 € 
SOBYFA CONSEIL*  
  Tunisia 
        
[ENPI] 
 
2015    AGISSONS ENSEMBLE POUR UN DÉVELOPPEMENT LOCAL CONCERTÉ DES TERRITOIRES 
À GAFSA, KASSERINE, ET SIDI BOUZID (ADEL ) 400,000 € 
ASSOCIATION BEDER POUR LA CITOYENNETE ET LE DEVELOPPEMENT  
  Tunisia 
        
ASSOCIATION CITOYENNETE A REGUEB  
  Tunisia 
        
2015    CONTRIBUER À RENDRE LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE ACTRICE DE LA GOUVERNANCE 
LOCALE EN MATIÈRE DE GESTION DES RESSOURCES NATURELLES ET DANS LE RESPECT 
DES DROITS HUMAINS 375,737 €       [CODE TJ  
TN] 
ANA YAKEDH - IWATCH  
  Tunisia 
        
AVOCATS SANS FRONTIERES - BELGIQUEASBL*ASF ADVOCATEN ZONDER GRENZEN ANWALTE OHNE GRENZEN  
  Belgium 
        
2015    RENFORCEMENT DU TIERS SECTEUR LOCAL 361,348 € 
CLUB MOHAMED ALI DE LA CULTURE OUVRIERE  
  Tunisia 
        
FONDAZIONE GIACOMO BRODOLINI*  
  Italy 
        
2015    PROJET POUR SOUTENIR L'IMPLÉMENTATION DE LA GOUVERNANCE LOCALE DANS LE 
GRAND TUNIS / LA GOUVERNANCE LOCALE AUX JEUNES 353,103 € 
INSTITUT ARABE DE LA GOUVERNANCE*ARAB GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE  
  Tunisia 
        
LA FONDATION JASMIN POUR LA RECHERCHE ET LA COMMUNICATION*JASMINE FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH 
AND COMMUNICATION  
  Tunisia 
   
2015    KOLNA KESRA 348,941 € 
CENTRE IBEN KHALDOUN POUR LES FORUMS INTELLECTUELS LITTERAIRES ET SCIENTIFIQUES*  
  Tunisia 
        




  Tunisia 
        
2015    RENFORCEMENT DES AUTORITÉS LOCALES ET DES OSC POUR L’ IMPLÉMENTATION DES 
POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES MUNICIPALES 320,943 € 
ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE POUR LE LEADERSHIP, L'AUTO-DEVELOPPEMENT ET LASOLIDARITE*  
  Tunisia 
        
COMITATO EUROPEO PER LA FORMAZIONEE L'AGRICOLTURA ONLUS ASSOCIAZIONE*EUROPEAN COMMITTEE 
FOR TRAINING AND AGRICULTURE  
  Italy 
        
2015    APPUI AU MINISTÈRE DE LA CULTURE ET LA SAUVEGARDE DU PATRIMOINE POUR LA 
CONCRÉTISATION DACTIONS PRIORITAIRES DU PROGRAMME DE L’ANNÉE 2015 299,933 € 
PROMAN SA*  
  Luxembourg 
        
2015    MISSION D'AT EN APPUI À LA DÉFINITION D'UNE STRATÉGIE SERVICE ET APPUI À 
L'UMNS DU MINISTÈRE DU COMMERCE DANS LE CADRE DE LA MISE EN OUEVRE DU VOLET 1 
DU PACS (PROGRAMME D'APPUI À LA COMPÉTITIVITÉ DES SERVICES) 294,196 € 
TRANSTEC SA*  
  Belgium 
        
2015    MISSION D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE À L'UAP DU PROGRAMME D'APPUI À LA 
COMPÉTITIVITÉ DES SERVICES (PACS) 292,164 € 
APPLICATION EUROPEENNE DE TECHNOLOGIES ET DE SERVICES SARL*AETS  
  France 
        
2015    MISSION D'ASSITANCE TECHNIQUE EN FAVEUR DEL 'INAS SANTÉ DANS LE CADRE DU 
PAZD II 280,110 € 
AGENCE EUROPEENNE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET LA SANTE SCRL AEDES*  
  Belgium 
        
2015    ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR APPUYER LE DÉMARRAGE DES NÉGOCIATIONS EN VUE 
D’UN ACCORD DE LIBRE ECHANGE COMPLET ET APPROFONDI (ALECA) 267,076 € 
BKP DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH & CONSULTING GMBH*  
  Germany 
        
2015    ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR L'ÉLABORATION D’ UNE STRATÉGIE ET UN PLAN 
D'ACTION POUR LA RÉFORME DES CENTRES TECHNIQUES SECTORIELS EN TUNISIE 257,054 € 
APPLICATION EUROPEENNE DE TECHNOLOGIES ET DE SERVICES SARL*AETS  
  France 
        
2015    MISSION D'APPUI POUR LA CONSOLIDATION ET LA TRANSFORMATION DE 
L'ENVIRONNEMENT INSTITUTIONNEL ET LEGAL DES OSC EN TUNISIE 255,964 € 
PARTICIP GMBH CONSULTANTS FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND UMWELT*  
  Germany 
        
2015    RENFORCER LA PARTICIPATION POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DANS LE QUARTIER DE SIDI 
AMOR ABADA – KAIROUAN 192,667 € 
ASSOCIATION DE DEVELOPPEMENT LOCALET D'ENTRAIDE SOCIALE KAIROUAN (ADLESK)  
  Tunisia 
        
ASSOCIATION DE SAUVEGARDE DE LA MEDINA DE KAIROUAN  
  Tunisia 
        
2015    ACCOMPAGNEMENT DU PROGRAMME D’APPUI À LA COMPÉTITIVITÉ DU SECTEUR DES 
SERVICES (PACS) EN TUNISIE A LA CONCEPTION ET LA MISE EN OEUVRE D’ACTIVITÉS DE 
COMMUNICATION 177,696 € 
POHL CONSULTING & ASSOCIATES GMBH*  
  Germany 
        
2015    ÉVALUATION FINALE DU PROGRAMME D’APPUI À LA COMPÉTITIVITÉ DES ENTREPRISES 
ET À LA FACILITATION DE L’ACCÈS AU MARCHÉ (PCAM) 168,760 € 
BKP DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH & CONSULTING GMBH*  
  Germany 
        
2015    APPUI AU DÉVELOPPEMENT D'UNE MODÉLISATION MACRO-FISCALE 165,688 € 
AIDE A LA DECISION ECONOMIQUE SA*  
  Belgium 
        




ASSOCIATION CAPSA LA NOUVELLE*KAPSA EL JADIDA  
  Tunisia 
        
ASSOCIATION DES CITOYENS A GAFSA  
  Tunisia 
        
2015    EVALUATION FINALE DU PROJET D’ APPUI AU SYSTÈME RECHERCHE & INNOVATION 
(PASRI) 
132,142 € 
AECOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT EUROPE SL  
  Spain 
        
2015    MISE EN PLACE D'UN SYSTÈME DE MANAGEMENT DES ACTIVITÉS DES ASSOCIATIONS EN 
TUNISIE 115,200 € 
ASTEC GLOBAL CONSULTANCY LIMITED*  
  Ireland 
        
2015    MISSION DE SÉLÉCTION DES ÉTABLISSEMENTS DE SANTÉ PILOTES EN VUE DE LEUR 
PARTICIPATION AU PROCESSUS D'ACCRÉDITATION (PACS-VOLET SANTÉ) 109,980 € 
AGENCE EUROPEENNE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET LA SANTE SCRL AEDES*  
  Belgium 
        
2015    EVALAUTION FINALE DU PEE 100,496 € 
AECOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT EUROPE SL  
  Spain 
        
2015    MISSION D'AT POUR ASSURER LA VISIBILITÉ ET LA COMMUNICATION DANS LE CADRE DU 
PROJET PAZD II SANTÉ 98,492 € 
INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING EXPERTISEGEIE*ICE  
  Belgium 
        
2015    MISSION D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE EN APPUI AU CENTRE DE PROMOTION DES 
EXPORTATIONS (CEPEX) DANS LE CADRE DU PROJET D'APPUI À LA COMPÉTITIVITÉ DES 
SERVICES (PACS) 97,008 € 
APPLICATION EUROPEENNE DE TECHNOLOGIES ET DE SERVICES SARL*AETS  
  France 
        
2015    EVALUATION À MI-PARCOURS DU PROGRAMME D'APPUI AUX ZONES DÉFAVORISÉES 
PAZD 75,588 € 
POHL CONSULTING & ASSOCIATES GMBH*  
  Germany 
        
2015    MISSION D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE ET DE FORMATION AU PROFIT DU MINISTERE DE LA 
SANTE DANS LE CADRE DU PROJET D'APPUI À LA RÉDUCTION DES INÉGALITÉS SOCIALES 
33,770 € 
AGENCE EUROPEENNE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET LA SANTE SCRL AEDES*  
  Belgium 
        
2015    AUDIT DES DEVIS PROGRAMME DE 2014 ET 2015 DU PCAM 19,122 € 
ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA*ERNST ET YOUNG REVISEURS D ENTREPRISES  
  Belgium 
        
2015    AVENANT POUR MODIFICATION D'EXPERT 15,140 € 
KLYNVELD, PEAT, MARWICK, GOERDELER-BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA*  
  Belgium 
        
2016 
 
2016    DÉCAISSEMENT DES TRANCHES D'APPUI BUDGÉTAIRE - PROGRAMME PAR V 49,000,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
        
2016    DÉCAISSEMENT DES TRANCHES D'APPUI BUDGÉTAIRE - PROGRAMME CAP2D 31,000,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
        
2016    DÉCAISSEMENT DES TRANCHES D'APPUI BUDGÉTAIRE - PROGRAMME PAR V 17,000,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 




2016    DÉCAISSEMENT DES TRANCHES D'APPUI BUDGÉTAIRE - PROGRAMME CAP2D 4,000,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
        
2016    ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE EN APPUI AU DÉMARRAGE DE L'INITIATIVE RÉGIONALE 
D'APPUI AU DÉVELOPPEMENT ÉCONOMIQUE DURABLE 290,750 € 
AMC ERNST & YOUNG SARL*AMC E&Y  
  Tunisia 
290,750 €         
 
2016    ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR LE DÉMARRAGE DU PROGRAMME D'APPUI AUX MÉDIAS 
EN TUNISIE - ENI/2014/037-337 289,920 € 
INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING EXPERTISEGEIE*ICE  
  Belgium 
289,920 €         
 
2016    IDENTIFICATION ET FORMULATION D’UN PROGRAMME D’APPUI À LA RÉFORME FISCALE, 
L’INCLUSION FINANCIÈRE ET LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DE L’ÉCONOMIE SOCIALE ET SOLIDAIRE 
EN TUNISIE 252,862 € 
AIDE A LA DECISION ECONOMIQUE SA*  
  Belgium 
252,862 €         
 
2016    ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR LA RÉDACTION DE TERMES DE RÉFÉRENCE ET LA 
COORDINATION DE 4 REVUES FONCTIONNELLES 208,910 € 
PARTICIP GMBH CONSULTANTS FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND UMWELT*  
  Germany 
208,910 €         
 
2016    IDENTIFICATION ET FORMULATION DE LA TROISIÈME PHASE DU PROGRAMME 
D'APPUI À LA RÉFORME DE LA JUSTICE (PARJ 3) 203,304 €    [CODE JSR 
TN] 
PARTICIP GMBH CONSULTANTS FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND UMWELT*  
  Germany 
203,304 €         
 
2016    IDENTIFICATION ET FORMULATION D’UN PROGRAMME D'EFFICACITÉ ÉNERGÉTIQUE 
EN TUNISIE 194,934 € 
COWI BELGIUM SPRL*  
  Belgium 
194,934 €         
 
2016    IDENTIFICATION ET FORMULATION D'UN PROGRAMME D'ACCOMPAGNEMENT DE 
RÉFORMES POUR FACILITER LE COMMERCE ENTRE LA TUNISIE ET L’ UE DANS LES SECTEURS 
INDUSTRIELS ET AGRICOLES 
186,978 € 
BKP DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH & CONSULTING GMBH*  
  Germany 
186,978 €         
 
2016    IDENTIFICATION ET FORMULATION D'UN PROGRAMME D'APPUI À LA SANTÉ EN TUNISIE 
186,032 € 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 
186,032 €         
 
2016    EVALUATION À MI-PARCOURS DU PARJ ET DU DÉMARRAGE DU PARJ II 
173,324 € 
PARTICIP GMBH CONSULTANTS FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND UMWELT*  
  Germany 
173,324 €         
 
2016    MISSION D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE AU DÉMARRAGE DU PROGRAMME D'APPUI À LA 
RÉFORME ET MODERNISATION DU SECTEUR DE LA SÉCURITÉ DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
TUNISIENNE 
163,782 €         [CODE SSR TN] 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA*  
  Belgium 





2016    ORGANISATION DES JOURNÉES DE L'EUROPE À L'OCCASION DU 40ÈME ANNIVERSAIRE 
DE LA COOPÉRATION UE-TUNISIE 
118,123 € 
ITALTREND C&T SRL  
  Italy 
118,123 €         
 
2016    APPUI AU DÉVELOPPEMENT D'UNE MODÉLISATION MACRO-FISCALE 
82,844 € 
AIDE A LA DECISION ECONOMIQUE SA*  
  Belgium 
82,844 €         
2016    4ÈME RÉSIDENCE EUROMAGHRÉBINE D'ÉCRIVAINS AUTOUR DU THÈME ''LITTÉRATURE 
ET DIALOGUE'' 66,767 € 
CONCEPTION, ETUDES ET COOPERATION DE FORMATION  
  Belgium 
66,767 €         
 
2016    MISSION DE FORMULATION POUR LA MISE EN OEUVRE DE LA BUDGÉTISATION 
SENSIBLE AU GENRE EN TUNISIE 21,976 €     
 [CODE GENDER TN] 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 
21,976 €         
 
2016    ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE DE DÉMARRAGE POUR LE PROGRAMME DE PROMOTION 
DE L'ÉGALITÉ HOMME-FEMME EN TUNISIE 20,076 €   [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
DAI EUROPE LIMITED  
  United Kingdom 
20,076 €        
  
2016    ORGANISATION D'UNE EXPOSITION DE PHOTOS À L'OCCASION DE SFAX, CAPITALE DE 
LA CULTURE ARABE EN 2016 20,000 € 
ALICE EVENTS*  
  Tunisia 
20,000 €         
 
2016    MISSION DE VÉRIFICATION DU CONTRAT 2011/280-406 START AVEC IOM 19,822 € 
ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA*ERNST ET YOUNG REVISEURS D ENTREPRISES  
  Belgium 
19,822 €     
     
2016    IDENTIFICATION ET FORMULATION D'UN PROJET DE DÉVELOPPEMENT RÉGIONAL 
INTÉGRÉ EN TUNISIE 11,046 € 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA*  
  Belgium 




2016    EVALUATION DU PROGRAMME D'APPUI À LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE ET FORMULATION D'UN 
NOUVEAU PROGRAMME D'APPUI 217,830 € 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA*  
  Belgium 
217,830 €        
  
2016    EVALUATION DU PROGRAMME PEFESE EN TUNISIE 156,380 € 
PROMAN SA*  
  Luxembourg 
156,380 €         
 
2016    PROGRAMME D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR LES INDUSTRIELS DE LA RÉGION DE 
GABÈS EN MATIÈRE DE RESPONSABILITÉ SOCIALE DE L'ENTREPRISE (RSE) ET GESTION DE 
L'ENVIRONNEMENT 153,686 € 
AECOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT EUROPE SL  
  Spain 





2016    ETUDE D'IMPACT DE LA POLLUTION INDUSTRIELLE SUR LA SANTÉ HUMAINE À GABÈS 
93,248 € 
INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING EXPERTISEGEIE*ICE  
  Belgium 
93,248 €         
 
2016    ETUDE D'IMPACT DE LA POLLUTION INDUSTRIELLE SUR L'ÉCONOMIE DE LA RÉGION DE 
GABÈS 
78,542 € 
PARTICIP GMBH CONSULTANTS FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND UMWELT*  
  Germany 
78,542 €         
 
2016    MISSION D'AT POUR ASSURER LA VISIBILITÉ ET LA COMMUNICATION DANS LE CADRE DU 
PROJET PAZD II SANTÉ 30,438 € 
INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING EXPERTISEGEIE*ICE  
  Belgium 
30,438 € 
         
2016    MISSION D'ASSITANCE TECHNIQUE EN FAVEUR DEL 'INAS SANTÉ DANS LE CADRE DU 
PAZD II 
19,883 € 
AGENCE EUROPEENNE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET LA SANTE SCRL AEDES*  
  Belgium 
19,883 €         
 
2016    VÉRIFICATION DES DÉPENSES DU DP 4 (CONTRAT 2015/358-261) ET DU DP DE CLÔTURE 
(2016/373-115) DU PROJET EUROMED JEUNESSE IV 16,520 € 
MOORE STEPHENS LLP*  
  United Kingdom 
16,520 €         
 
2016    MISSION DE VÉRIFICATION UNOPS CONTRATS 2013/316-652 -2013/316-393 - 2014/351-146 
15,760 € 
MOORE STEPHENS LLP*  
  United Kingdom 
15,760 €        
  
2016    MISSION DE VÉRIFICATION D'UNE ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE –  CONTRAT 
2013/315-095 UNICEF 15,380 € 
MOORE STEPHENS LLP*  
  United Kingdom 
15,380 €         
 
2016    AUDIT DES DEVIS PROGRAMME DE 2014 ET 2015 DU PCAM 6,400 € 
ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA*ERNST ET YOUNG REVISEURS D ENTREPRISES  
  Belgium 





2017    DÉCAISSEMENT DES TRANCHES D'APPUI BUDGÉTAIRE - PROGRAMME MAPU 66,500,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
66,500,000 €   
       
2017    DÉCAISSEMENT DES TRANCHES D'APPUI BUDGÉTAIRE - PROGRAMME EMORI 38,000,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
38,000,000 €         
 
2017    DÉVELOPPEMENT ET CONSOLIDATION DU DISPOSITIF MOBIDOC COMME INSTRUMENT 
DE CRÉATION DE VALEUR AU TRAVERS DE LA MOBILITÉ DES CHERCHEURS VERS 
L’ENTREPRISE 2,000,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
2,000,000 €     




2017    DÉCAISSEMENT DES TRANCHES D'APPUI BUDGÉTAIRE - PROGRAMME MAPU 1,000,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
1,000,000 €       
   
2017    FLAG : FEMMES, LEADERSHIP, APPUI ET GESTION 826,546 €  [CODE GENDER 
TN]   
ASSOCIAZIONE PONTES RICERCHE E INTERVENTI  
  Italy 
        
CENTRE TUNISIEN POUR L'ENTREPRENARIAT SOCIAL*TUNISIAN CENTER FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP  
  Tunisia 
 
        
2017    CLEF: COSMÉTOLOGIE ET FEMMES, ÉMANCIPATION ET ÉGALITÉ DE LA FEMME RURALE 
À TRAVERS LA VALORISATION ET LA COMMERCIALISATION DES RESSOURCES DU TERRITOIRE 
653,903 € 
ASSOCIATION DE KAIROUAN POUR L'AUTO-DEVELOPPEMENT  
  Tunisia 
        
ASSOCIATION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT DURABLE D'ELGUETAR  
  Tunisia 
        
 
2017    PARFAIT: PARTICIPATION DES FEMMES POUR L'AVANCEMENT ET L'INNOVATION 
DE LA TUNISIE 500,000 €       [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
ASSOCIATION DES AGENCES DE LA DEMOCRATIE LOCALE*ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL DEMOCRACY AGENCIES 
AADL/ALDA  
  France 
        
EUROPEAN PARTNERSHIP FOR DEMOCRACY  
  Belgium 
        
 
2017    PAROLE AUX FEMMES 465,209 €     [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
ACTION ASSOCIATIVE  
  Tunisia 
        
FUNDACION CIDEAL DE COOPERACION E INVESTIGACION*  
  Spain 
        
2017    LES FEMMES, ACTRICES DE LA GOUVERNANCE LOCALE DANS LES GOUVERNORATS 
DU GRAND TUNIS, DE GAFSA ET DE JENDOUBA 354,342 €   [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
ASSOCIATION FEDERATION HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL*HI HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION  
  France 
        
CENTRE TUNISIEN MEDITERRANEEN  
  Tunisia 
        
2017    MISE EN OEUVRE D'ACTIONS DESTINÉES À ENCOURAGER L'INVESTISSEMENT 
INTERCOMMUNAL ET LEVER LES FREINS À LA CROISSANCE RÉGIONALE 292,974 € 
GLOBAL MANAGEMENT & SERVICES  
  Tunisia 
292,974 €         
 
2017    MISSION D'IDENTIFICATION ET DE FORMULATION POUR UN PROGRAMME D'APPUI À LA 
JEUNESSE EN TUNISIE 287,179 € 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA*  
  Belgium 
287,179 €         
 
2017    ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR L'ÉTUDE D'UN RAPPROCHEMENT DE L'ACQUIS DE 
L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EN MATIÈRE SANITAIRE ET PHYTOSANITAIRE DANS LE CADRE DES 
NÉGOCIATIONS D'UN ACCORD DE LIBRE ECHANGE COMPLET ET APPROFONDI (ALECA) 
272,706 € 
APPLICATION EUROPEENNE DE TECHNOLOGIES ET DE SERVICES SARL*AETS  
  France 




     
2017    IDENTIFICATION ET FORMULATION D'UN PROGRAMME D'APPUI À LA DIVERSIFICATION 
DU TOURISME EN TUNISIE 249,823 € 
BKP DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH & CONSULTING GMBH*  
  Germany 
249,823 €         
 
2017    CONDUITE D'UNE REVUE FONCTIONNELLE AUPRÈS DU MINISTÈRE DES FINANCES DANS 
LE CADRE DE LA RÉFORME DE L'ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE 248,028 € 
INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING EXPERTISEGEIE*ICE  
  Belgium 
248,028 €     
     
2017    REVUE FONCTIONNELLE AUPRÈS DU MINISTÈRE DE LA SANTÉ DANS LE CADRE DE LA 
RÉFORME DE L'ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE 245,878 € 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 
245,878 €         
 
2017    REVUE FONCTIONNELLE AUPRÈS DU MINISTÈRE DE L'ÉDUCATION DANS LE CADRE DE 
LA RÉFORME DE L'ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE 230,628 € 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA*  
  Belgium 
230,628 €        
  
2017    Le renforcement des capacités des interlocuteurs sociaux et de la société civile médiatique tunisienne - 
ASWATONA ATTOUNISSIA 220,000 € 
COMMUNITY MEDIA SOLUTIONS LTD LBG*CMS  
  United Kingdom 
        
UNION TUNISIEN DES MEDIAS ASSOCIATIFS  
  Tunisia 
        
2017    INFORMATION DE PROXIMITÉ ET CITOYENNETÉ ACTIVE DANS LES GOUVERNORATS DE 
TOZEUR ET KEBILI 220,000 € 
ALTENATIVE MEDIA*ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE DES MEDIAS ALTERNATIFS  
  Tunisia 
        
IREX EUROPE  
  France 
        
2017    PROMOUVOIR ET DÉFENDRE LA LIBERTÉ, L'INDÉPENDANCE ET LA DIVERSITÉ DES 
MÉDIAS EN TUNISIE 210,400 € 
ARTICLE 19 LBG*A19  
  United Kingdom 
        
DEMOCRACY REPORTING INTERNATIONAL GGMBH*DRI  
  Germany 
        
2017    BARR-AL-AMAN : INTERVENTION POUR CONSOLIDER LE RÔLE DES ACTEURS 
MÉDIATIQUES ET DES INTERLOCUTEURS SOCIAUX DANS LA CONSTRUCTION D'UN ESPACE 
PUBLIC TUNISIEN PLURALISTE ET INCLUSIF 201,000 € 
ASSOCIACIO NOVACT  
  Spain 
        
BARR AL AMAN POUR LA RECHERCHE ET LES MEDIAS  
  Tunisia 
 
2017    MÉDIA PIONNIERS : DÉVELOPPEMENT DES STRATÉGIES DE FINANCEMENT DURABLES 
POUR LES MÉDIAS DE PROXIMITÉ EN TUNISIE 175,205 € 
MICT-MEDIA IN COOPERATION AND TRANSITION GGMBH  
  Germany 
175,205 €         
 
2017    REVUE FONCTIONNELLE AUPRÈS DU MINISTÈRE DE L'ÉQUIPEMENT DE L'HABITAT ET 
DE L'AMÉNAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE DANS LE CADRE DE LA RÉFORME DE 
L'ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE 169,440 € 
PARTICIP GMBH CONSULTANTS FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND UMWELT*  
  Germany 





2017    MÉDIAS CITOYENS 167,428 € 
ALTENATIVE MEDIA*ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE DES MEDIAS ALTERNATIFS  
  Tunisia 
        
JAMAITY  
  Tunisia 
        
2017    DÉVELOPPEMENT ET MISE EN OEUVRE D’UN SYSTÈME DE SUIVI ET D’ÉVALUATION 
(S&E) POUR LE « PROGRAMME DE PROMOTION DE L’ÉGALITÉ ENTRE LES FEMMES ET LES 
HOMMES EN TUNISIE » 161,500 €       [CODE 
GENDER TN] 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 
161,500 €         
 
2017    APPUI AU DÉVELOPPEMENT D'UNE CELLULE DE PROSPECTIVE MACRO-FISCALE 149,191 € 
AIDE A LA DECISION ECONOMIQUE SA*  
  Belgium 
149,191 €      
    
2017    ANALYSES GENRE SECTORIELLES –TUNISIE 138,084 €  [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA*  
  Belgium 
138,084 €        
  
2017    MISSION D'APPUI AU MINISTÈRE DE LA FEMME, LA FAMILLE ET L'ENFANCE, AU 
CONSEIL DES PAIRS ET SES PARTENAIRES 137,715 €     [CODE 
GENDER TN] 
INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING EXPERTISEGEIE*ICE  
  Belgium 
137,715 €      
    
2017    « ACCOMPAGNEMENT DE LA DISCUSSION DU PROJET DU CODE DES COLLECTIVITÉS 
LOCALES ET L’APPUI À L’ÉLABORATION DE SES TEXTES D’APPLICATION» 109,000 € 
CENTRE DE DEVELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONAL POUR LA GOUVERNANCE LOCALE INNOVANTE  
  Tunisia 
109,000 €         
 
2017    CONCEPTION ET MISE EN OEUVRE DE LA COMMUNICATION ET VISIBILITÉ DU 
PROGRAMME D'APPUI AU SECTEUR DES MÉDIAS EN TUNISIE 92,000 € 
MEDIANET  
  Tunisia 
92,000 €      
    
2017    APPUI AU DÉMARRAGE DU PROGRAMME «INITIATIVE PILOTE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT 
LOCAL INTÉGRÉ (IPDLI)» 59,937 € 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA*  
  Belgium 
59,937 €         
 
2017    MISSION D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE AU DÉMARRAGE DU PROGRAMME D'APPUI À LA 
RÉFORME ET MODERNISATION DU SECTEUR DE LA SÉCURITÉ DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
TUNISIENNE 46,107 €        
 [CODE SSR TN] 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA*  
  Belgium 
46,107 €      
    
2017    ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR LA RÉDACTION DE TERMES DE RÉFÉRENCE ET LA 
COORDINATION DE 4 REVUES FONCTIONNELLES 20,780 € 
PARTICIP GMBH CONSULTANTS FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND UMWELT*  
  Germany 
20,780 €         
 
2017    CONCEPTION ET PRODUCTION DES SUPPORTS DE COMMUNICATION POUR APPUYER LES 
EFFORTS DE COMMUNICATION DE L’INSTANCE DE PROSPECTIVE ET D’ACCOMPAGNEMENT 
DU PROCESSUS DE DÉCENTRALISATION AUTOUR DU PROJET CODE DES COLLECTIVITÉS 
LOCALES 19,800 € 




  Tunisia 
19,800 €         
 
2017    AUDIT FINANCIER ET DE SYSTÈME DU DPD ET DPC 1 DU PROGRAMME EGALITÉ 
HOMME ET FEMME 18,525 €       
 [CODE GENDER TN] 
MOORE STEPHENS LLP*  
  United Kingdom 
18,525 €         
 
2017    MISSION DE FORMULATION POUR LA MISE EN OEUVRE DE LA BUDGÉTISATION 
SENSIBLE AU GENRE EN TUNISIE 10,704 €     
 [CODE GENDER TN] 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 




2018    CONTRAT PRO FORMA APPUI BUDGÉTAIRE DU PROGRAMME D’APPUI À LA RÉFORME 
FISCALE, L’INCLUSION FINANCIÈRE ET LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DE L’ÉCONOMIE SOCIALE ET 
SOLIDAIRE 62,600,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
62,600,000 €         
 
2018    CONTRAT DE PERFORMANCE DE RÉFORME SECTORIELLE - PARJ3 50,000,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
50,000,000 €        
  
2018    CONTRAT DE PERFORMANCE DE RÉFORME SECTORIELLE - OBJECTIF TRANSITION 
ENERGÉTIQUE. 46,400,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
46,400,000 €         
 
2018    CONTRAT DE PERFORMANCE DE RÉFORME SECTORIELLE - APPUI BUDGÉTAIRE AU 
PROGRAMME D'APPUI À LA COMPÉTITIVITÉ ET AUX EXPORTATIONS 42,750,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
42,750,000 €        
  
2018    CONTRAT DE PERFORMANCE DE RÉFORME SECTORIELLE - APPUI BUDGÉTAIRE AU 
PROGRAMME D'APPUI À LA COMPÉTITIVITÉ ET AUX EXPORTATIONS 5,000,000 € 
ALJUMHURIYAH AT TUNISIYAH*REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
  Tunisia 
5,000,000 €         
 
2018    APPUI À LA MISE EN PLACE DU CONTRÔLE DÉMOCRATIQUE SUR LE SECTEUR DE LA 
SÉCURITÉ EN TUNISIE. 1,108,596 €     [CODE SSR TN] 
CENTRE POUR LE CONTROLE DEMOCRATIQUE DES FORCES ARMEES GENEVE FONDATION*GENEVA CENTRE FOR 
THE DEMOCRATICCONTROLE OF ARMED FORCES DCAF  
  Switzerland 
1,108,596 €       
   
2018    RENFORCER L’IMPLICATION DE LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE DANS LA RÉFORME DE LA 
JUSTICE EN TUNISIE 1,000,000 €      [CODE JSR TN] 
ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE DE LUTTE CONTRE LES MALADIES SEXUELLES ET LE SIDA*ASSOCIATION DE LUTTE 
CONTRE LESM.S.T. ET SIDA  
  Tunisia 
        
AVOCATS SANS FRONTIERES - BELGIQUEASBL*ASF ADVOCATEN ZONDER GRENZEN ANWALTE OHNE GRENZEN  
  Belgium 
1,000,000 €         
 
2018    ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR LA COMMUNICATION DU PROGRAMME IRADA 618,062 € 
PLANET AE*PLANET PROVISION OF CONSULTANCY SERVICES  
  Greece 





2018    ETUDE D’ÉCART ET D’IMPACT POUR L’ÉLABORATION D’UN PLAN D’ACTION VISANT À 
FACILITER LA CONCLUSION D’UN ACCORD ‘ACAA’ ENTRE LA TUNISIE ET L’UE DANS LE CADRE 
DES NÉGOCIATIONS D'UN ACCORD DE LIBRE-ÉCHANGE COMPLET ET APPROFONDI (ALECA) 
551,305 € 
RAMBOLL DANMARK AS*  
  Denmark 
551,305 €         
 
2018    APPUI À LA PLATEFORME ASSOCIATIVE JAMAITY.ORG 500,000 € 
JAMAITY  
  Tunisia 
500,000 €         
 
2018    ASSISTANCE POUR LA CONDUITE DE LA DEUXIÈME VAGUE DES REVUES 
FONCTIONNELLES DES MINISTÈRES TUNISIENS 299,535 € 
ALTAIR ASESORES SL  
  Spain 
299,535 €         
 
2018    APPUI AU DÉVELOPPEMENT D'UN SYSTÈME DE PROBATION - MESURES ALTERNATIVES À 
LA PRISON EN TUNISIE 296,424 € 
ALTAIR ASESORES SL  
  Spain 
296,424 €         
 
2018    ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR LE RENFORCEMENT DE LA CONNAISSANCE DE L’UNION 
EUROPÉENNE AUPRÈS DES DÉCIDEURS TUNISIENS : CONCEPTION ET MISE EN OEUVRE D’UN 
SYSTÈME DE FORMATION SUR L'UE ET SES POLITIQUES 295,964 € 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 
295,964 €         
 
2018    ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR L'ÉLABORATION D'UNE STRATÉGIE DE L'INCLUSION 
SOCIALE ET DE LUTTE CONTRE LA PAUVRETÉ EN TUNISIE 295,688 € 
AECOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT EUROPE SL  
  Spain 
295,688 €       
   
2018    APPUI OPÉRATIONNEL POUR L’UNITÉ DE GESTION PAR OBJECTIFS (UGPO) CHARGÉE DU 
PILOTAGE ET DE LA COORDINATION DES NÉGOCIATIONS DE L'ACCORD DE LIBRE-ECHANGE 
COMPLET ET APPROFONDI (ALECA) ENTRE LA TUNISIE ET L'UE. 295,384 € 
AECOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT EUROPE SL  
  Spain 
295,384 €         
 
2018    FORMULATION DE PROGRAMME ET ANALYSE D'ÉCONOMIE POLITIQUE ET SOUTIEN À 
L'IDENTIFICATION ET LA FORMULATION 2019 TUNISIE 287,130 € 
PARTICIP GMBH  
  Germany 
287,130 €         
 
2018    APPUI AU RAPPROCHEMENT DE LA RÉGLEMENTATION TUNISIENNE EN MATIÈRE 
D'AVIATION CIVILE À L'ACQUIS DE L'UE DANS LE CADRE DE LA MISE EN œUVRE DE L'ACCORD 
EURO-MÉDITERRANÉEN RELATIF AUX SERVICES (OPEN SKY) 279,220 € 
APPLICATION EUROPEENNE DE TECHNOLOGIES ET DE SERVICES  
  France 
279,220 €         
 
2018    APPUI POUR LE RENFORCEMENT DU SYSTÈME DE PROTECTION DES DONNÉES 
PERSONNELLES EN TUNISIE 271,530 € 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING  
  Belgium 
271,530 €     
     
2018    PRÉPARATION ET EXPÉRIMENTATION DE LA MISE EN OEUVRE DE LA 
BUDGÉTISATION SENSIBLE AU GENRE EN TUNISIE 240,520 €   
 [CODE GENDER TN] 
AECOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT EUROPE SL  




240,520 €         
 
2018    ETUDE DU CADRE RÉGLEMENTAIRE ET INSTITUTIONNEL TUNISIEN ET DE L'ACQUIS DE 
L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EN MATIÈRE DE CONCURRENCE ET D'AIDES D'ETAT DANS LE CADRE 
DES NÉGOCIATIONS D'UN ACCORD DE LIBRE-ÉCHANGE COMPLET ET APPROFONDI ''ALECA'' 
209,200 € 
APPLICATION EUROPEENNE DE TECHNOLOGIES ET DE SERVICES  
  France 
209,200 €        
  
2018    APPUI À LA MISE EN OEUVRE D'UN PLAN DE COMMUNICATION ET DE VISIBILITÉ 200,000 € 
SOCIETE WASABI  
  Tunisia 
200,000 €         
 
2018    ETUDE D'ÉCART ET D'IMPACT EN VUE D'UN RAPPROCHEMENT DU CADRE 
RÉGLEMENTAIRE TUNISIEN AVEC L'ACQUIS DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EN MATIÈRE DE 
SERVICES POSTAUX 199,720 € 
BKP DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH & CONSULTING GMBH*  
  Germany 
199,720 €         
 
2018    EVALUATION À MI-PARCOURS ET ÉVALUATION FINALE DU PROGRAMME D'APPUI AU 
SECTEUR DE LA CULTURE (PACT) 174,930 € 
PROMAN SA*  
  Luxembourg 
174,930 €         
 
2018    MISSION D'IDENTIFICATION ET DE FORMULATION D'UN PROGRAMME D'APPUI À LA 
PROTECTION SOCIALE EN TUNISIE 153,690 € 
CONSEIL SANTE  
  France 
153,690 €         
 
2018    ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR LA MISE EN OEUVRE DE LA RÉFORME DES CENTRES 
TECHNIQUES SECTORIELS EN TUNISIE 149,650 € 
AECOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT EUROPE SL  
  Spain 
149,650 €         
 
2018    ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE À L'INSTITUT NATIONALE DE LA STATISTIQUE POUR LE 
CHANGEMENT DE L'ANNÉE DE BASE DES COMPTES NATIONAUX TUNISIENS 149,300 € 
POHL CONSULTING & ASSOCIATES GMBH  
  Germany 
149,300 €        
  
2018    EVALUATION FINALE DU PROGRAMME D'APPUI AUX POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES DE 
GESTION DES RESSOURCES EN EAU POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT RURAL ET AGRICOLE (PAPS-
EAU) EN TUNISIE 138,840 € 
SOGEROM SA*  
  Luxembourg 
138,840 €         
 
2018    ETUDE D'ÉCART ET D'IMPACT EN VUE D'UN RAPPROCHEMENT DU CADRE 
RÉGLEMENTAIRE TUNISIEN VERS LES NORMES INTERNATIONALES ET DE L'UNION 
EUROPÉENNE EN MATIÈRE DE MARCHÉS PUBLICS 121,695 € 
COWI BELGIUM SPRL*  
  Belgium 
121,695 €      
    
2018    APPUI À LA MISE EN OEUVRE D'UN PLAN DE COMMUNICATION ET DE VISIBILITÉ 99,990 € 
SOCIETE WASABI  
  Tunisia 
99,990 €         
 
2018    ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR LA MISE EN PLACE D'UN SYSTÈME DE VEILLE JURIDIQUE 
AU PROFIT DES SERVICES DU CONSEILLER JURIDIQUE ET DE LÉGISLATION DU 
GOUVERNEMENT 94,500 € 
SWECO DANMARK AS  




94,500 €         
 
2018    ANALYSES GENRE SECTORIELLES –TUNISIE 68,986 €  [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING  
  Belgium 
 
68,986 €         
 
2018    MISSION D'APPUI À LA NÉGOCIATION D'UN NOUVEAU CONTRAT DE SERVICE POUR 
L'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE DE LONG TERME AU PROGRAMME D'APPUI À LA RÉFORME ET 
MODERNISATION DU SECTEUR DE LA SÉCURITÉ EN TUNISIE 55,600 € [CODE SSR TN] 
ALTAIR ASESORES SL  
  Spain 
55,600 €         
 
2018    « ACCOMPAGNEMENT DE LA DISCUSSION DU PROJET DU CODE DES COLLECTIVITÉS 
LOCALES ET L’APPUI À L’ÉLABORATION DE SES TEXTES D’APPLICATION» 50,908 € 
CENTRE DE DEVELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONAL POUR LA GOUVERNANCE LOCALE INNOVANTE  
  Tunisia 
50,908 €      
    
2018    IDENTIFICATION ET FORMULATION D'UN PROGRAMME D'APPUI À LA DIVERSIFICATION 
DU TOURISME EN TUNISIE 44,230 € 
BKP DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH & CONSULTING GMBH*  
  Germany 
44,230 €       
   
2018    EVALUATION À MI-PARCOURS DU PROGRAMME D'ACTIONS PILOTES DANS LE CADRE DE 
L'INITIATIVE EUROPÉENNE POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT AGRICOLE ET RURAL ENPARD EN 
TUNISIE 39,000 € 
ACK INTERNATIONAL  
  France 
39,000 €         
 
2018    DÉVELOPPEMENT ET MISE EN OEUVRE D’UN SYSTÈME DE SUIVI ET D’ÉVALUATION 
(S&E) POUR LE « PROGRAMME DE PROMOTION DE L’ÉGALITÉ ENTRE LES FEMMES ET LES 
HOMMES EN TUNISIE »       [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
28,500 € 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 
28,500 €         
 
2018    APPUI AU DÉMARRAGE DU PROGRAMME «INITIATIVE PILOTE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT 
LOCAL INTÉGRÉ (IPDLI)» 27,720 € 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING  
  Belgium 
27,720 €         
 
2018    APPUI POUR L’ÉLABORATION DE LA NOTE, LES TERMES DE RÉFÉRENCE (TDR) ET LE 
DOSSIER D’APPEL D’OFFRES POUR L'ÉLABORATION DU SCHÉMA NATIONAL DE 
L'AMÉNAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE 
19,000 € 
FASTLANE CONSULTING AND RESEARCH  
  Tunisia 
19,000 €         
 
2018    ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR LA RÉDACTION DE TERMES DE RÉFÉRENCE ET LA 
COORDINATION DE 4 REVUES FONCTIONNELLES 12,900 € 
PARTICIP GMBH  
  Germany 
12,900 €     
     
2018    MISSION D'IDENTIFICATION ET DE FORMULATION POUR UN PROGRAMME D'APPUI À LA 
JEUNESSE EN TUNISIE 10,298 € 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING  
  Belgium 





ENI/ENPI Ukraine  
2014 
 
2014    State Building Contract for Ukraine (AAP 2013) 
55,000,000 € 
UKRAINA*UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    State Building Contract for Ukraine (AAP 2013) 
55,000,000 € 
UKRAINA*UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Continued Support to the implementation of Ukraine`s Energy Strategy 
45,000,000 € 
UKRAINA*UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    State Building Contract for Ukraine (AAP 2013) 
13,000,000 € 
UKRAINA*UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    ''Supply of Mobility and Surveillance equipment for the State Border Guards Service Ukraine'' Lot 1 and 2 
Cars+ Joint Border Patrolling on the Green and Blue Border between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine 
(STRONGBOR) Lot 1 Cars 
4,830,322 € 
MORIS SLOVAKIA SRO*  
  Slovakia 
        
2014    Improvement of food safety control system in Ukraine 
3,591,550 € 
GRONTMIJ AS*GMDK CARL BRO GROUP ANDERSKOUV & THOMSEN AXEL NIELSEN JOHS JORGENSEN ACOUSTICA 
SKANDINAVISK LYDTEKNIK MICRO CONSULT DANEDUC  
  Denmark 
        
2014    Promoting Cohesion and Social Well-being of Families and Children displaced to Kyiv oblast 
1,971,137 € 
CHILDREN'S AND FAMILY SERVICE BODYOF THE KYIV REGIONAL STATE AMINISTRATION*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Support to the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine in Strengthening of Safety Standards of Commercial 
Road Transport 
1,550,000 € 
RZECZPOSPOLITA POLSKA*REPUBLIQUE DEPOLOGNE REPUBLIC OF POLAND  
  Poland 
        
2014    Complementary Measures to the Sector Policy Support Programme ''Promoting mutual trade by removing 
technical barriers to trade between Ukraine and the European Union'' 
1,495,050 € 
EUROPEAN PROFILES ANONYMI ETAIREIAMELETON KAI SYMVOULON EPICHEIRISEON*EUROPEAN PROFILES AE  
  Greece 
        
2014    Strengthening the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Ukraine 
1,468,005 € 
FUNDACION INTERNACIONAL Y PARA IBEROAMERICA DE ADMINISTRACION Y POLITICAS 
PUBLICAS*ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICIES  
  Spain 
        
2014    Recovery of amelioration network to boost economic growth in rural ares of Volyn region 1,171,859 € 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION DEPARTMENT OF THE OBLAST STATE 
ADMINISTRATION*DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AD  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Consolidation of Justice Sector Policy Development in Ukraine 1,000,000 € [CODE JSR UA] 
CONSEIL DE L' EUROPE*COUNCIL OF EUROPE  
  France 
        





CENTER FOR SUPPORT OF CIVIC AND CULTURAL INITIATIVES TAMARISK*  
  Ukraine 
        
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION CHARITABLEFOUNDATION CENTER FOR CIVIC INITIATIVES*  
  Ukraine 
        
...and 6 other recipients 
2014    Complementary support to the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine for the sector budget 
support implementation 
982,700 € 
EPTISA SERVICIOS DE INGENIERIA SL*  
  Spain 
        
2014    Support to the Implementation of the Transport Strategy of Ukraine 
935,200 € 
CORPORATE SOLUTIONS CONSULTING LIMITED*CSCL  
  United Kingdom 
        
2014    Improving Vocational Training System according to the needs of the Volyn sub-regional economy 
846,114 € 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF THE RIVNE REGIONAL STATE ADMINISTRATION*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    LOT 3 AND LOT 2 - SUPPLY OF SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT FOR THE STATE BORDER 
GUARDS SERVICE UKRAINE 
840,794 € 
DAT-CON DRUZBA ZA STORITVE PROIZVODNJO SERVIS IN TRGOVINO DOO  
  Slovenia 
        
2014    Hromadske Network 
815,552 € 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION PUBLIC TELEVISION*HROMADSKE.TV  
  Ukraine 
        
PUBLIC ORGANISATION PUBLIC RADIO* HROMADSKE  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Reducing the energy consumption and CO2 emissions in the sector of residential buildings in the city of 
Dolyna 
772,579 € 
COMMUNAL ENTERPRISE ADMINISTRATIONOF MUNICIPAL PROPERTY OF DOLYNA CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
DOLYNA CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Slavutich SEAP pilot - retrofit of two municipal budget-funded facilities 
721,937 € 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF SLAVUTYCH CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF SLAVUTYCH CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
...and 1 other recipients 
 
2014    Support economy of Zakarpatska oblast through its tourism capacity development and promotion 
712,443 € 
ZAKARPATTYA OBLAST COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Municipal Partnerships for Energy Efficiency in Sambir and Zhovkva, Ukraine 
699,789 € 
EAST EUROPE FOUNDATION INTERNATIONAL CHARITABLE ORGANISATION*EEF  
  Ukraine 
        
SAMBIR CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        




2014    Implementation of the first phase of The Action on the sanitation of the municipal boiler and the area heated 
with it 
688,000 € 
ZHOVKVA TOWN COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Support to Local Self-Government Reform in Ukraine 
662,299 € 
BUKOVINA CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION*BCDR  
  Ukraine 
        
CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE*  
  Ukraine 
        
...and 3 other recipients 
2014    Formation of the Modern Management Model for Regional Labour Market Development in Khmelnytskyi 
region 
651,304 € 
SOCIAL PROTECTION DEPARTMENT OF KHMELNYTSKYI REGIONAL STATE ADMINISTRATION*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Ivano-Frankivsk region - land for tourism 
600,000 € 
UKRAINA*UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Creation of the Regional Training and Practical Center for Development of Multifunctional Cooperatives 
491,925 € 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF CHERKASY REGIONAL STATE ADMINISTRATION*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    ''Development of possibilities of the cooperative for protection of legal and economic interests of private 
peasant farms as well as broadening of dairy product assortment to meet the demands of the social sphere of 
Tomashpil district'' 
426,793 € 
TOMASHPIL DISTRICT COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Enhancement of Energy Performance of Educational Institutions Buildings in Konotop 
400,000 € 
KONOTOP CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Developmentof agricultural activiites in Manevichi district of Volyn Region and in Volodymyrets Distreict of 
Rivne region by supporting regional programms of soil amendment and outreach activities among population (Pilot 
project) 
376,424 € 
MANEVYCHI DISTRICT COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
014    Tourism as a catalyst of rural economic development 
343,561 € 
ODESSA REGIONAL AGENCY FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Supporting internally displaced persons with diabetes and chronic kidney disease in Mykolayiv region. 
338,985 € 
MYKOLAYIV REGIONAL HOSPITAL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Establishment of Custody Centres and Temporary Holding Facilities for Irregular Migrants in Ukraine, Lot 1 
319,569 € 
EL-MAK ELEKTRIK MAKINE SANAYI VE TICARET LIMITED SIRKETI* EL MAK ELECTRIC MACHINERY IND AND 
TRADE LTD COEL MAK ELEKTRIKMAINA  
  Turkey 
        
2014    EU advisory support to the Government Office for European Integration and building up an effective 
coordination mechanism for the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement implementation 
284,480 € 
INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING EXPERTISEGEIE*ICE  




        
2014    EU advisory support to Ukraine in reforming civil service and administrative legal framework 
273,230 € 
INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING EXPERTISEGEIE*ICE  
  Belgium 
        
2014    Trousim - the guarantee of dynamic social and economic development of rural communities 
259,546 € 
VINNYTSIA DISTRICT COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Provision and establishment of accomodation facilities for the internally displaced persons on the territory of 
Zhytomyr Oblast 
254,200 € 
ZHYTOMYR OBLAST STATE ADMINISTRATION*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Improving of Life Conditions and Social Adaptation of Internally Displaced Persons in Chernivtsi Region 
251,860 € 
CHERNIVTSI REGIONAL COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Technical assistance in support to the preparation of the program ''Ukraine-Sustainable Private Sector 
Development''. 
226,804 € 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA*  
  Belgium 
        
2014    Assistance to the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine in the process of development of the 
Emissions Reduction Plan for Ukraine 
219,326 € 
PARTICIP GMBH CONSULTANTS FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND UMWELT*  
  Germany 
 
2014    Development of cycling toursm in Lipovets district 
210,736 € 
LIPOVETS TOWN COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Rada za Europu 
206,400 € 
AGENCY FOR LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVESCITIZENS ASSOCIATION*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Development of green and eco-tourism as a systematic component of economic development in Berezne 
region 
187,500 € 
BEREZNE DISTRICT COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Insufficient development of dairy farming and low efficiency of agricultural markets 
179,000 € 
PYATYKHATKY RAYON COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Evaluation of Budget Support Operations in Ukraine 
176,288 € 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA*  
  Belgium 
        
2014    Workshops and a study visit aimed at priority setting and monitoring of the EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement and relevant EU assistance 
123,860 € 
ITALTREND C&T SPA*  
  Italy 
        
2014    Dummy contract for the extension of the contract 147-509 ''Harmonisation of Competition and Public 
Procurement Systems with EU standards'' 
91,453 € 
DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FUR INTERNATIONALE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GIZ) GMBH*  




        
2014    Needs assessment for the Institutional Reform Plan in the area of implementation of the future EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement, including drafting project documentation 
75,398 € 
HTSPE LIMITED*  
  United Kingdom 
        
2014    Preparation of Twinning project and provision of assistance to National Commission for State Energy 
Regulation of Ukraine in the area of electricity market regulation 
48,266 € 
COWI AS*KAMPSAX GEODAN GEOPLUS KAMPSAX DATA GEOPLAN GEOMASTERS GEODATA AGRINOVA 
INTERNATIONAL KAMPSAX INTERNATIONAL KAMPSAX TEKNIK  
  Denmark 
        
2014    FINANCIAL AND SYSTEMS AUDIT OF GRANT CONTRACTS EIDHR/2012/298-145, 
EIDHR/2012/303-139, ENPI/2012/310-164 AND FINANCIAL AUDIT OF GRANT CONTRACT 
ENPI/2012/279-613 
20,608 € 
MOORE STEPHENS LLP*  
  United Kingdom 
        
2014    PR support for EC assistance and cooperation programmes in Ukraine 
20,000 € 
INTERNEWS UKRAINE*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Preparation of the ToRs for the TA project ''Support to Ukraine in approximation of the EU environmental 
acquis'' 
18,100 € 
VIESOJI ISTAIGA APLINKOS APSAUGOS POLITIKOS CENTRAS*CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY  
  Lithuania 




2015    KRAMATORSK MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC TRANSPORT POWER SUBSTATION MODERNIZATION 
961,835 € 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF KRAMATORSK CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    MODERNIZATION OF STREET LIGHTING IN TOWN OF MENA 
500,000 € 
MENA TOWN COUNCIL*MENA RAYON CHERNIHIV OBLAST  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    EVALUATION OF EU CIVIL SOCIETY SUPPORT IN UKRAINE 2007-2015 
164,672 € 
DAI EUROPE LIMITED*  
  United Kingdom 
        
2015    PRE-FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR PROJECTS TO BE POSSIBLY FUNDED UNDER THE EASTERN 
PARTNERSHIP INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT FLAGSHIP INITIATIVE 
92,800 € 
DAI EUROPE LIMITED*  
  United Kingdom 
        
2015    PREPARATION OF THE TOR FOR THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT ''ASSISTANCE TO 
THE UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT THE INFRASTRUCTURE CYCLE 
MANAGEMENT'' 
49,990 € 
ARS PROGETTI SPA - AMBIENTE RISORSE E SVILUPPO*  
  Italy 
        
2015    FINANCIAL AUDIT OF SERVICE CONTRACT 247776, WORKS CONTRACT 267879, SERVICE 
CONTRACT 299195 
37,694 € 
MOORE STEPHENS LLP*  
  United Kingdom 




2015    VERIFICATION MISSION OF THE CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS ENPI/2010/258-219; 
ENPI/2011/268-938; ENPI/2012/306-189 
37,006 € 
ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA*ERNST ET YOUNG REVISEURS D ENTREPRISES  
  Belgium 
        
2015    FINANCIAL AUDIT SERVICE CONTRACT N. 275-552 COMPLEMENTARY SUPPORT TO THE 
MINISTRY OF ECOLOGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 
24,996 € 
MOORE STEPHENS LLP*  
  United Kingdom 
        
2015    KRAMATORSK MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC TRANSPORT POWER SUBSTATION MODERNIZATION 
23,827 € 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF KRAMATORSK CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    VERIFICATION MISSION OF THE CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENT ENPI/2013/319615 IOM 
19,520 € 
ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA*ERNST ET YOUNG REVISEURS D ENTREPRISES  
  Belgium 
        
2015    FINANCIAL AND SYSTEMS AUDIT PROJECT TO SUPPORT JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM 
IN UKRAINE CONTRACT N. 2013/328-160 18,110 €    [CODE JSR UA] 
ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA*ERNST ET YOUNG REVISEURS D ENTREPRISES  
  Belgium 
        
2015    DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCEPT FOR A WEBSITE FOR THE REGISTRATION, TRACKING, 
ANALYSIS, REPORTING AND COORDINATION OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO 
THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT (U-AID DEVELOPMENT). 
18,075 € 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PRONET BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY  
  Ukraine 




2015    SECTOR POLICY SUPPORT PROGRAMME - SUPPORT TO UKRAINE'S REGIONAL POLICY 
50,000,000 € 
UKRAINA*UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    SUPPORT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU-UKRAINE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT 
7,704,680 € 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 
        
FCG SIPU INTERNATIONAL AB*  
  Sweden 
        
...and 1 other recipients 
2015    TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR'S PRIORITY AREAS 
3,360,000 € 
HULLA & CO HUMAN DYNAMICS KG*HULLABERNHARD GOTTFRIED THIERY  
  Austria 
        
2015    SUPPORT TO AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
2,994,500 € 
WYG INTERNATIONAL LIMITED*  
  United Kingdom 
        
2015    SUPPORT TO UKRAINE IN APPROXIMATION OF THE EU ENVIRONMENTAL 'ACQUIS' 
2,670,500 € 
ALL-UKRAINIAN ENVIRONMENTAL NGO MAMA-86 CIVIL ORGANISATION*UKRAINIAN NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL NGO FOR OUR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION  
  Ukraine 
        
ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTE,S.R.O*EI  
  Slovakia 




...and 1 other recipients 
2015    SUPPORT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT AND OF THE 
NATIONAL STRATEGY IN THE TRANSPORT SECTOR IN UKRAINE 
2,587,100 € 
DORNIER CONSULTING INTERNATIONAL  
  Germany 
        
2015    ''ENABLING LIVING CONDITIONS FOR VULNERABLE IDPS AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED 
LOCAL RESIDENTS IN THE CITY OF KRAMATORSK 
1,819,093 € 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF KRAMATORSK CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    SUPPORT TO STATE FISCAL SERVICE (SFS) OF UKRAINE IN REINFORCING IBM ELEMENTS 
IN THE AREA OF CUSTOMS MATTERS 
1,800,000 € 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND*REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D ALLEMAGNE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY  
  Germany 
        
2015    HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENCE OF INTERNAL DISPLACED PERSONS IN UKRAINE 
1,789,055 € 
CHARITABLE FOUNDATION CHARITABLE FOND STRENGTHENING OF FIRE AND TECHNOGENIC SAFETY  
  Ukraine 
        
CHARITABLE FOUNDATION STATION KHARKIV*CHARITI ORGANIZATION STATION KHARKIV CHARITY FUND  
  Ukraine 
        
...and 5 other recipients 
2015    SUPPORT THE NATIONAL ENERGY AND UTILITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION (NEURC) 
OF UKRAINE IN THE PROCESS OF ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORM 
1,600,000 € 
REGIONALNA ROZVOJOVA AGENTURA SENEC PEZINOK*  
  Slovakia 
        
2015    HOUSING PROVISION FOR IDPS IN DNIPROPETROVS’ K OBLAST. 
1,573,081 € 
CHARITY ORGANIZATION CHARITY FUND THE AID OF DNIPRO*NGO CHARITABLE FUND DOPOMOGA DNIPRA  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    CAPITAL REPAIR OF ROAD BRIDGE ACROSS SEVERSKIY DONETS RIVER 
1,429,978 € 
SEVERODONETSK CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    SUPPLY OF LABORATORY AND OTHER EQUIPMENT AND ANCILLARIES - LOT 2 
1,360,623 € 
BIOETHIC SRL*  
  Italy 
        
2015    ''BUILDING CAPACITY TO SUPPORT CONFLICT-AFFECTED IDPS AND LOCAL RESIDENTS IN 
MARIUPOL'' 
1,305,100 € 
MARIUPOLSKA SPILKA MOLODI*MARIUPOLYOUTH UNION  
  Ukraine 
        
VYKONAVCHYL KOMITET MARIUSPOLSKOI MISKOI RADY DONETSKOI OBLASTI*EXECUTTIVE COMMITTEE OF 
MARIUPOL CITY COUNCIL DONETSK OBLAST  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    TWINNING PROJECT ''INTRODUCTION OF A MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF WASTE OF 
ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT IN UKRAINE'' 
1,200,000 € 
UMWELTBUNDESAMT GMBH*UBA  
  Austria 
        
2015    DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF SUPPORT FOR IDPS AND LOCAL 
COMMUNITY OF BERDYANSK CITY. 
1,199,740 € 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF BERDYANSKCITY COUNCIL  
  Ukraine 




UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND*UNFPA FONDS DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LA POPULATION FNUAP  
  United States 
        
2015    SUPPORT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT AND OF THE 
NATIONAL STRATEGY IN THE TRANSPORT SECTOR IN UKRAINE 
1,151,600 € 
DORNIER CONSULTING INTERNATIONAL  
  Germany 
        
2015    POLTAVA REGION FOR INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 
1,036,204 € 
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION LIGHT OF HOPE  
  Ukraine 
        
POLTAVA CITY COUNCIL  
  Ukraine 
        
...and 1 other recipients 
2015    ASSISTANCE WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF SPS (SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY 
MEASURES) COMMITMENTS UNDER THE EU-UKRAINE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT 
1,000,000 € 
VALSTYBINE MAISTO IR VETERINARIJOSTARNYBA*STATE FOOD AND VETERINARY SERVICE  
  Lithuania 
        
2015    ACTIVATION OF THE TERRITORIAL COMMUNITY OF KHERSON TO OVERCOME THE 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE. 
723,747 € 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL POLICY OF KHERSON CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    HOME FOR HOMELESS 
721,060 € 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF SLAVYANSK CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
SLAVIANSK CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    IMPROVEMENT OF FOOD SAFETY CONTROL SYSTEM IN UKRAINE 
699,780 € 
SWECO DANMARK AS  
  Denmark 
        
2015    SUPPLY OF SOFTWARE FOR ANIMAL DISEASE SURVEILLANCE (LOT 3) AND FOR 
VETERINARY INSPECTION SUPPORT (LOT 4) 
693,500 € 
FOLGAT FTC LLC*  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    BUILDING THE FUTURE TOGETHER 
640,813 € 
KIROVOHRAD OBLAST COUNCIL*KIROVOHRAD REGIONAL COUNCIL  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    RENEWING OF FUNCTION EVACUATED FROM LUHANSK TO SEVERODONETSK 
VOLODYMYR DAHL EAST UKRAINIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
529,500 € 
VOLODYMYR DAHL EAST UKRAINIAN UNIVERSITY*  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    CREATION VERSATILE EDUCATIONAL AN INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX ''MOZAIKA'' 
357,566 € 
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION HLYNYANY DEVELOPMENT FUND*CO HDF  
  Ukraine 
        
HLYNIANY CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    EXPERT SUPPORT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UKRAINE EARLY RECOVERY 
PROJECT OF THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK: DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL MANAGEMENT 





INTERNATIONAL RENAISSANCE FOUNDATION  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    ADAPTATION CENTER FPR IN-MIGRANTS AND ENTERPRENEURS FROM ATO ZONE AND 
CRIMEA IN VINNYTSYA REGION 
322,629 € 
ASSOCIATION OF PRIVATE INVESTORS OF UKRAINE*  
  Ukraine 
        
DEPARTMENT OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF STATE OBLAST ADMINISTRATION*  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    NEW HOME, SCHOOL, INTEGRATION AND WORK OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTERNALLY 
DISPLACED PERSONS IN MYKOLAYIV. 
238,031 € 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF MYKOLAYIV CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ADAPTATION OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE CITY OF 
TERNOPIL. 
236,937 € 
TERNOPIL CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
 
2015    SUPPLY OF IT HARDWARE, STANDARD SOFTWARE AND ANCILLARIES - LOT 1 
208,055 € 
PREDUZECE ZA PROIZVODNJU TRGOVINUUSLUGE I INZENJERING PAN COMPUTERSDOO NOVI SAD  
  Serbia (Republic of) 
        
2015    TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETATION SERVICES 
200,000 € 
TRIS TRANSLATION BUREAU LLC  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    ASSESSMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN REGULATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT 
OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR, FROM PRODUCTS' REGISTRATION PROCEDURES 
APPLICABLE TO MEDICAL PRODUCTS (VACCINES, BLOOD PRODUCTS AND DRUGS) TO PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT BY RELEVANT ENTITIES 
132,922 € 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 
        
2015    WORKSHOPS AND A STUDY VISIT AIMED AT PRIORITY SETTING AND MONITORING OF 
THE EU-UKRAINE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT AND RELEVANT EU ASSISTANCE 
128,647 € 
ITALTREND C&T SPA*  
  Italy 
        
2015    CREATION VERSATILE EDUCATIONAL AN INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX ''MOZAIKA'' 
77,596 € 
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION HLYNYANY DEVELOPMENT FUND*CO HDF  
  Ukraine 
        
HLYNIANY CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    SECTOR NEEDS ASSESSMENT IN THE AREA OF UKRAINE'S MIGRATION POLICY, 
INCLUDING FORMULATION OF APPROPRIATE CAPACITY BUILDING SUPPORT 
56,168 € 
DAI EUROPE LIMITED*  
  United Kingdom 
        
2015    EVALUATION OF THE STATISTICS SECTOR IN UKRAINE AND EU ASSISTANCE PROVIDED 
SINCE 2010 
40,617 € 
EPRD- BIURO POLITYKI GOSPODARCZEJ IROZWOJU REGIONALNEGO SP(ZOO)*EPRD OFFICE FOR ECONOMIC 
POLICY AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
  Poland 




2015    EU ADVISORY SUPPORT TO UKRAINE IN REFORMING CIVIL SERVICE AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
26,768 € 
INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING EXPERTISEGEIE*ICE  
  Belgium 
        
2015    CONSULTANCY TO SET UP CUSTODY CENTRES AND TEMPORARY HOLDING FACILITIES 
FOR IRREGULAR MIGRANTS IN UKRAINE 
19,450 € 
OVE ARUP & PARTNERS INTERNATIONAL LTD*OAPIL  
  United Kingdom 
        
2015    SUPPORT TO UKRAINE'S REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
4,623 € 
DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FUR INTERNATIONALE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GIZ) GMBH*  
  Germany 
        
2015    FOLLOW UP AND ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE TECHNICAL REGULATION IN 
UKRAINE AND EXTERNAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CONDITIONS AND BENCHMARKS FOR THE EU-
FUNDED SECTOR POLICY SUPPORT PROGRAMME ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 
1,802 € 
APPLICATION EUROPEENNE DE TECHNOLOGIES ET DE SERVICES SARL*AETS  
  France 
        
2015    CONSOLIDATION OF JUSTICE SECTOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN UKRAINE 640 € 
         [CODE JSR UA] 
CONSEIL DE L' EUROPE*COUNCIL OF EUROPE  




2016    ''EU SUPPORT TO UKRAINE TO RE-LAUNCH THE ECONOMY (EU SURE) ''EU SURE 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT'' 
6,824,680 € 
GFA CONSULTING GROUP GMBH*  
  Germany 
6,824,680 €         
2016    REGIONS FOR REFORMS 
1,500,000 € 
EUROPEAN PRAVDA  
  Ukraine 
        
INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND POLICY CONSULTING CIVIC ORGANISATION*IER  
  Ukraine 
        
2016    ENHANCEMENT OF RPR COALITION 
965,000 € 
CENTRE FOR DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW  
  Ukraine 
        
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION CENTRE UA  
  Ukraine 
        
2016    DONBAS CIVIC BELT 
591,857 € 
CENTRE OF CIVIC ADVOCACY GROMADSKAORGANIZACIYA*CGA  
  Ukraine 
        
THE WEST UKRAINIAN RESOURCE CENTER  
  Ukraine 
        
...and 1 other recipients 
2016    BRIDGING GAPS FOR INCLUSIVE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 
543,320 € 
CENTRE FOR CULTURAL MANAGEMENT*  
  Ukraine 
        
CHARITY FOUNDATION POMOGAEM*BLAGODIYNY FOND POMOGAEM  
  Ukraine 




...and 2 other recipients 
2016    ENHANCING IMPACT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN MONITORING AND POLICY DIALOGUE ON 
ENERGY AND RELATED SECTORS’  REFORMS IN LINE WITH THE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT 
IMPLEMENTATION 
485,997 € 
ALL-UKRAINIAN PUBLIC ORGANIZATION CIVIL NETWORK OPORA*  
  Ukraine 
        
ASSOCIATION EUROPEAN-UKRAINIAN ENERGY AGENCY  
  Ukraine 
        
...and 4 other recipients 
 
2016    ''UKRAINIAN CIVIL SOCIETY FOR EUROPEAN STYLE WASTE MANAGEMENT'' 443,777 € 
ECOLOGIYA-PRAVO-LUDYNA INTERNATIONAL CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION*ENVIRONMENT-PEOPLE-LAW  
  Ukraine 
443,777 €        
  
2016    ENHANCED COMMUNICATION ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY 243,395 € 
GOPA COM.  
  Belgium 
243,395 €         
 
2016    EVALUATION OF THE POLICY STEPS TAKEN BY THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT 
TOWARDS THE DELIVERY OF SOCIAL SERVICES TO IDPS 83,686 € 
PROMAN SA*  
  Luxembourg 
83,686 €         
 
2016    A PARTNERSHIP FOR ALL: DEVELOPING STRATEGIES FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
COOPERATION BETWEEN ROMA COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN UKRAINE: PART 2 
63,466 € 
INTERNATIONAL CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION ROMA WOMEN FUND CHIRICLI*ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE 
DE BIENFAISANCE FONDS DE FEMMES DE ROM CHIRIKLI  
  Ukraine 
        
MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP EUROPA SZOLGALTATO NONPROFIT KFT*  
  Hungary 
        
2016    EVALUATION OF SBGS BUDGET SUPPORT 42,540 € 
ARS PROGETTI SPA - AMBIENTE RISORSE E SVILUPPO*  
  Italy 
42,540 €         
2016    A VERIFICATION MISSIN OF CONTR. AGREEMENT 2014/343-583 CBAIII, UNDP 26,884 € 
ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA*ERNST ET YOUNG REVISEURS D ENTREPRISES  
  Belgium 
26,884 €         
 
2016    FINANCIAL AUDIT OF SERVICE CONTRACT 357-205SUPPORT TO UKRAINE IN 
APPROXIMATION OF THE EU ENVIRONMENTAL 'ACQUIS' EPTISA 17,607 € 
MOORE STEPHENS LLP*  
  United Kingdom 
17,607 €       
   
2016    FINANCIAL AUDIT OF 316-284 TA IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR'S PRIORITY AREAS; HULLA 
AND CO 
17,102 € 
ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA*ERNST ET YOUNG REVISEURS D ENTREPRISES  
  Belgium 
17,102 €         
 
2016    FINANCIAL AUDIT SERVICE CONTRACT N. 275-552 COMPLEMENTARY SUPPORT TO THE 
MINISTRY OF ECOLOGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 3,740 € 
MOORE STEPHENS LLP*  
  United Kingdom 







2016    ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE IN THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ENERGY SECTOR 
REFORM IN LINE WITH UKRAINE`S INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS 2,229,950 € 
KANTOR SYMVOULOI EPICHEIRISEON AE*KANTOR MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS SA  
  Greece 
2,229,950 €         
2016    APPROXIMATION OF UKRAINIAN LEGISLATION WITH THE EU IN THE FIELD OF PLANT 
PROTECTION PRODUCTS AND PLANT HEALTH AND STRENGTHENING ASSOCIATED 
INSPECTION AND LABORATORY SERVICES 2,000,000 € 
LATVIJAS REPUBLIKA*REPUBLIQUE DE LETTONIE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA  
  Latvia 
2,000,000 €         
 
2016    STRENGTHENING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES OF THE ANTIMONOPOLY COMMITTEE OF 
UKRAINE TO CONDUCT MARKET STUDIES AND EFFECTIVELY ENFORCE COMPETITION LAW IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH EU STANDARDS. 1,800,000 € 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND*REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D ALLEMAGNE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY  
  Germany 
1,800,000 €         
 
2016    APPROXIMATION OF THE LEGISLATION OF UKRAINE IN THE FIELDS OF CERTIFICATION 
OF AERODROMES/ AIRPORTS AND AIRWORTHINESS WITH THE RELEVANT EU NORMS AND 
STANDARDS 
1,600,000 € 
FUNDACION INTERNACIONAL Y PARA IBEROAMERICA DE ADMINISTRACION Y POLITICAS 
PUBLICAS*ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICIES  
  Spain 
1,600,000 €         
 
2016    SUPPORT TO THE MINISTRY OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN ESTABLISHING CONDITIONS FOR 
APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN MODEL OF RAIL TRANSPORT SERVICE MARKET IN UKRAINE 
1,600,000 € 
FUNDACION INTERNACIONAL Y PARA IBEROAMERICA DE ADMINISTRACION Y POLITICAS 
PUBLICAS*ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICIES  
  Spain 
1,600,000 €         
 
2016    IMPROVING ACCESS TO WATER IN THE CONFLICT-AFFECTED COMMUNITY OF 
KREMINNA 
1,581,235 € 
KREMENSKOY CITY COUNCIL*KREMINSKY CITY COUNCIL  
  Ukraine 
1,581,235 €         
 
2016    TWINNING: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BEST EUROPEAN PRACTICES WITH THE AIM OF 
STRENGTHENING THE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF THE APPARATUS OF THE UKRAINIAN 
PARLIAMENT COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (OMBUDSPERSON) TO PROTECT HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
1,500,000 € 
LIETUVOS TEISES INSTITUTAS*LAW INSTITUTE  
  Lithuania 
1,500,000 €         
 
2016    TWG: STRENGTHENING THE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF UKRAINE IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
1,311,731 € 
 
         [CODE JSR UA] 
DEUTSCHE STIFTUNG FUR INTERNATIONALE RECHTLICHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT IRZ-STIFTUNG*  
  Germany 
1,311,731 €         
 
2016    RADA ZA EVROPU: CAPACITY-BUILDING IN SUPPORT OF THE VERKHOVNA RADA OF 
UKRAINE 
1,300,000 € 
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME*UNDP PROGRAMME DES NATIONS UNIESPOUR LE 
DEVELOPPEMENT PNUD  
  United States 




2016    SUPPORT TO THE STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE IN FURTHER 
DEVELOPMENT IBM APPROACHES FOR TRAVEL DOCUMENT VERIFICATION AND STOLEN 
MOTOR VEHICLES DETECTION 
1,300,000 € 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND*REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D ALLEMAGNE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY  
  Germany 
1,300,000 €         
 
2016    SUPPORT TO IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF MULTIMODAL DANGEROUS GOODS 
TRANSPORT IN UKRAINE 
1,200,000 € 
FUNDACION INTERNACIONAL Y PARA IBEROAMERICA DE ADMINISTRACION Y POLITICAS 
PUBLICAS*ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICIES  
  Spain 
1,200,000 €         
2016    HARMONISATION OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SYSTEM IN UKRAINE WITH EU STANDARDS 
1,000,000 € 
CROWN AGENTS LIMITED  
  United Kingdom 
1,000,000 €         
2016    IMPROVEMENT OF FOOD SAFETY CONTROL SYSTEM IN UKRAINE 
1,000,000 € 
SWECO DANMARK AS  
  Denmark 
1,000,000 €         
2016    SUPPORT TO UKRAINE'S REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
870,170 € 
DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FUR INTERNATIONALE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GIZ) GMBH*  
  Germany 
870,170 €         
2016    SUPPORTING DECENTRALISATION IN UKRAINE 
600,000 € 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT*OECD ORGANISATION DE COOPERATION 
ET DE DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUES OCDE  
  France 
600,000 €         
2016    FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE PARTICIPATION OF UKRAINE IN THE EU PROGRAMME 
HORIZON 2020, PHASE 1 
500,000 € 
UKRAINA*UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
500,000 €         
2016    FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE PARTICIPATION OF UKRAINE IN THE EU PROGRAMME 
HORIZON 2020, PHASE 1 
500,000 € 
UKRAINA*UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
500,000 €         
2016    TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE 
OF UKRAINE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW LEGISLATION ON TECHNICAL REGULATIONS, 
CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT, METROLOGY AND STANDARDS 
299,920 € 
BKP DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH & CONSULTING GMBH*  
  Germany 
299,920 €         
2016    ENERGY EFFICIENCY SUPPORT MECHANISM IN UKRAINE 
299,000 € 
MCKINSEY AND COMPANY UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
299,000 €         
2016    ADVISORY SUPPORT TO UKRAINE'S PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM 
IMPLEMENTATION 
257,780 € 
INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING EXPERTISEGEIE*ICE  
  Belgium 
257,780 €         
 
 






GOPA COM.  
  Belgium 
246,214 €         
2016    EVALUATION OF THE SECTOR POLICY SUPPORT PROGRAMME ''PROMOTING MUTUAL 
TRADE BY REMOVING TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE BETWEEN UKRAINE AND THE 
EUROPEAN UNION'' 
238,208 € 
DAI EUROPE LIMITED  
  United Kingdom 
238,208 €         
2016    STUDY OF EU BILATERAL ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE POST MAIDAN 
136,070 € 
IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA*  
  Belgium 
136,070 €         
2016    DEVELOPMENT OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR A PLANNED TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE PROJECT ON ''SUPPORT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 
SYSTEM IN UKRAINE”  
99,836 € 
BKP DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH & CONSULTING GMBH*  
  Germany 
99,836 €         
2016    SUPPORT THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND THE STATE FISCAL SERVICE OF UKRAINE TO 
FURTHER DEVELOP A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK ON TAX REFORM 
93,270 € 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 
93,270 €         
 
2016    RULE OF LAW IN UKRAINE–  POLICY AND BUDGETARY ANALYSIS IN THE AREA OF 
POLICE/LAW-ENFORCEMENT REFORM 83,357 €    [CODE SSR UA] 
DAI EUROPE LIMITED  
  United Kingdom 
83,357 €         
 
2016    COMPLEMENTARY CONTRACT (ADDENDUM 1 TO CONTRACT 2014/348-126) 
65,000 € 
INTERNEWS UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
65,000 €         
 
2016    'UPDATE OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR WEB-PORTAL AND THE 
MODERNISATION OF THE IT SYSTEM OF THE STATE STATISTICS SERVICE OF UKRAINE' 53,062 € 
DANISH MANAGEMENT AS*  
  Denmark 





2017    SUPPORT TO COMPREHENSIVE REFORM OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN UKRAINE 
(BUDGET SUPPORT COMPONENT) 
56,500,000 € 
UKRAINA*UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
56,500,000 €         
2017    SUPPORT TO COMPREHENSIVE REFORM OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN UKRAINE 
(BUDGET SUPPORT COMPONENT) 
33,500,000 € 
UKRAINA*UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
33,500,000 €         
2017    SUPPORT TO THE PARTICIPATION OF UKRAINE IN THE EU PROGRAMME HORIZON 2020 
FOR THE PERIOD 2016 (SECOND HALF YEAR) - 2018 
7,000,000 € 
UKRAINA*UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 




2017    SUPPORT TO THE NATIONAL PUBLIC BROADCASTER OF UKRAINE 
5,000,000 € 
BBC MEDIA ACTION LBG*BBC MA  
  United Kingdom 
        
DEUTSCHE WELLE*DW  
  Germany 
        
...and 1 other recipients 
2017    SUPPORTING TRANSPARENT LAND GOVERNANCE IN UKRAINE 
3,000,000 € 
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT  
  United States 
3,000,000 €         




  France 
2,999,000 €         
2017    STRENGTHENING THE REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF THE NON-BANK FINANCIAL 
MARKET 
2,828,000 € 
AFC AGRICULTURE AND FINANCE CONSULTANTS GMBH  
  Germany 
        
BE BERLIN ECONOMICS GMBH  
  Germany 
        
...and 1 other recipients 
2017    ASSISTANCE TO THE UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT THE 
INFRASTRUCTURE CYCLE MANAGEMENT 
2,325,000 € 
CORPORATE SOLUTIONS CONSULTING LIMITED*CSCL  
  United Kingdom 
        
SYSTRA SA*  
  France 
        
2017    TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT IN UKRAINE 
1,663,400 € 
FCG SWEDISH DEVELOPMENT AB  
  Sweden 
1,663,400 €         
2017    IMPROVEMENT OF FOOD SAFETY CONTROL SYSTEM IN UKRAINE 
1,300,000 € 
SWECO DANMARK AS  
  Denmark 
1,300,000 €         
 
 
2017    TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR'S PRIORITY AREAS 
1,000,000 € 
HULLA & CO HUMAN DYNAMICS KG*HULLABERNHARD GOTTFRIED THIERY  
  Austria 
1,000,000 €         
2017    CONVERGENCE OF CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS BASED ON THE ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN 
THE STATE AVIATION ADMINISTRATION OF UKRAINE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON 
CONVERGENCE OF CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS 
1,000,000 € 
EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY*AGENCE EUROPEENNE DE LA SECURITE AERIENNE  
  Germany 
1,000,000 €         
2017    COMMUNICATING EUROPE IN UKRAINE 
1,000,000 € 
ALBANY ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL LTD*  
  United Kingdom 
1,000,000 €         





NOVEMISTO VILLAGE COUNCIL OF STAROSAMBIRSKYY RAYON OF IVIV OBLAST*NOVE MISTO AMALGAMATED 
TERRITORIAL COMMUNITY COUNSIL  
  Ukraine 
        
THE WEST UKRAINIAN RESOURCE CENTER  
  Ukraine 
        
2017    CIVIL SOCIETY AND PUBLIC SECTOR COOPERATION FOR RECONCILIATION, SOCIAL 
INTEGRATION AND CHILD PROTECTION IN UKRAINE 
797,982 € 
CROSS CULTURES PROJECT ASSOCIATION*CCPA  
  Denmark 
797,982 €         
2017    YOUTH-DRIVEN ORGANIC BUSINESS CLUSTER IN BARANIVKA AMALGAMATED 
COMMUNITY 
795,754 € 
BARANIVKA CITY COUNCIL  
  Ukraine 
        
CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE*  
  Ukraine 
        
2017    FIGHTING CORRUPTION AND IMPLEMENTING REFORMS AT REGIONAL LEVEL 
729,541 € 
PLATFORMA HROMADS'KYY KONTROL*CIVIL CONTROL PLATFORM  
  Ukraine 
729,541 €         
2017    STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN FACILITATING DEMOCRATIC 
REFORMS AND INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND QUALITY OF 
GOVERNMENT 
685,805 € 
CENTRE FOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL REFORMS CIVIL ORGANISATION*CPLR  
  Ukraine 
685,805 €         
2017    ENHANCING THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN PUBLIC FINANCE OVERSIGHT 
682,670 € 
NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION CENTER, NGO ANTAC  
  Ukraine 
        
NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION NASHIGROSHI  
  Ukraine 
        
...and 1 other recipients 
2017    COMMUNICATING EUROPE IN UKRAINE 
600,000 € 
ALBANY ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL LTD*  
  United Kingdom 
600,000 €         
 
 
2017    DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES –  JOINT DECISIONS FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 
587,688 € 
HLYBOKA SETTLEMENT COUNCIL  
  Ukraine 
587,688 €         
2017    CLUSTER ''YABLUNEVYI SHLYAKH'' (“ APPLE WAY” ) 
560,000 € 
BAR CITY COUNSIL  
  Ukraine 
        
PODOLIAN AGENCY FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT CIVIC ORGANISATION*PARD  
  Ukraine 
        
...and 1 other recipients 
2017    COOPERATION FOR INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS IN AGRICULTURE SECTOR AND 
DIVERSIFICATION THE STRUCTURE OF LOCAL ECONOMIC IN DOLYNA SUBREGION 
520,605 € 
DOLYNA CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
520,605 €         





ALBANY ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL LTD*  
  United Kingdom 
500,000 €         
2017    COMMUNICATING EUROPE IN UKRAINE 
400,000 € 
ALBANY ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL LTD*  
  United Kingdom 
400,000 €         
2017    COMMUNICATING EUROPE IN UKRAINE 
300,000 € 
ALBANY ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL LTD*  
  United Kingdom 
300,000 €         
2017    PREPARATION OF LARGE IBM PROJECT FOR UKRAINE 
299,980 € 
INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING EXPERTISEGEIE*ICE  
  Belgium 
299,980 €         
2017    ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY IN THE INLAND WATERWAYS TRANSPORT 
SUB-SECTOR AND PERFORMANCE ON DNIEPER RIVER, AND DRAFTING TERMS OF REFERENCE 
FOR A NEW TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT ''ASSISTANCE FOR DNIEPER TRANSPORT 
DEVELOPMENT'' 
299,578 € 
TRANSPORT & INFRASTRUCTURE EXPERTISE GROUP -TIEG EZHZ*  
  Slovakia 
299,578 €         
2017    COMMUNICATING EUROPE IN UKRAINE 
250,000 € 
ALBANY ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL LTD*  
  United Kingdom 
250,000 €         
2017    FORMULATION OF EU SUPPORT TO REFORMS IN VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND 
TRAINING (VET) IN UKRAINE 
122,890 € 
AECOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT EUROPE SL  
  Spain 
122,890 €         
 
 
2017    CONFERENCES IN THE AREA OF CULTURE, UKRAINE 
95,602 € 
LDK CONSULTANTS ENGINEERS & PLANNERS SA*  
  Greece 
95,602 €         
2017    HARMONISATION OF UKRAINE SUBSOIL LEGISLATION, DRAFTING THE TOR FOR A NEW 
TA PROJECT 
87,200 € 
AECOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT EUROPE SL  
  Spain 
87,200 €         
2017    FINANCIAL AUDIT OF PROJECT 370128 ''SUPPORT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU-
UKRAINE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT''GFA 
19,983 € 
KPMG BEDRIJFSREVISOREN*KPMG REVISEURS D'ENTREPRISES  
  Belgium 
19,983 €         
2017    FINANCIAL AUDIT OF PROJECT 352249 PPRD EAST II; MWH SA 
17,544 € 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA PWC BEDRIJFSREVISOREN*PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 
REVISEURS D'ENTREPRISES SCRL PWC REVISEURS D'ENTR  
  Belgium 
17,544 €         
2017    FINANCIAL AUDIT OF GRANT CONTRACT 221-005; UKRAINIAN SOCIETY FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF BIRDS 
2,840 € 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA PWC BEDRIJFSREVISOREN*PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 
REVISEURS D'ENTREPRISES SCRL PWC REVISEURS D'ENTR  
  Belgium 








2018    SUPPORT TO COMPREHENSIVE REFORM OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN UKRAINE 
5,249,000 € 
CORPORATE & PUBLIC MANAGMENT CONSULTING INTERNATIONAL OU  
  Estonia 
5,249,000 €         
2018    ASSISTANCE TO THE UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL 
TRANSPORT MODEL AND MASTER PLAN 
4,699,906 € 
A+S CONSULT GMBH FORSCHUNG UND ENTWICKLUNG*  
  Germany 
        
EGIS INTERNATIONAL  
  France 
4,699,906 €         
 
2018    CONTINUING SUPPORT TO THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING MISSION IN 
UKRAINE 3,000,000 €        [CODE TJ 
UA] 
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS*OHCHR HAUT COMMISSARIAT DES NATIONS UNIES 
AUX DROITS DE L'HOMME HCDH  
  Switzerland 
3,000,000 €      
    
2018    SUPPORT TO THE STATE AVIATION ADMINISTRATION OF UKRAINE (SAAU) IN 
REINFORCING ITS COMPETENCIES IN AIR OPERATIONS (OPS) AND FLIGHT CREW LICENSING 
(FCL) 2,499,000 € 
AGENCIA ESTATAL DE SEGURIDAD AEREA*SPANISH AIR SAFETY AGENCY  
  Spain 
        
CAA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED*CAAI  
  United Kingdom 
2,499,000 €       
   
2018    ''EU SUPPORT TO UKRAINE TO RE-LAUNCH THE ECONOMY (EU SURE) ''EU SURE 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT''  2,053,650 € 
GFA CONSULTING GROUP GMBH*  
  Germany 
2,053,650 €     
     
2018    ASSISTANCE FOR DNIPRO TRANSPORT DEVELOPMENT 1,970,000 € 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 
1,970,000 €         
HASKONINGDHV NEDERLAND BV*DHV HASKONING NEDERLAND VAN HEUGTEN ENGINEERING IBZH 
INGENIEURSBUREAU ZUID HOLLAND VHP STEDEBOUWKUNDIGEN AR RHDHV  
  Netherlands 
        
2018    SUPPORT FOR PARTICIPATION OF UKRAINE IN THE COSME PROGRAMME 1,000,000 € 
UKRAINA*UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
1,000,000 €      
    
2018    STRENGTHENING CAPACITY OF THE STATE AGENCY ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND 
ENERGY SAVING OF UKRAINE (SAEE) ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENERGY PRODUCTION 
FROM RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES, PRODUCTION AND USE OF ALTERNATIVE FUELS 
1,000,000 € 
ACCADEMIA EUROPEA DI BOLZANO*EUROPAISCHE AKADEMIE BOZEN ACADEMIA EUROPEICA BULSAN 
EUROPEAN ACADEMY OF BOZEN BOLZANO  
  Italy 
        
ENERGIE-CONTROL GMBH*ECG  
  Austria 
1,000,000 €    
      
2018    STRENGTHENING THE CAPACITY OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL STANDARDISATION 




BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND*REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D ALLEMAGNE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY  
  Germany 
998,583 €     
     
2018    SUPPLY OF SOFTWARE AND IT EQUIPMENT TO BUILD-UP A STATISTICS WEB PORTAL FOR 
THE STATE STATISTIC SERVICE OF UKRAINE 899,764 € 
MEMETECH SRL  
  Italy 
899,764 €         
 
2018    COMMUNICATING EUROPE IN UKRAINE – SUPPLEMENT 500,000 € 
ALBANY ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL LTD*  
  United Kingdom 
500,000 €         
 
2018    HIGH LEVEL TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL ASSISTANCE FOR 2018 INTEGRATED BORDER 
MANAGEMENT PROJECT  335,730 € 
DAI BRUSSELS SPRL  
  Belgium 
335,730 €         
 
2018    SUPPORT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REFORM 
STRATEGY/ROAD MAP FOR HARMONIZATION IN UKRAINE 298,600 € 
LINPICO*  
  France 
298,600 €    
      
2018    SUPPLY OF SOFTWARE AND DATABASE FOR THE STATE SERVICE OF UKRAINE FOR FOOD 
SAFETY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION (SSUFSCP) - LOTS # 1 & 2 283,385 € 
PRIVATE COMPANY CENTER INFORMATSIYNIH TEHNOLOGIY BRAVO  
  Ukraine 
283,385 €         
 
2018    HIGH-PERFORMING TEAM PILOT AT THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
TRADE OF UKRAINE (MEDT) 
282,500 € 
DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLC  
  Ukraine 
 
282,500 €         
2018    ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL 
WASTE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
253,550 € 
COWI BELGIUM SPRL*  
  Belgium 
253,550 €         
 
2018    SUPPLY OF IT HARDWARE AND ANCILLARIES FOR THE STATE SERVICE OF UKRAINE FOR 
FOOD SAFETY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION (SSUFSCP) - LOT # 3 
204,802 € 
MEMETECH SRL  
  Italy 
204,802 €         
 
2018    ASSISTANCE TO THE NATIONAL SECURITIES AND STOCK MARKET COMMISSION IN 
HARMONISING UKRAINE LEGISLATION ALLOWING THE CREATION OF MODERN FINANCIAL 
AND COMMODITY PRODUCTS ORGANISED TRADING IN UKRAINE 
198,350 € 
FRANKFURT SCHOOL OF FINANCE & MANAGEMENT GEMEINNUTZIGE GMBH*  
  Germany 
198,350 €         
 
2018    SUPPORT TO CYBERSECURITY IN UKRAINE 153,600 €  [CODE SSR UA] 
STANTEC  
  Belgium 
153,600 €         
 
2018    MID-TERM EVALUATION OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED WITHIN THE 





COWI BELGIUM SPRL*  
  Belgium 
145,760 €         
 
2018    MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE EU SURE (EU4BUSINESS) PROGRAMME 
137,175 € 
STANTEC  
  Belgium 
137,175 €         
 
2018    MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE SERVICE CONTRACT ''U-LEAD WITH EUROPE 
PROGRAMME'' - CRIS REF.NO. ENI/2015/038-739 
103,940 € 
ARS PROGETTI SPA - AMBIENTE RISORSE E SVILUPPO  
  Italy 
103,940 €         
 
2018    EVALUATION OF BUDGET SUPPORT PROGRAMME-STATE BUILDING CONTRACT 
98,440 € 
AECOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT EUROPE SL  
  Spain 
98,440 €         
2018    EU-UKRAINE CULTURAL RELATIONS CONFERENCE -2018 
72,705 € 
BUSINESS AND STRATEGIES IN EUROPE*  
  Belgium 
72,705 €         
2018    SUPPORT THE STATE STATISTICS SERVICE OF UKRAINE WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE UNIFIED STATISTICS WEB PORTAL 
54,065 € 
ECORYS NEDERLAND BV*  
  Netherlands 
54,065 €         
2018    A VERIFICATION MISSION OF AN ACTION ''SUPPORT FOR MIGRATION AND ASYLUM 
MANAGEMENT IN UKRAINE'' MANAGED BY IOM UKRAINE 
16,420 € 
BDO LLP*  
  United Kingdom 
16,420 €         
2018    EXPENDITURE VERIFICATION OF A SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 2015/360-274 ''SUPPORT TO 
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD POLICY IMPLEMENTATION''; WYG INTERNATIONAL B.V. 
15,980 € 
ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA*ERNST ET YOUNG REVISEURS D ENTREPRISES  
  Belgium 
15,980 €         
2018    A VERIFICATION MISSION OF AN ACTION MANAGED BY GIZ CTR.376096 ''U-LEAD WITH 
EUROPE'' 
15,942 € 
BDO LLP*  
  United Kingdom 
15,942 €         
2018    SUPPORT TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONCEPT OF REFORM STAFF POSITIONS 
15,660 € 
HGR UKRAINE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY  
  Ukraine 
15,660 €         
2018    'UPDATE OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR WEB-PORTAL AND THE 
MODERNISATION OF THE IT SYSTEM OF THE STATE STATISTICS SERVICE OF UKRAINE' 
8,200 € 
DANSK ENERGI MANAGEMENT & ESBENDENAS  
  Denmark 









2011    EU ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION TO TUNISIA 2011 3,403,202 € 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION*  
  Switzerland 
        
2011    Renforcer les éléments constituants d'une démocratie: Appui aux partis politiques 300,000 € 
KONRAD-ADENAUER-STIFTUNG EV*KAS  
  Germany 
        
2011    Renforcer le rôle de la société civile dans la promotion des droits de l'homme et des réformes démocratiques. 
300,000 € 
LIGUE TUNISIENNE POUR LA DEFENCE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME LTDH*  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    TRANS Process: Vers une transparence du processus Electoral 267,432 € 
ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE POUR L'EVEIL DEMOCRATIQUE*ATED ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE POUR L'ENVOL 
DEMOCRATIQUE  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    TUNISIE 2024 199,500 € 
ASSOCIATION NESS EL FEN*  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    Une expression de la liberté: Soutenir les médias démocratiques en Tunisie 199,000 € 
DEUTSCHE WELLE*DW  
  Germany 
        
2011    Promotion de l'égalité à travers le renforcement de la société civile et la participation des citoyennes et citoyens 
au processus démocratique dans le nord ouest tunisien 198,640 € 
FUNDACION CIDEAL DE COOPERACION E INVESTIGACION*CIDEAL  
  Spain 
        
2011    Renforcer la place des jeunes dans le débat démocratique en Tunisie à travers les medias 185,964 € 
SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND VZW*SFCG  
  Belgium 
        
2011    Festival International du Film des Droits de l'Homme en Tunisie 155,000 € 
ALLIANCE ASSOCIATION*  
  France 
        
2011    Civil society seminar in Tunisa 129,819 € 
TIPIK COMMUNICATION AGENCY SA*  
  Belgium 
        
2011    Décryptages: du droit d'informer au droit d'être informé 116,300 € 
RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONALE SA*  
  France 
        
2011    ELECTORAL EXPLORATORY MISSION TO TUNISIA 87,074 € 
CONSEIL SANTE SA*  
  France 
        
2011    Tous les Tunisiens aux Urnes 50,000 € 
D PRODS SARL*  
  Tunisia 
        
2011    EXPERT MISSION TO TUNISIA 22,850 € 
NATURAL PERSON ; PERSONNE PRIVÉE ; PRIVATPERSON - Art. 21(2) RAP  
  Sri Lanka 
        
2011    EXPERT MISSION TO TUNISIA 18,967 € 
NATURAL PERSON ; PERSONNE PRIVÉE ; PRIVATPERSON - Art. 21(2) RAP  
  Italy 




2011    EXPERT MISSION TO TUNISIA 18,087 € 
SELF-EMPLOYED NATURAL PERSON  
  Germany 
        
2011    EU EOM Tunisia Chief Observer 14,140 € 
NATURAL PERSON ; PERSONNE PRIVÉE ; PRIVATPERSON - Art. 21(2) RAP  
  Germany 
        
2011    Formation et information aux organisations et membres de la société civile tunisienne qui participent à l'appel 
à propositions IEDDH Tunisie 2011  10,000 € 
INPROGRESS UG (HAFTUNGSBESCHRANKT)*  




2012    INSPIRED Integrated Support Programme for Inclusive Reform and Democratic Dialogue 1,300,000 € 
STICHTING EUROPEAN PARTNERSHIP FORDEMOCRACY*EPD  
  Netherlands 
        
2012    En quête d'autres regards. Réfléchir les images de la prison. 289,000 € 
LES YEUX DE L'OUIE ASSOCIATION*  
  France 
        
2012    Suivi et contribution au processus de transition démocratique en Tunisie 261,673 € 
ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE POUR L'INTEGRITE ET LA DEMOCRATIE DES ELECTIONS*ATIDE  
  Tunisia 
        
2012    Le Tunisie Bondy Blog: Une école de journalisme par les citoyens 236,987 € 
ASSOCIATION TUNISIE BONDYBLOG*TBB  
  Tunisia 
        
2012    La défense des droits économiques et sociaux des groupes vulnérables des régions de Monastir et du 
Bassin Minier (Gafsa) 218,944 €       [CODE TJ 
TN] 
AVOCATS SANS FRONTIERES - BELGIQUEASBL*ASF ADVOCATEN ZONDER GRENZEN ANWALTE OHNE GRENZEN  
  Belgium 
        
2012    Périphéries actives: Appui à la participation et libre expression de la société civile et des groupes 
vulnérables du Gouvernorat de Sidi Bouzid 206,489 €     
 [CODE TJ TN] 
GRUPPO DI VOLONTARIATO CIVILE ASSOCIAZIONE*G.V.C  
  Italy 
        
2012    Formation et information aux organisations de la société civile tunisienne qui participent à l'appel à 
propositions IEDDH Tunisie 2012 48,580 € 
INPROGRESS UG (HAFTUNGSBESCHRANKT)*  
  Germany 
        
2013  
 
2013    Assistance technique pour la formation des organisations de la societé civile Tunisienne à participer à l'AaP 
EuropeAid/134204/L/ACT/TN 19,970 € 
INPROGRESS UG (HAFTUNGSBESCHRANKT)*  
  Germany 
        
2014  
 
2014    ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION TUNISIA 2014 2,986,633 € 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION*  
  Switzerland 
        
2014    En quête d'autres regards. Réfléchir les images de la prison. 195,410 € 
LES YEUX DE L'OUIE ASSOCIATION*  
  France 
        
2014    Sensibilisation des étudiants Tunisiens à la préservation des droits de la femme et à une meilleure 





IMAGES ET PAROLES DE FEMMES ASSOCIATIO*  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    Projet de lutte contre l’abus sexuel des filles 157,731 €   [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE DES DROITS DE L'ENFANT*ATUDE ATDE  
  Tunisia 
        
FEMMES & LEADERSHIP ASSOCIATION*F&L  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    Sensibilisation des étudiants Tunisiens à la préservation des droits de la femme et à une meilleure 
comprehénsion du modèle patriarchal 132,534 €    [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
IMAGES ET PAROLES DE FEMMES ASSOCIATIO*  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    Karama-Dignité 131,035 € 
THE BRITISH COUNCIL ROYAL CHARTER*  
  United Kingdom 
        
TUNISIAN ASSOCIATION FOR MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL STABILITY*ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE DE GESTION ET 
DE STABILITE SOCIALE TAMSS  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    Promotion de l’égalité professionnelle femmes-hommes en Tunisie  126,566 € [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
ASSOCIATION DES RESPONSABLES DE FORMATION ET DE GESTION HUMAINE DANS LES 
ENTREPRISES*ARFORGHE  
  Tunisia 
        
FONDATION AGIR CONTRE L'EXCLUSION*FACE  
  France 
        
2014    Promotion de l’égalité professionnelle femmes-hommes en Tunisie 113,434 € [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
ASSOCIATION DES RESPONSABLES DE FORMATION ET DE GESTION HUMAINE DANS LES 
ENTREPRISES*ARFORGHE  
  Tunisia 
        
FONDATION AGIR CONTRE L'EXCLUSION*FACE  
  France 
        
2014    Karama-Dignité 80,204 € 
THE BRITISH COUNCIL ROYAL CHARTER*  
  United Kingdom 
        
TUNISIAN ASSOCIATION FOR MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL STABILITY*ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE DE GESTION ET 
DE STABILITE SOCIALE TAMSS  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    Projet de lutte contre l’abus sexuel des filles 71,174 €   [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE DES DROITS DE L'ENFANT*ATUDE ATDE  
  Tunisia 
        
FEMMES & LEADERSHIP ASSOCIATION*F&L  
  Tunisia 
      
2014    DROUCE - Droits sociaux et citoyenneté  65,662 €   [CODE TJ TN] 
IMED ISTITUTO PER IL MEDITERRANEO ASSOCIAZIONE*  
  Italy 
        
2014    Monitoring and Advocacy in Support of Independent Human Rights Defenders in Tunisia 58,434 € 
WRITERS & SCHOLARS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED BY GUARANTEE*WSI  
  United Kingdom 
        
2014    Exploratory Mission to Tunisia 2014 57,092 € 
TRANSTEC SA*  
  Belgium 
        




ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE POUR L'INTEGRITE ET LA DEMOCRATIE DES ELECTIONS*ATIDE  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    Périphéries actives: Appui à la participation et libre expression de la société civile et des groupes 
vulnérables du Gouvernorat de Sidi Bouzid 31,697 €     
 [CODE TJ TN] 
GRUPPO DI VOLONTARIATO CIVILE  
  Italy 
        
2014    Le Tunisie Bondy Blog: Une école de journalisme par les citoyens 
23,699 € 
ASSOCIATION TUNISIE BONDYBLOG*TBB  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    La défense des droits économiques et sociaux des groupes vulnérables des régions de Monastir et du 
Bassin Minier (Gafsa) 21,894 €       [CODE TJ 
TN] 
AVOCATS SANS FRONTIERES - BELGIQUEASBL*ASF ADVOCATEN ZONDER GRENZEN ANWALTE OHNE GRENZEN  
  Belgium 
        
2014    Festival International du Film des Droits de l'Homme en Tunisie 20,452 € 
ALLIANCE ASSOCIATION*  
  France 
        
2014    Renforcer le rôle de la société civile dans la promotion des droits de l'homme et des réformes démocratiques. 
20,000 € 
LIGUE TUNISIENNE POUR LA DEFENCE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME LTDH*  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    Renforcer la place des jeunes dans le débat démocratique en Tunisie à travers les medias 18,596 € 
SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND VZW*SFCG  
  Belgium 
   
2014    Une expression de la liberté: Soutenir les médias démocratiques en Tunisie 12,749 € 
DEUTSCHE WELLE*DW  
  Germany 
        
2014    Audit des contrats avec Alliance n° 270524 (Tunisie) et 255341 (Madagascar) 7,601 € 
MOORE STEPHENS LLP*  
  United Kingdom 
        
2014    Audit des contrats avec Alliance n° 270524 (Tunisie) et 255341 (Madagascar) 7,601 € 
MOORE STEPHENS LLP*  
  United Kingdom 
        
2014    Promotion de l'égalité à travers le renforcement de la société civile et la participation des citoyennes et 
citoyens au processus démocratique dans le nord ouest tunisien 625 € 
FUNDACION CIDEAL DE COOPERACION E INVESTIGACION*  





2015    KACHEF AL MASKOUT ANHOU (BRISER LE TABOU) : LUTTER CONTRE LA TRAITE DES 
ÊTRES HUMAINS EN TUNISIE 500,000 € 
ASSOCIACIO NOVA CENTRE PER A LA INNOVACIO SOCIAL*NOVA -CIS  
  Spain 
        
AVOCATS SANS FRONTIERES - BELGIQUEASBL*ASF ADVOCATEN ZONDER GRENZEN ANWALTE OHNE GRENZEN  
  Belgium 
        
FORUM TUNISIEN POUR LES DROITS ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIAUX*  
  Tunisia 
        
2015    ADEM POUR L'ACCOMPAGNEMENT DE LA DÉFENSE DES MIGRANTS 473,243 € 
BEITY  
  Tunisia 
        
FRANCE TERRE D'ASILE-ASSOCIATION*  




        
2015    MARSAD MAJLESS : RENFORCEMENT DE LA REDEVABILITÉ ET DES CAPACITÉS DES ÉLUS 
ET PLAIDOYER POUR UNE RÉFORME DÉMOCRATIQUE, INCLUSIVE ET PARTICIPATIVE DE LA 
LÉGISLATION TUNISIENNE. 411,990 € 
AL BAWSALA  
  Tunisia 
        
2015    MOBILISATION DE LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE DANS LE SUIVI DES RELATIONS ENTRE LA 
TUNISIE ET L’UNION EUROPÉENNE PHASE II 273,243 € 
EUROMED RIGHTS - EURO-MEDITERRANEAN HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK  
  Denmark 
        
2015    MOBILISATION DE LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE DANS LE SUIVI DES RELATIONS ENTRE LA 
TUNISIE ET L’UNION EUROPÉENNE PHASE II 226,757 € 
EUROMED RIGHTS - EURO-MEDITERRANEAN HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK  
  Denmark 




2016    CONTAINING THE DEATH PENALTY IN TIMES OF THE ¿WAR ON TERROR¿ IN EGYPT, 
SOMALIA AND TUNISIA 966,347 € 
INSTITUT ARABE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME*  
  Tunisia 
        
NE TOUCHEZ PAS A CAIN*HANDS OF CAIN  
  Belgium 
     
2017  
 
2017    THINK NATIONAL, ACT LOCAL: VERS UNE DÉCENTRALISATION DE LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE 
425,000 € 
ANA YAKEDH - IWATCH  
  Tunisia 
425,000 €      
    
2017    ''ART ET DROITS DE L’ENFANT : DÉCONSTRUIRE LA VIOLENCE PAR L’ART'' 301,131 € 
L'ART RUE SARL*  
  Tunisia 
301,131 €       
   
2017    POUR LA CONSOLIDATION DES CAPACITÉS DE LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE TUNISIENNE DANS LA 
LUTTE CONTRE LES FORMES DE DISCRIMINATION 273,869 € 
ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE DE LUTTE CONTRE LES MALADIES SEXUELLES ET LE SIDA*ASSOCIATION DE LUTTE 
CONTRE LESM.S.T. ET SIDA  
  Tunisia 
        
MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP LBG*MRG  
  United Kingdom 
        
2017    EXPLORATORY MISSION TO TUNISIA 104,298 € 
BUSINESS AND STRATEGIES IN EUROPE*  
  Belgium 
104,298 €         
 
2017    POUR LA CONSOLIDATION DES CAPACITÉS DE LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE TUNISIENNE DANS LA 
LUTTE CONTRE LES FORMES DE DISCRIMINATION 98,392 € 
ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE DE LUTTE CONTRE LES MALADIES SEXUELLES ET LE SIDA*ASSOCIATION DE LUTTE 
CONTRE LESM.S.T. ET SIDA  
  Tunisia 
        
MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP LBG*MRG  
  United Kingdom 
        
2018  
 
2018    IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU EOM TO TUNISIA 2018 2,416,659 € 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION  




2,416,659 €         
2018    POUR UNE DÉMOCRATIE INCLUSIVE ET PARTICIPATIVE EN TUNISIE 474,192 € 
LIGUE DES ELECTRICES TUNISIENNES  
  Tunisia 
474,192 €         
2018    TRANSITION DÉMOCRATIQUE TUNISIENNE, CITOYENNETÉ ACTIVE, ÉDUCATION ET 
SENSIBILISATION ÉLECTORALES 356,973 € 
LAM ECHAML ASSOCIATION*  
  Tunisia 





2014    Ensuring the protection of palliative care patients through civil society organisations working in the area of 
palliative care 
259,709 € 
RIVNE REGIONAL DEPARTMENT OF ALL-UKRAINIAN CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION ALLUKRAINIAN NETWORK OF 
PLWH*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Strengthening the role of civil society in protecting the human rights of vulnerable groups of offenders in 
Ukraine 236,918 € 
PENAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL UK LGB*PRI  
  United Kingdom 
        
2014    Joint International Media Centre ''For Fair Elections'' 142,277 € 
EA EUROPAISCHER AUSTAUSCH GGMBH*  
  Germany 
        
2014    Civic campaign against torture and ill-treatment in Ukraine 140,583 €  [CODE TJ UA] 
KHARKIV HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION GROUP*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Civic campaign against torture and ill-treatment in Ukraine 119,417 €  [CODE TJ UA] 
KHARKIV HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION GROUP*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Ukraine - EU Speedometer: Constitutional and Judicial Reforms 114,612 € [CODE JSR UA] 
CENTRE FOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL REFORMS CIVIL ORGANISATION*CPLR  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Civic monitoring of electoral processes as a means of raising electoral awareness and ensuring free and fair 
elections 
109,743 € 
ILKO KUCHERIV DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES CHARITABLE FOUNDATION*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Campaign for Fundamental Rights in Ukraine through Instruments of the International Human Rights 
Documentary Festival Docudays UA 100,496 € 
KHERSON REGIONAL CHARITY AND HEALTH CHARITABLE FOUNDATION*KRCHF  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    National exit poll for 2014 presidential elections in Ukraine 95,969 € 
ILKO KUCHERIV DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES CHARITABLE FOUNDATION*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Reaching equality: participatory approach to enhancement of equality and non-discrimination in Ukraine 
73,538 € 
SOCIAL ACTION CENTRE GROMADSKA ORGANIZACIYA*SAC NBP  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    European practices and standards for Ukrainian elections 71,424 € 
ALL-UKRAINIAN PUBLIC ORGANIZATION CIVIL NETWORK OPORA*  
  Ukraine 
        





GROMADSKA ORGANIZATZIJA INFORMACIJNNYJ CENTER MAIDAN MOMTORING UZR TRASTIT*MAIDAN 
MONITORING INFORMATIONCENTER  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Strengthening the role of civil society in protecting the human rights of vulnerable groups of offenders in 
Ukraine 50,700 € 
PENAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL UK LGB*PRI  
  United Kingdom 
        
2014    National Exit Poll for the October 2014 Parliamentary Election in Ukraine 45,900 € 
ILKO KUCHERIV DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES CHARITABLE FOUNDATION*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Joint International Media Centre ''For Fair Elections'' 35,569 € 
EA EUROPAISCHER AUSTAUSCH GGMBH*  
  Germany 
        
2014    Simplified and non-discriminatory legalisation for the stateless citizens in Ukraine 34,261 € 
ODESSA REGIONAL ORGANIZATION OF ALL UKRAINIAN NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE OF 
VOTERS OF UKRAINE CIVIC ORGANISATION*ORO CVU  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Legal support and education for vulnerable segments of population through a network of permanent and 
mobile liaison offices 24,535 € 
ALL-UKRAINIAN NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE OF VOTERS OF UKRAINE*CVU  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Preventing Elder Abuse in Ukraine 24,104 € 
HELP THE AGED LBG*  
  United Kingdom 
        
2014    Ensuring access to justice through free legal aid delivery and introduction of high quality standards 
of human rights protection in Ukraine 22,211 €      [CODE JSR 
UA] 
ALL-UKRAINIAN CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION UKRAINIAN LEGAL AID FOUNDATION*ULAF  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Empowering civil society to challenge discrimination against LGBTI persons in Ukraine 21,836 € 
THE EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST LBG*ERT  
  United Kingdom 
        
2014    Enhancing legal opportunities for vulnerable groups in society to defend their rights 21,459 € 
VSEUKRAINSKA ASOCIACIYA GROMADSKIHORGANIZACIY UKRAINSKA GELSINSKA SPILKA Z PRAV 
LYUDINI*UKRAINIAN HELSINKI HUMAN RIGHTS UNION UHHRU  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Development of legislative and organizational framework, based on international human rights standards, to 
defend human rights, with emphasis on fight against ill-treatment 20,998 € 
KHARKIV HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION GROUP*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Ukraine without discrimination: research, monitoring, mapping, education and information campaign 
14,994 € 
GROMADSKA ORGANIZATZIJA INFORMACIJNNYJ CENTER MAIDAN MOMTORING UZR TRASTIT*MAIDAN 
MONITORING INFORMATIONCENTER  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    European standards to Ukraine’s pre-trial detention system 13,526 € 
INTERNATIONAL CIVIC ORGANISATION FREEDOM HOUSE-UKRAINE*FHU  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    National Exit Poll for the October 2014 Parliamentary Election in Ukraine 11,475 € 
ILKO KUCHERIV DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES CHARITABLE FOUNDATION*  
  Ukraine 
        
2015 
 
2015    HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA FOR NEW UKRAINE 285,000 € 
CENTER FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES CIVIC ORGANIZATION*PO CCL  
  Ukraine 




2015    A NEW HOME: COMMUNITY REINTEGRATION AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT OF 
INTERNALLY DISPLACED CHILDREN IN KYIV AND ODESA OBLAST. 284,897 € 
LABOR AND HEALTH SOCIAL INITIATIVES CIVIC SOCIETY ORGANIZATION  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    INTEGRATION THROUGH DIALOGUE. A NETWORK OF LOCAL EDUCATIONAL CENTRES 
FOR INTERNALLY DISPLACED AND OTHER CHILDREN AFFECTED BY THE ONGOING CONFLICT 
IN UKRAINE 238,725 € 
ALL UKRAINIAN ASSOCIATION OF TEACHERS OF HISTORY CIVIC EDUCATION AND SOCIAL STUDIES NOVA DOBA*  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    LIFE GOES ON: INTEGRATION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE INTO VILLAGE 
COMMUNITIES 177,896 € 
GROMADSKA ORGANIZACIJA HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER POSTUP*  
  Ukraine 
        
YOUTH ORGANIZATION M ART IN CLUB*  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    MOBILIZATION AMONG INTERNALLY DISPLACED WOMEN FOR ADDRESSING 
DOMESTIC AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 160,143 €    
 [CODE GENDER UA] 
ALL UKRAINIAN CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION CONVICTUS UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
        
2015    MOBILIZATION AMONG INTERNALLY DISPLACED WOMEN FOR ADDRESSING 
DOMESTIC AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 118,481 €    
 [CODE GENDER UA] 
ALL UKRAINIAN CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION CONVICTUS UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
        
2016 (6 commitments) 
 
2016    ACT LOCAL: EMPOWERING UKRAINE’S CIVIL SOCIETY IN MONITORING LOCAL 
AUTHORITIES AND ENHANCING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN POLICY MAKING 281,732 € 
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION CENTRE UA  
  Ukraine 
        
CLOVEK V TISNI OPS*PEOPLE IN NEED  
  Czech Republic 
        
2016    IMPROVEMENT OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND DEFENCE OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR 
TRIAL FOR VULNERABLE GROUPS IN UKRAINE 259,999 €    [CODE JSR 
UA] 
KHARKIV HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION GROUP*  
  Ukraine 
        
KHARKIV INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCHES*  
  Ukraine 
        
2016    I.N.G.R.E.S.S: CSOS CAPACITY BUILDING FOR INTEGRATION, REHABILITATION, SUPPORT 
AND SERVICES FOR INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN UKRAINE 207,446 € 
ALL-UKRAINIAN NETWORK OF PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION**AUKN PLWH  
  Ukraine 
207,446 €         
2016    PROVIDING LEGAL PROTECTION TO INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN UKRAINE 
90,680 € 
DONBAS SOS NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION  
  Ukraine 
90,680 €         
2016    EU- UKRAINE CIVIL SOCIETY SEMINAR ON HUMAN RIGHTS 52,641 € 
LDK CONSULTANTS ENGINEERS & PLANNERS SA*  
  Greece 
52,641 €         
2016    I.N.G.R.E.S.S: CSOS CAPACITY BUILDING FOR INTEGRATION, REHABILITATION, SUPPORT 
AND SERVICES FOR INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN UKRAINE 46,044 € 
ALL-UKRAINIAN NETWORK OF PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION**AUKN PLWH  
  Ukraine 







2017    PARLIAMENTARY CAMPAIGN FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS AND UNIVERSALITY OF THE 
ROME STATUTE (RS) OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) SYSTEM (PGA ICC 
CAMPAIGN) 1,120,000 €        [CODE TJ 
UA] 
CENTER FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES CIVIC ORGANIZATION*PO CCL  
  Ukraine 
        
2017    COMBATTING TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT IN GEORGIA ARMENIA AND 
UKRAINE 1,000,000 €        [CODE TJ 
UA] 
INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL REHABILITATION CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF WARS AND TOTALITARIAN REGIMES (IRC)  
  Ukraine 
        
UKRAINIAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION*  
  Ukraine 
        
2017    STRENGTHENING THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL 
FREEDOMS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES IN EAST 
UKRAINE 300,000 € 
UKRAINSKA GELSINSKA Z PRAV LYUDYNY*UKRAINIAN HELSINKI HUMAN RIGHTS UNIONKI HUMAN RIGHTS 
UNION UHHRU  
  Ukraine 
        
2017    STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 
IN NEED OF PALLIATIVE CARE 284,938 € 
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION NETWORK OF100 PERCENT LIFE RIVNE  
  Ukraine 
284,938 €         
 
2017    FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR EVERYBODY: REFORM OF THE RESIDENCE 
REGISTRATION SYSTEM IN UKRAINE 240,815 € 
CENTRE FOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL REFORMS CIVIL ORGANISATION*CPLR  
  Ukraine 
        
INFORMATION CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS  
  Ukraine 
        
UKRAINIAN CENTER FOR INDEPENDENT POLITICAL RESEARCH*  




2018    JUSTICE FOR ROMA IN UKRAINE 300,000 € 
CARPATHIAN AGENCY OF HUMAN RIGHTS VESTED  
  Ukraine 
        
EUROPAI ROMA JOGOK KOZPONTJA ALAPITVANY*EUROPEAN ROMA RIGHTS CENTER FOUNDATION ERRC  
  Hungary 
300,000 €   
       
2018    UKRAINIAN CSOS FOR CHANGE: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS, 
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND SOCIAL INCLUSION OF PEOPLE, WHO HAVE INTELLECTUAL 
AND/OR PSYCHOSOCIAL DISABILITIES'' 298,946 € 
PSICHIKOS SVEIKATOS PERSPEKTYVOS VIESOJI ISTAIGA  
  Lithuania 
298,946 €         
 
2018    FIGHT AGAINST TORTURE, ILL-TREATMENT AND IMPUNITY IN UKRAINE 275,000 € 
 
         [CODE TJ UA] 
KHARKIV HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION GROUP*  
  Ukraine 
275,000 €         
KHARKIV INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCHES*  
  Ukraine 




ODESSA REGIONAL ORGANIZATION OF ALL UKRAINIAN NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE OF 
VOTERS OF UKRAINE CIVIC ORGANISATION*ORO CVU  
  Ukraine 
        
TERRITORY OF SUCCESS*TERYTORIYA USPIKHY  
  Ukraine 
        
 
EU commitments in Tunisia and Ukraine under the IcSP 
IcSP Tunisia  
2016 
 
2016    BORDER SECURITY MANAGEMENT IN TUNISIA'S SOUTHERN BORDERS, 
PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 1,193,065 €     
 [CODE GENDER TN] 
DANSK FLYGTNINGEHJAELP FORENING*DANISH REFUGEE COUNCIL DRC  
  Denmark 
1,193,065 €         
 
2016    ENHANCING INCLUSIVE AND DEMOCRATIC SECURITY GOVERNANCE OF TUNISIA'S 
BORDERS 805,016 €        
 [CODE SSR TN] 
INTERNATIONAL ALERT LBG*IA  
  United Kingdom 




2017    ''SALAM PRÉVENIR L'EXTRÉMISME VIOLENT EN TUNISIE : UNE APPROCHE BASÉE 
SUR LES DROITS HUMAINS ET LA CONSOLIDATION DE LA PAIX'' 998,001 € 
 [CODE SSR TN] 
ASSOCIACIO NOVACT  
  Spain 
499,000 €         
ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE DES FEMMES DEMOCRATES  
  Tunisia 
99,800 €         
 
2017    PROMOUVOIR LA PARTICIPATION SOCIALE, ÉCONOMIQUE ET POLITIQUE DES 
JEUNES MARGINALISÉS DANS LES ZONES LES PLUS TOUCHÉES PAR LE PHÉNOMÈNE DE 
L’EXTRÉMISME VIOLENT EN TUNISIE. 800,000 €     
 [CODE SSR TN] 
I CHANGE  
  Tunisia 
40,000 €         
INTERNATIONAL ALERT LBG*IA  
  United Kingdom 
760,000 €         
 
2017    Renforcer la résilience des jeunes tunisiens pour prévenir les tentatives de récidive et de 
recrutements par les entités extrémistes  646,442 €     
 [CODE SSR TN] 
ASSOCIATION DES JEUNES ET HABILITES*ASSOCIATION JEUNESS ET HABILITES CHABEB W MAHARAT  
  Tunisia 
40,403 €         
ASSOCIATION FORUM DES SCIENCES SOCIALES APPLIQUEES*ASSF APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE FORUM  
  Tunisia 
193,933 €         
 
2017    RÉINSERTION SOCIO-PROFESSIONNELLE DES JEUNES SORTANT DE PRISON EN 
RISQUE DE RADICALISATION 531,633 €      [CODE SSR 
TN] 
FONDATION AGIR CONTRE L'EXCLUSION  




372,143 €         
FONDATION AGIR CONTRE L'EXCLUSION*FACE  
  France 
159,490 €         
 
2017    FEMMES ET JEUNES POUR LA PAIX 320,000 €   [CODE GENDER 
TN] 
FONDAZIONE TERRE DES HOMMES ITALIAONLUS*  
  Italy 
64,000 €         
HELP CODE ITALIA ONLUS  
  Italy 
96,000 €         
 
IcSP Ukraine  
2015 
 
2015    SUPPORT TO THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING MISSION IN UKRAINE 3,199,522 € 
 
         [CODE TJ UA] 
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS*OHCHR HAUT COMMISSARIAT DES NATIONS UNIES 
AUX DROITS DE L'HOMME HCDH  
  Switzerland 
        
2015    PSYCHOSOCIAL SEEDS FOR PEACE: TRAUMA REHABILITATION AND CIVIC ACTIVISM IN 
UKRAINE 
2,232,945 € 
GLOBAL INITIATIVE ON PSYCHIATRY TBILISI FOUNDATION*GIP TBILISI  
  Georgia 
        
INTERNATIONAL ALERT LBG*IA  
  United Kingdom 
        
2015    REGIONAL EYE 2,110,477 € 
MEMO'98 OBCIANSKE ZDRUZENIE*  
  Slovakia 
        
STICHTING EUROPEAN JOURNALISM CENTRE*EUROPEAN JOURNALISM CENTRE FOUNDATION EJC  
  Netherlands 
        
2015    SUPPORT TO OSCE SPECIAL MONITORING MISSION IN UKRAINE 2,000,000 € [CODE TJ 
UA] 
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE*OSCE ORGANISATIONPOUR LA SECURITE ET LA 
COOPERATIONEN EUROPE  
  Austria 
        
2015     HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION ASSISTANCE IN UKRAINE 1,579,356 € 
DANSK FLYGTNINGEHJAELP FORENING*DANISH REFUGEE COUNCIL DRC  
  Denmark 
        
2015    INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION FOR UKRAINE LOCAL ELECTIONS 
OF 2015 1,000,000 € 




2016    FURTHER SUPPORT TO THE OSCE SPECIAL MONITORING MISSION 7,000,000 € [CODE 
TJ UA] 
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE*OSCE ORGANISATIONPOUR LA SECURITE ET LA 
COOPERATIONEN EUROPE  
  Austria 
7,000,000 €   
       
2016    RESTORATION OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND RECONCILIATION IN CRISIS-AFFECTED 
AREAS OF UKRAINE 6,994,000 € 
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME*UNDP PROGRAMME DES NATIONS UNIESPOUR LE 




  United States 
6,994,000 €   
       
2016    OSCE SPECIAL MONITORING MISSION TO UKRAINE 6,000,000 € [CODE TJ UA] 
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE*OSCE ORGANISATIONPOUR LA SECURITE ET LA 
COOPERATIONEN EUROPE  
  Austria 
6,000,000 €         
 
2016    RESTORATION OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND RECONCILIATION IN CRISIS-AFFECTED 
AREAS OF UKRAINE 3,006,000 € 
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME*UNDP PROGRAMME DES NATIONS UNIESPOUR LE 
DEVELOPPEMENT PNUD  
  United States 
3,006,000 €         
 
2016    MINE ACTION RESPONSE IN EASTERN UKRAINE 377,699 € 
THE HALO TRUST LBG*  
  United Kingdom 
377,699 €         
 
2016    FINAL EVALUATION UNDER DECISION C(2014)2336 OF 3.4.2014 38,100 € 
PARTICIP GMBH CONSULTANTS FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND UMWELT*  
  Germany 
38,100 €         
 
2016    FINAL EVALUATION OF EU SUPPORT UNDER THE ICSP PROJECT ''HUMANITARIAN MINE 
ACTION ASSISTANCE IN UKRAINE'' 35,502 € 
TRANSTEC SA*  
  Belgium 




2017    FURTHER SUPPORT TO THE OSCE SPECIAL MONITORING MISSION IN UKRAINE 
5,000,000 € 
 
         [CODE TJ UA] 
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE*OSCE ORGANISATIONPOUR LA SECURITE ET LA 
COOPERATIONEN EUROPE  
  Austria 
5,000,000 €         
 
2017    SUPPORT TO POLICE REFORM IN UKRAINE 1,500,000 €  [CODE SSR UA] 
KONUNGARIKET SVERIGE*ROYAUME DESUEDE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN  
  Sweden 




2018    BUILDING CAPACITY FOR PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN EASTERN UKRAINE 977,703 € 
CENTER FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT  
  United States 
977,703 €       
   
2018    REWEAVING THE UKRAINIAN SOCIAL FABRIC: SUPPORTING COMMUNITY-LED 
PEACEBUILDING AND ADVOCACY 953,515 € 
INTERNATIONAL ALERT LBG*IA  
  United Kingdom 
715,136 €         
THOMSON FOUNDATION (TRUSTEE) LIMITED*THOMSON MEDIA FOUNDATION  
  United Kingdom 
238,379 €         
 
2018    REWEAVING THE UKRAINIAN SOCIAL FABRIC: SUPPORTING COMMUNITY-LED 
PEACEBUILDING AND ADVOCACY 46,485 € 
INTERNATIONAL ALERT LBG*IA  
  United Kingdom 




THOMSON FOUNDATION (TRUSTEE) LIMITED*THOMSON MEDIA FOUNDATION  
  United Kingdom 
11,621 €         
 
2018    FINAL EVALUATION OF ICSP 2016/372337 RESTORATION OF GOVERNANCE AND 
RECONCILIATION OF CONFLICT-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES IN UKRAINE 42,410 € 
NIRAS AS  
  Denmark 
42,410 €         
 
 
EU commitments in Tunisia and Ukraine under the Instrument for 
Development Cooperation 
Instrument for Development Cooperation in Tunisia 
2012 
 
2012    Vie Autonome et Participation sociale : vers une nouvelle prise en compte des Personnes en Situation de 
Handicap dans les dynamiques locales de développement 400,000 € 
ASSOCIATION FEDERATION HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL*HI HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION  
  France 
        
2012    Centre femme Solidarité soutien à l'inclusion et à l'économie sociale feminine dans le gouvernorat de 
Jendouba 352,744 €        
 [CODE GENDER TN] 
COOPERAZIONE PER LO SVILUPPO DEI PAESI EMERGENTI ONLUS ASSOCIAZIONI*COSPE  
  Italy 
        
2012    Pour une meilleure participation sociale et économique des personnes souffrant de handicap mental 309,175 € 
ASSOCIATION SANTE SUD*  
  France 
        
2012    « Création et consolidation des Groupements de Développement des Oasis (GDO) de femmes et de 
jeunes de Gafsa pour la promotion d’activités génératrices de revenus par la valorisation des produits et des 
sous produits oasiens 300,000 €       
 [CODE GENDER TN] 
ASSOCIATION POUR LA SAUVEGARDE DE LA MEDINA DE GAFSA*ASM DE GAFSA  
  Tunisia 
        
2012    Radio 3R ''Regueb, Révolution, Renouveau'' 134,594 € 
AMIS AGENZIA MULTIMEDIALE INFORMAZIONE SOCIALE ASSOCIAZIONE*  
  Italy 




2014    Pour une meilleure participation sociale et économique des personnes souffrant de handicap mental 230,927 € 
ASSOCIATION SANTE SUD*  
  France 
        
2014    Vie Autonome et Participation sociale : vers une nouvelle prise en compte des Personnes en Situation de 
Handicap dans les dynamiques locales de développement 177,693 € 
ASSOCIATION FEDERATION HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL*HI HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION  
  France 
        
2014    Soutien à la création d'activité et développement solidaire en Tunisie et au Maroc 87,905 € 
UNION TUNISIENNE DE SOLIDARITE SOCIALE ASSOCIATION*UTSS  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    Centre femme Solidarité soutien à l'inclusion et à l'économie sociale feminine dans le gouvernorat de 
Jendouba 44,448 €         [CODE 
GENDER TN] 




  Italy 
        
2014    « Création et consolidation des Groupements de Développement des Oasis (GDO) de femmes et de 
jeunes de Gafsa pour la promotion d’activités génératrices de revenus par la valorisation des produits et des 
sous produits oasiens 30,000 €       
 [CODE GENDER TN] 
ASSOCIATION POUR LA SAUVEGARDE DE LA MEDINA DE GAFSA*ASM DE GAFSA  
  Tunisia 
        
2014    Radio 3R ''Regueb, Révolution, Renouveau'' 13,459 € 
AMIS AGENZIA MULTIMEDIALE INFORMAZIONE SOCIALE ASSOCIAZIONE*  
  Italy 




2015    POUR UNE MEILLEURE APPLICATION DES DROITS DES ENFANTS SANS SOUTIEN 
FAMILIAL EN TUNISIE 600,000 € 
ASSOCIATION SANTE SUD*  
  France 
        
RESEAU AMEN ENFANCE TUNISIE  
  Tunisia 
        
2015    MARSAD BALADIA : ENGAGEMENT CITOYEN, REDEVABILITÉ DES MUNICIPALITÉS ET 
DÉCENTRALISATION 600,000 € 
AL BAWSALA  
  Tunisia 
        
STICHTING OXFAM NOVIB*  
  Netherlands 
        
2015    POUR L’AMÉLIORATION DE L’ACCÈS AUX SOINS DE SANTÉ DE QUALITÉ DES 
POPULATIONS DE GAFSA ET SIDI BOUZID. 577,500 € 
ASSOCIATION SIHATOUNA  
  Tunisia 
        
MEDECINS DU MONDE - DOKTERS VAN DEWERELD  
  Belgium 
        
2015    ETUDE D'IMPACT POUR LA MISE EN PLACE D'UN CODE POUR LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE EN 
TUNISIE 89,923 € 
ALTAIR ASESORES SL*  
  Spain 




2017    PROGRAMME D'EMPOWERMENT DES COMMUNES (PEC) 1,000,000 € 
FEDERATION NATIONALE DES VILLES TUNISIENNES  
  Tunisia 
        
VERENIGING VAN NEDERLANDSEGEMEENTEN*  
  Netherlands 
        
2017    PROGRAMME D'EMPOWERMENT DES COMMUNES (PEC) 600,000 € 
FEDERATION NATIONALE DES VILLES TUNISIENNES  
  Tunisia 
        
VERENIGING VAN NEDERLANDSEGEMEENTEN*  
  Netherlands 




2018    IMPLIQUER LES CITOYENS DANS LA SPHÈRE PUBLIQUE ET ENCOURAGER LE RÔLE DE LA 
SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE LOCALE EN MATIÈRE DE REDEVABILITÉ 1,000,000 € 




  Tunisia 
1,000,000 €   
 
 




2014    Sustainable Civil Society - Sustainable City Future 245,820 € 
CITY INSTITUTE*CI  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Restoration of blacksmith art as one of the oldest elements of economic growth 229,413 € 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF IVANO-FRANKIVSK CITY COUNCIL*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Violence free: Improving access to Social Services Across Ukraine 220,790 € 
ALL-UKRAINIAN PUBLIC CENTRE VOLONTER*VOLUNTEER  
  Ukraine 
        
INTERNATIONAL CHARITABLE FUND UKRAINIAN FOUNDATION FOR PUBLIC HEALTH*INTERNATIONAL 
CHARITABLE FOUNDATION  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Back to Work: Re-integration of Parents to Professional Life after the Maternity/Parental Leave 212,227 € 
ALL UKRAINIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ASSOCIATION LEAGUE OF SOCIAL WORKERS OF UKRAINE*LSWU  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Empowering the role of local communities in decision-making in social service provision at boarding 
institutions 192,432 € 
ASSOCIATION OF UKRAINIAN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT GROMADSKA 
ORGANIZACIYA*UMDPL  
  Ukraine 
        
KHARKIV INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCHES*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Sustainable housing in Ukraine: Promoting local development and the role of non-state actors 174,127 € 
INITIATIVE WOHNUNGSWIRTSCHAFT OSTEUROPA E V*IWO HOUSING INITIATIVE FOR EASTERN EUROPE  
  Germany 
        
2014    Community Involvement in Urban Spatial planning (CIUSP) 154,975 € 
LADYZHYNSKA MISKA RADA*LADYZHYN TOWN COUNCIL LTC LADIJINSKA  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Effective government of labour migation and its skills dimensions 150,750 € 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION*ILO ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DU TRAVAIL OIT  
  Switzerland 
        
2014    Community Involvement in Urban Spatial planning (CIUSP) 138,883 € 
LADYZHYNSKA MISKA RADA*LADYZHYN TOWN COUNCIL LTC LADIJINSKA  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Energy Sector Development for the public benefit 112,960 € 
NATIONAL ECOLOGICAL CENTRE OF UKRAINE GROMADSKA ORGANIZACIYA*NECU  
  Ukraine 
  
2014    East-Ukrainian Training and Methodological Compentence Center for Public Servants 102,728 € 
LUHANSK CITY COUNCIL*LCC  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Equal opportunities in getting profession for young mother-students in higher educational establishment 
(HEE) 70,355 € 
SUMY STATE UNIVERSITY*SSU  
  Ukraine 
        




ALL-UKRAINIAN FOUNDATION FOR CHILDREN S RIGHTS CIVIC ORGANISATION*AUFCR  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Performance Budgets in Cherkasy and Vinnitsa - support for good governance and financial transparency of 
local governments in Ukraine 45,861 € 
MIZHNARODNA GROMADSKA ORGANIZACIA FUNDACIA POLSKO-UKRAYNSKOI SPIVPRACIPAUSI*PAUCI 
FOUNDATIONPOLISH UKRAINIAN COOPERATION FOUNDATION PAUCI  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Demonstration, dissemination and deployment of CCT and CCS in Ukraine  43,700 € 
INSTITUTE OF COAL ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES*CETI  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Improvement of the delivery of administrative services to the population in Kherson region 35,442 € 
UKRAINA*UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Enhancing Governance Integrity of the Lviv City Council 32,597 € 
CITY INSTITUTE*CI  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Improving the quality and efficiency of administrative services for the population of Ivano-Frankivsk region 
through cooperation between communities and the authorities 20,122 € 
YOUTH SOCIAL CENTER ETALON CIVIC ORGANISATION*YSC ETALON  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    A Transparent Ukrainian City: A reference model of e-governance for better administrative services 19,634 € 
PODOLIAN AGENCY FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT CIVIC ORGANISATION*PARD  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Promote multi-stakeholder cooperation for development and implementation of local sustainable 
development strategies in three rural communities in Poltava region 17,901 € 
POLTAVA DISTRICT STATE ADMINISTRATION IN POLTAVA REGION*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Campaigning for transparency and openness of the Ukrainian state 15,013 € 
KHARKIV HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION GROUP*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Development and implementation of public information access instruments in small cities of Ukraine 
15,000 € 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF TOWN OF UKRAINKA*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Low-Carbon Opportunities for Industrial Regions of Ukraine (LCOIR-UA)) 13,980 € 
DONETSK NATIONAL UNIVERSITY*DONNU  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Mearuring the Index of Local Self-Government Publicity in Ukraine 11,695 € 
LVIV OBLAST ORGANIZATION OF ALL UKRAINIAN CIVIC ORGANIZATION CIVIL NETWORK OPORA*  
  Ukraine 
        
2014    Financial audit of grant contract 221010 Integrating Climate Change into Vulnerable Ecosystems 
Management 10,819 € 
ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA*ERNST ET YOUNG REVISEURS D ENTREPRISES  
  Belgium 
        
2014    Financial audit of grant contract 221010 Integrating Climate Change into Vulnerable Ecosystems 
Management 10,819 € 
ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA*ERNST ET YOUNG REVISEURS D ENTREPRISES  
  Belgium 
        
2015  
 
2015    TRANSPARENT, ACCOUNTABLE AND EFFICIENT PUBLIC BUDGETING AT THE LOCAL 
LEVEL IN UKRAINE (TAB PROJECT) 1,059,896 € 
ALL-UKRAINIAN ASSOCIATION OF LOCALGOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES ASSOCIATIONOF UKRAINIAN CITIES  
  Ukraine 
        
CONSEIL DES COMMUNES ET REGIONS D'EUROPE  




        
2015    CENTRES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES DELIVERY AS AN INNOVATIVE INSTRUMENT 
OF COOPERATION BETWEEN AUTHORITIES AND COMMUNITIES IN UKRAINE 940,097 € 
VOLYN REGIONAL STATE ADMINISTRATION  
  Ukraine 





2016    CIVIC SYNERGY: STRENGTHENING PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
REFORMS THROUGH EU-UKRAINE CIVIL SOCIETY PLATFORM AND UKRAINIAN NATIONAL 
PLATFORM OF THE EAP CIVIL SOCIETY FORUM'' 2,100,000 € 
INTERNATIONAL RENAISSANCE FOUNDATION  
  Ukraine 
2,100,000 €         
 
2016    PUBLIC BUDGETS FROM A TO Z: GREATER CIVIL SOCIETY AWARENESS, ACCESS AND 
PARTICIPATION 553,514 € 
CENTRE FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH CASE UKRAINE CIVIL ORGANISATION*CASE UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
        
EAST EUROPE FOUNDATION INTERNATIONAL CHARITABLE ORGANISATION*EEF  
  Ukraine 
        
2016    STRENGTHENING THE CAPACITY OF PARENT-LED CSOS TO SUPPORT THE DELIVERY OF 
REFORMS THAT ADDRESS THE RIGHTS AND NEEDS OF YOUNG CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 
IN UKRAINE 439,173 € 
CHARITY FUND EARLY INTERVENTION INSTITUTE FOR CHILDREN WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DELAYS AND 
DISABILITY  
  Ukraine 
        
HEALTHPROM  
  United Kingdom 
        
2016    A PARTNERSHIP FOR ALL: DEVELOPING STRATEGIES FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
COOPERATION BETWEEN ROMA COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN UKRAINE: PART 1 
407,313 € 
INTERNATIONAL CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION ROMA WOMEN FUND CHIRICLI*ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE 
DE BIENFAISANCE FONDS DE FEMMES DE ROM CHIRIKLI  
  Ukraine 
        
MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP EUROPA SZOLGALTATO NONPROFIT KFT*  
  Hungary 




2017    CENTRE OF GENDER CULTURE AS A PLATFORM FOR EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN 
AND YOUTH 645,000 €        [CODE 
GENDER UA] 
KHARKIV REGIONAL ORGANIZATION KHARKIV REGIONAL GENDER RESOURCE CENTER  
  Ukraine 
645,000 €         
 
2017    ELECTORAL REFORM TO STRENGTHEN THE POWER OF AGENTS OF CHANGE AND 
SUPPORT PUBLIC DIALOGUE 628,553 € 
ALL-UKRAINIAN PUBLIC ORGANIZATION CIVIL NETWORK OPORA*  
  Ukraine 
        
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF UKRAINIAN GREEK CATHOLIC CHURCH*  
  Ukraine 
        
2017    ''WOMEN AS AGENTS OF CHANGE, PEACE BUILDING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION 
AT THE GRASSROOTS LEVEL IN UKRAINE'' 561,065 €    [CODE 
GENDER UA] 
INTERNATIONAL CHARITABLE FOUNDATION UKRAINIAN WOMEN'S FUND  




        
WOMEN'S INFORMATION CONSULTATIVE CENTER  
  Ukraine 
        
2017    JOINT MASTERS DEGREES: CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN, RUSSIAN AND EURASIAN 
STUDIES 
490,000 € 
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF KYIV-MOHYLAACADEMY*NAUKMA  
  Ukraine 
        
2017    INTERNATIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION CAPACITY BUILDING : INTEGRATED DOCTORAL 
PROGRAM FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY 469,883 € 
INSTYTUT EKOLOHII KARPAT NATSIONALNOI AKADEMII NAUK UKRAINY*INSTITUTEOF ECOLOGY OF THE 
CARPATHIANS, OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE OF U  
  Ukraine 
26,386 €         
ODESSA STATE ENVIRONMENTAL UNIVERSITY*OSENU  
  Ukraine 
41,387 €         
V. N. KARAZIN KHARKIV NATIONAL UNIVERSITY*KHNU  
  Ukraine 
38,375 €         
 
2017    SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: ACHIEVING SOCIAL CHANGE FROM BOTTOM UP 416,441 € 
UKRAINIAN PHILANTHROPISTS FORUM  
  Ukraine 
416,441 €         
 
2017    INTERNATIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION CAPACITY BUILDING : FROM THEORETICAL-
ORIENTED TO PRACTICAL EDUCATON IN AGRARIAN STUDIES 325,988 € 
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LIFE AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES OF UKRAINE*NUBIP  
  Ukraine 
40,634 €         
SUMY NATIONAL AGRARIAN UNIVERSITY  
  Ukraine 
40,630 €         
 
2017    INTERNATIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION CAPACITY BUILDING : IMPLEMENTATION OF 
EDUCATION QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEM VIA COOPERATION OF UNIVERSITY- BUSINESS-
GOVERNMENT IN HEIS 
244,589 € 
DONETSK STATE UNIVERSITY OF MANAGEMENT*DSUM  
  Ukraine 
21,219 €         
INSTITUTE OF HIGHER EDUCATION OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF EDUCATIONAL SCIENCES OF UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 
3,541 €         
NACIONALNIJ UNIVERSITET LVIVSKA POLITEHNIKA*LVIV POLYTECHNIC NATIONALUNIVERSITY  
  Ukraine 
21,072 €         
NATIONAL AGENCY FOR HIGHER EDUCATION QUALITY ASSURANCE  
  Ukraine 
3,541 €         
NATIONAL METALLURGICAL ACADEMY OF UKRAINE*NMAU  
  Ukraine 
20,763 €         
SIMON KUZNETS KHARKIV NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS*NATIONALE SIMON-KUZNETZ-
WIRSCHAFTSUNIVERSITAT CHARKIW UNIVERSITE NATIONALE D'ECONOMIE  
  Ukraine 
26,363 €         
UKRAINA*UKRAINE  
  Ukraine 




2018    ''SUPPORT TO CIVIL SOCIETY, LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN UKRAINE - 
REHERIT: COMMON RESPONSIBILITY FOR SHARED HERITAGE" 457,008 € 
CENTER FOR URBAN HISTORY OF EAST CENTRAL EUROPE  




        
DEPARTMENT OF CULTURE OF UMAN TOWNCOUNCIL  
  Ukraine 
        
...and 2 other recipients 
 
2018    MYSTERIOUS RIVNE 443,835 € 
DEPARTMENT OF CULTURE AND TOURISM OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF RIVNECITY COUNCIL  
  Ukraine 
443,835 €     
     
2018    EFFECTIVE PRIMARY HEALTHCARE IN HROMADA 441,213 € 
KHARKIV REGIONAL COUNCIL  
  Ukraine 








APPENDIX III: STATEMENTS ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND VAW 
IN ANNUAL EU HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS  
 
Statements on transitional justice Tunisia 
2014: Several independent committees and mechanisms were created during 2014 in the 
areas of human rights, administration of justice, transitional justice, and the fight against 
corruption and torture. The modernization of the Tunisian judicial system has seen little 
progress. Since the approval of the constitution, the authorities have supported the 
drafting of new legislation on military justice, detention conditions, transitional justice 
and the fight against corruption. 
 
2015: The transitional justice process, conducted through the Instance Vérité et Dignité 
(Truth and Dignity Commission, IVD) created at the end of 2014, is facing a number of 
obstacles, highlighting the resistance of some political and economic groups to its 
successful completion.  
 
Civil society is also increasingly concerned by the growing number of reported cases of 
torture and mistreatment in detention – with three cases of suspicious deaths in 2015 – 
and by the continued impunity of the security forces.  
 
2016: The transitional justice process, conducted through the ‘Instance Vérité et 
Dignité’, created at the end of 2014, is still facing obstacles. The first public hearings of 
victims took place on 17/18 November 2016.  
 
2017: Significant progress in fighting corruption has taken place, namely with the 
adoption in February 2017 of the law to protect whistle blowers and the operation 
'clean hands' launched in May 2017 by the Government. However, the adoption of the 
law on administrative reconciliation in October 2017 is considered by many in 
contradiction with these developments.  
 
2018: It welcomed the creation of the Supreme Council of Magistracy (CSM) and the 
launching of the process for the operationalisation of the Specialized Chambers in the 
courts of first instance, opening the possibility of judging cases of serious and systemic 
violations of human rights under the law on transitional justice.  
 
Statements on transitional justice Ukraine 
2014: On 17 April 2014, Ukraine lodged a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court for events that took place between 21 November 2013 
and 22 February 2014. The EU took positive note of this declaration and continued to 
encourage Ukraine to conclude internal procedures allowing for the ratification of the 
ICC statute, as provided for in the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, signed in June 
2014 and now provisionally in force. The EU has welcomed the establishment of the 
International Advisory Panel of the Council of Europe which monitors the 
investigations by Ukrainian authorities of the violent incidents which took place 






On 17 April 2014, Ukraine lodged a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court for events that took place between 21 November 2013 
and 22 February 2014. The EU took positive note of this declaration and continued to 
encourage Ukraine to conclude internal procedures allowing for the ratification of the 
ICC statute, as provided for in the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, signed in June 
2014 and now provisionally in force. The EU has welcomed the establishment of the 
International Advisory Panel of the Council of Europe which monitors the 
investigations by Ukrainian authorities of the violent incidents which took place 
between 30 November 2013 and 21 February 2014 and of the Odessa events of 2 May 
2014.  
 
2015: International human rights stakeholders, including the UN Human Rights 
Monitoring Mission, have recorded a substantial number of violations of international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law in the conflict affected areas of 
eastern Ukraine, particularly in territories not under the effective control of the 
government. The impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators on all sides remains a cause of 
serious concern and must be addressed.  
Due to the conflict, addressing the fundamental rights of at least 1.4 million internally 
displaced persons was a key challenge confronting the government in 2015. 
Furthermore, the Ukrainian government formally notified the Council of Europe and 
the United Nations that, given the emergency situation in the country, it would be 
derogating from some of the obligations stipulated in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). As such derogations reduce human rights protection, they are only legitimate 
under Article 4 of the ICCPR and Article 15 of the ECHR if certain conditions are met. 
All measures taken under the derogation regime must be proportional and non-
discriminatory and their duration, geographic and material scope must be limited to the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. Whether or not these 
conditions are met needs to be reviewed on a regular basis.  
 
In the Crimean peninsula, the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms has 
deteriorated significantly since the illegal annexation by the Russian Federation, 
particularly for pro-Ukrainian activists, journalists and the Crimean Tatar community. 
Members of these groups are subjected inter alia to arbitrary criminal prosecutions, 
house searches and in several cases enforced disappearances. During her visit to 
Ukraine in November 2015, HR/VP Mogherini met with civil society representatives 
and Crimean Tatar leaders. The worrying deterioration of the human rights situation in 
Crimea figured prominently in the EU's public communications, including Council 
conclusions and statements.  
 
Ukraine has lodged a second declaration with the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
accepting its jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and war crimes committed on 
Ukrainian territory since 20 February 2014. A preliminary probe by the ICC stated that 
crimes committed at Maidan between November 2013 and February 2014 (under the 
first Ukrainian declaration recognising the ICC's jurisdiction in 2014) 'do not amount to 
crimes against humanity', noting at the same time that 'serious human rights abuses did 
occur'.  
 
Impunity and the lack of protection and justice for victims remain a cause of concern. 
According to the reports of the International Advisory Panel (IAP) of the Council of 




demonstrations and the tragic events in Odessa in May 2014, the Ukrainian government 
failed to satisfy the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
IAP acknowledged that the investigation faced significant challenges but concluded that 
these challenges 'cannot excuse any failings which did not inevitably flow from them'.  
 
The dialogue had a comprehensive agenda in line with the established policy priorities. 
Discussions covered a range of issues, including elections, freedom of the media and 
freedom of peaceful assembly, ensuring accountability and non-discrimination policy, 
including the rights of LGBTI persons and persons belonging to ethnic, linguistic, 
religious and national minorities, and the ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC,  
 
2016: The EU’s priorities are ensuring accountability for all crimes committed in the 
course of the ongoing armed conflict.  
 
The collapse of the rule of law and public order in the east of Ukraine in the area not 
under government control continues. The most severe cases of torture, ill-treatment 
and impunity are being recorded in particular in the areas not under Ukrainian 
government control. At the same time, the Ukrainian government has also been 
criticised by international watchdogs for cases of forced disappearances, arbitrary 
detention and ill-treatment.  
 
The EU has urged the authorities to adopt a long-term integration strategy for internally 
displaced persons (IDPs), and to resume social assistance and pension payments which 
were suspended pending verification of their places of residence.  
 
Some progress has been made with regard to the human rights violations committed 
during the Maidan demonstrations and the violent events in Odesa on 2 May 2014, but 
only a few perpetrators have been brought to justice. Physical attacks against journalists 
and impunity for such crimes have declined. 
 
Ukraine has ratified most of the core human rights instruments and cooperates well 
with them. The constitutional amendments on the judiciary, adopted in the summer, 
will also enable the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), albeit only after a three-year transition period. Ukraine has issued two 
declarations accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction in Ukraine’s territory since November 
2013.  
 
2017: The human rights situation in Ukraine continues to be impacted negatively by the 
ongoing active conflict in the eastern part of the country, as a consequence of the 
Russian destabilising actions, as well as by the illegal annexation of the Crimean 
peninsula by the Russian Federation. These developments have resulted in grave 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. In the territory under the 
control of Ukrainian authorities, human rights are widely respected and fundamental 
freedoms upheld. Still, a number of concerns persist, relating to discrimination on 
various grounds, the existence of cases of torture and ill-treatment, and the lack of 
protection of vulnerable groups.  
The EU’s priorities in the area of human rights are multi-fold and include:  
• ensuring accountability for all crimes, including those committed in the course 
of the ongoing armed conflict, as well as human rights violations committed at 




• prevention of ill-treatment and torture;  
In the Crimean peninsula, the Russian Federation continues to heavily violate 
international human rights and humanitarian law, disregarding the responsibilities it has 
as an occupying power in line with UNGA resolutions 71/205 and 72/190. The 
systematic discrimination of Crimean Tatars as well as other groups openly opposing 
the illegal annexation remains of grave concern.  
 
In the Non-Government Controlled Area (NGCA) of eastern Ukraine, the collapse of 
the rule of law and public order continues. As the access of humanitarian and human 
rights organisations to the NGCA continues to be severely restricted, the humanitarian 
space shrinks. At the same time, the Ukrainian government has also been criticised by 
international watchdogs, particularly for a lack of progress in investigating conflict-
related crimes, including cases of forced disappearances, arbitrary detention, ill-
treatment and sexual violence.  
As a result of the conflict, there are approximately 1.6 million internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), who continue to face a difficult situation. The EU has called on the 
Ukrainian government to resume social assistance and pension payments which have 
been suspended for approximately 500.000 – 600.000 IDPs in 2016 pending verification 
of their places of residence. Voting rights of IDPs in local elections continue being 
restricted. In 2017, the authorities adopted an action plan towards NGCA as well as a 
long-term integration strategy for IDPs.  
Social assistance and pension payments have also been suspended in NGCA. The 
international community has repeatedly called on the Ukrainian authorities to resume 
these payments. The population in NGCA still needs to recur to court procedures for 
the recognition of for example birth certificates, which, according to UNHCR, raises 
the risk of statelessness. The investigations into the killings at Maidan and the violent 
events in Odesa on 2 May 2014 have proceeded very slowly and culprits have still not 
been brought to justice.  
 
2018: 1. Overview of the human rights and democracy situation: Human rights are 
generally respected and fundamental freedoms upheld in the area under the control of 
Ukrainian Government. The most severe human rights violations take place in the areas 
not under the control of the government (NGCA), both in the Crimean peninsula, 
which has been illegally annexed by Russia, and in eastern Ukraine, due to the conflict 
in Donbas, as a consequence of Russia's destabilising actions. The situation of more 
than 1.5 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Donbas and Crimea remains 
challenging, although some improvements have been observed.  
 
2. EU action - key focus areas:  
•  accountability for all crimes, including those committed in the course of the 
ongoing armed conflict, and during the incidents occurred in Maidan and Odesa 
in 2014; •  preventing ill-treatment and torture;  
Little progress was achieved in 2018 in the prosecution and judgement of high-profile 
cases related to the 2014 mass killings in Maidan and Odesa.  
In terms of public messages, the HR/VP, her spokesperson, and the EU Delegation to 
Ukraine have issued various statements condemning human rights violations in the 





Statements on VAW and gender equality Tunisia 
2014: Violence against women (including domestic violence) remains cause for great 
concern. In April 2014, Tunisia notified CEDAW of the lifting of reservations, and a 
new draft law on violence against women was finalized in October 2014.  
 
2015: Violence against women (including domestic violence) remains a cause for great 
concern; the government's draft law on this matter is being finalised with the support of 
an EU-funded project.  
 
2016: A draft law on violence against women was submitted to parliament in July. In 
2016 the EU continued to provide financial assistance for Tunisia’s transition through 
several ongoing and new sectoral programmes, dedicated to the promotion of women’s 
rights. 
 
2017: Noteworthy progress must be acknowledged with regard gender. 2017 has been 
marked by the adoption of important laws to promote the progress of women. The 
framework law on the violence against women adopted on 26 July is a milestone not 
only for Tunisia, but an important example for the entire region. The EU Spokesperson 
issued a statement at this important occasion. The government decision to cancel a 
1973 administrative decree has opened the possibility for Tunisian women to get 
married with non-Muslim. The new electoral law ensures an even stronger participation 
of women. The creation of a Presidential commission on individual liberties and 
equality in August 2017 is a recognition and an engagement to move ahead with further 
actions to ensure gender equality. 
 
Still, concerns on the social condition of women remain: unemployment is higher 
among women (23%) than men (12,5%) and affects two times more women with a 
diploma than men (41,5%). 
 
2018: Important steps forward included the organisation of the first free municipal 
elections in May, the presentation of the report by the Committee on Personal 
Freedoms and Equality (COLIBE) in June, and the adoption of important legislation 
relating, in particular, to the promotion of gender equality and the fight against racial 
discrimination. Tunisia plays a pioneering role in the region in the promotion and 
protection of women's rights. 
 
The dialogue on human rights focused on a wide range of areas. The EU praised the 
steps forward to fight gender disparities. Following COLIBE recommendations, a draft 
law on equality in inheritance was adopted by the Council of Ministers in November 
and submitted to Parliament.  
 
Statements on VAW and gender equality Ukraine 
2016: Ukraine has signed the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating 
violence against women and domestic violence, but the parliament failed to ratify it in 
2016.  
 
2017: protection of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and 




With regards to women's rights and gender equality, Ukraine tasked one of the Vice-
Prime Ministers responsible for gender policy coordination and nominated a gender 
commissioner. While Ukraine has signed the Istanbul Convention on preventing and 
combating violence against women and domestic violence, the parliament has so far 
failed to ratify it. However, some domestic legislation has been aligned with it.  
 
2018: Concerns exist in a number of areas, including the safety of investigative 
journalists, rights of persons belonging to different minorities and accountability, while 
some progress has been observed in gender equality.  
The 2018 Government Action Plan for Ukraine’s overall political priorities features 
gender issues higher among priorities than in previous years and measures are planned 








APPENDIX IV: PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON TRANSITONAL JUSTICE 
AND VAW BY HIGH-RANKING EU OFFICIALS 
Statements on Ukraine 
1. European Commission, EU announces more than €100 million for Ukraine to support 
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at: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6263_en.htm, accessed 4 August 2019. 
 
2. European Commission, Statement - Meeting of President Juncker and President Tusk with 
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3. European Commission, European Commission proposes visa-free travel for citizens of Ukraine 
(20 April 2016). Available at: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1490_en.htm, 
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20. Representative EEAS, Brussels, 19 June 2017 
21. Representative Council of the European Union, Brussels, 20 June 2017 
22. Representative UN Agency, Brussels, 12 July 2017 
23. Representative European Commission, Brussels, 12 July 2017 
24. Representative 1 EU CSDP HQ Brussels, 13 July 2017 
25. Representative 2 EU CSCP HQ, Brussels, 13 July 2017 
26. Representative EEAS, Brussels, 13 July 2017 
27. Representative EEAS, Skype, 27 July 2017 
28. Representative European Commission, Skype, 7 August 2017 
 
List of interviewees Tunisia 
1. Representative Tunisian women’s rights NGO, Tunis, 4 August 2017 
2. Representative international humanitarian NGO, Tunis, 9 August 2017 
3. Diplomat European Member State, Tunis, 11 August 2017 
4. Tunisian expert in the realm of WPS, Tunis, 14 August 2017 
5. Representative EU Delegation Tunis, Tunis, 16 August 2017 
6. Representative female victims’ organization, Sfax, 17 August 2017  
7. Representative female victims’ organization, Sfax, 17 August 2017  
8. Representative regional women’s rights NGO, Tunis 21 August 2017 
9. Representative 1 Tunisian development NGO, Tunis, 22 August 2017 
10. Representative 2 Tunisian development NGO, Tunis, 22 August 2017 
11. Representative UN Agency 1, Tunis, 22 August 2017  
12. Representative UN Agency 2, Tunis, 23 August 2017  
13. Representative Tunisian women’s rights NGO, Tunis, 23 August 2017 
14. Representative international NGO, Tunis, 24 August 2017 
15. Diplomat European Member State, Tunis, 24 August 2017  
16. Representative international NGO, Tunis, 24 August 2017 
17. Representative international NGO, Tunis, 28 August 2017 
18. Representative Tunisian human rights NGO, Tunis, 29 August 2017 
19. Representative 1 Tunisian human rights NGO, Tunis, 30 August 2017 
20. Representative 2 Tunisian human rights NGO, Tunis, 30 August 2017 
21. Representative regional transitional justice NGO, Tunis, 7 September 2017 
22. Representative international women’s rights NGO, Tunis, 7 September 2017 
23. Representative international transitional justice NGO, Tunis, 8 September 2017 
24. Representative EU Delegation, Tunis, 12 September 2017 




26. Representative Tunisian feminist NGO, Tunis, 13 September 2017 
27. Representative Tunisian Islamist women’s NGO, Tunis, 18 September 2017 
28. Diplomat European Member State, Tunis, 25 September 2017 
29. Representative Tunisian feminist NGO, Tunis, 29 September 2017 
30. Representative UN Agency 3, Tunis, 2 October 2017 
31. Representative international human rights NGO, Tunis, 5 October 2017 
32. Representative international human rights NGO, Tunis, 6 October 2017 
33. Representative Tunisian human rights NGO, Tunis, 9 October 2017 
34. Representative Tunisian Islamist women’s group, Tunis, 11 October 2017 
 
List of interviewees Ukraine 
1. Representative UN Agency, Kyiv, 27 October 2017 
2. Representative EUAM, Kyiv, 27 October 2017 
3. Representative EUAM, Kyiv, 30 October 2017 
4. Ukrainian expert on transitional justice, Kyiv, 31 October 2017 
5. Representative Ukrainian transitional justice NGO, Kyiv, 31 October 2017 
6. Representative Ukrainian justice sector reform NGO, Kyiv, 3 November 2017 
7. Representative OSCE, Kyiv, 4 November 2017 
8. Representative EU Delegation, Kyiv, 8 November 2017 
9. Representative Ukrainian women’s rights NGO, Kyiv, 8 November 2017 
10. Representative Ukrainian justice sector reform NGO, Kyiv, 9 November 2017 
11. Representative Council of Europe, Kyiv, 10 November 2017 
12. Representative EU Delegation, Kyiv, 10 November 2017 
13. Representative Ukrainian feminist NGO, Kyiv, 14 November 2017 
14. Ukrainian expert on transitional justice 1, Kyiv, 15 November 2017 
15. Representative EU Delegation, Kyiv, 15 November 2017 
16. Ukrainian expert on transitional justice 2, Kyiv, 15 November 2017 
17. Representative UN Agency, Kyiv, 16 November 2017 
18. Ukrainian peace mediator, Kyiv, 20 November 2017 
19. Representative 1 EU Delegation, Kyiv, 21 November 2017 (withdrawn) 
20. Representative 2 EU Delegation, Kyiv, 21 November 2017 (withdrawn) 
21. Representative Ukrainian justice sector reform NGO, Kyiv, 21 November 2017 
22. Representative international human rights NGO, Kyiv, 24 November 2017 
23. Representative NATO, Kyiv, 27 November 207 
24. Representative Ukrainian government, Kyiv, 28 November 2017 
25. Ukrainian feminist activist, Kyiv, 29 November 2017 
26. Representative Council of Europe, Skype, 17 December 2017 

















APPENDIX VI: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Information Sheet for Participants in the Study:894  
 
The impact of a changing security landscape on the EU’s support for gender justice in the 
European Neighbourhood 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. This sheet provides you with information 
about the content and aims of this study and your role in it. Before you decide whether or not 
to take part in this research it is important that you carefully read this document. Please do not 
hesitate to ask any questions in case any of the information in this sheet is unclear. Thank you 
for taking the time to consider this invitation. 
 
Name of Researcher: Elise Ketelaars 
Name of Chief Investigator: Professor Louise Mallinder 
 
What is this study about? 
This study examines the impact of security interests on European Union support for gender 
justice/women’s rights in societies in transition. It examines how the EU has incorporated 
support for gender justice in its broader security approach towards Tunisia and Ukraine. The 
main aim of this study is to find out how gender experts and activists in different contexts 
(within EU institutions or within civil society in Brussels, Tunisia, and Ukraine) perceive this 
connection between security issues and support for women’s rights in order to get more insight 
in the benefits and risks of approaching gender justice as a matter of security.  
 
What is this study for? 
This is an academic study being carried out for a PhD programme at the Transitional Justice 
Institute, Ulster University, Northern Ireland. Findings of the study will be submitted to the 
university as part of the PhD, and may also be published in academic journals.  
 
Why have I been selected to participate? 
You have been selected to participate in this study in your quality as an EU official situated in 
Brussels who has expertise in the field of transitional justice, gender justice, or EU security 
policy in general or specifically in relation to Ukraine or Tunisia.  
 
What is expected of me? 
In case you decide to participate in the study, I will ask you to give official consent through the 
Informed Consent Form. By signing this form, you confirm your participation in this study 
under the conditions outlined in the form. Both the participant and the Researcher will sign two 
copies so each of us can keep one.  
 
In case you decide to take part in this research project I would like to conduct an interview with 
you at a mutually agreed time and place that you consider convenient (e.g. your office or a 
public venue such as a coffee shop/library). The interview will last about 60-90 minutes. I 
would like to talk to you about your experiences with and perspectives on the European Union 
as a supporter of gender justice and women’s rights in a society in transition. The interview will 
specifically focus on what you consider gender justice priorities and how you think the EU 
approaches these issues at a generic level and in Ukraine and Tunisia specifically, and on your 
perspectives on the links between support for security and support for gender justice issues. 
Your and other participants’ input will allow me to understand how the EU is supporting 
gender justice in practice and what are the benefits and risks of linking support for women’s 
rights to security issues.  
 
894 Subject information sheets were adjusted to each category of interviewees. This example is an 





Will the interview be recorded?  
With your permission I would like to record the interview using a digital recorder, but you do 
not have to agree to this. If you prefer not to have the interview recorded I will take hand-
written notes. In case you do agree to have the interview recorded you can choose to pause or 
stop the interview recording at any point. Digital recordings will be transcribed in Word and 
saved on my password protected laptop and office pc.  
 
If requested, I can send you a transcript of our conversation (in English) for review, in which 
case you can propose changes or clarifications.  
 
Confidentiality and Anonymity 
You shall be made anonymous, in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. For the sake 
of clarity, and if you agree, I would like to give generic titles to interviewees in the publications 
emerging from this project. On the consent form you will be provided with an opportunity to 
indicate what you would like to be referred to. I will ensure that you are not identified by name 
in any of the files or data produced by the project. Furthermore, if I quote you at any stage, I 
will not identify you directly and I will redact the quote to remove any details that may identify 
you. 
Similarly, if you ask to go ‘off the record’ during the interview, and I subsequently quote that 
material, I will not attribute it to you personally. 
Under Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation in the United Kingdom, interested parties may 
request access to certain non-personal or generalised data produced by the project. If I receive 
FOI requests, I will comply with them but I will be careful not to release any confidential 
material. 
I will make every effort to protect confidential material, but if any interviewees disclose 
information relating to criminal activities, I may be required by law or court order to disclose 
that information to the police or prosecuting authorities. If this occurs, I will continue to refrain 
from releasing the material to other audiences. 
How will the data be stored and used? 
All data collection, storage and processing will comply with the principles of the Data 
Protection Act 1998 and the EU Directive 95/46 on Data Protection, and Ulster University’s 
data handling policies. During the fieldwork, all audio recordings will be backed up on a 
password protected external hard drive and a password protected laptop. In addition, following 
completion of each stage of fieldwork, the data will be stored in folders on my password 
protected office computer and in the project folders on Ulster University server. All stored 
interview data will only be accessible myself and my supervisors. 
The interview data will be used primarily to inform my understanding of the research themes. 
In some cases, excerpts of individual interviews will be cited in my thesis and in academic 
publications (e.g. in journal articles, conference papers and contributions to edited volumes), 
and policy briefs. It is not likely that the findings of this study will be covered by the media. 
Your anonymity will be respected in all these outputs. 
 
Are there any benefits in taking part? 
There is no material payment for taking part. However, by participating you are contributing to 
academic knowledge. The Researcher hopes that the study’s results can be used to create 
strategies how gender justice advocates can optimize their cooperation with the EU on gender 
justice issues. User friendly versions of these strategies will be shared with the participants of 
this research project. 
 




The study is funded through Ulster University’s Vice-Chancellor’s Research Scholarship. I have 
received 1250 euro by the Dutch Catherina Halkes Fund to fund my fieldwork in Tunisia, and 
1500 euro by the Dutch Foundation ‘Stichting Internationale Informatie en Communicatie’ to 
fund my research in Ukraine.  
  
Contact Details 
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, you can contact me, the Researcher 
(Elise Ketelaars) or alternatively my academic supervisor (Professor Louise Mallinder). 
 
Contact details for the Researcher: 
Elise Ketelaars, Transitional Justice Institute, Shore Road, Newtownabbey, Northern 
Ireland, UK. BT39 OQB 
Email: Ketelaars-E@email.ulster.ac.uk 
Telephone: (0044) 7495979650  
 
Contact details for Chief Investigator: 
Prof Louise Mallinder, Transitional Justice Institute, Shore Road, Newtownabbey, Northern 
Ireland, UK. BT39 0QB 
Email: l.mallinder@ulster.ac.uk 





Informed Consent Form for Participants in the Study:  
 
The impact of a changing security landscape on the EU’s support for gender justice in the 
European Neighbourhood 
 
Name of Researcher: Elise Ketelaars 
Name of Chief Investigator: Louise Mallinder 
          
 Initial 
1. I agree to participate in the study  
2. I confirm that I have read and understood an information sheet about 
the study and that any questions about the study have been answered  
 
3. I understand that I can pause or withdraw from the interview at any 
time. I also understand that I can withdraw some or all of the 
information revealed during the interview at any time, up until the point 
where results have been published or submitted to the university 
 
4. I understand that the researcher will safely store all information received 
from the interview and will treat it confidentially within the limits of the 
law 
 
5. I understand that the researcher will make every effort to ensure that I 
am referred to in the final results of the study only in the ways that I 
have given permission for. 
 
6. I agree that the interview can be digitally recorded  
7. I agree that handwritten notes can be taken during the interview  
8. I agree I can be referred to as (cross out if not applicable): EU official 
Brussels/EU gender expert Brussels /EU policy maker Brussels/EU 





________________________________ _________________________ _________ 




________________________________ _________________________ _________ 




________________________________ _________________________ _________ 
Name of Witness (if applicable)  Signature    Date: 
 
 
Contact details for the Researcher: 
Elise Ketelaars, Transitional Justice Institute, Shore Road, Newtownabbey, Northern 
Ireland, UK. BT39 OQB 
Email: Ketelaars-E@email.ulster.ac.uk 
 
Contact details for Chief Investigator: 
Prof Louise Mallinder, Transitional Justice Institute, Shore Road, Newtownabbey, Northern 
Ireland, UK. BT39 0QB 
Email: l.mallinder@ulster.ac.uk 
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